# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff, )	73C 1529 CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. )	
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP ) and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC., ) Defendants. )	COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq.

The United States of America alleges:

- This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
   3613 seeking to remedy violations of the Fair Housing Act,
   Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601,
   et seq.
- 2. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 42 U.S.C. 3613.
- 3. Defendant Trump Management Inc., which is a New York corporation, doing business in the Eastern District of New York, manages and operates numerous apartment buildings, totalling at least 14,000 dwelling units in the New York area and elsewhere. Defendant Fred C. Trump is the principal stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Trump Management Inc. Defendant Donald Trump is president of Trump transact business in New York and are responsible for the policies and practices of Trump Management Inc.



- 4. The apartment buildings and complexes managed by Trump Management Inc. are dwellings within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 3602(b).
- 5. The defendants, through the actions of their agents and employees, have discriminated against persons because of race in the operation of their apartment buildings, among other ways, by:
  - (a) Refusing to rent dwellings and negotiate for the rental of dwellings with persons because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(a).
  - (b) Requiring different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of dwellings because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(b) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(b).
  - (c) Making and causing to be made statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation and discrimination based on race and color in violation of Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(c).
  - (d) Representing to persons because of race and color that dwellings are not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings are in fact so available, in violation of Section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(d).

- 6. The defendants' conduct described in the preceding paragraph constitutes:
  - (a) A pattern and practice of resistance by the defendants to the full enjoyment of rights secured by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq; and
  - (b) A denial to groups of persons of rights granted by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., which denial raises an issue of general public importance.

WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays that the Court enter an Order enjoining the defendants, their employees, agents, and successors and all those in active concert and participation with any of them, from:

- (a) Discriminating against any person on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin, with respect to any right secured by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.
- (b) Failing or refusing to take adequate affirmative steps to correct the effects of their past discriminatory policies and practices. Plaintiff further prays for such

additional relief as the interests of justice may require, together with the costs and disbursements of this action.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON Attorney General

J. STANLEY POTVINGER
Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT A. MORSE & Ma Brashing United States Attorney

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

## United States District Court

FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK P.M.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.....

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

730 1529

SUMMONS

Plaintiff

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendant s

To the above named Defendant:

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon ROBERT A. MORSE, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,

plaintiff's attorney , whose address is 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, 11201,

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgement by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

LEWIS ORGEL

Glerk of Court.

Deputy Clerk.

Date: October 15 1973

[Seal of Court]

Note:-This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.



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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NOTICE OF

Plaintiff,

APPEARANCE

Civil Action File

-against-

No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

SIR:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the defendants, Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump, and Trump Management, Inc., hereby appear in the above entitled action, and that the undersigned havebeen retained as attorneys for said defendants and demand that copies of all papers in this action be served upon the undersigned at the office and post office address stated below.

> SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 472 1400

TO: Hon. Robert A. Morse United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

STIPULATION

Plaintiff, :

Civil Action File No. 73 C 1529

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and : TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, attorney for the plaintiff, and Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, attorneys for the defendants, that the defendants' time within which to answer or otherwise move with respect to the complaint be and the same hereby is extended to and including November 26, 1973.

Dated: New York, New York November 1, 1973

Robert A. Morse United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley Attorneys for Defendants

SO ORDERED:

BROOKIAN, NEW YORK V NOVEMBER J 1973 Coward R. Habley U. S. D. J.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NOV 151973 ★

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}
) PLAINTIFF'S FIRST ) INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS
) )

TO THE DEFENDANTS, FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.:

Plaintiff requests that the defendants answer each Interrogatory separately and fully, in writing and under oath, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the information requested by any Interrogatory is contained in documents, papers or records in the custody of the defendants, you may so indicate and answer that Interrogatory by attaching copies of such documents or papers to your answers and by indicating the Interrogatory to which those documents or papers are deemed responsive. In the alternative, you may answer that Interrogatory by identifying those documents, papers or records in which the answer is contained and specifying the location of the documents, papers or records, and making the same available to Plaintiff to inspect, copy or photograph.



These Interrogatories call for all information available to the defendants, their employees and agents, and the officers of defendant Trump Management Inc., with respect to the subject matter into which they inquire. If some of the information is known or available to a particular officer, employee or agent, and other information is available to another officer, employee or agent, please include in your answers all information known to each officer, employee or agent, and please specify which officer, employee or agent provided information with respect to each answer:

- 1. Please state the name, race and address of all persons who own stock or who have any other ownership interest, direct or indirect, in Trump Management Inc. [hereinafter referred to as "T.M.I."] and the date they acquired such interest.
- 2. Please state the date and place of incorporation of T.M.I. and the name, race and address of each officer of the corporation. Please specify each officer's duties.
- 3. Please state whether any person with an interest in T.M.I., as described in the above two Interrogatories, directly or indirectly supervises the management of the apartments owned and/or managed by T.M.I. If so, please identify the person or persons with such supervisory duties and explain in detail those duties performed.
- 4. Please state whether any person with an ownership or management interest in T.M.I., owns any interest, direct or indirect, in any other real estate development, management or

estate interest and its location. In the case of any other apartment complex in which an interest is held by such person, or which is owned by a company in which such person owns an interest, please indicate the total number of units at each said apartment complex and the number of units at each said apartment complex that are occupied by Negro \*/ persons.

- 5. Please state the name and address of each apartment building or real estate development owned and/or managed, in whole or in part, by T.M.I. at anytime since January 1, 1968 and with respect to each, please state the following information:
  - A. The date the apartment or development opened for occupancy;
  - B. The number of efficiencies, one-bedrooms, two-bedrooms, and three-bedrooms in each building;
  - C. The number of units in each building occupied by Negroes as of January 1, 1968, January 1, 1969 and as of the present time. Please identify each individual by name, address and dates of occupancy;
  - D. Please indicate the date the first Negro tenant, other than an employee of T.M.I., moved into each building;
  - E. Please set forth the number of apartment units which became available for rental, by size, \*\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> In each Interrogatory requesting information concerning Negroes, please also indicate the same information for Puerto Ricans.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> For example, one-bedrooms, two-bedrooms, etc.

per month, between January 1, 1969 and November 1, 1973;

- F. Please state the number of persons per month, by race, making inquiry concerning the availability of an apartment between January 1, 1969, and the present. Please also state the number of people who submitted applications for an apartment during the same period of time. If exact figures are not reasonably available, please provide estimates or approximations. In any event, please state the basis for the figures provided;
- G. Whether a formal, written application is required of every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made to this general policy. If exceptions are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without submitting a formal written application in the past three years, \*/ please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment. Please state how long applications for apartments are retained on file.

<sup>\*/</sup> The term "past three years" used throughout these Interrogatories means the period of time between November 1, 1970 and November 1, 1973.

If you are willing to do so, please attach copies of such application forms to your answers to these Interrogatories;

- H. The maximum, average, and minimum length of time required for the processing of tenant applications. Please state what factors have affected or presently affect the time required for the processing of individual applications;
- I. Please indicate what qualifications have
  been or are required for an applicant to be accepted
  as a tenant in terms of income, credit standing,
  age, education, family status, children, or any
  other factors which may be taken into account in
  deciding whether to accept or reject an applicant.

  If exceptions to these qualifications are made,
  please state how frequently they are made, why
  exceptions are made and the name, race, address
  and job title of every person who has the authority
  to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been
  accepted as a tenant without meeting these requirements
  in the past three years, please indicate the tenant's
  name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding
  the rental of the apartment;
- J. Please state whether credit or background checks are or have been obtained in the past three years on every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made

to this general policy. If exceptions to obtaining credit or background checks are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without a credit or background check being obtained in the past three years, please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment. Please state whether the services of any credit reporting companies have been used at any time since January 1, 1969 and, if so, indicate the name of each company and the dates its services have been used. Also, please state whether the reports are given orally or in writing, whether the same types of reports are required on all applicants, the general contents of the reports, and under what, if any, circumstances different types of reports are requested or required;

K. Please indicate whether a waiting list is maintained from which new tenants are selected. If so, please state whether there is one central waiting list for all the buildings managed and/or owned by T.M.I. or if there is a separate waiting list for each apartment building managed and/or owned by T.M.I.

Please describe the conditions which must be met before an applicant's name goes on the waiting list, how often the list is updated and the average number of persons on the list at any one time. Please state whether all new tenants are selected from the waiting list or whether exceptions are made to rent to individuals not on the list. If exceptions are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. (If no central waiting list is maintained, please state the information requested above separately for each apartment building that utilizes a waiting list.) Please list the name, race and address of the last ten tenants (if applicable) who were rented an apartment while a waiting list was maintained, but whose names were not on a waiting list.

If you are willing to do so, would you please attach a copy of the waiting lists used since January 1, 1970, including the name, address, race and date of application of each prospective tenant. In the alternative, are you willing to allow representatives of the plaintiff to inspect and copy these documents without an Order of the Court under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

- L. Please state whether a security deposit is required of every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made to this general policy. If exceptions are made, please indicate how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without submitting a security deposit in the past three years, please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment. Please indicate the amount of security deposit required and whether it is required the time of application or whether it may be submitted subsequent to the formal application;
- M. Please state the monthly rental rates for efficiencies, one, two and three-bedroom apartments. Please indicate whether there have been any increases or decreases in these rental rates since January 1, 1968, and, if so, the reasons for such changes. Please state this information for each complex owned and/or managed by T.M.I.;
- N. Please describe the method presently or formerly used to publicize vacant apartments. If advertising is utilized, please indicate every newspaper that T.M.I. has run apartment advertisements in since January, 1968,

whether advertisements have ever been run in newspapers which have predominantly Negro or Puerto Rican audiences, if so, please identify each such newspaper, the approximate frequency of all newspaper advertising and whether T.M.I. advertising now contains or ever contained a fair housing logo. If present-tenant referrals are or were ever used, please indicate whether this is or was ever the exclusive means utilized to rent available apartments. If neither advertising, nor present-tenant referrals are or have ever been utilized, please explain the rental procedures used since January 1, 1968. If any exceptions to the normal rental procedures have been made, please state generally the nature of all such exceptions, the circumstances and the reasons for them, and the name, race, address and employment position of each person who is authorized to make or allow such exceptions;

- O. Please indicate the name, race, last known address, job title, job location, dates of employment, immediate supervisor and details of the duties of every person who has had the authority to accept and/or consider and/or act on rental applications since January 1, 1968;
- P. Please describe in detail the supervision that officers of T.M.I. or other T.M.I. personnel maintain over the persons referred to in Interrogatory No. 5 (0)

and whether they have ever instructed these persons to maintain racial records or use racial codes for any purpose.

- 6. With respect to each apartment building owned and/or managed, in whole or in part, by any of the defendants, please state:
  - A. Whether there has ever been in effect a policy to refuse to accept, or to dissuade applications for tenancy from certain classes of persons because of their race, color or national origin. If so, please state why such a policy was maintained;
  - B. If such a policy was maintained, please state whether it has been changed, the nature of the change, the reasons for making a change and when the change was made. Please state in detail any steps taken to implement the policy, including but not necessarily limited to, instructions to resident managers, rental agents and other personnel.
- 7. Please state the name, race and last known address of all employees of T.M.I. employed for any period of time, since January 1, 1968, including for each employee listed, the job title, job location, dates of employment and details of their duties. (It is unnecessary to duplicate any information which has been provided in response to Interrogatory 5 (0)).
- 8. Please state whether any of the defendants have ever had a policy not to employ Negroes or members of any racial or ethnic group, or to consider race or national origin

in any manner in relation to employment. If race or national origin are considered, please state in detail all pertinent circumstances surrounding this policy. Has there ever been a change in this policy? If so, please explain in detail including the reasons for this change.

- 9. Please state the name and address of each black and Puerto Rican individual who has applied for a position of any kind with T.M.I. in the past three years, and indicate the disposition of each such application. For each individual whose application for employment was rejected, please state the reason(s) for the rejection.
- 10. Please describe in detail the nature and location of all T.M.I. rental records since January 1, 1969, in defendants custody or control including applications for tenancy, records of action taken therein, correspondence, daily telephone logs and waiting lists. Are you willing to allow representatives of the plaintiff to inspect and copy any or all of these documents without an Order of the Court under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures? Please state if any records have been destroyed since January 1, 1968, and, if so, the date, circumstances and reason for such destruction.
- 11. Please provide the name, address, apartment number, and date of occupancy of each black tenant presently living, or who has lived in the past five years, in any apartment buildings owned and/or managed in whole or in part, by T.M.I. and which now has a black population of less than 10%. For each tenant, please indicate if the individual had been placed

on a waiting list prior to being leased an apartment, and if so, for how long the tenant's name had been on a waiting list.

- 12. Please describe in detail what positive steps, if any, each of the defendants has taken to promote equal housing opportunity after being contacted by the United States Department of Justice in October, 1972.
- person who has, to the knowledge of any owner or agent of T.M.I., made a complaint, \*/ oral or written, to or about T.M.I. regarding racial discrimination in employment or housing by T.M.I., by any agent of or any person having an ownership interest in T.M.I., or by any representatives of T.M.I., since January 1, 1960. If so, please state the name, address and race of every complainant, the details of the complaint, to whom it was made, the name, race, address and job title of the person(s) representing T.M.I. who dealt in any way with the complaint and the disposition of the matter. With respect to this Interrogatory, please give all details of each such incident including, but not necessarily limited to:
  - A. Complaints made directly to T.M.I. or to any person having an ownership interest in T.M.I.;
  - B. Complaints made to the owners or the representatives of the owners of any building managed by

<sup>\*/</sup> As used herein, "complaint" refers to any information suggesting or alleging actual or possible discrimination.

- T.M.I. or by any person with an ownership interest
  in T.M.I.;
- C. Complaints made to any federal, state or local agency such as the New York City Human Rights Commission or to any local civil rights or fair housing organizations, including, but not limited to the Urban League, N.A.A.C.P., A.C.L.U., etc.
- 14. Please indicate whether any persons have ever been accepted as tenants to any building owned and/or managed in whole or in part by T.M.I. after having initially been rejected and/or after having made a complaint (as that word is used in the preceding Interrogatory) concerning discriminatory rental practices by T.M.I. or its agents? If so, please give all details of each such incident, including, but not necessarily limited to:
  - A. The name, race and address of each person whose application for tenancy was originally rejected;
  - B. The dates of original application, rejection, later acceptance and the date tenancy commenced;
    - C. The names of all T.M.I. personnel involved;
  - D. The reason(s) the application was originally denied;
  - E. The reason(s) the application was subsequently approved.
- 15. Please state the name, address, race and occupation of each person interviewed by you or on your behalf in relation to this case. Please state separately the name, address, race and occupation of any person not interview by

you or on your behalf but whom you intend to interview, or who has information with respect to any facts pertinent to this case.

16. If the answers to any of these Interrogatories are not known to you or to any of your representatives, please state the name, address, race and occupation of any person, whom you believe may have knowledge or information requested in a specific Interrogatory.

Please take notice that a copy of such answers must be served upon the undersigned within thirty days after service of the foregoing interrogatories.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank & Schwell

ROBERT MORSE United States Attorney FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Elgor S. Soldweller
ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 7, 1973, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's First Interrogatories to Defendants were placed in the United States first-class mail, postage-prepaid, addressed to:

Michael Rosen, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bollan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York City, New York 10021

> Elyse S. Goldweller ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, attorney for the plaintiff, and Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, attorneys for the defendants, that the defendants' time within which to answer or otherwise move with respect to the complaint be, and the same hereby is extended to and including December 3, 1973.

Dated: New York, New York November 21, 1973

> ROBERT A. MORSE United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

ву:

YE BACON BOTAN CAMANAME

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANTEY Attorneys for Defendants

By: Cel

SO ORDERED

Lowerd L. Wisher

U.S. D. J.

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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

STIPULATION

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and S. DISTRICT COURT ED CIVIL Action File TRUMP MANAGEMENT. INC.

IN CLERK'S CEFIC # DEC4 1973

FILE

TIDAL A.M. Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, attorney for the United States of America, and Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, attorneys for the defendants, that the defendants' time within which to answer or otherwise move with respect to the complaint be and the same hereby is extended to and including December 10th, 1973.

DATED: NEW YORK, NEW YORK November 30, 1973

Robert A. Morse United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for the United States of America

A SO ORDERED

Dated: BROOKLYN\_NEWYORK MBER 30, 1973

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

Attorneys for Defendants





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

DEFINITE STATEMENT
Civ. Action File

DISMISS OR FOR A MORE

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS! MOTION TO

Civ. Action File No. 73 C 1529

Defendants.

STATE OF NEW YORK } ss.:

DONALD TRUMP, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a defendant in the above-entitled action and am associated with Trump Management, Inc., also a defendant.

I make this affidavit in support of our motion to dismiss the Government's complaint for failure to state a claim or for a more definite statement.

On the morning of October 15th while listening to the news on car radio, I was shocked to hear that the Government was bringing an action against me, my father, and Trump Management for bias in renting our apartments. I have never, nor has anyone in my organization ever, to the best of my knowledge, discriminated or shown bias in the renting of our apartments. The news report was all the more shocking inasmuch as I had not to that point received any formal communication from the Government whatever, regarding the subject matter of the action. In fact, the first I heard about it was on my car radio the morning of the 15th.

Later that day on television news reports and the next day, on the front page of the New York Times and in the Daily News, there were headline stories stating that we had been charged with bias in renting our apartments. Again, still no word from the Government itself. It was not until the 17th that the Summons and Complaint were finally served.

I have always tried to see to it that buildings which we own and manage are well run and that there is equal opportunity for anyone to rent apartments. We have always maintained the respect and admiration of not only our tenants, but the community as a whole.

As a direct result of the Government's unwarranted and unfounded charges made public, we have suffered substantial damage to our business and reputation. As is set out in the Memorandum of Law and Roy M. Cohn's affidavit, there is no one single fact alleged, not a date, year, apartment location, not an employee's name mentioned. We cannot answer charges against us when we do not know upon what grounds they are made, and to find our name blackened in the press before we had received formal notification and had an opportunity to have a trial or even answer is unfair and unjust.

When these stories hit the national wire services, I received many calls and letters of surprise from tenants and community leaders expressing their shock and disbelief that our organization should be charged with such outrageous lies. The fact is that our apartments have the same ratio of minority tenants as exists in the community as a whole. Our organization has never discriminated and does not now discriminate.

Sworn to before me this

day of December, 1973

HAROLD LA SCHWART YOUN HAROLD LA SCHWART YOUNG ABOT 2220 County Notary NO. 3 New March 30, 196 County Notary No. 3 New March 30, 196 County No. 3 New March

Land Comme

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

AFFIDAVIT

Civ. Action File No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

----X

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

ROY M. COHN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a partner in the firm of Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, attorneys for defendants in the above-entitled action, and am familiar with the facts and circumstances herein.

I make this affidavit in support of our motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or for a more definite statement. The Government has failed to allege even one fact in the complaint upon which a cause of action could be granted and it appears certain that they will be entitled to no relief. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), a motion may be made to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Government's complaint recites the statutes alleged to have been violated verbatim with no factual allegations to support the complaint.

On October 16, 1973, the Government announced the filing of their suit in the Daily News with banner headlines stating that the United States Charges Bias. Similar headlines appeared on the front page of the New York Times. They attempted to bring

unlawful and undue pressure upon the defendants to settle this case. The Government has no facts to support the charges. If they did, they would be stated in the complaint. This action was brought to coerce the defendants into making a settlement and nothing more. The request for interrogatories served upon defendants by the Government makes it evident that this is a form of harassment and that the Government is merely "fishing" for facts upon which it can base its case. These facts do not exist and the Government knows they do not exist.

In the alternative, I request that a sufficiently full, definite, certain and specific complaint be served upon defendants so that they may prepare their answer and prepare for trial.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for such a motion and such a motion is the proper method of obtaining a fuller statement of a cause of action. Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

"... if a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. . . "

As has been set forth above and as the complaint attached hereto clearly shows, the defendants are unable to properly answer the charges alleged therein and a more definite statement of these charges should be required.

This case represents an abuse of process. The Civil
Rights Division did not file a lawsuit. It slapped together a
piece of paper for use as a press release, and only secondarily
as a court document. It contains not one fact concerning the
discriminatory practices against blacks by the Trump organization

It does not name one single building in which any improper practices were directed. It not only contains no statement of days or months, but believe it or not, it does not even designate any year. What was done was simply to copy verbatim the language of the statute, and add the name of the Trump organization, because it is one of the largest in its field. If a private litigant filed such a paper, it would be summarily dismissed, with costs to the defendants. The Civil Rights Division's conduct after the filing of this threadbare document is even more outrageous. They immediately approached the defendants to quickly terminate the litigation by entering into a "consent" decree dictated by the Civil Rights Division! This would undoubtedly have resulted in the next press release  $\operatorname{--}$  that one announcing the capitulation of the defendants and the substitution of the Welfare Department for the management corporation. Such a capitulation would have been a surrender under pressure of the rights of the defendants, who have established an efficient organization which has contributed substantially to community life on all levels for many years. It would have been a surrender of the interests of our tenants -- past, present and future -- who are entitled to the maintenance of the type service we offer -- not subservience to the Welfare Department.

When it became apparent that we would not accept this "capitulation" an amazing thing occurred. Realizing that it had no case, the Civil Rights Division served us with fifteen pages of interrogatories, asking such question as the "number of persons per month, by race, making inquiries concerning the availability of an apartment . . ." (Pltf's first interrogatories to Def. p. 4, 5, F); the name of any credit reporting company

used and the dates of their service (p.5, J); "State the monthly rental rates for efficiencies, one, two and three-bedroom apartments. Indicate whether there have been any increases or decreases in these rental rates since January 1, 1968, and, if so, the reasons for such changes. State this information for each complex owned and/or managed by T.M.I. "(p. 8,M); and "Indicate the name, race, last known address, job title, job location, dates of employment, immediate supervisor and details of the duties of every person who has had the authority to accept and/or consider and/or act on rental applications since January 1, 1968 (p.9, 0).

The reading of the Bill of Particulars which is attached hereto in effect, asks us to go out and make an investigation as to whether any of our employees had ever had a disagreement against anyone. In other words, after having smeared us on the front page of the New York Times with an amorphous complaint, the Government is now asking us to find out whether there could have been any truth to it. Our top management was never even questioned in advance of the charges or given the opportunity to show that we do not employ discriminatory practices.

I respectfully urge that these defendants do not discriminate in the renting of their apartments and that the Government's charges are totally unfounded. The complaint, which shows no facts, and the publicity which was released by the Government and has damaged the defendants was all geared to: force the defendants to compromise their rights for fear of Government reprisal.

Sworn to before me this // day of December, 1973.

MAROLD L SCHWARTZ
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-9872220
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1997

## Wajor Landlord Accused Of Antiblack Bias in City

By MORRIS KAPLAN

The Department of Justice, and we've won them all. We tharging discrimination against were charged with discriminaplacks in apartment rentals, tion, and we proved in court prought suit in Federal Court that we did not discriminate." n Brooklyn yesterday against Mr. Trump and his father, the Trump Management Corpor-Fred C. Trump, the principal ation, a major owner and man-stockholder and corporate ager of real estate here. board chairman, were also

The corporation, which owns named as defendants. They are and rents more than 14,000 required to respond to the apartments in Brooklyn, Queens complaint within 20 days. The and Staten Island, was accused Trump family has been in the of violating the Fair Housing real-estate business for more Act of 1968 in its operation of than 40 years. 39 buildings. Most are in Coney In Washington, J. Stanley Island, Brooklyn, and in Jamai-Pottinger, assistant attorney

ca Estates and Forest Hills, general in charge of the Justice Queens.

the Government contended that tion begun by the department Trump Management had re- in the last two years. fused to rent or negotiate rent-als "because of race and colon" It also charged that the company had required different Continued on Page 72, Column 2 rental terms and conditions because of race and that it had misrepresented to blacks that apartments were not available.

At the corporation's main of-fice, 600 Avenue Z in Brooklyn, Donald Trump, president, denied the charges.

"They are absolutely ridiculous," he said, "We never have discriminated, and we never would. There have been a number of local actions against us,

Department's civil-rights divi-Seeking an injunction to halt sion, termed the suit the second alleged discriminatory practises, major rental discrimination ac-

> The first involved Samuel J. Lefrak, one of the country's

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1973

## U.S. Accuses Major Landlord of Bias

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5 fifty black families were assisted in moving into predominantly white buildings.

Department had charged racial discrimination in the renting of 21,000 Lefrak-controlled apartments in 150 buildings in Gity had filed complaints against the Lefrak Organization, called the agreement "agrent disappointment" to numerous other blacks and Puerton batween the Justice Department Richard to procupancy by blacks and Puerton hibit discrimination in apart-Ricans has risen "substantial volunger Trump. A two-bed-ment rentals, and subsequently ly" at Lefrak buildings since room rental is about \$2500.

DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1973

# .S. Suit Against Trump

By ROBERT KAPPSTATTER

Charging discrimination against blacks, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil suit yesterday against the Trump Management Corp., which owns and operates more than 14,000 apartments in Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island.

more than 14,000 apartments
The suit charges specifically
that the firm refused to rent or
negotiate renting units with
blacks; that it required different
rental terms and conditions because of race, and that it misrepresented to blacks that apartments were not available. The
suit asks Brooklyn Federal Court
to order the alleged discrimination ended.
Named as defendants in the

tion ended.

Named as defendants in the suit, beside the firm, were Donald Trump, president and his father Fred, the principal stockholder and chairman of the board. The Trumps, who own and operate 39 apartment buildings, most of them in Coney Island, Januaica Estates and Porest Hills, were charged with violating the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

#### Second Such Action

Donald Trump flatly denied the charges yesterday, statings They are absolutely ridiculous. We never have discriminated and we never would."

The suit was the second major Attorneys for the firm, whose rental-discrimination action in the main office is at 600 Avenue Z,

metropolitan area filed by the department in the last two years. The first, against Life Realty, an arm of the Samuel Lefrak organization, ended with a consent decree in which the firm agreed to seek more with the period

decree in which the firm agreed to rent more units to members of minority groups.

Announcing the filing of the suit in Washington, J. Stanley Pottinger, the assistant attorney general in charge of the civil rights division, said the Trump case was originally referred to his office by the New York City Human Rights Commission.

"We've Won Them All"

It was based in part he said.

"We've Won Them All"

It was based in part, he said, on allegations made by Operation Open City, an affiliate of the Urban League.

The younger Trump said "There have been a number of local actions against us and we've won them all. We were charged with discrimination and ve proved in court that we did not discriminate."

Attorneys for the firm whose



Fred Trump

Brooklyn, have 60 days to answer the charges made by the governIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

V.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST

TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT.

TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS

TO THE DEFENDANTS, FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.:

Plaintiff requests that the defendants answer each
Interrogatory separately and fully, in writing and under
oath, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. If the information requested by any Interrogatory is contained in documents, papers or records in the
custody of the defendants, you may so indicate and answer
that Interrogatory by attaching copies of such documents or
papers to your answers and by indicating the Interrogatory to
which those documents or papers are deemed responsive. In
the alternative, you may answer that Interrogatory by identifying those documents, papers or records in which the answer is
contained and specifying the location of the documents, papers
or records, and making the same available to Plaintiff to inspect,
copy or photograph.

These Interrogatories call for all information available to the defendants, their employees and agents, and the officers of defendant Trump Management Inc., with respect to the subject matter into which they inquire. If some of the information is known or available to a particular officer, employee or agent, and other information is available to another officer, employee or agent, please include in your answers all information known to each officer, employee or agent, and please specify which officer, employee or agent provided information with respect to each answer:

- 1. Please state the name, race and address of all persons who own stock or who have any other ownership interest, direct or indirect, in Trump Management Inc. [hereinafter referred to as "T.M.I."] and the date they acquired such interest.
- 2. Please state the date and place of incorporation of T.M.I. and the name, race and address of each officer of the corporation. Please specify each officer's duties.
- 3. Please state whether any person with an interest in T.M.I., as described in the above two Interrogatories, directly or indirectly supervises the management of the apartments owned and/or managed by T.M.I. If so, please identify the person or persons with such supervisory duties and explain in detail those duties performed.
- 4. Please state whether any person with an ownership or management interest in T.M.I., owns any interest, direct or indirect, in any other real estate development, management or

promotion company. If so, please identify each such real estate interest and its location. In the case of any other apartment complex in which an interest is held by such person, or which is owned by a company in which such person owns an interest, please indicate the total number of units at each said apartment complex and the number of units at each said apartment complex that are occupied by Negro \*/ persons.

- 5. Please state the name and address of each apartment building or real estate development owned and/or managed, in whole or in part, by T.M.I. at anytime since January 1, 1968 and with respect to each, please state the following information:
  - A. The date the apartment or development opened for occupancy;
  - B. The number of efficiencies, one-bedrooms, two-bedrooms, and three-bedrooms in each building;
  - C. The number of units in each building occupied by Negroes as of January 1, 1968, January 1, 1969 and as of the present time. Please identify each individual by name, address and dates of occupancy;
  - D. Please indicate the date the first Negro tenant, other than an employee of T.M.I., moved into each building;
  - E. Please set forth the number of apartment units which became available for rental, by size, \*\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> In each Interrogatory requesting information concerning Negroe please also indicate the same information for Puerto Ricans.

\*\*/ For example, one-bedrooms, two-bedrooms, etc.

per month, between January 1, 1969 and November 1, 1973;

- F. Please state the number of persons per month, by race, making inquiry concerning the availability of an apartment between January 1, 1969, and the present. Please also state the number of people who submitted applications for an apartment during the same period of time. If exact figures are not reasonably available, please provide estimates or approximations. In any event, please state the basis for the figures provided;
- G. Whether a formal, written application is required of every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made to this general policy. If exceptions are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without submitting a formal written application in the past three years, \*/ please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment. Please state how long applications for apartments are retained on file.

<sup>\*/</sup> The term "past three years" used throughout these Interrogatories means the period of time between November 1, 1970 and November 1, 1973.

If you are willing to do so, please attach copies of such application forms to your answers to these Interrogatories;

- H. The maximum, average, and minimum length of time required for the processing of tenant applications. Please state what factors have affected or presently affect the time required for the processing of individual applications;
- I. Please indicate what qualifications have been or are required for an applicant to be accepted as a tenant in terms of income, credit standing, age, education, family status, children, or any other factors which may be taken into account in deciding whether to accept or reject an applicant. If exceptions to these qualifications are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without meeting these requirements in the past three years, please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment;
- J. Please state whether credit or background checks are or have been obtained in the past three years on every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made

Please describe the conditions which must be met before an applicant's name goes on the waiting list, how often the list is updated and the average number of persons on the list at any one time. Please state whether all new tenants are selected from the waiting list or whether exceptions are made to rent to individuals not on the list. If exceptions are made, please state how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. (If no central waiting list is maintained, please state the information requested above separately for each apartment building that utilizes a waiting list.) Please list the name, race and address of the last ten tenants (if applicable) who were rented an apartment while a waiting list was maintained, but whose names were not on a waiting list.

If you are willing to do so, would you please attach a copy of the waiting lists used since January 1, 1970, including the name, address, race and date of application of each prospective tenant. In the alternative, are you willing to allow representatives of the plaintiff to inspect and copy these documents without an Order of the Court under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

L. Please state whether a security deposit is required of every prospective tenant and, if so, whether any exceptions are made to this general policy. If exceptions are made, please indicate how frequently they are made, why exceptions are made and the name, race, address and job title of every person who has the authority to make these exceptions. If any applicant has been accepted as a tenant without submitting a security deposit in the past three years, please indicate the tenant's name, race, address and the circumstances surrounding the rental of the apartment. Please indicate the amount of security deposit required and whether it is required the time of application or whether it may be submitted subsequent to the formal application;

M. Please state the monthly rental rates for efficiencies, one, two and three-bedroom apartments. Please indicate whether there have been any increases or decreases in these rental rates since January 1, 1968, and, if so, the reasons for such changes. Please state this information for each complex owned and/or managed by T.M.I.;

N. Please describe the method presently or formerly used to publicize vacant apartments. If advertising is utilized, please indicate every newspaper that T.M.I. has run apartment advertisements in since January, 1968,

whether advertisements have ever been run in newspapers which have predominantly Negro or Puerto Rican audiences, if so, please identify each such newspaper, the approximate frequency of all newspaper advertising and whether T.M.I. advertising now contains or ever contained a fair housing logo. If present-tenant referrals are or were ever used, please indicate whether this is or was ever the exclusive means utilized to rent available apartments. If neither advertising, nor present-tenant referrals are or have ever been utilized. please explain the rental procedures used since January 1, 1968. If any exceptions to the normal rental procedures have been made, please state generally the nature of all such exceptions, the circumstances and the reasons for them, and the name, race, address and employment position of each person who is authorized to make or allow such exceptions;

- O. Please indicate the name, race, last known address, job title, job location, dates of employment, immediate supervisor and details of the duties of every person who has had the authority to accept and/or consider and/or act on rental applications since January 1, 1968;
- P. Please describe in detail the supervision that officers of T.M.I. or other T.M.I. personnel maintain over the persons referred to in Interrogatory No. 5 (0)

and whether they have ever instructed these persons to maintain racial records or use racial codes for any purpose.

- 6. With respect to each apartment building owned and/or managed, in whole or in part, by any of the defendants, please state:
  - A. Whether there has ever been in effect a policy to refuse to accept, or to dissuade applications for tenancy from certain classes of persons because of their race, color or national origin. If so, please state why such a policy was maintained;
  - B. If such a policy was maintained, please state whether it has been changed, the nature of the change, the reasons for making a change and when the change was made. Please state in detail any steps taken to implement the policy, including but not necessarily limited to, instructions to resident managers, rental agents and other personnel.
- 7. Please state the name, race and last known address of all employees of T.M.I. employed for any period of time, since January 1, 1968, including for each employee listed, the job title, job location, dates of employment and details of their duties. (It is unnecessary to duplicate any information which has been provided in response to Interrogatory 5 (0)).
- 8. Please state whether any of the defendants have ever had a policy not to employ Negroes or members of any racial or ethnic group, or to consider race or national origin

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in any manner in relation to employment. If race or national origin are considered, please state in detail all pertinent circumstances surrounding this policy. Has there ever been a change in this policy? If so, please explain in detail including the reasons for this change.

- 9. Please state the name and address of each black and Puerto Rican individual who has applied for a position of any kind with T.M.I. in the past three years, and indicate the disposition of each such application. For each individual whose application for employment was rejected, please state the reason(s) for the rejection.
- of all T.M.I. rental records since January 1, 1969, in defendants custody or control including applications for tenancy, records of action taken therein, correspondence, daily telephone logs and waiting lists. Are you willing to allow representatives of the plaintiff to inspect and copy any or all of these documents without an Order of the Court under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures? Please state if any records have been destroyed since January 1, 1968, and, if so, the date, circumstances and reason for such destruction.
- 11. Please provide the name, address, apartment number, and date of occupancy of each black tenant presently living, or who has lived in the past five years, in any apartment buildings owned and/or managed in whole or in part, by T.M.I. and which now has a black population of less than 10%. For each tenant, please indicate if the individual had been placed

on a waiting list prior to being leased an apartment, and if so, for how long the tenant's name had been on a waiting list.

- 12. Please describe in detail what positive steps, if any, each of the defendants has taken to promote equal housing opportunity after being contacted by the United States Department of Justice in October, 1972.
- person who has, to the knowledge of any owner or agent of T.M.I., made a complaint, \*/ oral or written, to or about T.M.I. regarding racial discrimination in employment or housing by T.M.I., by any agent of or any person having an ownership interest in T.M.I., or by any representatives of T.M.I., since January 1, 1960. If so, please state the name, address and race of every complainant, the details of the complaint, to whom it was made, the name, race, address and job title of the person(s) representing T.M.I. who dealt in any way with the complaint and the disposition of the matter. With respect to this Interrogatory, please give all details of each such incident including, but not necessarily limited to:
  - A. Complaints made directly to T.M.I. or to any person having an ownership interest in T.M.I.;
  - B. Complaints made to the owners or the representatives of the owners of any building managed by

<sup>\*/</sup> As used herein, "complaint" refers to any information suggesting or alleging actual or possible discrimination.

T.M.I. or by any person with an ownership interest in T.M.I.;

- C. Complaints made to any federal, state or local agency such as the New York City Human Rights

  Commission or to any local civil rights or fair housing organizations, including, but not limited to the Urban League, N.A.A.C.P., A.C.L.U., etc.
- accepted as tenants to any building owned and/or managed in whole or in part by T.M.I. after having initially been rejected and/or after having made a complaint (as that word is used in the preceding Interrogatory) concerning discriminatory rental practices by T.M.I. or its agents? If so, please give all details of each such incident, including, but not necessarily limited to:
  - A. The name, race and address of each person whose application for tenancy was originally rejected;
  - B. The dates of original application, rejection,later acceptance and the date tenancy commenced;
    - C. The names of all T.M.I. personnel involved;
  - D. The reason(s) the application was originally denied;
  - E. The reason(s) the application was subsequently approved.
- 15. Please state the name, address, race and occupation of each person interviewed by you or on your behalf in relation to this case. Please state separately the name, address, race and occupation of any person not interview by

you or on your behalf but whom you intend to interview, or who has information with respect to any facts pertinent to this case.

16. If the answers to any of these Interrogatories are not known to you or to any of your representatives, please state the name, address, race and occupation of any person, whom you believe may have knowledge or information requested in a specific Interrogatory.

Please take notice that a copy of such answers must be served upon the undersigned within thirty days after service of the foregoing interrogatories.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT MORSE United States Attorney FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 7, 1973, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's First Interrogatories to Defendants were placed in the United States first-class mail, postage-prepaid, addressed to:

Michael Rosen, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bollan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York City, New York 10021

> Elyse & Daldweller ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

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FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

738 1529

Plaintiff

SUMMONS

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendant s

To the above named Defendant :

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon ROBERT A. MORSE, United . States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,

plaintiff's attorney , whose address is 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, 11201,

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgement by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

LEWIS ORGEL

Clerk of Court.

Deputy Clerk.

Date: October 15, 1973

[Seal of Court]

EXH D

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED	STATES	of	AMERICA,	
			-	

Plaintiff,

730 1529

CIVIL ACTION NO.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq.

The United States of America alleges:

- 1. This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

  3613 seeking to remedy violations of the Fair Housing Act,

  Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601,

  et seq.
- 2. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 42 U.S.C. 3613.
- York corporation, doing business in the Eastern District of New York, manages and operates numerous apartment buildings, totalling at least 14,000 dwelling units in the New York area and elsewhere. Defendant Fred C. Trump is the principal stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Trump Management Inc. Defendant Donald Trump is president of Trump transact business in New York and are responsible for the policies and practices of Trump Management Inc.

- 4. The apartment buildings and complexes managed by Trump Management Inc. are dwellings within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 3602(b).
- 5. The defendants, through the actions of their agents and employees, have discriminated against persons because of race in the operation of their apartment buildings, among other ways, by:
  - (a) Refusing to rent dwellings and negotiate for the rental of dwellings with persons because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(a).
  - (b) Requiring different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of dwellings because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(b) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(b).
  - (c) Making and causing to be made statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation and discrimination based on race and color in violation of Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(c).
  - (d) Representing to persons because of race and color that dwellings are not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings are in fact so available, in violation of Section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(d).

- 6. The defendants' conduct described in the preceding paragraph constitutes:
  - (a) A pattern and practice of resistance by the defendants to the full enjoyment of rights secured by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq; and
  - (b) A denial to groups of persons of rights granted by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., which denial raises an issue of general public importance.

WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays that the Court enter an Order enjoining the defendants, their employees, agents, and successors and all those in active concert and participation with any of them, from:

- (a) Discriminating against any person on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin, with respect to any right secured by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.
- (b) Failing or refusing to take adequate affirmative steps to correct the effects of their past discriminatory policies and practices. Plaintiff further prays for such

additional relief as the interests of justice may require, together with the costs and disbursements of this action.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON Attorney General

STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT A. MORSE & &

United States Attorney

Frenk E. Khwell

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Flyse & Colourbe

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DEC 12 1973

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

MOTION TOMDISMISS Civ. Action File No.

73 C 1529

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will move before United States District Judge NEAHER , at Room 7, in the CADMAN PLAZA
United States Courthouse, Feley Square, New York, New York, on the 1714 day of December, 1974, at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard for an order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or for a more definite statement and for such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in the premises.

This motion is based upon this notice, the affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy M. Cohn, sworn to the iday of December, 1973, and upon all the pleadings and proceedings heretofore had herein.

Yours, etc.,

TO: United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for the United States

of America 225 Cadman Plaza East New York, New York

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley Attorneys for Defendants

Roy M. Cohn

39 East 68th Street

New York, New York 10021

(212) 472 1400



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

-against-

Civ. Action File No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.

Defendants in the above entitled cause hereby separately and severally move the Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States that the plaintiff be ordered to furnish a more definite statement with respect to matters alleged in the Complaint herein in each of the following particulars:

- 1. That with respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 5, page 2 of the complaint plaintiff be required to state the facts supporting their conclusion that defendants violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(a), (b), (c) and (d) in the following respects:
  - (a) name the employees and agents alleged to have carried out the discrimination for the defendants;
  - (b) the exact addresses and locations of the apartment building at which the alleged discrimination occurred;
  - (c) the parties to the alleged discrimination;
  - (d) the time, giving exact dates, that the alleged discrimination occurred.

- 2. That with respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 6 page 3 in the complaint, that the plaintiff be required to state the facts supporting the allegations contained in paragraph SIXTH in the following respects:
  - (a) name the employees and agents alleged to have carried out the discrimination for the defendants;
  - (b) the exact addresses and locations of the apartment building at which the alleged discrimination occurred;
  - (c) the parties to the alleged discrimination;
  - (d) the time, giving exact dates, that the alleged discrimination occurred.

Dated: New York, New York
December 7, 1973

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 472-1400

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

Civ. Action File

No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS GOVERNMENT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP RULE 12

### Preliminary Statement

The Government on or about October 15, 1973, served a summons and complaint upon the defendants. No answer has yet been made. The complaint, which contains six paragraphs, asks for an injunction pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, but states absolutely no facts upon which the injunction might be granted. There is simply a recitation of the statutes alleged to have been violated. Nowhere in the complaint is there one date, not even a year, nor one address where the alleged violations occurred, not one employee's name who is alleged to have committed the violations. It is for these reasons that no answer can be given and that the defendants are

making this motion to dismiss the complaint. The Government is obviously seeking to have the defendants sign a consent decree by harassing them through unfair and undue publicity. In fact, even before the summons and complaint were served upon defendants, the media publicized nationally news of the charges against defendants. (See affidavit of Donald Trump.) They have even sent to defendants' attorneys a sample consent decree. It is extremely questionable how the Government can enter into any agreement with the defendants when it is apparent that they do not know upon what facts the alleged violations occurred.

The defendants are a large management company and operate buildings in many areas of the city, especially Brooklyn and Queens. The buildings are filled with tenants of many races and nationalities. No attempt whatever to screen prospective tenants according to any racial or religious lines is made. The buildings as a rule are filled with roughly the same percentages of races and religions as the communities in which these buildings are located.

An examination of the complaint immediately discloses that the Government has no facts and knows of no facts to support their complaint. It is completely void of any information which would enable the defendants

to supply an answer or to properly respond.

# <u>Issues</u>

There are two issues presented to this Court.

(1) Whether the Government's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)-(6) because of action upon which relief might be granted, and (2) whether a more definite statement should be required pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(e).

#### POINT I.

# MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM SHOULD BE GRANTED

The Government has failed to state a claim upon which a judgment might be rendered and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6), where the claim has not been adequately stated in the complaint it should be dismissed. In the Government's complaint there are no facts and the allegations are nothing more than "sweeping legal conclusions."

In <u>Pauling</u> v. <u>McElroy</u>, C.A. 1960, 278 F.2d 252, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 372, cert. denied 81 S. Ct. 61, 364 U.S. 835, 5 L. Ed. 2d 60, the Court held that they would not accept "sweeping legal conclusions in the form of factual allegations." In the instant case the Government has not even attempted to make these factual allegations but has relied upon restating the sections of the Fair Housing Law alleged to have been violated. The principal was adopted in <u>McCleneghan</u> v. <u>Union Stock Yards Co.</u> of Omaha (8 Cir. 1962), 298 F.2d 659:

"For the purpose of the motions to dismiss we are to regard as admitted the well pleaded facts of the complaint.... This admission 'does not, of course, embrace sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.' ... Furthermore, a general allegation of conspiracy without a statement of facts constituting that conspiracy, is only an allegation of a legal conclusion and is insufficient to constitute a cause of action. . "

See also Stewart v. Havelone, D.C. Neb. 1968, 283 F. Supp. 842, Blackburn v. Fish University, C.A. 6th 1971, 443 F.2d 121; Atlanta Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., D.C. Ga. 1972, 338 F. Supp. 1039.

The Government's failure to state even one fact in support of their allegations is really a bald statement that they may have some type of valid claim against defendants and this the courts have held is insufficient. When the complaint contains nothing but a series of broad conclusory statements the complaint should be dismissed. Thurston v. Setab Computer Institute, D.C.N.Y. 1969, 48 F.R.D. 134, Jackson v. Nelson, C.A. 9th 1968, 405 F.2d 872.

In <u>Huey v. Barloga</u>, D.C. III. 1967, 277 F. Supp. 864, 871, the Court held that a complaint failed to state a civil rights claim, stating that "although pleadings are given a liberal construction in the federal courts, the rules contemplate some factual statement in support of the claim. General allegations of this kind unsupported by any factual statements have usually been rejected as insufficient. <u>Huey v. Barloga</u>, <u>supra</u>. In <u>Stewart v. Havelone</u>, <u>supra</u>, the Court similarly held that a general allegation of conspiracy without a statement of the facts constituting that conspiracy is only an allegation of a legal conclusion and is insufficient to constitute a claim for relief.

We are presented here with no facts to support the Government's allegations and therefore the complaint should be dismissed.

#### POINT II.

### A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT IS REQUIRED

The courts have consistently held that Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite statement should be granted when the broad allegations of plaintiff's complaint will permit the Government to conduct a fishing expedition among defendant's records for evidence of misconduct. Cope v. Fuyn Engineering Co., D.C. Pa. 1949, 8 F.R.D. 620.

The allegations herein are extremely vague and sketchy and there is no way in which defendant in responding to the complaint can help formulate the issues in the action at the pleading stage and thereby limit the scope of plaintiff's discovery.

The Government's complaint is so general that it does not even include dates of the alleged violations.

# CONCLUSION

In summary, the statute and case law is clear.

The complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Government has provided no facts whatsoever to support its complaint.

If the Government has these facts, then at the very least, defendants' motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(e) should be imposed. It is impossible to require the defendants to reply to a complaint couched in vague allegations when no facts are stated.

WHEREFORE, the Government's complaint should be dismissed or a more definite statement required.

Respectfully submitted,
SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY
Attorneys for Defendants

Of counsel

Roy M. Cohn

J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.

DEC 1 2 1973

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 7. A.M.....

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

Civ. Action File No. 73 C 1529

COUNTERCLAIM

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

# AS AND FOR A FIRST DEFENSE AND BY WAY OF A COUNTERCLAIM

- 1. On October 16, 1973, the New York Times published a statement containing false and misleading information concerning the suit herein.
- 2. On October 16, 1973, plaintiff caused the Daily News to publish under banner headlines a story containing information which it knew to be false and misleading and damaging to defendants.
- 3. Defendants have sustained damages as a result of the plaintiff's untrue and unfair statements to the communications media prior to any formal action on its part. The plaintiff knew the information which it released to be false and misleading.

WHEREFORE, defendants pray that this Court enter an order granting defendants judgment on their counterclaim in the amount of One Hundred Million Dollars (\$100,000,000.00), together with such further relief as the interests of justice may require and the costs and disbursements of this action.

> Attorneys for Defendants Office and Post Office Address 39 East 68th Street

New York, New York 10021



Bracket.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE M CLERKT CFFIC-J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ★ JAN8 1974 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TIME A.M. P.M. Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 v. FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants.

. ( - .

### SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff, United States of America will move this Court, before the Honorable Edward R. Neaher, District Judge at the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York in Courtroom 9, on the day of January 11, 1974 at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an Order dismissing defendants' counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Fed. R. Civ. Proc. on the grounds that:

- This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim;
- 2. That the counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and for other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 4, 1974 Brooklyn, New York

To: Roy M. Cohn, Esq.
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan
and Manley
39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Yours, etc.

Frank & Schwell

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

MENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney

Brooklyn, New York

Elyse S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

• ...

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the attached Notice of Motion of the United States to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for More Definite Statement and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 4th day of January, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC..

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE COUNTERCLAIM

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney
Department of Justice
Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM

# INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The United States initiated this action on October 15, 1973, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3613 \*/ alleging racial discrimination in housing. The operative paragraphs of the Complaint allege that:

<sup>\*/ 42</sup> U.S.C. 3613 provides that the Attorney General may sue when there has been a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in housing or where he determines that a denial of equal housing opportunity to a group of persons raises an issue of general public importance.

The defendants, through the actions of their agents and employees, have discriminated against persons because of race in the operation of their apartment buildings, among other ways, by: (a) Refusing to rent dwellings and negotiate for the rental of dwellings with persons because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(a). Requiring different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of dwellings because of race and color, in violation of Section 804(b) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(b). Making and causing to be made statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation and discrimination based on race and color in violation of Section 804(c) of the

- Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(c).
- (d) Representing to persons because of race and color that dwellings are not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings are in fact so available, in violation of Section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(d)."
- The defendants' conduct described in the preceding paragraph constitutes:
  - (a) A pattern and practice of resistance by the defendants to the full enjoyment of rights secured by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; and
  - (b) A denial to groups of persons of rights granted by Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., which denial raises an issue of general public importance."

The defendants have filed Motions to dismiss and, in the alternative, for a more definite statement, alleging that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action and is too vague to enable them to respond. Defendants have also filed what purports to be a counterclaim which seeks damages from the United States in the amount of 100 million dollars. Defendants' counterclaim is grounded on the proposition that plaintiff having no facts to support its charges and having filed an "amorphous" \*/ complaint, damaged defendants in the amount of 100 million dollars because of the false and misleading information plaintiff conveyed to the New York Times and the Daily News concerning this lawsuit.

# **DISCUSSION**

## I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants claim that the Complaint in this action does not allege facts to support its general allegations, and that it should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff submits that the Complaint conforms to the requirements of F.R.C.P. 8(a) and is sufficient.

<sup>\*/</sup> Affidavit of Roy Cohn, p.4. Ostensibly in support of their motions and counterclaim, defendants have filed extravagant and misleading affidavits by the defendant Donald Trump and by his counsel which accuse the United States, in the most inflammatory rhetoric, of bringing the suit without grounds, of attempting to "bludgeon" a settlement, and of various other nefarious activities. While these affidavits have nothing to do with any of the motions before the Court, Motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement are predicated on pleadings alone. We respond to them briefly in a separate memorandum in order to set the record straight.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "[the] federal courts are not hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence or law . . . There is no requirement that the pleading state 'facts," or 'ultimate facts,' or 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.'"

2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶813, pp. 1692, 1694. In Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), another case of racial discrimination in which defendants filed a motion identical in principle to that filed here, the Supreme Court sustained the Complaint as follows:

The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.

The Complaint in this case alleges that the defendants pursue a racially discriminatory policy in the operation of their apartment

buildings. While omitting evidentiary details such as names, dates, places, etc., it clearly advises the defendants of the nature and basic outline of the charges by alleging, in paragraph 5, in "simple, concise, and direct" \*/ terms four separate categories of the defendants' noncompliance with the Fair Housing Act. It is identical, in terms of nonpleading of evidentiary matter, to a number of other fair housing complaints by the Attorney General brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3613, with respect to which similar motions to dismiss have been uniformly denied. See e.g., United States v. Luebke, 345 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1972); United States v. Black Jack, Civil Action No. 71-C-372(1), P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,561 (E.D. Mo. March 30, 1972); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970); rel'd order aff'd 474 F. 2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. den. U.S. \_\_\_\_\_, 42 L.W. 3195 (Oct. 9, 1973.); United States v. Northside Realty Associates, 324 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1971). \*\*\*/

 $<sup>\</sup>pm$ / FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(1).

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The Courts have reached the same result in the following unreported cases: United States v. Raymond, Civil Action No. 73-119-CIV-T-H (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 1973); United States v. City of Parma, Civil Action No. C-73-439 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1973); United States v. Robbins, Civil Action No. 73-848 CIV-JE (S.D. Fla. June 22, 1973); United States v. Watson Civil Action No. 73-97 (M.D. La. May 15, 1973); United States v. Pelzer Realty Company, Inc., Civil Action No. 3284-N (M.D. Ala. July 16, 1971); United States v. Davis, Civil Action No. 6451-71 (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1971); United States v. A.B. Smythe, Inc., Civil Action No. C-69-885 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1970); United States v. Goldberg, Civil Action No. 70-1223-CIV-CF (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1970); United States v. PMC Development Co., Inc. Civil Action No. 13578 (N.D. Ga., July 28, 1970); United States v. Palm (continued on next page)

The same result has been reached in numerous employment discrimination cases. United States v. Georgia Power Company, 301 F. Supp. 538, 541 (N.D. Ga. 1969); United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 683, 270 F. Supp. 233, 235 (S. D. Ohio 1967); United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council of St. Louis, 271 F. Supp. 447, 452 (E. D. Mo. 1966).

In Conley v. Gibson, supra, the Court said:

"... in appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46.

See also 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶12.08, p. 2271-2274 and

<sup>(</sup>continued from previous page)

Beach Listing Bureau, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-379-CIV-CF (S.D. Fla. May 5, 1970); United States v. Miller, Civil Action No. 70-40 (D. Md. April 27, 1970); United States v. H.G. Smithy, Civil Action No. 21470 (D. Md. April 17, 1970); United States v. Management Clearing, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-23-PHX. (CAM) (D. Ariz. April 8, 1970).

Copies of the Complaints and Orders in the above cases have been attached to this memorandum.

cases there collected. \*/ A Rule 12(b)(6) motion has the effect of admitting the validity and existence of the claim as stated, but contests plaintiff's right to recover under the law . . . On motion to dismiss, the complaint is to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." <u>United States v. Georgia Power Company</u>, supra, 301 F. Supp. at 541. In <u>United States v. City of Parma</u>, Civil Action No. 73-439 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1973), P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,616 the Court, after summarizing the foregoing authorities, added that:

"It is especially in civil rights disputes that we ought to be wary of disposing of the case on pretrial motions and courts do in fact have a predilection for allowing civil rights cases to proceed until a comprehensive record is available to either support or negate the facts alleged." Sisters of Prov. of St. Mary of Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. III. 1971).

Consistent with the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff is authorized to adduce proof that defendants have refused to rent dwellings on the basis of race, have required different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of dwellings on the basis of race, made discriminatory statements relating to the rental of dwellings and have represented on account of race that dwellings were

<sup>\*/</sup> The test as to sufficiency laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes in <u>Hart</u> v. <u>B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange</u>, 262 U.S. 271 (1923) is whether the claim is wholly frivolous. <u>Radovich</u> v. <u>National Football League</u> 352 U.S. 445 (1957) <u>reh</u>. <u>den</u>. 353 U.S. 931 (1957).

unavailable for rental when such dwellings were in fact so available. Defendants can hardly controvert the proposition that if plaintiff proves its allegations, then the defendants will have been shown to have violated 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) through (d) and plaintiff will be entitled to relief. Conley v. Gibson, supra, Cf. United States v. Georgia Power Company, supra, 301 F. Supp. at 541, 543; United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council of St. Louis, supra, 271 F. Supp. at 452.

The authorities cited by defendants do not even remotely support the proposition that the complaint in this case should be dismissed. While plaintiff's authorities arise out of cases involving complaints and suits virtually identical in principle to those here, defendants' authorities involve entirely different kinds of complaints and issues. Even so, the motions to dismiss in several of defendants' cases were denied, and the propriety of general pleadings which are to be liberally construed was recognized in substantially all of them. In those cases in which the complaints were dismissed, that result rested on considerations demonstrably absent from the instant case.

In <u>Pauling</u> v. <u>McElroy</u>, 278 F. 2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of a suit to enjoin nuclear testing on the grounds that the **plaintiffs** lacked standing. The Court explicitly stated that:

"we need not reach possible questions arising out of the facts, well pleaded or otherwise." Id at 254.

The Court recognized by way of dictum that a motion to dismiss does not admit "sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." In the present case, however, we allege, among other things, that defendants have refused to rent to blacks on account of race - a statement of fact pertaining to defendants' policies which can hardly be characterized as a "legal conclusion". Conley v. Gibson, supra. \*/

Defendants claim to rely on Thurston v. Setab Computer Institute, 48 F.R.D. 134 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). That case involved a prose complaint which alleged fraud by the defendants but failed to allege any injury resulting from that fraud. Since Rule 9(b), F.R.CIV.P. explicitly requires that in such cases, "the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity," the Court, was compelled to dismiss the action, even though it recognized the general liberal rules of pleading described in this memorandum.

<sup>\*/</sup> The McLeneghan, Stewart, and Atlanta Gas cases purportedly relied on by defendants at pages 4-5 of their brief are apparently cited simply because they contain the same observation about "sweeping legal conclusions" as in Pauling. They are all distinguishable on the same ground as Pauling. In the Blackburn case, the Court declined to "accept as true allegations that are in conflict with facts judicially known to the Court." 443 F. 2d at 123. This is of no help to defendants here, for this Court can hardly take judicial notice without proof that the Trumps do or do not discriminate in their rental practices.

But it is well settled that a civil suit by the Attorney General for racial discrimination is not one for fraud subject to Rule 9(b). As the Court said in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Lynd</u>, 321 F. 2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1963), in relying on <u>Conley</u> v. <u>Gibson</u>, <u>supra</u>, to sustain a voting discrimination complaint no more specific than the housing discrimination complaint in this case;

As to the problem of pleading, we adhere to our former ruling that "it is clear that there was no justification for the Court's requiring the government to amend its complaint in this civil rights action to allege specific details of voter discrimination as if this were an action for fraud or mistake under Rule 9, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."

Accordingly, defendants' analogy to the Thurston decision is unsound.

Finally, defendants cite a group of decisions for the proposition that a general allegation of conspiracy, without more, will not survive a motion to dismiss. \*/ In the present case, however, no conspiracy is alleged, and it is therefore unnecessary to plead with particularity such items as intentional wrongdoing and overt acts, which are essential to a civil complaint in conspiracy. Huey v. Barloga, supra, 277 F. Supp. at 871-872. The present action alleges housing discrimination, not conspiracy, and it is well established that conduct with a racially discriminatory effect violates the Fair Housing Act, irrespective of motivation. \*\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. III. 1971); Stewart v. Havelone, 283 F. Supp. 842 (D. Neb. 1968).

<sup>\*\*/</sup> United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F. 2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972) and see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

We believe that the foregoing demonstrates that none of the authorities relied on by defendants stands for any proposition at issue in this case. Since complaints such as that in this case have been uniformly sustained in suits by the Attorney General under the Fair Housing Act and similar statutes, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

### II. Motion for More Definite Statement

Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement requests specific facts as to the persons, buildings and dates that were involved in the alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. 3604. Plaintiff submits that such information amounts to evidentiary detail which should be obtained through discovery. Rule 12(e) on which defendants' motion is based, "is designed to strike at unintelligibility rather than want of detail . . . If the pleading meets the requirements of Rule 8 and fairly notifies the opposing party of the nature of the claim, a motion for a more definite statement will not be granted." 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶12.18, p. 2389, Della Vecchia v. Fairchild Engine Co., 171 F. 2d 610 (2d Cir. 1968). As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit observed in Michael v. Clark Equipment Co., 380 F. 2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1967), motions of this kind ostensibly designed to "get the plaintiff's pleading into better shape," are often a waste of time, especially since evidentiary facts can easily be elicited through discovery and frivolous suits disposed of by a motion for summary judgement.

It is not the function of a Motion for a more definite statement to discover evidence. Nixa v. Hayes, 55 F.R.D. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Accordingly, courts have repeatedly held in cases involving racial discrimination that the complaint need not plead The Complaint in this action is identical, in terms of non-pleading of evidentiary matter, to a number of other fair housing complaints by the Attorney General brought pursuant to 42 U.S. 3613, with respect to which motions for a more definite statement have been filed on a wide variety of grounds. All of these motions have been denied, the Court holding in each instance that additional clarification or evidentiary allegations were unnecessary. See e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970); United States v. Northside Realty Associates, 324 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v. City of Black Jack, Civil Action No. 71-C-372(1), P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,561 (E.D. Mo. March 30, 1972); United States v. City of Parma, P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. para. 13,616 (N.D. Ohio 1973). \*/ As the Court said in Lawrence, supra:

<sup>\*/</sup> The Courts have reached the same result in the following unreported cases: United States v. Mrs. Dean Miles, et al., Civil Action No. CA-3-7243-E (N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1973); United States v. Robbins, Civil Action No. 73-848 CIV-JE (S.D. Fla. June 22, 1973); United States v. Jim Tucker Co., Civil Action No. 72-H-993 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1972); United States v. J.C. Long, Civil Action No. 71-1262 (D. S.C. April 3, 1972); United States v. Exclusive Multiple Exchange, Civil Action No. C-70-969 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 1971); United States v. Margurette Jones, (Continued on next page)

We conclude further that the complaint, couched as it is in the very language of the statute, provides adequate notice of the claim made by plaintiff and is not subject to a motion for more definite statement. Any additional information to which defendant is entitled may be obtained by use of the discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., supra, 313 F. Supp. at 873. (emphasis added)

Likewise in employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6, (which has a pattern and practice provision substantially identical to 42 U.S.C. 3613) the courts have denied motions for a more definite statement, holding that the Government's complaints clearly advised the defendants of the nature and basic outline of the charges by alleging categories of noncompliance with the law and not evidentiary details. <u>United States v. Gustin-Bacon Division</u>, 426 F. 2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1970), <u>cert. den.</u> 400 U.S. 832 (1970); <u>United States v. Georgia Power Co.</u>, <u>supra</u>, 301 F. Supp. at 543-44; <u>United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 683</u>, 270 F. Supp. 233, 235 (S.D. Ohio 1967);

<sup>(</sup>continued from previous page)
Civil Action No. 71-H-279 (S.D. Tex. April 30, 1971); United States v.
Chirico, Civil Action No. 70-1851 (E.D. Pa., August 12, 1970); United
States v. Gilman, Civil Action No. 70-Civil 1967 (S.D. N.Y. July 28, 1970); United States v. PMC Development Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 13578 (N.D. Ga. July 28, 1970); United States v. Palm Beach Realty
Listing Bureau, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-379-CIV-CF (S.D. Fla., May 5, 1970); United States v. Arco Inc., Civil Action No. 70-29
(W.D. Tenn. March 20, 1970).

Copies of the complaints and orders in the above cases have been attached to this memorandum.

United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council of St. Louis, 271 F. Supp. 447, 454 (E.D. Mo. 1966). See also, United States v. Lynd, 321 F. 2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1963) (voting discrimination) (district judge abused discretion by granting motion for a more definite statement on theory that voting discrimination case was equivalent to suit for fraud).

It is well settled that "Rule 12(e) does not require the pleader to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, . . . nor may the Rule be employed as a means of discovery." Michigan Gas & Electric Co. v. American Electric Power Co., 41 F.R.D. 462, 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); 4 Moore's Federal Practice §12.18, pp. 2395-96. The test is whether the complaint is "capable of being answered."

Acoustica Associates v. Powertron Ultrasonic Corp., 4 F.R. Serv. 2d 12e. 241, case 1 (E.D. N.Y. 1961). Defendants are hardly in a position to claim that a complaint alleging, among other things, that defendants have refused to rent apartments on account of race and have misrepresented their availability on account of race, is incomprehensible to them.

The defendant Donald Trump has denied discrimination in his affidavit. His counsel, Mr. Cohn, has sworn that "it appears certain that they \*/ will be entitled to no relief" and, further, that:

<sup>\*/</sup> Although Mr. Cohn consistently refers to the Government in the plural, we expressly disavow the royal "we".

" these defendants do not discriminate in the renting of their apartments and that the Government's charges are totally unfounded."

Being so committed under oath, the defendants can surely answer the Complaint, deny the allegations, and put us to our proof, instead of engaging in the "barristerial shadow boxing" to which motions for a more definite statement are prone. <u>Lincoln Laboratories</u> v. <u>Savage Laboratories</u>, 26 F.R.D. 141, 142-143 (D. Del. 1960).

### III. <u>Defendants' Counterclaim</u>

Defendants' purported counterclaim, which is rather cryptically pleaded and has apparently been presented to the Court even though defendants seek dismissal of the main action and have not answered, alleges in substance that plaintiff has defamed defendants by causing two New York newspapers to publish false information about the suit, to defendants' pecuniary damage. It seeks damages in the modest amount of \$100,000,000. On its face, it appears to be a claim for damages for libel or slander. Read in the most generous way possible, and in conjunction with the Cohn and Trump affidavits, it could conceivably be construed as alleging abuse of process. Either way, the Court has no jurisdiction of the claim, and it should be dismissed as the United States is not subject to suit for damages for libel, slander, or abuse of process. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h).

This Court's jurisdiction to grant relief against the United States "depends wholly upon the extent to which the sovereign has waived its immunity to suit, and such waiver cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." <u>United States</u> v. <u>Sherwood</u>, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); <u>United States</u> v. <u>King</u>, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); <u>United States</u> v. Clark, 8 Peters. 436, 33 U.S. 436 (1834).

Despite the express requirement of Rule 8(a) that a counterclaim contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends," defendants' counterclaim contains no such statement. The reason is plain: this Court has no jurisdiction of defendants' claim.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) and Ch. 171, this Court does have jurisdiction of actions against the United States "for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his employment . . . . " 28 U.S.C. §1346(b). However, the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that it shall not confer jurisdiction of actions against the United States on "[a]ny claim arising out of . . . abuse of process, . . . libel [or] slander . . . . " 28 U.S.C. §2680(h). In sum, ". . . the United States is not liable for the deliberate torts of its agents of the kind alleged." Wessly v. General Services Administration, 341 F. 2d 275, 276 (2d Cir. 1964). See also, Baca v. United States, 467 F. 2d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1972); Smith v. DiCova, 329 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. N.Y. 1971); DiSilvestro v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. N.Y. 1960); Teplitsky v. Bureau of Compensation, U.S. Department of Labor, 288 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); and Benjamin v. Ribicoff, 205 F. Supp. 532, 533 (D. Mass. 1962).

That defendants' alleged claim is asserted as a counterclaim here, instead of as an independent action, is immaterial. Rule 13(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against the United States . . . "

Moreover, even if a claim against the sovereign for damages for defamation or abuse of process were cognizable in this Court, 

\*/
this counterclaim would not be. "With the exception of a compulsory counterclaim which asserts a matter of recoupment and a setoff, neither a permissive nor a compulsory counterclaim may be maintained against the United States unless it has given specific 
statutory consent." 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed. 313-28; United 
States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1939); United States v. Northside Realty 
Associates, 324 F. Supp. 287, 292 (N.D. Ga. 1971). No consent has 
been given to claims, or counterclaims, such as this. \*\*/

(footnote continued next page)

<sup>\*/</sup> Were such a claim within the Tort Claims Act jurisdiction, it would nonetheless be jurisdictionally defective for want of compliance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §2675(a), which bars a tort action against the United States 'unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing . . . "

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The total absence of any foundation in law for defendants' purported counterclaim is compounded by the technical but significant fact that this extraordinary pleading has not been signed "by at least one attorney of record in his individual name," as required by Rule 11,

\* \* \*

This is not the first time that a large real estate company has sought to strike back flamboyantly against the United States for seeking to bring its housing practices before the courts. In United States v. Northside Realty Associates, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the defendants made essentially the same baseless motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement here presented by the Trumps, and also sued for damages. More temperate than the Trumps, Northside and its president, Ed Isakson, only sought not less than \$100,000 per each defendant, a substantial enough amount but only one tenth of one per cent of what the Trumps would like.

Although a similar press release was issued, and received considerable

(footnote continued from previous page)
F.R.C.P.. That salutary Rule declares, in pertinent part:

The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.

See American Automobile Ass'n. v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. N.Y. 1952); American Automobile Ass'n. v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 1951); and United States to Use of and for Benefit of Foster Wheeler Corporation v. American Surety Co. of New York, 25 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. N.Y. 1938).

play, \*/ Northside's counterclaim contained no count for libel and was limited to abuse of process. \*\*/ After denying defendants' motions addressed to the Complaint, the Court dismissed the counterclaim for reasons comprehensively presented in its opinion, 324 F. Supp. 290-293. Despite the minor technical differences between these two counterclaims, they are two of a kind. For the reasons given by the Court in Northside, \*\*\*/ as well as the additional grounds related in this brief, we ask the Court to dismiss the counterclaim with prejudice so that the parties can address themselves to the one and only real issue in this case, namely, whether defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination in housing or have denied equal housing opportunity to a group of persons. 42 U.S.C. 3613.

<sup>\*/</sup> Defendant Isakson was the President of the Georgia Real Estate Commission.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> Northside's counterclaim was against the Attorney General and his subordinates, but the Court treated it as a claim against the United States.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> The Court held, in sum, that the claim did not qualify as a compulsory counterclaim since it did not arise from the same transaction, nor as a permissive counterclaim because the suit was really one against the United States to which the sovereign had not consented. United States v. Faneca, 332 F. 2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964).

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that defendants' Motions to Dismiss and for a More Definite Statement be denied and that defendants' counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff has prepared a proposed Order which is attached to this Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorneý

Department of Justice

Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB

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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the attached Notice of Motion of the United States to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for More Definite Statement and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 4th day of January, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IT CLERK'S OFFICE

S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

★ JAN8 1974 ★

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

P.M.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

UNREPORTED ORDERS CITED IN THE
MEMOFANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR MORE
DEFINITE STATEMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THE COUNTERCLAIM

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- <u>United States</u> v. <u>City of Parma</u>, Civil Action No. C-73-439 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1973)
- <u>United States v. Robbins</u>, Civil Action No. 73-848 CIV-JE (S.D. Fla., June 22, 1973)
- <u>United States</u> v. <u>Watson</u>, Civil Action No. 73-97 (M.D. La., May 15, 1973)
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- <u>United States</u> v. <u>Goldberg</u>, Civil Action No. 70-1223-CIV-CF (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1970)
- <u>United States v. PMC Development Co., Inc.</u>, Civil Action No. 13578 (N.D. Ga., July 28, 1970)
- <u>United States</u> v. <u>Palm Beach Listing Bureau</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, Civil Action No. 70-379-CIV-C (S.D. Fla. May 5, 1970)
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- <u>United States v. Chirico</u>, Civil Action No. 70-1851 (E.D. Pa. August 12, 1970)

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<u>United States</u> v. <u>Mrs. Dean Miles, et al.</u>, Civil Action No. C.A.-3-7243-E (N.D. Tex. Sept., 1973)

United States v. J.C. Long, Civil Action No. 71-1262 (D. S.C. April 3, 1972)

<u>United States</u> v. <u>Jim Tucker Co.</u>, Civil Action No. 72-H-993 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1972)

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

SEP 6 1973
No. 73-119-Civ-T-H TAMPA

GEORGE N. RAYMOND,

Defendant.

# FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The United States of America filed this action on March 14, 1973, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §3613 against the Defendant George N. Raymond seeking relief for alleged violations of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §3601, et seq. The Complaint alleges that the Defendant made dwellings unavailable to persons because of race and color; imposed different terms, conditions, and privileges of rental of dwellings on persons because of race and color; and made statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation, and discrimination based on race and color. Complaint further alleges that the Defendant's conduct constitutes a pattern and practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights secured by the Fair Housing Act and a denial to groups of persons of rights granted by the Fair Housing Act, which denial raises an issue of general public importance. The Complaint seeks injunctive and affirmative relief. The United States also moved for a preliminary injunction. On April 12, 1973, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. Both of Defendant's motions have been denied.

On July 5, 1973, Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction came on for hearing. The Court has considered the testimony and documentary evidence, and the contentions of counsel for both parties. Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

# FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The Defendant George N. Raymond owns and operates approximately 50 apartment rental units in St. Petersburg, Florida. He previously owned and operated approximately 20 additional apartment units in St. Petersburg, including the Florene Apartments.
- 2. All of Mr. Raymond's tenants have been white persons.
- 3. During May 1972, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, conducted an investigation of allegations that Mr. Raymond was engaged in racially discriminatory housing practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Mr. Raymond was told of the purpose of this investigation. He consented to being interviewed, and furnished a signed statement which was witnessed by Special Agents James Delk Leland and John V. DeNeale. Mr. Raymond admitted pursuing a racially discriminatory policy in the operation of his apartment buildings, as follows:

My policy is not to rent my apartments to black people. If I rented to black people I would lose the white tenants in my apartment house. In addition, with my plan to sell this apartment house [located at 516 10th Avenue South,] if I had rented to black people, I feel as it I would have lost 1/3 of my investment in this particular property.

There are no black tenants in any of these apartments and never has been. If a black person wanted to rent an apartment in one of these apartments I would refuse to rent it inasmuch as I would not "break the color line." (Emphasis added)

4. On July 26, 1971, Mr. Raymond rented apartment #4 at the Florene Apartments, 516 10th Avenue South, to Bradford and Gail Sorenson, a white couple, for a one-year period, August 1, 1971, through July 31, 1972. On May 4, 1972, two black females were visiting the Sorensons at their apartment. Mr. Raymond came to the apartment and asked to speak to Mr. Sorenson outside at the garage. Once outside Mr. Raymond told Mr. Sorenson that he wanted the Sorensons to move out of the apartment as soon as possible. Upon being asked by Mr. Sorenson whether or not having two black guests in the apartment had anything to do with their eviction, Mr. Raymond replied in the affirmative. In his signed statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Raymond admitted this affirmative response.

Mr. Sorenson returned to his apartment and told his wife they were being evicted because they had black female guests. Mrs. Sorenson left the apartment and met Mr. Raymond in front of the building. Mr. Sorenson joined them shortly thereafter. When Mrs. Sorenson asked Mr. Raymond why he was evicting them, Mr. Raymond told her that it was because they had two blacks in their apartment. Mr. Raymond also said he was in the process of selling the apartment building (Florene Apartments) and that the presence of the black females on the premises would decrease the value of the property. Finally, Mr. Raymond stated that another tenant had complained to him regarding the presence of the black females.

Mr. Raymond subsequently sent the Sorensons an eviction notice and they vacated the apartment at the end of May 1972.

5. On May 4, 1972, a white tenant asked Mr. Raymond if he was going to rent a vacant apartment at the Florene Apartments to "colored people" and subsequently told him that she would leave if "colored people" moved into the apartment. In his signed statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Raymond admitted telling her that he "was not going to rent to colored people."

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §1345 and 42 U.S.C.A. §3613.
- 2. The Defendant's apartments are dwellings within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. §3602(b).
- 3. 42 U.S.C.A. §3604 (a) and (b) prohibit discrimination against "any person" because of race or color. Discrimination against white persons because of the race or color of their guests is therefore prohibited. Cf. <u>Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.</u>, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); <u>Walker v. Pointer</u>, 304 F.Supp. 56, 57-61 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
- 4. To prevail on the merits, the United States must show that the Defendant has either:
- (a) engaged in a "pattern or practice" of resistance to the full enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity; or
- (b) denied the right to equal housing opportunity and "such denial raises an issue of general public importance." 42 U.S.C.A. §3613; <u>U.S. v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.</u>, 474 F.2d 115, 122-123 (5th Cir. 1973); <u>U.S. v. Hunter</u>, 459 F.2d 205, 216-218 (4th Cir. 1972).

- To prove a "pattern or practice" of resistance to 5. the full enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity, the United States must show more than "an isolated or accidental instance of conduct violative of the Act, but rather, as the term 'resistance' connotes, an intentional, regular, or repeated violation of the right granted by the Act." U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir. 1972). Extrajudicial admissions of a racially discriminatory policy are evidence of a pattern or practice. Cf. U.S. v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir: 1971); U.S. v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Miss. 1972). The Court finds that the Defendant's extrajudicial admissions of a discriminatory policy (Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 5) coupled with the eviction of a white tenant pursuant to that policy because they had black guests (Finding of Fact No. 4) constitute a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct. The incident was not accidental due to the Defendant's own deliberate act (however impetuous and regretable); and it was not isolated (due to the admitted policy or attitude, corroborated by the absence of any black tenants in the past).
- 6. With regard to the remedy, "[e]stablished principles of equity dictate that in considering whether to grant injunctive relief a court should impose upon a defendant no restriction greater than necessary to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he complains." <u>U.S. v. Hunter</u>, 459 F.2d 205, 219 (4th Cir. 1972). Cf. <u>U.S. v. Bob Lawrence Realty</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 474 F.2d 115, 127 (5th Cir. 1973). In this instance, while the Court has concluded that the evidence is sufficient to establish the Government's claim as alleged in the Complaint, including the element of "pattern or practice," the proof does

not justify a finding or conclusion that Defendant has maliciously and repeatedly denied rights guaranteed by the Act or that his present attitude portends a contumacious adherence to his discriminatory policy. Cf. U.S. v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1971). Defendant is the proprietor of a small business with offices in his own home. He is not the corporate owner of a large scale apartment complex with a supporting staff of numerous assistants to help in management. Cf. U.S. v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., supra; U.S. v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776, 779 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Further, the Court notes Defendant's contrite declaration in his testimony at the hearing that he would freely and willingly rent units to any applicant without regard to race or color as required by the Act. Cf. U.S. v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., supra, at 126. Together these factors dictate moderation in framing the injunctive decree so that it "impose[s] upon the defendant no restriction greater than necessary to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he complains." U.S. v. Hunter, supra. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction in the form that follows is amply suited to the circumstances of this case as contrasted with the facts in Peachtree which had none of the mitigating features present here. U.S. v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., supra, at 228-231.

### PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court that, pending further Order of the Court, the Defendant, George N.

Raymond, and his agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with him are enjoined from:

- 1. Failing or refusing to rent an apartment to any person because of race or color and from making an apartment unavailable to any person because of race or color;
- 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of an apartment, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race or color;
- 3. Making, printing, or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or published, any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the rental of an apartment, that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race or color, or an intention to make such preference, limitation, or discrimination;
- 4. Representing to any person because of race or color that an apartment is not available for inspection or rental when such apartment is in fact available.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall forthwith adopt and implement the following affirmative program to correct the effects of his past discriminatory practices:

- 1. Within ten (10) days of this Decree, Defendant shall permanently post a notice, or notices, at places clearly visible to rental applicants, stating that Defendant's apartments will be rented without regard to race or color. At least one such notice shall be posted at each of his several apartment complexes.
- 2. The Defendant shall forthwith fully instruct all of his employees, if any, with respect to the provisions of this Decree and with respect to their obligations thereunder. Upon

hiring a new employee, Defendant shall explain the contents of this Decree to him and advise him that he is subject to all the requirements contained herein.

3. In the event that a firm, association, company, corporation, or other person is engaged by Defendant to act as a real estate agent, referral agency, or otherwise manage or promote rentals of apartments for the Defendant, such firm association, company, corporation, or person shall be notified by Defendant that apartments are rented without regard to race or color.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ninety (90) days after the entry of this Decree, and at three-month intervals thereafter, for a period of two years following the entry of this Decree, the Defendant shall file with this Court, and serve on counsel for the Plaintiff, a report containing the name, address, and the visually observed race of each person who has, within the preceding ninety (90) days:

- (a) made written application for the rental of an apartment; and/or
- (b) visited the premises as a prospective tenant for the purpose of inspecting an available apartment.

These reports shall additionally contain:

- 1. whether or not the rental of an apartment was offered to such person;
- 2. whether or not the rental of an apartment was accepted by each such person;
- 3. the dates on which each of the foregoing actions were taken.

For a period of two years following the entry of this decree, the Defendant shall maintain and retain any and all

records which are the source of, or contain, any of the information pertinent to Defendant's obligation to report to the Court.

Representatives of the Plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the Defendant at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that the Plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the Defendant from the inspection of such records.

The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for all purposes, including particularly the purpose of modification of the terms and requirements of this Decree in the event the same should prove inadequate to facilitate an efficient and objective method of determining Defendant's compliance with the statute and the Decree.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for both parties are directed to notify the Court in writing within ten (10) days from the date hereof whether either wishes to present additional evidence at the trial of this cause, or whether, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the hearing on the application for the preliminary injunction previously held may be treated as a trial of the general issues.

DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this \_\_\_\_\_\_ day of September, 1973.

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NOPTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIOSEP 5 4 11 FA '73

EASTERN DIVISION

CLERKIUS, CIETURAT COURT
HORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

NO. C 73-439

V.

CITY OF PARMA, ONIO,

Defendant

NO. C 73-439

AND OPDER

Battisti, C.J.

This is an action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States of America seeking injunctive relief against alleged violations of the Fair Housing Provisions contained in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC §3601 et seq., by the City of Parma, a municipal corporation established under Ohio law.

The Government's complaint alleges, in substance, that the defendant, acting in accordance with its purported general policy of substantially excluding blacks from residing within its boundaries, prevented the construction of a federally assisted apartment development (under Section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 USC §17152-1) which would have offered accommodations to a fair percentage of black tenants and, further, adopted procedures designed to effectively block any possibility of racially integrated federally assisted housing from being built in the City. The effect of the above-described acts, it is alleged, is to perpetuate the virtually all-white population makeup of the defendant City; deny dwellings to blacks purely on account

race; similarly work to deny dwellings to prospective white residents of racially integrated housing purely for racial motives; and interfere with the right and ability of actual and prospective sponsors of federally assisted housing from assisting persons in the exercise and enjoyment of their rights to fair and non-discriminatory housing opportunities.

The complaint charges that defendant's conduct constitutes a pattern of practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the Fair Housing Act and by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the Government's complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b) F.R.Civ.P. on the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that the Government has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, defendant has filed separate motions to require the Government to strike various allegations in its complaint and make others more definite.

Defendant bottoms its motion to dismiss, first, on the argument that it is not subject to suit by the Attorney General pursuant to 42 USC §3613 for the reason that municipalities or political subdivisions of a state are not "persons" against which such a suit may be brought. 42 USC §3613 provides:

"Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance,

he may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States District Court by filing with it a complaint setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of rights, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter."

In support of its position, defendant places great

reliance on the holdings of the Supreme Court in Morroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) and City of Kenoscha v. Bruno, , 41 U.S.L.W. 4819 (June 11, 1973). These cases taken together establish that municipalities are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 USC §1983; and, accordingly, are not amenable to suit under that statute, even if only declaratory or equitable relief is sought. 1 Defendant urges that these two cases resolve the issue here in question. Morroe and City of Keroscha, however, may not be so broadly viewed. Both cases exclusively involved the statutory construction of Section 1983 and were predicated on explicit legislative history peculiar to that statute. In neither case was there any suggestion that the construction given to Section 1983 in regard to "persons" was to apply to other civil rights statutes, particularly one passed nearly one hundred years after the initial en stmert of Section 1983.2 Monroe and City of Kenoscha, therefore, are not dispositive of whether

*-- ک* ..

seemed to have expressly held that municipalities were not amenable to suit under Section 1983, the holding was construed in several subsequent decisions by lower federal courts to disallow suits for damages but not suits seeking only equitable relief. See e.g., Schrell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). The recent ruling in City of Keroscha v. Bruno, supra, dispelled any doubts relating to that the Monroe holding by squarely ruling that under no circumstances may municipalities be subject to suit under Section 1073.

<sup>2) 42</sup> USC 51993 was originally eracted as Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 29, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.

municipalities are "persors" under Section 3613 of the Fair Housing Act. This Court must resolve that issue by adopting a construction of Section 3613 which properly comports with its own particular context.

In determining the meaning or reach of the word "persor" in the context of Section 3613 of the Fair Housing. Act, it is the express duty of the courts to construe the language so as to give effect to the intert of Congress. United States v. America Trucking Assoc., 310 US 534, 542 (1940). No legislative history has been cited clearly manifesting ore way or the other whether muricipalities were meant to be covered by the Fair Housing Act. It is clear, however, that when Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 its purpose was to enact lesignation so as to deal broadly with those prevalent discriminatory housing practices which were blocking blacks and other racial and rational mirorities from enjoying full and fair access to decent and desirable housing. Indeed it is explicitly stated in 42 USC §3601 that the purpose underlying the Fair Housing Act is "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."

In light of this expansive purpose, and in light of the established canor of statutory construction that civil rights statutes such as the one here under construction should be read broadly in order to fulfill their purposes,

See Griffin v. Breckerridge, 403 US 88 (1971); Daniel v. Paul,

395 US 298 (1969); Mayers v. Pidley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.

1972) (en banc); United States v. Real Estate Develop. Corp.,

347 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972), the word "person" must be

construed in such a manner as to foreclose singular loopholes in the coverage of the Fair Housing Act.

Defendant, however, argues that as the term "person" is expressly defined by 42 USC §3602(d) of the Fair Housing Act and since municipalities are not specifically mentioned within the definition there set forth, Congress must have intended to exclude them. 42 USC §3602(d) provides:

"'Person' includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and fiduciaries."

The Government argues that the term "corporation" in Section 3602(d) should be read to ercompass not only private corporations, but public ones as well. Assuming, arguendo, that the term "corporation" is not to be read so broadly, it is nonetheless clear that the definition of "person" as set forth in Section 3602(d) was not meant to be all-inclusive. If Congress had meant the definition of "person" to be limited to the express enumeration of entities in Section 3602(d), it could easily have so stated. the language of Section 3602(d) indicates only that the term "person" should be construed to "include" what is enumerated therein, and not be limited to such erumeration. "The word 'includes' is usually a term of enlargement, and not a limitation." Argosy v. Hernigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968) quoting <u>United States v. Gertz</u>, 249 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1957). This is plainly the case here.

Accordingly, it is held that a city or municipality is a "person" within the meaning of 42 USC \$3613 and is amenable to suit. See Kerney Park Homes Assoc. 1. City of

Lackavanna, 318 F.Supp. 669, 694 (W.D. N.Y. 1970), aff'd.,

436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den., 401 US 1010 (1971);

United States v. City of Black Jack, F.Supp.

P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,561 (E.D. Mo. 1972).

Defendant argues secondly that even if it is subject to suit under 42 USC §3613, the Covernment's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief under the Fair Housing Act. Defendant unges that since it is not being charged with discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings, 42 USC §3604, or in the financing of dwellings, 42 USC §3605, or in providing access to opportunities in the real estate brokerage services, 42 USC §3606, it cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed to have violated any prohibition contained in the Fair Housing Act. The Government, on the other hand, maintains that the allegations of its complaint clearly and squarely charge defendant with discriminatory housing practices falling within Section 3604 (a) as well as with violations of Section 3617 of the Act.

<sup>3)</sup> In support of this contention, defendant has cited to the Court several remarks by various Government and congressional figures made either in the course of congressional hearings on the Act, or in the course of debate on the floor of Congress immediately prior to the Act's passage. E.g. 114 Cong. Rec. 2275, 2270, 2232-2233, 2528 (Pemarks of Senator Tondale, Senator Brooke and Senator Tydings) These remarks may be generally characterized as attempts at setting forth the purposes of the Fair Mousing Act and the policies underlying it. They focus, as is natural, on the need to pass legislation proscribing discrimination in the housing sector itself. They do not indicate, however, what the impact of the legislation was to be on municipalities, nor do they seem to contemplate the problems presented by this suit.

Covernment's complaint do not charge defendant specifically with refusing to sell or rent dwellings on racial grounds, the prohibitions contained in Section 3604(a) are clearly not so limited. Section 3604(a) not only makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent. . ." a dwelling for racial reasons, but also makes it unlawful to "otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin." (Emphasis added.) This catchall phraseology may not be easily discounted or de-emphasized. Indeed it "appears to be as broad as Congress could have made it, and all practices which have the effect of derying dwellings on prohibited grounds are therefore unlawful."

United States v. Youritas Constr. Co., F.Supp.

P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,592 (N.D. Calif. 1973).

The Government further invokes 42 USC §3617 in support of its complaint. This section makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or erjoyment of . . . or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted by Sections 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title." 42 USC §3617, although broadly worded, and seemingly endless in scope, has until now received little treatment by the courts. 4

The Government's complaint, however, fairly alleges that defendant's conduct in barring the construction of

<sup>4)</sup> It would seem, however, that Judge Meredith, in passing on the sufficiency of a complaint comparable to the one here at issue in several respects, relied partially on 42 USC 93617 in sustaining the complaint. See United States v. City of Black Josk, supra.

federally assisted housing interfered with the right of actual and propsective sponsors of federally assisted housing to assist persons in exercising their right to equal housing opportunities. This allegation seems to fall within the ambit of Section 3617.

It is well established that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief unless it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no state of facts in support of its allegations that could entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41, 45-46 (1952);

Jerkins v. McKeithen, 395 US 411, 421-422 (1969). Moreover, the material allegations of the complaint are to be taken as admitted for purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, and the complaint must be liberally construed and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeither, supra, 395 US at p. 421. With these rules in mird, it would be entirely inappropriate for this Court to dismiss this complaint summarily. See Kennedy Park Homes

<sup>5)</sup> Noteworthy too is Section 3615 of the Fair Housing Act. This section provides, ir pertinent part, that:

<sup>&</sup>quot;. . . any law of a state or political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid."

In Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 0.2d 1203, 1214 (8th Cir. 1972), an action challenging alleged discriminatory zoning by a municipality was expressly sustained as arising under Section 3615.

Assoc. v. City of Lackawarra, N.Y., supra; Urited States v. City of Black Jack, supra; Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1972); Sisters of Prov. of St. Mary of Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 309 (N.D. III. 1971). In the last-cited case, Judge Marovitz so correctly said, at page 399:

"It is especially in civil rights disputes that we ought to be wary of disposing of the case on pretrial motions and courts do in fact have a prediliction for allowing civil rights cases to proceed until a comprehensive record is available to either support or negate the facts alleged."

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the Government's complaint is denied. Defendant has, in the alternative, moved to strike in their entirety paragraphs four, five, seven, and ten of the Government's complaint, to strike a portion of paragraph nine, and for a more definite statement as to paragraphs five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten of the complaint. These motions are without merit, and are denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Frank/J. Battisti

Chief Judge

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MINUTE ENTRY: MAY 15, 1973 WEST, J.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL ACTION

**VERSUS** 

NUMBER 73-97

GILLIE G. WATSON, SR., ET AL

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This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for a more definite statement. A review of the record indicates that no oral argument is required on this motion.

Since all of the information which the defendants seek through this motion could more properly be obtained by the defendants through the proper use of discovery procedures, and since the complaint, on its face, is couched in language similar to that of the statute involved, and since the Court concludes that the language of the complaint does, in fact, provide adequate notice of the claim made by the plaintiff:

IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for a more definite statement be, and it is hereby DENIED.

(SIGNED) E. GORDON WEST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Douglas M. Gonzales, Esq.

Gillie G. Watson, Sr.

Sumpter B. Davis, III, Esq.

RE: Civil Action 72-H-993
United States of America vs. The Jim Tucker Company, Inc.

9/22/72: In view of answer having been filed, Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement is denied. Fed. R. Civ. 2 12(e). Clerk shall notify counsel. COB

CIVIL FIGHTS BIVISION & 2P 28 4 19 PH '7?
HAIL ROCH

#### FILED

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

JUL 1 6 1971

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

DEPUTY CLERK

Plaintiff,

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO.3284-N

PELZER REALTY COMPANY, INC.,

ET AL,

Defendants.

#### ORDER

The Defendants', Pelzer Realty Company, Inc. and William G. Thames, motions to dismiss, filed herein on May 7, 1971, are now submitted. Upon consideration of the motions and the complaint, it is ORDERED that said motions be, and the same are hereby, denied.

DONE this the / The day of July, 1971.

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
213 U. S. COURT HOUSE & CUSTOM HOUSE MOBILE, ALABAMA 36602

CIVIL RIGHTS ,

DATE: MAY 18, 1971

Mr. C. S. White-Spunner, Jr., P. O. Drawer E, Mobile, Ala. 36601 Mr. Henry C. Hagen, Housing Section, Civil Rights Division U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. Mr. William L. Irons, 1300 City National Bank Building, Birmingham, Ala. 35203

RE:	CIVIL	ACTI	ои ио	. 6451	-71	ADM.	N	0		CR	NO		
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Motion for change of venue filed by defendants on 2/3/71 and submitted on 4/9/71 is DENIED.

submitted on 4/9/71 is DENIED.

MAY 21 1971 CIV. HIGHTS DI

WILLIAM JE SONHOR, CLERK,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

.... No. C 69-885

v

A.B. SMYTHE COMPANY, INC., and IRENE MICHAEL, at al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND

ORDER

Defendants

LAMBROS, DISTRICT JUDGE

This cause of action was instituted by the Government under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. \$3601 et sec. The defendants, A.B. Smythe Company and Irene Michael, now move to dismiss the complaint. The motion is denied in its entirety.

Two basic issues are raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. One, whether or not the defendants are exempt from the provisions of the Act for the conduct alleged in the complaint because of the exemption provided to any single family house sold or rented by an owner under 42 U.S.C. \$3603(b)(l). Two, whether or not 42 U.S.C. \$3604(c) is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.

The first issue arises since the Act does not have a specific effective date for all its provisions but becomes effective in certain stages. Upon enactment, it is applicable to dwellings (1) which have federal assistance or are

<sup>1.</sup> Under the Act, a dwelling is defined as "any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof." 49 U.S.C. \$3602(b).

of federal ownership. 42 U.S.C. \$3603(a)(1). After December 31, 1968, it applies to all other dwellings, except for two exemptions. 42 U.S.C. \$3603(a)(2). One of these exemptions is for any single-family house sold or rented by an owner. 42 U.S.C. \$3603(b)(1). After December 31, 1969, the Act applies to any single-family house sold or rented by an owner "if such house is sold or rented... [with) the use in any manner of the sales or rental services of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or person ... " 42 U.S.C. \$3603(b)(1)(A).

The defendants argue that they come within the exemption accorded to the sale or rental of a single-family house for the year of 1969. Particularly, they contend that for the year of 1969, a real estate broker or agent is included within the exemption for a single-family house. They claim that since the sale or rental of a single-family house with the assistance of a real estate broker or agent is specifically included in the Act for the period of time after December 31, 1969, the sale or rental of such a house with the aid of real estate men is implicitly excluded prior to that time.

The Court need not reach the validity of the defendants contention. The Government alleges that the defendants engaged in discriminatory conduct in regard to vacant land in the Lake Lucerne subdivision and with respect to all the houses in the subdivision. The Court finds that the exemption accorded to a single-family house for the year of 1969 is not applicable to vacant land nor to a subdivision as an entity.

Thus, notwithstanding the alleged exemption, the Government has still stated a claim for relief against the defendants.

As for the second issue, that is the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. §3604(c), the Court finds that it is constitutional. The section reads as follows:

"To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination."

The Court finds that the statute is not void for vagueness. This section is not violative of the First Amendment.

The defendants' other contentions in regard to their motion are also without merit.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint is denied in its entirety.

Thomas D. Lambros

United States District Judge

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, filed the complaint in this case on August 19, 1970, alleging racial discrimination, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Right Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 3601 at seq., by the defendant in the operation of two spartment buildings he owns and operates in Hollywood, Florida. The defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the complaint on three grounds:

- 1. failure to join, as an indispensable party, a Negro who was allegedly a victim of the defendant's racial discrimination;
- 2. failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and
- 3. failure to state in the complaint sufficient facts to enable the defendant to dereme an enewer. Defendant has also moved for Summary Judgment.

This Court, having considered the complaint, the affidavite on file herein, and the briefs and arguments of counsel, hereby denies all of defendant's motions.

Defendant shall have until Hovember 9, 1970 to snewer the complaint. DOCKETED

It is so ORDERED

NOV 5 1970

This \_\_\_\_\_ day of October, 1970.

CIVIL RIGHTS

CHARLES B. FULTON

Center Junga

CLAUDE L. GOZA Clark

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MORTIERN DESTRICT OF CEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DOCKETED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

<sup>AUG</sup> - ? 1970

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13,578

PAC COMPANY, INC. OF GLORGIA, et al

#### ORDER

The defendants have motions to dismiss, for a more definite statement, and to strike, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pending before this court.

This is a suit brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601, et seq. Jurisdiction exists in this court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §1345. In paragraph 10 of the complaint it is alleged in part:

The defendants follow a policy and practice of racial discrimination against Negroes with respect to the sale of lots in the properties described in the preceding paragraphs.

A reading of the complaint clearly shows that a claim is stated sufficient to pass defendants' motion to dismiss, and that the allegations are clear enough to enable defendants to respond. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); and United States v. Ceorgia Power Co., 301 F.Supp. 533 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Further, defendants' alleged pre-Act discrimination is not "redundant, impertinent, or scandelous matter" subject to a motion to strike. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705 (1943). Accordingly, all defendants' motions are denied as without merit.

The issues raised by defendants' motion are well-settle and require no discussion beyond that provided in the government'

AUG 7 1970

brief. Following their answer discovery is the proper procedure for defendants to employ in learning more about plaintiff's allegations. Discovery is not to be used to delay further proceedings. Local Rule 10 provides such "procedures shall be commenced promptly, pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay and within four months after the answer has been filed...."

So ordered this the 28th day of July, 1970.

/s/ Albert J. Henderson, Jr.

Judge, United States District Court
for the Worthern District of Georgia

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
NO. 70-379-Giv-CF

UNITED STABES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

PALM DEACH REALTY LISTING BUREAU, INC.,

Defendant.

OSDIE

Monday, May 11, 1970, at 10:00 A.M. upon motions of the defendant to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative to strike certain portions thereof, or for more definite statement. In preparation for this hearing the Court has carefully studied the complaint and the motions and has determined that oral argument is unnecessary. Thereupon, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that these motions be and the same are hereby denied. The material sought by the motion for more definite statement are proper subjects for discovery.

DONE and CRDERID at Miami, Florida, this 5 day of

C. CLYDS ATMIX

cc: U.S. Attorney Gustave T. Proberg, Jr.

> John H. Mitchell, Esquire Jerris Leonard, Esquire Frank F. Cehrelb, Esquire Uslter J. Bernstt, Fequire

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

#### DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) 95 5
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION 326 NO. 70-40
JOSEPH and ROSE MILLER and UNITED INVESTORS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION d/b/a PENNEROOKE TERRACE APARTMENTS,	ORDER
Defendants.	<b>}</b>

This matter came on for a hearing on April 10, 1970 on the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint.

The United States commenced this action under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. on January 12, 1970, against the owners and managers of Pennbrooke Terrace, an apartment complex in Suitland, Maryland. The operative portions of the complaint, after allegations of jurisdiction and coverage, read as follows:

"The defendants follow a policy and practice of racial discrimination against Negroes with respect to the renting of apartments, Pursuant to this racially discriminatory policy; defendants have refused to make apartments available to Negroes and have made statements with respect to the rental

of dwellings that indicate a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race.

Defendants have rented 1 of the 404 apartment units in the above named building to a Negro tenant, and have retained the one Negro tenant for the purpose of creating a non-discriminatory image.

The conduct described in the preceding paragraphs constitute a pattern and practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights secured by Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq."

The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the complaint does not comply with Section 813 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 3613. This section provides that the Attorney General, when he has reasonable cause to believe persons to have engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any rights granted by the Act, may file a complaint "setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief . . as he deems necessary . . . "

The defendants contended, in addition, that the complaint failed to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for a "short and plain statement of the claim," and did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Upon due consideration, the Court finds the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, complies with 42 U.S.C. 3613, and is sufficient to resist a motion to dismiss. The factual details underlying the broad allegations of the complaint are available to defendants by means of pretrial discovery, Rules 26-37, Fed. R. Civ. P.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this And day of April, 1970.

To K. Dorse, Watherin

R. DORSEY WATKINS United States District Judge

Agreed as to form:

MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN

Attorney for Plaintiff

NELSON DECKELBAUM

Attorney for Defendants

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff	
· v.	Civil Action No. 21470
H. G. SMITHY COMPANY, et al.,	
Defendants	<b>`</b>

#### ORDER

This maiter came on for a hearing on April 17, 1970, on all defendants' motions to dismiss the action and for summary judgment, and on the motion of the defendants H. G. Smithy Company, Victor and Lydia Carone, and Mrs. Lewis Armstrong for a severance. The motions having been fully briefed, and a full hearing having been held in open court, now therefore it is by the Court this low day of Afric, 1970,

ORDERED that the motion of defendant H. G. Smithy

Company to dismiss and in the alternative for summary judgment
be and it hereby is denied, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of the Chillum Heights corporate defenderts and Sidney Rothstein to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment be and it hereby is denied, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motions of H. G. Smithy
Company, Victor and Lydia Carone, and Mrs. Lewis Armstrong for
a severance be and they hereby are denied, and it is

 in the alternative for summary judgment be and they hereby are depied without prejudice to said defendants to renew their motions for summary judgment when the plaintiff has completed its discovery, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that all defendants shall have until May 18, 1970, to answer the complaint.

W. DORSEY WATKING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MANAGEMENT CLEARING, INC., a corporation,

Defendant.

No. CIV. 70-23-PHX. (CAM)

ORDER

The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the argument that 42 U.S.C. 3613 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the complaint fails to allege or show any facts or circumstances under which the Attorney General is authorized to file suit and that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, having been fully heard in oral argument and the Court being fully advised in the matter,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

DATED this  $S^{\frac{fh}{h}}$  day of April, 1970.

United States District Judge

CIVIL RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
213 U. S. COURT HOUSE & CUSTOM HOUSE MOBILE, ALABAMA 36602

E 1-097-155

MAY 18, 1971 DATE:

Mr. C. S. White-Spunner, Jr., P. O. Drawer E, Mobile, Ala. 36601 Mr. Henry C. Hagen, Housing Section, Civil Rights Division U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. Mr. William L. Irons, 1300 City National Bank Building, Birmingham, Ala. 35203

RE: CI	VIL ACTIO	ON NO	6451-7	1 ADM	1. N	0	CI	R. NO.	<del></del>	
UNITED	STATES (	F AMER	ICA	vs	н.	MELVILL	E DAVIS	5, JR.,	ET	AL.,
******	*****	****** ·	*****	****	***	******	****	* <del>***</del>	****	**** <del>*</del>
Yo	u are ad	vised t	hat on	the	18_	day	of	MAY		
19 71	, the fo	ollowin	g action	n was	tak	en in th	e above	e-entit	led	
case by	Judge _	PITTMA	N			: ,				
			٠							:

Motion to dismiss filed by defendants on 2/3/71 and submitted on 4/9/71 is DENIED. Motion for change of venue filed by defendants on 2/3/71 and submitted on 4/9/71 is DENIED.

> DEPA. 3 MAY 21 1971 R.A.O. CIV. HIGHTS DIV

Broomnon, CLERK,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

70-Civ.1967

ALVIN GILMAN and MITCHELL EISEN, d/b/a Gilman-Eisen Company,

Defendants.

#### APPEARANCES:

WHITNEY MORTH SEYMOUR, JR.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Attorney for the United States of America
Southern District of New York
By: MICHAEL C. SILBERBERG, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
Of Counsel

GILBERT & GILBERG, ESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants
22 West First Street
Mount Vernon, N. Y. 10550
By: David C. Gilberg, Esq.
For the Firm

CROAKE, D. J.

#### MEMORANDUM

of the United States, pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 81), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.,

# 3695

of spartments in buildings owned and operated by them at 555 McLean Avenue, Yonkers, New York, and 2-4 Windsor Terrace, White Plains, New York. The complaint commencing this action was filed on May 14, 1970 and no answer has yet been filed by the defendants.

bring on this motion, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking an order for a more definite statement of the complaint on the ground that "... fails to comply with the provisions of § 3613 of the Public Health and Welfare Law (being Public Law 90-284, Title VIII, § 813, effective April 11, 1968), and that the complaint in this action fails to set forth any facts as specifically required by such law, but rather, conclusions ... so vague and ambiguous that the defendants should not reasonably be required to prepare a responsive pleading ..."

Provides that federal pleadings shall contain no more than

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . . A more definite statement of a plaintiff's claim, as requested by defendants in the instant case, is required by Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only when the pleading to which it is addressed is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading . . "

that the allegations contained therein are neither vague nor ambiguous. The action brought by the Government seeks to enjoin a "policy and practice" of racial discrimination by defendants. In paragraph 4 of the complaint such "policy and practice" is alleged to include:

- will not be rented to Negroes;
- 2) Representing to Negroes that apartments are unavailable for rental when in fact apartments are available; and
- and conditions of rental.

This Court finds that the complaint is plainly in conformity with the requirements of Rules 8(a) and

is patently sufficient on its face. It should be further noted that motions for more particular statements are not favored since pleadings in the federal courts are required only to give adequate notice of the claim, which the complaint in the present case clearly satisfies.

See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957);

Fairmont Foods Co. v. Manganello, 301 F. Supp. 832

(S.D.N.Y. 1969); MacDonald v. Astor, 21 F.R.D. 159

(S.D.N.Y. 1957).

Defendants advance the argument, in support of their motion, that the provisions of \$ 813 of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. \$ 3613, are in derogation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and require evidentiary facts to be pleaded. No cases are cited in support of this proposition.

The courts have consistently refused to adopt
the argument proposed by defendants and to construe this
section as being in derogation of the requirements of
Rule 8 that a complaint shall contain no more than a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief." In three recent cases, other federal district courts have rejected similar arguments and sustained complaints under Title VIII which are nearly identical to the one in this case. Bob See United States v./Laurence Realty Co., Inc., et al. (N.D.Ga. 1970, civil action # 13468); United States V. Palm Beach Realty Listing Bureau, Inc. (S.D.Fla. 1970, civil action # 70-379); United States v. Joseph and Rose Miller, et al. (D. Md. 1970, civil action # 70-40). Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Gustin-Bacon Division, et al. F.2d \_\_\_\_\_ 10th Cir. 1970, No. 71369) construing a similar provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, governing discrimination in employment, held that it did not require the Attorney General to plead

evidentiary matter. As stated by the Court:

"By construing Section 2000(e)(6)(a) as a trial court interpreted, is to reinstate a type of fact pleading which was eradicated by the current federal rules. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was originally designed to circumvent the morass caused by the Code pleading requirement of pleading facts, constituting a cause of action. As Professor Moore points out, the 'requirement that facts be pleaded is illusory, and unsound; and results in a battle over

"the form of pleading that does not advance the action to an adjudication on the merits. 2(a) MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.12 at ---1092. To reinstate this type of pleading even in the limited circumstances here involved is to directly contradict the spirit of Rule 8(a) and the general concept of modern federal pleadings. We find no suggestion in the Civil Rights Act of enactment which supports appellees! contention that Congress intended to require the Attorney General to revert to a detailed pleading of evidentiary matters." Accordingly, defendants' motion is denied in its entirety. -- SO ORDERED. Dated: New York, N. Y. July 23, 1970 THOMAS F. CROAKE U. S. D. J.

V.,BAILEY THOMAS

Houston, Texas May 4, 1971

Re: CA 71-H-279 United States vs Margurette Jones, et al

Mr. Anthony J. P. Farris Vunited States Attorney Houston, Texas

Messrs. Vinson, Elkins, Searls & Smith First City National Bank Bldg Houston, Texas 77002

Gentlemen:

Judge Carl O. Bue, Jr. has entered the following order in the above case:

"4-30-71: Defendants motion for more definite statement is denied since plaintiff's complaint is sufficient pursuant to Rule 8, F.R.C.P. The information defendant seeks can be more adequately secured by ordinary discovery methods. Clerk will notify counsel.

Yours very truly,

V. Bailey Thomas, Clerk

By White audien, Deputy
Albert E. Anderson

Un-Mergen

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION

IGNATIUS J. CHIRICO, doing business as SIDDALL REAL ESTATE COMPANY,

Defendant

**NO. 70-1**851

#### MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FULLAM, J.

August 12,1970

This is a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601, et seq., by the United States of America to enjoin racial discrimination in the rental and sale of housing. The complaint states that defendant follows a policy of furthering segregation in housing and has refused to make available dwellings and negotiate for the sale or rental of housing to Negroes on account of their race. It also alleges that defendant has made statements to the effect that he would not make dwellings available to Negroes in at least one white residential area. Defendant has moved for a more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (e) requesting that the persons with whom he has failed to negotiate and to whom he made statements of racial preference be named, and the specific occasions when such discriminatory acts occurred, and the properties involved be identified.

granted unless the complaint is so unintelligible that the defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading to it. As long as the complaint gives notice of the nature of the claims, it is sufficient. See Schaedler v. Reading Fagle Publication, Inc., 370 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1967). Complaints based on statutes which prohibit discrimination against a general class of citizens need only allege that such a pattern of discrimination has been followed by the defendant and the general way in which he has fostered such discrimination. United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council of St. Louis, 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.Mo. 1966); United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 270 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (discrimination in employment under 42 U.S.C. §2000, et seq.); see United States v. Grav, 39 U.S.L.W. 2057 (D.C.R.I. filed July 14, 1970). Specific instances of discrimination relied on by the government may be determined through discovery.

#### ORDER

AND NOW, this | day of August, 1970, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion for more definite statement

is DENIED.

Sidn R. F. Mann

3

UNITED STATES PROTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff

No. C 70-969

V

EXCLUSIVE MULTIPLE EXCHANGE, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

LAMBROS, DISTRICT JUDGE

Upon consideration, the motion of the defendants for a more definite statement is denied. As stated by the Court in the case of United States v. Pob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F.Supp. 870 (N.D.Ga. 1970) with respect to a similar motion:

"[T]he complaint, couched as it is in the very language of the statute, provides adequate notice of the claim made by plaintiff and is not subject to a motion for more definite statement. Any additional information to which defendant is entitled may be obtained by use of the discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules." Id. at 873; see also United States v. Chirico, Case No. 70-1851 (D.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 1970)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Thomas D. Lambros United States District Judge

DATED. 18/2/

[] 175 - 57 - 157 - 1

### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

ARCO, INC., et al

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. C-70-29

DOCKETED

图第 20 1970

CIVIL RIGHTS

In this action brought by the United States pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 United States Code, §3601, et seq., defendants Robert F. Baird, d/b/a Bair's Realty Company, Edward Davis, d/b/a Edward Davis Realty Company, and Cornette Realty, Inc. have moved for a more definite statement of the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The relevant paragraph of the Complaint alleges:

- Pursuant to a policy and practice, the defendants have for profit induced and attempted to induce the owners of certain dwellings, occupied by white persons, located in the Cherokee Heights subdivision in Memphis, Tennessee, to sell those dwellings by representations regarding the entry and prospective entry of Negroes into the neighborhood. This conduct of the defendants is in violation of Section 804(e) of the Civil Rights. Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C., §3604(e).

In the present Motions, defendants seek a more definite statement indicating the dates, places, and particular circumstances of
the alleged acts and the names and addresses of the persons whom
defendants allegedly induced or attempted to induce to sell their
dwellings.

The Motions came on for hearing on March 13, 1970, and the Court, after full consideration of the issues, orders as follows:

The Motions of defendants Robert F. Baird, d/b/a Bair's Realty Company, Edward Davis, d/b/a Edward Davis Realty Company, and Cornette Realty; Inc., for a more definite statement are overruled. Defendants shall file answers to the Complaint on or before March 30, 1970.

So ORDERED this as day of March, 1970.

United

cates District Judge

A MRUE CORY.

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M. M.S.ID JOSENSON, COM

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# IN THE U FED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

JOSEPH MOELROY, USD, CLERK Y Deputy

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA 3-7243-E

MRS. DEAN MILES, d/b/a DEAN MILES REALTY, et al.

#### ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon defendants' motions for a more definite statement. The pleading in question is the Complaint plaintiff filed under the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., alleging discrimination in housing.

After reviewing the Complaint and the authorities cited by both parties in support of their respective positions, the Court concludes as follows:

With respect to the motions for a more definite statement, the plaintiff has provided sufficient notice to the defendants of the Government's claims to enable them to frame a responsive pleading. The Complaint, paraphrasing the language of the statute itself, meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not subject to a motion for more definite statement. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F.Supp. 870, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The Federal Rules provide ample opportunity for the defendant to discover the facts of plaintiff's case following joinder of the issue.

In consequence of this Court's conclusions, above, defendants' motions for a more definite statement is denied.

Entered this \_\_\_\_\_ day of September, 1973.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

# IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

FILED

Civil Action No. 71-1262

APR 5 1972

MILLER C. PUBLICK, JR., CLERK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff,
)

-versus-

ORDER

J. C. LONG, individually and as Executor for the ESTATE OF FRANK J. SOTTILE, and THE WORTH AGENCY, a partnership,

Defendants.

This matter is before the court upon defendants'

Motion for a More Definite Statement. The pleading in question
is the within Complaint plaintiff filed under Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, alleging discrimination in housing.

After reviewing the Complaint and the authorities cited by both parties in support of their respective positions, it is concluded that plaintiff provided sufficient notice to the defendants of the Government's claims to enable them to frame a responsive pleading. Although plaintiff's Complaint is couched in general terms, and in part follows the language of the statute, it does acquaint the defendants with the character of the victations charged. Such a pleading meets both the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Burris v. Toxaco, Inc., 361 F.2d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1956); United States v. Bruce, 353 P.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1955), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613, the statute under which

#1

United States v. Gustin Bacon, 426 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1970);

United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962). Moreover, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide ample opportunity for the defendants to discover the facts of plaintiff's case following the joinder of issue and because the defendants have already secured two extensions of time in which to frame their responsive pleading it is concluded that the defendants should respond to the Complaint in this case within fifteen days of the entry of this Order.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Charles E. Simons, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Aiken, South Carolina March 31, 1972.

The only ruling that was found which might support a different conclusion is contained in the case of <u>United States v. Gustin-Bacon</u>, 302 F.Supp. 759 (D.Kan. 1969); but that ruling by the District Court was reversed on appeal. 426 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1970).

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COUR OUTTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUL 27 1973

HOUSTON DIVISION

V. BAILEY THOMAS, CLERK
BY DEPUTY: D. Shullman

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Plaintiff, )

V. ) CIVIL ACTION
NO. 72-H-993

THE JIM TUCKER COMPANY, INC., )

Defendant. )

### ORDER

Summary judgment is not a favored resolution of legal conflicts, and where there are genuine issues as to material facts, viewing the inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing a motion, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 8 L.Ed.2d 176, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 7 L.Ed.2d 458, 82 S.Ct. 486 (1962); Harvey v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 388 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1968). The record is clear that the defendant's position is that it has not violated the law in the past by engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Since implementing an Equal Opportunity Program in mid 1972, alleges the defendant, non-discriminatory practices will be even more vigorous in the future with severe actions being taken against non-complying employee-agents. On this record, concludes the defendant, there is no showing of a substantial threat of recurrent future violations which is the prerequisite to an injunction. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); <u>United States v. Oregon State</u>

TRUE COPY I CERTIFY
ATTEST:
V. BAILEY THOMAS, CLERK

Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).

Accepting, but not deciding, the defendant's proposition of law, it is clear that the "burden is a heavy one" upon the defendant to show that there is no such reasonable expectation.

W. T. Grant Co., supra, 345 U.S. at 633, 97 L.Ed. at 1309.

The plaintiff disputes the defendant's position with respect to both past violations and contends that an injunction is necessary, not only to ensure that Mr. Tucker obeys the law, but also to ensure that his agents do so. The affidavits and materials submitted support inferences favorable to the plaintiff, and it appears to this Court that genuine issues do exist as to facts material to alleged past practices as well as to the need for injunctive relief. For these reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

There being no prejudice to the defendant demonstrated by the plaintiff's somewhat tardy filing (a couple of days) of three affidavits, defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits is denied.

In light of the plaintiff's assurances that interviews with agents still associated with the defendant will not be conducted unless the defendant grants permission to conduct such interviews, plaintiff's motion to compel answers to Interrogatory 6 is granted. The answers to Interrogatories 7, 8, 16 and 17 appearing to this Court to be relevant to the subject matter of this action, plaintiff's Motion to Compel Answers is granted. For the same reason, plaintiff's Motion to Produce Documents is granted. Clerk will notify counsel.

DONE at Houston, Texas, this 27 day of July, 1973.

Carl O. Bue, Jr.

United States District Judge

2

### Anited States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE JIM TUCKER COMPANY, INC.

72-H-993 No.

TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been set for pre-trial

, 19 73 , at Houston, Texas 11 a.m. , on August 31 before United States Magistrate Ronald J. Blask, room 12628, 515 Rusk, Houston, Texas

August 2 Date

, 19 73

V. BAILEY THOMAS

Rona O'Quinn

Deputy Clerk.

Clerk.

Mr. Norman P. Goldberg To

Mr. James R. Gough 💉

Mr. John A. Bailey

will be filed on or before
2. All discovery will be completed on or before
3. Jury is is not requested.
4. Estimated duration of trial:
5. Other instructions:
E. Pre-Trial Order, Memoranda of Law and other pretrial material as specified in Judge Bue's <u>Procedures</u> are to be filed with the clerk not less than 3 business days before trial.
7. The case is set for Docket Call and Trial before Judge Bue at  o'clock on  of this case on the docket can be ascertained by contacting the Deputy Clerk.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Settlement negotiations are are not presently in progress. If the case is settled, and such announcement is made prior to trial, settlement papers will be submitted to Judge Bue before the trial date, OR counsel will appear in court on the date of trial to dictate the terms of the settlement into the record and the case will be dismissed at that time, the court retaining jurisdiction for the sole purpose of enforcing settlement. A NOTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT BY TELEPHONE WILL NOT obviate the necessity of appearance on the scheduled trial date.  A COPY OF "PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COUNSEL IN PREPARATION OF CASE FOR TRIAL FOLLOWING PRETRIAL HEARING" IS ENCLOSED. BRING THIS FORM WITH YOU TO THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
Pretrial conference held
H. Lingo Platter, U. S. Magistrate
We agree to and acknowledge the dates set out above, and acknowledge we have received a copy of Judge Bue's <u>Procedures</u> .
Attorney for Plaintiff
Attorney for Defendant

١.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS JUDGE CARL O. BUE, JR.

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COUNSEL IN PREPARATION OF CASE FOR TRIAL FOLLOWING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

I.

### IN GENERAL

The paramount goal in the trial of a case is to accomplish a just result. The following guidelines are designed to assist in achieving such a result. If one or more of these procedures create a problem for counsel in any case, they will be discussed with the court and opposing counsel well in advance of the trial date.

well prepared trials bring about the fairest and most expeditious verdicts. Well prepared counsel present the evidence most fully and clearly and create the most complete record for appeal, if one becomes necessary. The courts and lawyers must conserve the time and minimize the expense of juries, witnesses and the parties. They owe a duty to advance the administration of justice by making the trial an efficient and clear exposition of the real issues. The procedures set forth below are designed to expedite the reaching of a just result without impeding in any way the ability of a lawyer, as an advocate, to present his client's case fully, fairly and effectively:

### PROCEDURES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED

- 1. In this court detailed memoranda of law in support of each party's position must be filed with the clerk at least three business days before the trial, unless some other time is fixed by the court. This rule must be strictly complied with so that the court and the law clerks can be fully acquainted with the case which is to be tried. Such memoranda will dovetail with and support the issues raised by the parties in the Pre-Trial Order. In non-jury cases, counsel should be prepared to argue the case upon conclusion of the evidence, if the court feels it would be helpful in clarifying the issues.
- 2. The <u>Pre-Trial Order</u> will be filed with the clerk along with the memorarda of law at least three business days before trial. It should narrow the issues for the benefit of the court. Points of evidence reasonably anticipated to arise during the trial should also be set out along with supporting legal authorities. The court will review and rule on such questions of admissibility of evidence and objections before the trial commences. The Pre-Trial Order should generally contain the following matters, although the Order should be tailored to the requirements of the individual case:
  - (a) Nature of the case.
  - (b) Specification of issues.
  - (c) Facts stipulated.
  - (d) Pacts in dispute.
  - (e) Agreed applicable propositions of law.
  - (f) lisputed propositions of law.

- (g) Such other information or data as the attorneys may deem pertinent and helpful.
- (h) List of witnesses (except rebuttal witnesses) and a concise but complete summary of the substance of each witness' testimony.
- (i) List of exhibits.
- (j) Estimate of time required for trial.
- 3. In non-jury cases each counsel will prepare and file with the clerk <u>Procosed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law</u> concurrently with the Pre-Trial Order and a Memorandum of Law. These Findings and Conclusions can be amended, if the proof adduced at the trial requires it. The legal authorities supporting each Proposed Conclusion of Law, where appropriate, should be set out directly under each Conclusion for ready reference by the court.

In jury cases each counsel will prepare and file with the clerk concurrently with the Pre-Trial Order and a Memorandum of Law any Proposed Charge including instructions or definitions to the jury along with supporting authorities, where applicable.

Proposed Interrogatories to the Jury should be included by counsel so as to cover all ultimate fact issues to be resolved by the jury.

This court has a duty to insure that a proper jury charge is formulated and submitted to the jury. Counsel have a duty to this court to insure that Proposed Findings and Conclusions in non-jury cases and jury charges in jury cases are as thoroughly and professionally prepared as possible based on the applicable law and the evidence in the case. Such proposals of counsel will be regularly made a part of the record in the case after the jury has been charged and objections to the charge have been heard and ruled upon by the court.

- 4. The court is regularly available for conferences with counsel at a mutually convenient time prior to the trial date, if such a conference is necessary or advantageous to the parties. Mormally, there will be no contact with counsel in the case initiated by the court between the pre-trial conference and the docket call of the case. All settlement discussions should be fully exhausted before the date of trial in order to minimize the expense and conserve the time and effort of the court, the parties and their counsel and the jury.
- 5. Counsel should notify doctors and expert witnesses well ahead of time of the date of the trial so that their depositions can be taken if they will not be available.
- All exhibits, including sketches, models, diagrams or objects must be numbered and marked before the trial starts. All such exhibits will be offered and received in evidence as the first item of business at the trial. At least three business days before the trial starts, those exhibits to which objections are made will be numbered, marked and tendered, and the court will be notified of the objections in writing accompanied by supporting legal authorities, where appropriate. The court will rule on the admissibility of such exhibits before the trial commences, and objections of counsel will be preserved in the record. It is the obligation of any party who wishes to offer exhibits to comply with this procedure by tendering such exhibits to the other party or parties for examination and approval or objections as indicated above. In the absence of unusual circumstances, the court will deny the introduction of exhibits which are not presented pursuant to these guidelines.

- 7. If a portion of any deposition is to be read or summarized, counsel will notify opposing counsel and the court of his intention, (citing pages and lines inclusively) at least three business days before the trial starts (unless the necessity for using a deposition develops unavoidably thereafter). Opposing counsel will note his objections promptly to such portion or portions of the deposition (citing pages and lines inclusively) with supporting authority before the day of trial, and the court will rule on the objections before the trial commences.
- 8. All trials will commence at 10:00 a.m. unless counsel are notified to the contrary. The noon recess will normally run from 12:30 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. In a multi-day trial, the court will normally recess about 4:45 p.m. Counsel should bear in mind these hours of court, notify parties to be on time and arrange for witnesses accordingly. The court will not recess to permit counsel to call a missing witness, unless he has been subpoenaed and has failed to appear. In that case, the matter will be handled as the interests of justice require including the issuance of a bench warrant, where appropriate.
- 9. This court conducts the voir dire examination in jury cases. Counsel may submit proposed questions in writing to be propounded to the jury panel. These will be submitted three business days prior to the commencement of the trial for consideration by the court and, where appropriate, the court will make every effort to ask such questions of the prospective jurors as are thought to be relevant.

- to move their respective portions of the case promptly. Every effort should be made by counsel to elicit from the witnesses only information which is relevant to the issues in the case and to avoid cumulative testimony. If counsel wish the Marshal or Bailiff to summon the witnesses from the witness room as needed, they should supply a list of witnesses to the courtroom clerk before the trial, setting forth the order in which they will be called.
- 11. If counsel will require a blackboard, viewbox or other equipment in the presentation of the case to the court or jury, the courtroom clerk should be advised before the trial commences so that proper arrangements can be made to obtain such equipment in advance, wherever possible.
- 12. Administrative and procedural handling of a case, once it is activated and a pre-trial hearing is held, will frequently require the Deputy Clerk and the law clerks at the request of the Court to be in contact with counsel. As arms of the court such personnel will be extended every courtesy and complete cooperation by the attorneys who will immediately return all telephone calls and promptly answer all written communications relative to their case, once they are received.
- 13. If any other matters arise which are not covered in the above procedures, counsel for the parties will confer with the court well in advance of the trial date.

Carl W. Bue, Jr.

United States District Judge

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the attached Notice of Motion of the United States to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for More Definite Statement and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 4th day of January, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

IN CLERK'S OFFICE

S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

A JAN8 1974

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

P.M.\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

٧.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF DONALD TRUMP AND ROY COHN

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney
Department of Justice
Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB
Chief, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF DONALD TRUMP AND ROY COHN

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Brooklyn, New York 11201

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FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF DONALD TRUMP AND ROY COHN

Ostensibly in support of their pending motions, defendants have filed the affidavits of Donald Trump, a named defendants, and Roy Cohn, their attorney. The only matters before the Court, based on the pleadings hereinbefore filed, are defendants' motions to dismiss the action and for a more definite statement and plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Since such motions are all

addressed exclusively to the pleadings, and require no factual elaboration, and since there is no suggestion in defendants' papers that they seek summary judgment, the affidavits serve no purpose germane to any issue before the Court. The counterclaim seeks the nice round sum of \$100,000,000 in damages, and since defendants announced its filing at a press conference at a major hotel, the inference is reasonable if not compelling that the purpose of the filing of the affidavits was extrajudicial. Since these affidavits accuse the United States and its counsel of misconduct, we think it appropriate, in spite of their irrelevancy to the issues directly before the Court, to file at least a brief response. \*/

### I. Alleged Baselessness of the Complaint

In an affidavit characterized by what must be remarkable powers of extrasensory perception, which enable the affidant to read the mind both of the Court and of opposing counsel, Mr. Cohn has stated under oath, among other things, that:

<sup>\*/</sup> There being no specific matter before the Court for which affidavits would be appropriate, we have not responded by affidavit. Most of the facts discussed herein are based on the pleadings and associated papers previously on file. The remaining facts - primarily those dealing with the press release and with notice of the suit to defendants - are true to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned counsel for the United States, and, so far as we know, undisputed.

- 1. "It appears certain that [the Government] will be entitled to no relief."
- 2. "The Government has no facts to support the charges. If they [sic] did, they would be stated in the complaint. This action was brought to coerce the defendants into making a settlement and nothing more."
- 3. The United States is "merely fishing for facts upon which it can base its case. These facts do not exist and the Government knows they do not exist." (emphasis added)

Mr. Cohn has thus sworn not only that the complaint is baseless, but that he is personally familiar with opposing counsel's malicious state of mind. He claims to know with sufficient certainty to swear to it that counsel for the United States deliberately violated the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Procedure, which forbids counsel from signing a pleading which he knows to be false.

The sole stated basis for Mr. Cohn's certitude that the allegations in the complaint were fabricated by counsel for the United States is that plaintiff did not plead evidence in the complaint, and subsequently propounded interrogatories to defendants. Even the most superficial inquiry would have disclosed to the affiant that evidentiary facts need not and should not be pleaded in a complaint of this nature \*/, and that all parties - including plaintiffs - may

<sup>\*/</sup> See the unanimous line of decisions collected at pages 5-6 and 12-13 of our brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement.

responsible litigant conducts discovery, and there is no basis in reason or authority to suggest that a party's propounding of interrogatories to his adversary implies that its case is in any respect infirm. \*/ Simple interrogatories addressed to plaintiff, which defendants still have not propounded, would have disclosed to the affiant that the United States has evidence of recent acts of discrimination at a substantial number \*\*/ of different Trump complexes together with substantial additional evidence of discrimination provided by the Commission on Human Rights of the City of New York and by other persons and organizations with knowledge of pertinent facts. Accordingly, it is apparent that facts directly contrary to counsel's affidavit were readily ascertainable by the affiant but not ascertained by him prior to filing the affidavit. \*\*\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> See, e.g. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Procter & Gamble</u>, 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958), in which the Supreme Court described how discovery makes a trial "less of a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest."

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This number has since been increased by further investigation and may well rise further as discovery proceeds.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> The very newspaper clippings which counsel attached to his affidavit disclose that the City Commission and the Urban League provided information to the United States, but counsel's affidavits disclose no inquiry with these organizations. There has likewise been no suggestion of an exchange of informal discovery, which would then have been forthcoming, and could have provided defendants with information contrary to the content of Mr. Cohn's affidavit.

### II. Alleged Coercion of Defendants to Settle

Mr. Cohn's affidavit accuses the Government of attempting to bring "unlawful and undue pressure upon the defendants to settle this case" by 'immediately approaching the defendants to quickly terminate the litigation by entering into a Consent Decree dictated by the Civil Rights Division." The allegation of pressure, due or undue, lawful or unlawful, is completely false.

A copy of a letter from counsel to plaintiff responding to an inquiry by counsel for defendants regarding a possible consent decree is attached hereto. The letter, to which defendants never responded, recites that it was sent following a communication by counsel for defendants to Mr. James D. Porter, Jr., Chief of the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's office. On its face, the letter proposed relief customary in suits under 42 U.S.C. 3613, and makes it unmistakably clear that no ultimatum was intended. It relates that "alternative steps" to accomplish the same result [equal housing opportunity] may be given appropriate consideration. It states that counsel for plaintiff is ready to meet and negotiate with counsel for defendants. It explicitly invites counterproposals. The letter also makes it clear that plaintiff does not want negotiations

<sup>\*/</sup> See Ex. 1.

to delay the litigation, \*/ but seeks to achieve equal housing opportunity promptly one way or the other. This is still plaintiff's position, and it is consistent with the Attorney General's responsibilities under 42 U.S.C. 3613.

### III. "Capitulation to the Welfare Department"

At page 3 of his affidavit Mr. Cohn swears that the real purpose of this suit is a press release "announcing the capitulation of the defendants and the substitution of the Welfare Department for the management corporation." In the New York Post of December 12, 1973, Mr. Donald Trump is quoted as claiming that plaintiff is trying to force defendants to rent to welfare recipients ". . . who do not otherwise qualify for our apartments in our buildings." These statements suggest that it has been the policy of the United States to seek to require landlords, including the Trumps, to waive their general rental criteria for persons who are on welfare. This is not true, and the falsity of the allegation is apparent from the face of pertinent documents, especially the amended consent decree in United States v. Life Realty Inc., Civil Action No. 70 C 964, copy attached hereto.\*\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> Or, for that matter, dilatory motions addressed to pleadings, where the facts sought to be elicited by such motions can so easily be secured through interrogatories.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Ex. 2.

No proposal has ever been communicated by plaintiff to defendants at all about welfare recipients. The only possible basis for defendants' accusations about this is the consent decree negotiated with <a href="Life Realty Co.">Life Realty Co.</a>, which was given to defendants at the request of Mr. Abraham Lindenbaum, who was then acting as their counsel and asked the United States Attorney's office to provide him with a copy. In fact, the letter from counsel to plaintiff to present counsel for defendants' dated November 7, 1973 responding to defendants' expressed interest in a consent decree, contains no mention of welfare recipients at all. \*/

The consent decree in <u>Life Realty Co</u>.--even if it had been proposed to defendants as a model for this case, which it was not - does not require the Life Realty Co. to rent to persons on welfare who fail to meet the landlord's standard rental qualifications. On the contrary, the decree requires defendants to rent to all applicants

<sup>\*/</sup> A copy of this letter is attached hereto. Mr. Cohn is therefore in the curious position of having sworn, in effect,

that the United States has brought this suit to put unqualified welfare recipients into Trump buildings; and yet

that it has sought to bludgeon the defendants into signing a consent decree which makes no mention of welfare recipients.

equally, regardless of the source of an applicant's funds, \*/ on the basis of the rental standards previously negotiated by the parties and approved by the Court. In fact, a black woman who is also a welfare recipient brought suit against the United States and its officers, as well as against Life Realty Co., et al., alleging that the consent decree discriminated against persons on welfare.

The Court found no basis for the suit against the United States.

Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. N.Y. 1972). Accordingly, the attribution of this malign purpose to the United States is not only inconsistent with the other evil deeds which Mr. Cohm has ascribed to us, but also lacks any support whatever in the record of this case or of any other case.

<sup>\*/</sup> If they were unable or unwilling to read the <u>Life Realty</u> decree before filing their affidavits, Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohn could have contacted the voluble Mr. Samuel Lefrak of Life Realty. Mr. Lefrak is quoted in the New York Times of December 13, 1973 as expressly denying that the consent decree in <u>Life Realty</u> requires him to rent to persons on welfare who do not meet the other objective rental standards, Mr. Lefrak's explanation in the New York Times conforms to the provisions of the consent decree.

### IV. Notice to Defendants

The affidavit of Donald Trump alleges that he was "shocked" to hear that this suit had been brought, because he had not received any "formal communication whatever" about the subject matter of this action, and because "the first I head about it was on my car radio the morning of the 15th," the date the complaint was filed. Mr. Trump's words are carefully chosen to make it appear that the suit was a complete surprise based on no investigation, and that news of it was released to the press without defendants being notified. That is quite different from what in fact occurred.

First, we note that, unlike defendants, the United States held no press conference in which the "real motivations" of their adversaries were discussed, intuitively or otherwise. A simple press release, a copy of which is attached, and which states no facts about the Trumps which are not in the Complaint, was released to the press shortly after the Complaint was filed and had become a matter of public record. The case was certainly one of general public interest, and it is both the right and the responsibility of the Public Information Office of the Department of Justice to disclose matters of public record to the press. Equal housing opportunity would provide little practical benefit to anybody if steps to assure it were taken secretly, so that prospective beneficiaries could never learn of them.

<sup>\*/</sup> See Ex. 3.

Even if defendants' allegations that news of the suit was released to the media before the defendants were notified were true, this would not have been unlawful. Unlike some other civil rights statutes, \*/ 42 U.S.C. 3613 does not require pre-suit notice to or negotiations with prospective defendants. See <u>United States</u> v. <u>Luebke</u> 345 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1972). Even though no such notice is required, however, it is the general practice of the Civil Rights Division to notify defendants of suits, as a matter of courtesy, before the media report them, and this procedure was followed in the present case. The defendants have seriously distorted the events which occurred when suit was filed by omitting critical facts from their affidavits.

This suit was filed shortly after 10:00 A.M. on October 15, 1973. Shortly thereafter, Departmental Attorney Judith Wolf telephoned both Mr. Durban of Durban and Tosti, attorneys and statutory agents for the defendants, and defendant Donald Trump and advised each that the suit had been filed. This was accomplished no later than 10:30 A.M., well in advance of any dissemination of the news by the media, for the press release was not issued until after the case was filed. Mr. Trump expressed no awareness of the suit when Ms. Wolf spoke to him.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{*}{\text{E.g.}}$  42 U.S.C. 2000c-(6) (school desegregation); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a) (employment discrimination suits by private parties).

Mr. Trump's affidavit fails to mention Ms. Wolf's telephone call at all, except by the artful use of the phrase "no formal communication" in denying notice of the suit. By claiming that no "formal" communication was received, Mr. Trump implicitly admits - as he must - that he received what he chooses to characterize as "informal" notice by means of Ms. Wolf telephone call. We submit that the presentation of this incident by affidavit without any mention of an event which completely changed the character of the transaction has the foreseeable effect of misleading anyone who reads it.

### CONCLUSION

Were it not for the extraordinary intimations of impropriety in the affidavits submitted by defendants, we would not have burdened the Court with material which is so remote from the merits of the motions now before the Court. We believe, however, that the foregoing discussion conclusively establishes the propriety of the conduct of counsel for the United States and the baselessness of the sworn changes submitted on behalf of defendants. The existence of substantial basis for the suit will be demonstrated beyond peradventure if defendants ever get around to a serious effort to elicit the facts by discovery.

If the entire controversy has any relevance to the issues in this case, it is to establish that defendants and their counsel made serious but baseless allegations, the insubstantiality of which could easily have been discovered by them.

Respectfully submitted,

MENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney

Brooklyn, New York

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

Elyse S. Goldwebol ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C.

JSP:FES:ESG:cmk DJ 175-52-28

> Mr. Michael Rosen Saxe, Bacon, Bollan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York City, New York 10021

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management Inc. C.A. No. 73 C 1529

### Dear Mr. Rosen:

I am writing to you in response to information that Jim Porter has conveyed to me indicating that your clients might be interested in negotiating a Consent Decree with the United States in the above-mentioned lawsuit. This Department, while certainly not desiring to delay the litigative process is at the same time amenable to affording the defendants the opportunity to enter into a Consent Decree. If a Consent Decree could be negotiated, the question whether there have been violations in the past need not be resolved, and any such decree would ordinarily be entered without adjudication of the merits.

The specifics of a Consent Decree, of course, depend on the specifics of each case, and if your clients are interested in negotiating a Decree, it will be necessary for us to obtain further information in order to formulate the details of appropriate relief. However, on the basis of the information we have as a result of our investigation prior to the filing of the complaint in this action, we believe the Decree should prohibit all discriminatory practices and should include, at a minimum, provisions such as those described below. Let me stress that these provisions are not necessarily exhaustive, and that alternative steps to accomplish the same result may be given appropriate consideration:

- 1. Instructing all employees in detail as to their responsibilities under the civil rights laws and under the Consent Decree;
- 2. Including in all advertising, leases, brochures and other materials relating to renting of apartments, an appropriate fair housing statement, such as the slogan and logotype approved by HUD;
- 3. Taking appropriate steps to acquaint blacks and Puerto Ricans with their opportunity to live at Trump buildings. This might be accomplished by advertising on a periodic basis in media which primarily serve the non-white community the availability of apartments in all geographical areas, and by sending vacancy reports on a periodic basis to local groups which assist black and Pearto Rican persons in obtaining housing;
- 4. Devising and implementing an affirmative action program for the recruitment and hiring of black and Puerto Rican superintendents and renting agents:
- 5. Devising and implementing objective and uniform rental standards, and procedures:
- 6. Placing victims of unlawful discriminatory practices, as far as possible, in their rightful place including financial compensation as appropriate;
- 7. Periodically sending to the court and to this Department reports on the implementation of the Consent Decree, so that the effectiveness of the steps taken may be evaluated. Maintenance of appropriate records with

racial identification would be necessary to enable us to make an appropriate evaluation of the adequacy the affirmative action program.

It would also be necessary, during the discussion of a Consent Decree, for our representatives to inspect appropriate company records and obtain certain information pertinent to relief.

We will, of course, be happy to meet with you and your clients to discuss the terms of a Consent Decree consistent with the principles set forth herein, as well as any counterproposals which you may have. Please feel free to contact me at (202) 739-4132 if you have any questions concerning the matters set forth in this letter.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney
Housing Section

cc: Mr. Jim Porter
Assistant United States Attorney

RAM: TO F. 700827

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

-against-

LIFE REALTY, INC., et al.

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

Civil Action No. 70 C 964

I. The Apartment Leasing Corporation of America (Leasing), which manages all the buildings which are listed

on Attachment "A" hereto, submits to the jurisdiction of this Court, and warrants to the Court that it has the power and authority to carry out the provisions of those paragraphs of this Order directed to it, subject to liability for contempt for failure to carry out such provisions. Said Leasing

consents to be a party-defendant to this action, without

amendment of the complaint. Accordingly, IT IS SO ORDERED.

II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the complaint against the following individuals: Samuel J. Lefrak, Anthony Cuccia and Rheba Gelman, is dismissed against them in their personal capacities, with prejudice as to the allegations with respect to the buildings set forth in Attachment "A" hereto, predating this Order.

III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Life Realty, Inc., Leasing, their agents, employees, successors 1/2, and all

I/ For the purpose of this order the term "successors" shall be defined as follows: The successors of Life Realty, Inc. include any person or group of persons who in the future may act as rental agent for any of the buildings in Brooklyn rented by Life Realty, Inc. at the time this decree is entered, unless the ownership of any such building shall be changed in a bona fide arms' length transaction.

Further, for the purpose of this Order the successors of Apartment Leasing Corporation of America shall include any person or group of persons who in the future may act as managing agent for the buildings in Brooklyn listed on Attachment "A" hereto, unless both the ownership and management of any such building in Attachment "A" shall be changed in a bona fide arms' length transaction. The defendants will notify the plaintiff at least thirty (30) days prior to any projected transfer of title.

those in active concert or participation with any of them are permanently enjoined with regard to the buildings in Brooklyn named on Attachment "A", from: A. Representing to any person, because of race, color, religion or national origin, that any dwelling is unavailable for inspection or rental, when such dwelling is in fact available; and Making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion or national origin. IV. In order to assure nondiscriminatory assignment of tenants, and to encourage integration of the buildings listed on Attachment "A" hereto, Life Realty, Inc. will A. Maintain a date and time-punch clock in its rental office in Brooklyn, and stamp every application which is submitted together with a \$25.00 deposit, with the date and time of filing; B. On Wednesday of each week, compile a list of apartments for which Life Realty, Inc. is rental agent, believed to be available for rent, including the size, rent, (specifying whether utilities are included), the address of the building, and the probable date when a new tenant may take occupancy; Display such list of available apartments at all times after it is compiled in a prominent place in its Brooklyn office, and include on the current weekly list all apartments available for rent; Eliminate from said list apartments for which incumbent tenants have reserved orally or in writing since its listing, or for which application with a \$25.00 deposit has been received, by striking such apartment from the list. Whenever application is made for any apartment appearing upon the list, the application shall be recorded with the name and race of the applicant as provided for in paragraph E. below, and date and time of filing in a daily log, as more fully set forth below. Maintain for two years from the entry of this decree, as a daily log, all applications filed (retaining the original applications), with the following information: 2/ As used in the remainder of this Order, the terms "Defendant" or "Defendants", or the named defendants, include employees, agents, successors, assigns, and all those acting in concert or participation with any of them. ~ 2 ~

. 1. The name of the applicant and his or her race (Black, White or Other) as perceived by the defendants agents, unless race has been voluntarily furnished by the applicant on a form such as the one attached hereto as Attachment "B' 2. The building, the apartment applied for, the date and time of filing, whether the applicant was accepted or rejected and, if the applicant was rejected, the reason therefor. F. Accept applications only for specific available units in the Brooklyn buildings appearing on Attachment "A" hereto, and will not take applications which fail to specify a particular unit; G. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, mail to every tenant in the buildings listed on Attachment "A" hereto the first list of available apartments to be published pursuant to paragraph B. above, together with a statement that such apartments are available on a first-come, first-served basis (provided that the applicant meets the qualifications set forth in Part 7. of this Order), and ×. that similar lists may thereafter be viewed at Life Realty, Inc. offices at 1790 Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. The defendants will: Post and maintain in the Life Realty, Inc. offices in Brooklyn, in a prominent place, where it is clearly visible to all applicants, a sign reading as follows: "UNDER THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968, ALL APARTMENTS RENT-ED THROUGH THIS OFFICE SHALL BE AVAILABLE WITHOUT REGARD TO RACE, COLOR, RELIGION OR NATIONAL ORI-GIN"

B. Through a joint press release with the plaintiff, or otherwise, communicate to the general public, including members of minority groups, their policy favoring integration in housing;

c. Adopt and implement the following standard procedure for approval of all applicants for apartments:

1. All applicants will indicate upon their applications:

(a) Home address, age, sex, marital status and name of spouse, relative or other person who will live in the apartment;

- (b) Employment, address of employer, gross salary, net salary after withholding tax, other income and obligations on installment contracts, conditional sales, bank loans, finance company loans, mortgage loans, payments required to be made on judgments, garnishments, and all other information showing, on a monthly basis, the obligations (in amounts) of the applicant; and the same information, together with the age for any working spouse or other person who will live in the apartment;
- (c) The name of any bank in which any or all adult applicants maintain either a checking account or savings account;
- (d) Former residence and landlord of all prospective occupants;
- 2. The information furnished pursuant to paragraphs (a) through (d) above, will be verified by defendints and if it proves accurate, an appropriate indication will be made on the application or on an accompanying form as to whether verification has been made;
- 3. If the applicant is rejected, the reasons for the rejection shall be entered upon the application and the applicant will be informed within five days thereafter of the fact of his rejection;
- 4. If the information furnished by the applicant has been verified by defendants, and if he has been a satisfactory tenant at his prior residence, and if his net income per week, after deduction of the obligations listed in V. C. 1. (b) of this Order on a weekly basis, proves to be equal to at least 90% of the monthly rental of the apartment for which he has applied, no further investigation shall be conducted, and the applicant shall be accepted or rejected on the basis of information already available. No applicant shall be rejected for failure to have a checking or savings account at a commercial bank, if said failure was truthfully stated by the applicant in his application;
- 5. If any item furnished by the applicant cannot be verified, or if he has proved to be an unsatisfactory tenant at his prior residence, or if his net weekly income

as defined above is less than 90% of the monthly rental, such further and additional investigation may be conducted as may be judged necessary to determine the applicant's acceptability as a tenant, provided only that the extent of such additional investigation may not be determined or affected by the applicant's race, color, religion or national origin.

VI. A. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, Life Realty, Inc. will mail to each tenant in the buildings known as the West Point, Cornell, Princeton, Purdue, Syracuse, Northwestern and Clarkson Terrace, a notice in the form attached hereto as Attachment "C", and the-defendants-shall carry out the obligations described in said Attachment "C", which is made a part of this Order by reference.

B. Beginning no more than thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order, Life Realty, Inc. will maintain in its Brooklyn office a weekly "Special List" to be posted on Wednesday morning of each week, showing all those apartments known to be available in any building on Attachment "A" (other than those named in paragraph A. hereof), which will be available for occupancy no less than four weeks from the posting date. This special list will specify the price, size, rental, and whether utilities are included in the rent, and the date on which the apartment will be available for occupancy.

C. The special list described in paragraph B. above shall be available by written application with a \$25.00 deposit until 5:00 P.M. of each Friday, exclusively to tenants of the seven buildings named in paragraph A. above, whose occupancy, as determined by lease date, shall have commenced after January 1, 1969 and prior to August 1, 1970. After 5:00 P.M. on each Friday the apartments on the special list shall be incorporated into the general list described in Part IV., paragraphs B. and C. of this Order.

D. Tenants in the aforementioned seven buildings who apply for any apartment on either the special or regular list at least four weeks prior to projected occupancy, and who qualify for said apartment under Part V. C. of this Order, will be released from their lease obligation and permitted to take occupancy of the new apartment without any penalty or sacrifice of security deposit, except in relation to liability for damage to the apartment vacated.

terminate after one year from the first posting pursuant hereto, or after fifty (50) families of the named buildings shall have transferred to other buildings pursuant hereto, whichever is sooner.

VII. A. The defendants will, beginning ten (10) days after the entry of this Order, maintain the following records:

C Ç

- 1. The log of applications described in Part IV. above, such log to designate tenants transferring pursuant to Part VI. hereof;
- 2. All applications, whether accepted or rejected, with accompanying credit checks and leases. Defendants will keep these records available for periodic inspection by the plaintiff's representatives for two years from the entry of this Order.
- B. No less than three months and ten days from the entry of this Order, and thereafter at three-months intervals for two years, the defendants will prepare and send to counsel for plaintiff, reports including the following data: The total number of applications received, indicating the buildings for which applications were made; the name, address and race of the applicant; whether or not the applicant was accepted or rejected and, if rejected, the reason for the rejection. Defendants may fulfill their obligations under this paragraph by

forwarding to the plaintiff at the prescribed intervals copies of the log which they have kept pursuant to Part IV. of this Order. In addition to the foregoing, the defendants shall mail to counsel for plaintiff, as part of each report. a copy of each special list as defined in Part VI. B. of this Order. All notices and reports shall be addressed to Chief, Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. - 20530.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that whenever any future complaint arises under the provisions of this Order, except where the Government determines that there exists a need for emergency relief threatening the effectiveness of this decree, the Government shall furnish the defendants the name of the person who made such complaint and a brief description of the nature and substance of the complaint, including the date of the alleged incident and the building with respect to which the complaint was made. after, the defendant shall have fifteen (15) days from the date notice is received of such complaint and the nature thereof, to investigate such complaint, and if the complaint is determined by defendants to be valid, to advise the Government what steps, if any, have been taken to correct the conditions leading to the complaint; or, if the complaint is determined by defendants to be invalid, to advise the Government of the basis for determining the complaint to be invalid, before the Government shall apply to this Court with any motion for an Order to Show Cause or any other motion to compel compliance with this Order. the Government determines that a situation has arisen threatening the effectiveness of this decree, and that there is a need for emergency relief, notice to the defendants shall be by telephone without the filing of any papers; and the Court, after consulting orally with both

- 7 -

parties by telephone, shall decide whether an emergency exists. If the Court determines that an emergency in fact exists, plaintiff may proceed to move for immediate relief without necessity for the fifteen (15) days' notice provided herein.

IX. Two years from the date this decree is entered, or thereafter, the defendants may move to dissolve this Order. If the United States fails to interpose any objection within thirty (30) days of the Notice of Motion, the injunction shall be dissolved and the complaint dismissed without a hearing or further Order of the Court.

X. No costs incurred prior to the date of this Order shall be assessed against the defendants in light of their agreement to take the affirmative steps described in this Order and in the simultaneous extrinsic agreement between the parties to this Order.

XI. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York, January 28, 1971.

> UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Without any adjudication of the merits, and without any admission by any party as to the existence or absence of liability, the undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of the above Order.

FOR THE PLAINT	'IF'F'
* W-	
Cerus Leonard	
JERRIS LEONARD	•
Assistant Attorney General	
Civil Rights Division	
U. S. Department of Justice	
Schward R. Makes	•
/	••
EDWARD R. NEAHER	
United States Attorney	
Eastern District of New York	
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ROBERT A. MORSE	The second section of the second section is a second section of the second section section is a second section of the second section s
Chief Assistant, U. S. Attorney	
Eastern District of New York	
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FRANK E. SCHWELB	•
Chief, Housing Section	
Civil Rights Division	
Department of Justice	
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MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN	•
Attorney, Department of Justice	
•	
Richa D L. Martes	
Richard L. Mailes	
RICHARD L. MASTER	•
Attorney, Department of Justice	
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FOR THE DEFEND	ANTS
Millerson & Allegrees	
ANDERSON & ALLEGAERT	•
Attorneys for Life Realty, Inc.	
NO CARlem Billehem Sh	aus & bude
COLDEDELM CHORELM CHAMES & HADE	
GOLDSTEIN, GURFEIN, SHAMES & HYDE Attorneys for Agartment Leasing Cor	moration of America
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lonal Hill	•
TEOMARD CONORDIAN	

IRWIN SCHOFFMAN / President, Apartment Leasing Corporation of America

# ATTACHMENT "A"

ATTACHMENT "A"						
	OWNER	ADDRESSES IN BROOKLYN,	NEW	YORK		
	Amherst Leasing Corp. Annapolis Leasing Corp. Arcadia Leasing Corp. Atlantis Leasing Corp.	845 - 43rd Street 2815 Coyle Street 3232 Shore Parkway 3235 Emmons Avenue	•			
٥	Bel Air Leasing Corp. Belt Parkway Constr. Corp. Buick Leasing Corp.	2775 East 12th Street 2625 East 15th Street 2626 Homecrest Avenue				
	Citadel Leasing Corp. Colgate Leasing Corp. Cornell Leasing Corp.	1 Prospect Park Southwe 4411 Church Avenue 665 New York Avenue	est			
	Dakota Leasing Company Danbury Leasing Company Dartmouth Leasing Corp. Delaware Leasing Company District Leasing Corp. Dodge Leasing Corp. Dover Leasing Corp.	2425 Nostrand Avenue 388 Avenue X 4114 Ninth Avenue 7705 Bay Parkway 250 East 38th Street 950 Rutland Road 2375 East 3rd Street	•			
	Georgetown Leasing_Corp.	170 East 4th Street				
	Hampton Leasing Corp. Harvard Leasing Corp. Hollywood Leasing Corp.	3205 Emmons Avenue 4190 Bedford Avenue 2750 Homecrest Avenue				
	Iowa Leasing Company	2401 Nostrand Avenue				
	Kings Highway Property Corp	.3900 Kings Highway				
	Life Management Corp.	2021 East 41st Street		-		
	Minnesota Leasing Corp. Montauk Leasing Corp.	1145 East 35th Street 3191 Emmons Avenue				
	National Realty Co. National Realty Co. National Realty Co. Nautilus Leasing Corp. Newport Leasing Company North Carolina Leasing Co. Northwestern Leasing Corp.	1640 Ocean Parkway 8301 Bay Parkway 35 Pierrepont Street 2790 Bragg Street 444 Avenue X 2501 Nostrand Avenue 452 East 96th Street				
	Oxford Leasing Corp.	288 Bay 38th Street	•.			
	Plymouth Leasing Corp. Pontiac Leasing Corp. Portland Leasing Corp. Purdue Leasing Corp.	410 Avenue X 2611 East 13th Street 2411 East 3rd Street 450 Rockaway Parkway				
	Rakfel Realty Corp. Rakfel Realty Corp. Rakfel Realty Corp. Regent Leasing Co.	2047 Nostrand Avenue 2054 Nostrand Avenue 2064 Nostrand Avenue 1035 Clarkson Avenue	,			
	Stanford Leasing Corp. Syracuse Leasing Corp.	1625 Rockaway Parkway 1115 Willmohr Street				
	Tri Buildings Tri Buildings	7410 Ridge Boulevard 7420 Ridge Boulevard				
	Virginia Gardens, Inc.	3502 Kings Highway				
	West Point Leasing Corp. Westport Leasing Corp. Wetherole Holding Corp. Wisconsin Leasing Co.	333 East 92nd Street 2800 Coyle Street 295 Clinton Avenue 1201 Ocean Parkway				

# ATTACHMENT "B"

# TO ALL APPLICANTS:

In order to promote nondiscrimination in housing in accordance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, please check one of the following as to your race or national origin, IF YOU CHOOSE TO DO SO.

White
Black
Other

Failure to answer will not adversely affect your chance of getting an apartment.

(Please Print) NAME

# ATTACHMENT "C"

TO TENANTS WHOSE OCCUPANCY COMMENCED AFTER JANUARY 1, 1969 AND BEFORE AUGUST 1, 1970:

Dear Tenant:

We would like to offer you on a limited basis the following opportunity. If you desire to move to other of our buildings in Brooklyn, we will allow you to move without any penalty except for property damage to your present apartment. In addition, if you are accepted for another apartment, we will credit you towards the first month's rent of the new apartment to the extent of one month's rent of your present apartment. In other words, you will not have to pay the first month's rent on the new apartment, except to the extent that the new rent is higher than your present rent. However, if the new apartment rental is less than the rent you are now paying, you will receive the difference between the old monthly rent and the new rent for the first month, in cash, as well as your first month's rent free.

This offer applies only to those apartments appearing on lists available at Life healty Corp., 1790 Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, for occupancy not less than four (4) weeks from the date of application. This offer will expire when the first fifty (50) tenants have transferred under its terms, and in any event will expire one year from the date of this letter.

If you have any questions regarding this special offer, call Mr. Howard Jacobs at IL. 9-9021, or Mrs. Rheba Gelman at Life Realty Corp., 1790 Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, telephone CL 8-9090.

Very truly yours,

APARTMENT LEASING CORPORATION OF AMERICA.

## EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 70 C 964

-against-

LIFE REALTY, INC., et al.,

AMENDMENT TO CONSENT ORDER OF JANUARY 28, 1971

Defendants.

Upon the report of the parties dated December 6, 1971, a copy of which is annexed hereto, the Consent Decree, entered on January 28, 1971, in this case is hereby amended so that paragraph V, c, 4 shall be:

4. If the information furnished by the applicant has been verified by defendants, and if he has been a satisfactory tenant at his prior residence, and if his net income per week, after deduction of the obligations listed in V, c, l (b) of this Order on a weekly basis, proves to be equal to at least 90% of the monthly rental of the apartment for which he has applied or his payment of rent shall be guaranteed by a legally enforceable contract by a duly authorized government agency, no further investigation shall be conducted, and the applicant shall be accepted or rejected on the basis of information already available.

# EXHIBIT A, continued

No applicant shall be rejected for failure to have a checking or savings account at a commercial bank, if said failure was truthfully stated by the applicant in his application;

Dated: Brooklyn, New York December 22, 1971.

> Jack Weinstein United States District Judge

The parties, by their attorneys, consent to the entry of this amendment to the Consent Order.

For the Plaintiff:

For the Defendants:

ROBERT A. MORSE United States Attorney Eastern District of New York GOLDSTEIN, SHAMES & HYDE Attorneys for Defendants

Bv:

EDWARD BRODSKY

A Member of the Firm

FRANK E. SCHWELD Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant United States Attorney Eastern District of New York

RICHARD L. MASTER
Attorney, Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

# EXHIBIT B

Section 604-4.0 -- Administrative Code of the City of New York provides:

- The Commissioner of Social Services shall have the power to and may, within the amount appropriated therefore, enter into a contract to make to the owner, landlord, lessee, managing agent of, or other person entitled to rent and receive rental payments for, housing accommodations whenever (a) a recipient of public assistance and care has neglected or failed to make rental payment and payment has not otherwise been made, or (b) a housing accommodation is vacant and the owner, landlord, lessee, managing agent or such other person agrees in such contract to hold such housing accommodation vacant and to accept as a new tenant a recipient of public assistance and care designated by the commissioner, and until such housing accommodation is occupied by and rental payments are made by such new tenant; provided, however, that no rental payment shall be made in accordance with this provision if such housing accommodation remains vacant for more than 60 days.
- (2) The commissioner shall not be deemed to have assumed the duties of a tenant under lease because he has entered into a contract to make rental payments.

### EXHIBIT C

### NOTICE TO WELFARE RECIPIENTS

Before you fill out an application for an apartment in a Lefrak building, please consider the following:

The Lefrak organization treats all applicants for apartments equally, regardless of race, color, religion or national origin, and regardless of whether or not the applicant receives public assistance.

The Lefrak organization will take an application from a welfare recipient, just as from anyone else. The rental standards which it uses apply to all applications regardless of the source of an individual applicant's money. The rental standards include economic standards which are as follows:

NO APPLICANT WILL BE ACCEPTED AS A TENANT BY LEFRAK UNLESS HIS NET WEEKLY INCOME IS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 90% OF THE MONTHLY RENTAL FOR THE APARTMENT FOR WHICH HE APPLIES,

OR

THE APPLICANT SECURES A PRIVATE GUARANTOR ACCEPTABLE TO LEFRAK

OR

THE APPLICANT'S PAYMENT OF RENT SHALL BE GUARANTEED BY A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BY A DULY AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT AGENCY.

This means, for example, that if you apply for an apartment which rents for \$175 per month, your application cannot be seriously considered unless you receive at least \$155 per week in benefits. If an apartment rents for \$200 per month, you must receive at least \$180 per week in benefits in order to be seriously considered.



# Department of Justice

EXHIBIT 3

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1973

CR

The Department of Justice filed a civil suit today charging an apartment management firm that controls more than 14,000 units in the New York City metropolitan area with discriminating against black persons in the operation of their buildings.

Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson said the housing discrimination suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, New York.

Named as defendants were Trump Management, Inc., its principal stockholder and board chairman, Fred C. Trump, and its president, Donald Trump.

The defendants own and manage some 39 apartment buildings, principally in Brooklyn and Queens.

The suit said the defendants have violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by refusing to rent and negotiate rentals with blacks, requiring different rental terms and conditions because of race, and misrepresenting that apartments are not available.

The suit asked for a court order enjoining the defendants from practising racial discrimination in the operation of their apartment buildings and requiring them to correct the effects of their alleged discriminatory conduct.

Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger, head of the Civil Rights Division, said the suit is the Justice Department's second major rental discrimination case in the New York metropolitan area.

The first suit, involving about 10,000 rental units controlled by

Life Realty Company, was resolved by a consent decree under which black

and Puerto Rican occupancy at previously all-white buildings rose substantially,

Mr. Pottinger said.

He also said the Trump case was referred to the Justice Department by the New York City Commission on Human Rights and was based in part on allegations made by Operation Open City, which is affiliated with the Urban League.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the attached Notice of Motion of the United States to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for More Definite Statement and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and a copy of the attached Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 4th day of January, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

★ JAN 1 a 1974 ☆

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

TIME A.M....STIPULANION

Civil Action File No. 73 C 1529

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, attorney for the plaintiff, and Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, attorneys for the defendants, that defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and for a more definite statement and Government's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim is hereby adjourned to January 25, 1974.

Dated: New York, New York January 9, 1974

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V

United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
Attorney for Plaintiff

Ву

By KINY

WENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants

SO ORDERED:

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

varo R. Nlahe

U.S.D.J.

(15)

> DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW Attorneys for Defendants
39 EAST 68th STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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•

73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

----X

DEFENDANTS REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The defendants have moved to dismiss the government's complaint for failure to state a cause of action or for a more definite statement, and have filed a compulsory counterclaim. All of these actions were taken in order to prevent a clear abuse of the Federal pleading rules and a trend by the government to exert pressure on defendants to settle with them by unfair publicity.

In the instant case, even before the defendants were served with the summons and complaint, the radio and T.V. newscasters reported the case and the newspapers were carrying banner headlines proclaiming that a "major landlord is accused of anti-black bias in the city" (N.Y. Times, October 16, 1973, p.1), and "U.S. suit against Trump charges bias in renting" (Daily News, October 16, 1973).

The government's memorandum in response to affidavits submitted by defendant and his attorneys attempts to mask the true purpose of these news releases, claiming that their intent was to benefit the public. The practical benefit to the public is extremely doubtful since there are no facts whatever stated in the complaint. It's only real purpose is obviously to pressure the defendants into a premature settlement.

The government's claim that defendants are guilty of some wrong by holding a news conference is utterly hypocritical. The defendants purpose was to alert the citizens of New York, as well as the tenants residing in Trump buildings, that the charges against them were unfounded and unproven and especially that the government had not won the case; but that they had merely filed a complaint.

The complaint in this case contains not one factual allegation and there is no case which permits this. The government has attempted to put the burden on the defendants to supply all of the facts that they lack. The situation is analagous to an indictment in a criminal action which contains but one line charging a defendant with arson and then requiring that defendant to hire investigators to disprove the charge.

The government throughout its memorandum of law cites to unreported cases. An analysis of each opinion shows that not one case supports their argument in opposition to defendants motions. The cases break down into two major groups.

The first are those in which the government supplied facts in their complaint which are totally absent from the complaint in the instant action. The second major group contains decisions in which there is no discussion by the court and so no conclusions may be reached as regards them. There are a few cases which do not fit into either of these groups and they are discussed separately. A case by case analysis as listed in the government's table of contents in the "unreported cases cited. . "follows:

CASES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPLAINT CONTAINS FACTS TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS CHARGES

United States v. Raymond, Civil Action No. 73-119 CIV-T-H (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 1973).

United States v. Gilman, Civil Action No. 70-Civil 1967(S.D. N.Y., July 28,1970.

United States v. Miller, Civil Action No.70-40 (D.Md. April 27, 1970).

United States v. Chirico, Civil Action No. 70-1851 (E.D. Pa. August 12, 1970)

United States v. Arco, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-29 (W.D. Tenn., March 20, 1970).

### CASES IN WHICH THERE IS NO DISCUSSION IN THE DECISION

United States v. Watson, Civil Action No. 73-97 (M.D. La., May 15, 1973).

United States v. Pelzer Realty Company, Inc., Civil Action No. 3284-N (M.D. Ala. July 16, 1971).

United States v. Davis, Civil Action No. 6451-71(S.D. Ala. May 18, 1971).

United States v. Goldberg, Civil Action No.70-1223-CIV-CF (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1970).

United States v. PMC Development Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 13578 (N.D. Ga., July 28, 1970.

United States v. Palm Beach Listing Bureau, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-379-CIV-C (S.D. Fla. May 5, 1970).

United States v. H. G. Smithy, Civil Action No. 21470 (D. Md. April 17, 1970).

United States v. Management Clearing, Inc., Civil Action No. 70-23-PHX (CAM) (D. Ariz. April 8, 1970).

United States v. Margurette Jones, Civil Action No. 71-H-279 (S.D. Tex. April 30, 1971).

United States v. Exclusive Mutual Exchange, Civil Action No. C-70-969 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 1971).

United States v. Mrs. Dean Miles, et al., Civil Action No.
C.A.-3-7243-E (N.D. Tex. Sept., 1973).

United States v. J.C. Long, Civil Action No. 71-1262 (D.S.C. April 3, 1972).

### MISCELLANEOUS CASES CITED BY THE GOVERNMENT

United States v. City of Parma, Civil Action No. C-73-439 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1973).

The motions in this case were based on the defendant's argument that municipalities or political subdivisions are not persons against whom a suit may be brought and in addition, facts are apparently presented in the complaint.

United States v. Robbins, Civil Action No. 73-848 CIV-JE  $\overline{\text{(S.D. Fla., June }}$  22, 1973).

A copy of the decision was not included in the Orders given to the defendants.

United States v.A.B. Smythe, Inc., Civil Action No. C-69-885 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1970).

The motion to dismiss was based on exemptions and the unconstitutionality of the statute alleged to have been violated.

United States v. Jim Tucker Co., Civil Action No.72-H-993 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1972).

This was a motion for summary judgment not for a motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement.

### IN SUMMARY

In the decisions in which there is some discussion, it is seen that the government supplied facts in the complaint in addition to a mere recitation of the statutes as they have done in the instant case.

### POINT I

# GOVERNMENT'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED

The government's complaint should be dismissed. In opposition to this, the government has cited <u>Conly</u> v. <u>Gibson</u>, 355 U.S.41(1957), the decision, especially that portion quoted in the government's memorandum, could well have been cited by defendants in support of their motions.

In <u>Conly</u>, supra, the court said that they would not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, but that it <u>would</u> require "<u>fair notice</u> of what the plaintiff's claim is and <u>the grounds upon which</u> it rests," (47-48) [emphasis supplied].

The government has entirely failed to give defendants fair notice of the grounds although they attempt to get around the court's direction by claiming it is alright if what is lacking is "evidentiary details such as names, dates, places, etc." The government must conclude that every fact is evidentiary detail since they have totally failed to state any facts whatsoever.

In a recent case, Coopersmith v. Supreme Court

State of Colorado, (10 Cir. 1972) 46 F.2d 993, the court
said citing to Conly,

"allegations of conclusions or of opinions are not sufficient when no facts are alleged by way of the statement of the claim." 994 (emphasis supplied).

In <u>Burak</u> v. <u>Sprague</u> (E.D. Pa. 1971) 335 F. Supp. 347, the complaint was dismissed, the court stating:

The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; it fails to set forth facts; it sets forth only a series of conclusionary charges devoid of factual content lacking legal significance. The complaint is dismissed."

A complaint in a case like this must set forth some facts, and to merely state vague and conclusionary allegations are not enough. Nishiyama v. North America Rockwell (C.D. Calif. 1970), 49 FRD 288. Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co. (C.A.2d, 1971) 448 F.2d 442, Israel v. City Rent & Rehabilitation Administration of City of New York (S.D.N.Y.1965) 28 F.Supp. 908.

Even in civil rights cases where a claim is nothing more than plaintiff's conclusions, unsupported by any factual statement, a motion to dismiss will be granted. Scott v.

Larson, (E.D. Wis.1973) 58 FRD 131), Jones v. Bales (N.D.Ga. 1972) 58 FRD 453, aff'd (C.A.5th,1973)480 F.2d 805.

In <u>Sisters of Providence of Saint Mary of the</u>

<u>Woods</u> v. <u>City of Evanston</u>, 335 F.Supp.396, the court noted that it is important to balance the infringed right against police power, the determination of which is based on facts presented. The government has not presented any facts to support these allegations and so the very real possibility

of abuse has become a reality. The complaint lacks facts to substantiate it, and as if in an attempt gave it substance, newspaper reports are released, this is the exact abuse the court in <u>Sisters of Providence</u> sought to provide protection against.

### POINT II

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED

The defendants are entitled to sufficient information around which they can frame a responsive pleading. The government has failed to supply this, and thus, if defendants' motion dismissing the complaint is not granted, then a more definite statement is required. Jenn Air Products Co., v. Penn Ventilator, Inc., E.D.Pa.1968, 283 F.Supp.591.

The cases cited by the government in opposition to this motion all involve situations where the courts found sufficient facts not where they found no facts.

### POINT III

### DEFENDANTS'COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

The government has severely damaged the defendant by releasing to the press statements which it knew to be untrue before they served the defendant. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to state as a counterclaim any claim which the pleader has against the opposing party. Defendants counterclaim. The government,

by the institution of this action, has subjected itself to defendants' compulsory counterclaims, as it admits on page 18 of the government's memorandum.

### CONCLUSION

The government complaint should be dismissed because of their failure to state any facts in their complaint and a more definite statement should be required. The unreported cases cited by the government completely fail to support their argument. It is mere evidentiary detail that the defendants are requesting.

Respectfully submitted,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68 Street New York, New York 10021

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

	IN CLEAR COURT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	U. S. DISTRICT COULT
Plaintiff,	· ·
v.	P.M
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD	) NOTICE OF MOTION TO
TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGE-	COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO
MENT, INC.,	ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S
•	) INTERROGATORIES
Defendants.	

### SIRS:

America, will move this Court, before the Honorable Edward R. Neaher, District Judge at the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York in Courtroom 9, on the 25th day of January 1974 at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an Order compelling defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories propounded and served on or about November 7, 1973 and not yet answered. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 37 of the Fed.R.Civ.P., and the grounds therefor are set forth with particularity in plaintiff's supporting memorandum. Plaintiff further prays for such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.



Dated: January 21, 1974 Brooklyn, New York

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan

and Manley

To:

39 East 68th Street

New York, New York 10021

Yours, etc.

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

A. BRACHTL HENRY

Assistant United States

Attorney

Department of Justice Brooklyn, New York 11201

Elipe S. Goldweber ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Notice of Motion to Compel Defendants to Answer Plaintiff's Interrogatories on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 21st day of January, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

# AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES

CITY OF	WASI	HINGTON	)	
			)	SS
DISTRICT	OF	COLUMBIA	)	

Elyse S. Goldweber, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Fred</u> C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. On November 7, 1973, I caused to be mailed to counsel for defendants a set of interrogatories presently on file with the Court. Defendants have received copies of these interrogatories, as evidenced by the fact that they have attached copies thereof to their motions and counterclaim now pending.
- 3. On December 21, 1973, having received no response, I telephoned Mr. Michael Rosen, an associate of Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley concerning defendants' failure to respond to plaintiff's interrogatories. Mr. Rosen indicated to me that the attorneys from his firm, Roy Cohn, Esq. and Jeffrey Shulman, Esq., handling this lawsuit were out of town and would return on January 2, 1974.
- 4. On January 4, 1974, Mr. Shulman returned the last of several telephone calls which I had placed to him in an effort to discuss the unanswered interrogatories pursuant to Local Rule 9(f). Mr. Shulman informed me that the defendants had no intention of filing any answers or objections

to the interrogatories until their motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement, were ruled on.

> Elyse S. Soldweber ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to

before me this 18th day of January, 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: Jul. 14, 1977.

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendants To Answer Plaintiff's Interrogatories on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 21st day of January, 1974.

. . . . . .

Elyse S. Goldweber ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

Justin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAN 24 1974

U. S. DISTRICT COUNT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

-against-

No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES

Of Counsel:

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant U. S. Attorney

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney

U.S. Department of

Justice

Brooklyn, New York

11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES

# INTRODUCTION

On October 15, 1973, the United States instituted this action, pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. (Fair Housing Act) against the defendants, who operate apartment complexes in the New York City area. The Complaint alleges that the defendants have engaged in unlawful racially discriminatory

housing practices and that such conduct constitutes a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the Fair Housing Act and a denial to a group of persons of rights secured by the Act, which denial raises an issue of general public importance. See 42 U.S.C. 3613.

On December 12, 1973, defendants filed Motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement, alleging that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is too vague to enable them to respond. Defendants have also filed what purports to be a counterclaim against the United States seeking damages in the amount of 100 million dollars. On January 7, 1974, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motions and moved to dismiss the purported counterclaim. These motions are presently before the court.

On November 7, 1973, plaintiff served on defendants, by mail, a set of interrogatories. On January 4, 1974, no answers or objections having been received in the interim, Elyse Goldweber, an attorney for the United States, telephoned Jeffrey Shulman, an attorney for the defendants pursuant to Local Rule 9(f), to discuss defendants' failure to respond to plaintiff's interrogatories. Mr. Shulman informed Ms. Goldweber that the defendants had no intention of filing any

answers or objections to the interrogatories until a ruling on their pending motions. As of January 21, 1974, plaintiff has not received any response to its interrogatories, and no motion for a protective order has been filed. Accordingly, plaintiff has moved this Court for an order compelling defendants to answer the interrogatories promptly.

# **DISCUSSION**

Plaintiff's 16 interrogatories are designed to determine the breadth and scope of defendants' allegedly unlawful discriminatory practices, to ascertain the identity and location of persons having knowledge of pertinent facts and to assist plaintiff in determining the scope and specifics of any injunctive and affirmative relief which may ultimately be awarded. The interrogatories also seek to elicit any information on which defendants may rely in their defense of the action. Since the defendants have not filed objections to these interrogatories, we do not here defend each interrogatory against an attack which the defendants have not made. However, if defendants' response to these interrogatories includes objections as well as answers, and if the Court finds such objections timely, plaintiff is prepared to defend each interrogatory which it has propounded.

We observe that defendants have not moved this court for a

protective order, under Rule 26(c) of the Fed.R.Civ.P., to excuse them from responding to plaintiff's interrogatories within the time prescribed by Rule 33(a) F.R.Civ.P. In this connection, Rule 37(c) provides that failure to respond

. . . may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).

Defendants have identified no provision of the Federal Rules, nor can they, which would automatically stay the filing of a response to interrogatories, until the disposition of pending motions.

Instead, they have blithely disregarded the Rules.

Rule 37(d) authorizes the Court to impose sanctions when no protective order has been sought. The Rule was amended in 1970 to remove the requirement that the moving party prove "willfulness" in order to obtain sanctions. While plaintiff does not presently seek sanctions but only a response to its interrogatories, we believe that the availability under the Rules of a sterner remedy suggests that further unilateral disregard of the Rules by defendants should be remedied promptly and defendants should be required to address themselves to the factual issues in this case. As stated in prior memoranda, we are prepared to

disclose all discoverable evidence in response to an appropriate interrogatory, and we ask that defendants be required to do the same.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff requests that the Court grant plaintiff's motion to compel answers to plaintiff's interrogatories.

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney

Department of Justice Brooklyn, New York 11201 Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This, the 21st day of January, 1974.

Elyse S. Goldwelek ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 JDP:HAB:sm F.#730959

> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN CLEMES OFFICE DISTRICT COURT ED. N.Y.

----x ERG, 1974 x

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against-

Civil Action

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,

No. 73 C 1529

Defendants.

This cause came on to be heard on January 25, 1974 on (1) the motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or for a more definite statement, (2) plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim for want of jurisdiction and (3) plaintiff's motion to compel answers to interrogatories, and it appearing (1) that the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted and is not so vague or ambiguous that defendants cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, (2) that this Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of defendants' alleged counterclaim and (3) that justice will be served by requiring defendants' answers to interrogatories on the terms and conditions set forth below, it is

ORDERED, that defendants' motion for an order dismissing the complaint or for a more definite statement is denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants' counterclaim is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants answer the complaint on or before February 8, 1974; and it is further

ORDERED, that should interrogatories be served by defendants upon plaintiff on or before February 8, 1974, plaintiff answer such interrogatories on or before February 28, 1974; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants answer plaintiff's interrogatories of November 7, 1973 on or before April 1, 1974.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January , 1974

Tedward R. Wahen
United States District Judge

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## AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss: being duly sworn, says that on the day of\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_, I deposited in Mail Chute Drop for mailing in the U.S. Courthouse, Cadman Plaza East, Borough of Brooklyn, County of Kings, City and State of New York, a\_\_\_\_\_ of which the annexed is a true copy, contained in a securely enclosed postpaid wrapper directed to the person hereinafter named, at the place and address stated below: Sworn to before me this day of AFFIDAVIT OF PERSONAL SERVICES STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss: JOHN HUNTER , being duly sworn, says that he is employed in the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. That on the \_\_30th day of \_January, 1974 \_\_\_\_, he served a true copy of the annexed of Settlement and signature Order with Notice on the office of Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. attorney for defendants herein, located at 39 East 68th Street, \_\_\_\_\_, Borough of Manhattan\_\_\_, City of New York, by leaving a true copy of same with his clerk or other person in charge of said office. Sworn to before me this 31st day of January

STELLA B. MAGIER
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-4501884
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 1975

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FEB 8 1974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

73 Civ. 1529

Plaintiff,

ANSWER

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

\_\_\_\_\_

Defendants, for and as their answer to the complaint for an injunction, state:

- l. Deny any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in paragraphs "1", "2" and "4"
- 2. Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
  "5" and "6" of the plaintiff's complaint.

WHEREFORE, defendants demand that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, together with costs and disbursements, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just.

SAXE/ BACON, BOLAN, & MANLEY

FOX M. CO

By Jeffin N Thumb

Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

FEB 8 1974 73 Civ. 1529

P.M....

FILE

Plaintiff, :

- - - x

TIME A.M .....

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and : TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' FIRST DEMAND FOR INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF

TO THE PLAINTIFF, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Defendants request that plaintiff answer each interrogatory separately and fully in writing and under oath, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the information requested by any interrogatory is contained in documents, papers or records in the custody of the plaintiffs, you may so indicate and answer that interrogatory by attaching copies of such documents or papers to your answers and by indicating the interrogatory to which those documents or papers are deemed responsive. In the alternative, you may answer that interrogatory by identifying those documents, papers or records in which the answer is contained and specifying the location of the documents, papers or records and making the same available to defendant to inspect, copy or photograph.

These interrogatories call for all information available to the plaintiff, its employees or agents, with respect to the subject matter into which they inquire. If some of the

information is known or available to a particular employee or agent and other information is available to another employee or agent, please include in your answers all the information known to each employee or agent and please specify which employee or agent provided information with respect to each answer:

- 1. Please provide all information which supports your allegations stated in paragraph "FIFTH" in your complaint for an injunction.
- (a) Include in your answer to this interrogatory dates and locations of alleged violations and those allegedly responsible for the violation and in what manner you learned of the violation, giving particularly the name of the complainant or informant and the date of the complaint to you, what action or investigation was taken to verify the complaint, and the results of said action or investigation, and in what way it is alleged that each of the defendants had knowledge of and/or was involved in such alleged violation.
- 2. Please give all information in your possession which supports your allegations contained in paragraph "SIXTH" of the complaint for an injunction.
- (a) Include in your answer to this interrogatory dates and locations of alleged violations and those allegedly responsible for the violation, and in what manner you learned of the violation, giving particularly the name of the complainant or informant and the date of the complaint to you, what action or investigation was taken to verify the complaint, and the results of said action or investigation, and in what way it is alleged that each of the defendants had knowledge of and/or was involved in such alleged violation.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a copy of such answer must be served upon the undersigned within thirty days after service

of the foregoing interrogatories.

Respectfully submitted,

SAXE BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY

Ву

Roy M. Cohn

Jeffrey A. Shuman

Attorneys for Defendants Office and P. O. Address 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

1	IN CLERK'S OFFIC.
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.
3	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FEB 28 1974
4	TIME A.M
5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
6	-against- 73 C 1529
7	F. C. TRUMP, D. TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,
8	Defendants :
9	x
10	United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York
11	January 25, 1974
12	10:00 o'clock a.m.
13	
14	Before:
15	HONORABLE EDWARD R. NEAHER, U.S.D.J.
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17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	BURTON H. SULZER
23	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
24	

(22)

APPEARANCES:

EDWARD J. BOYD V, ESQ., Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

> BY: HENRY A. BRACHTL, ESQ., Assistant United States Attorney.

FRANK E. SCHWELD, ESQ.,
MS. ELYSE GOLDWEBER
Attorneys for Housing Section, Civil Rights
Division.

ROY COHN, ESQ., Attorney for Trump Management Inc. F. C. Trump and D. Trump.

,

THE CLERK: United States against F.C. Trump,
D. Trump and Management, Inc.

MR. BRACHTL: Your Honor, the first matter of several to which we'll be addressed this morning will be Mr. Cohen's motion, but before we get to that I would like to first introduce to the Court Frank E. Schweld, who is the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and Attorney Elyse Goldweber, also of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division.

With respect to the matters which are on the calendar this morning, there are three concerning this case: first, there is the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement.

There is, secondly, the plaintiff's motion to compel an answer to interrogatories; and, thirdly, there is the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

With respect to counsel for the government on those several matters, Ms. Goldweber will address the arguments with respect to the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement, and as we think a necessary corollary to that argument,

our argument in support of our motion to compel answers to interrogatories.

At the conclusion of that argument I will have a few remarks to make in support of our application for the dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim.

MR. COMNE: Your Honor, I am afraid that I will have to be affirmative and negative with respect to this battery of distinguished legal talent from the government all by myself on all motions, but I will do my very best.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Charn, I recognize you as a big gun, too.

MR. COMPAGE You are very kind, your Honor. I wish it was so.

Judge Neaher, I guess the best thing to do here is start at the beginning. Back in the fall one day the Trumps and the Trump organization -- well, I ought to start by telling you the Trump Management Company, which is a defendant, and Frederick Trump and his son, Donald Trump, who are associated with Trump Management, is one of the largest management and most successful and most respected management companies in this area, and I suppose in the country.

One fine day back in the late fall, without having been served with any legal papers or any such

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formality, all of a sudden the Trumps turn on the radio and heard themselves being blasted all over, pursuant to a press release issued out of the Department of Justice in Washington -- not up here -- as people who are discriminating, adopting discriminatory policies.

The next day, the bulldog editions of the Daily
News and the front page of the New York Times emblazoned
the facts for all to see and all to read, and I guess
some time thereafter the court papers finally turned up
someplace and we found out what this was all about.

I noticed in some papers submitted to your Honor it is said that somebody made or was supposed to make a phone call to somebody in the Trump organization simultaneously with the release of this press release. But what I am saying now, really, is not actionable by us at the moment, except with reference to our counterclaim which I will come to in a few minutes. I tell it to your Honor as the background as to how this whole thing started.

I know that the Eastern District and the Southern District and the Second Circuit have had things to say about this idea of these press releases being handed out in the first instance, but the fact is, and the government concedes that they did hand out

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23 24 one and they have been candid enough to attach that press release to the papers which are submitted to your Honor.

The damage done to the Trumps and the defendants here was, I suppose, something that is never going to, no matter what the outcome of this case, I suppose the damage is never going to be completely undone because you are never going to catch up with these initial headlines.

When these motions were filed, we had a somewhat reserved press conference in which we tried to contact the same people, the same representatives of the media to whom the government had distributed its press release originally, and we acquainted them with the papers we were filing in Court and Mr. Trump acquainted them with his position, which is a denial which he felt he wanted to have before the thousands of people who do business with him commercially and his tenants and banks and everybody else, have before them his position, which is that the charges made and emblazoned over the front pages were without foundation. In any event, here we are where we should be, in court.

Now, Judge Neaher, the complaint in this case is one of the most unusual things I have ever seen. I must admit that in recent years I suppose my practice

has gone from between office matters and trial of criminal cases, and I frankly have not been in a civil rights case before and I must say I am amazed and confounded by some of the principles of law which the government urges apply to this type of case.

First of all as to the complaint. You have before you a motion to dismiss this complaint on the grounds it totally fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is a bare bones complaint. And we ask in the alternative, if your Honor disagrees, we of course ask you to dismiss the complaint. If your Honor should disagree, we ask that your Honor, in the alternative, dismiss it with leave to the government to file a complaint with some factual allegations in it so that the defendants are on notice with some reasonable detail as to exactly what proscribed conduct they are specifically charged with having committed.

This complaint which gave rise to all these front pages is a very short document. The only facts stated in the complaint are the names of the defendant, Trump Management and Fred and Donald Trump, and from therein, there is a verbaim recitation of the statutory language of Title 42, 3602(b) and 3601, which says that it is a violation of the Fair Housing Act, and enjoinable violation to discriminate because of race,

color or creed, and that if discriminatory policies are pursued by a landlord, this is proscribed by the Fair Housing Act and the government may apply for injunctive relief of the Court.

There is not one specific allegation in this very short complaint. They don't even give a year.

They don't even say between 1968 and 1972 at such-and-such projects operated by the Trump Organization,

blacks have been denied such-and-such, or on January 17,

1973, John Jones, being otherwise fully qualified and able to pay the rent, applied and was denied an apartment because of his race, whereas the same apartment was given to a subsequent applicant, or something like that; not one line in this whole complaint.

When Mr. Trump brought it in to me and I read it, I said, "I don't know what to tell you. It has your name and it sets forth verbatim statutory language saying you should not discriminate. And there isn't one specific act." I said, "It's akin to a defendant being indicted with the statutory section being charged and not one specific in the indictment."

Now, I realize a defendant in a criminal case could then come forward and ask the government for a bill of particulars, which is a relief the Court would grant if a situation existed as I described. In this case, something crazy happened, Judge Neaher. After this

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complaint was filed and we made the motion to dismiss-and I don't remember whether it was before we made the
motion or after we made the motion, and it really
isn't too material -- but, in any event, after this
complaint is filed and we set up a rumpus about it
and said, "We don't know what this is all about. We
didn't discriminate and we don't know how to tell you
we didn't because you haven't given us one thing we
can sink our teeth into; you haven't given us one
location, one name, one fact which we can answer here."

They said, "Don't worry; that's going to be taken care of." And then I find out how it will be taken care of, they serve us with 16 pages of interrogatories and tell us to go out and make an investigation to find out whether or not we discriminated, to furnish them with the answers and when we furnish them with the answers, then they will be in a position to amplify the complaint and tell us whether or not in fact the charge which they made on every front page in this area might have some substance to it or not.

Now, the third motion before your Honor this morning is to compel us to answer these interrogatories.

I'm going to say just a word about them because it would seem to me, and I don't think there will be much disagreement on that, that the first thing we do is

impose upon your Honor for a ruling, after your Honor has had a chance to go into this mess we are throwing at you, on the sufficiency of the complaint, and if your Honor rules it sufficient and does not dismiss it, or rules that they should furnish some facts and then give them time to furnish facts, once that is cleared up; then we get down, I suppose, to the stage of interrogatories and further particulars and all of that.

Now, this 16 pages of interrogatories they served on us to find out whether there is any basis for their action has to be the wildest thing I ever read in my life. Maybe it is my ignorance of this type of proceeding. On page 15, they say, "Please state the name, address, race and occupation of each person interviewed by you or on your behalf in relation to this case. Please state separately the name, address, race and occupation of any person not interviewed by you or on your behalf, but whom you intend to interview in the future about this case."

Well, I have been around a little while and I can just picture myself calling up some witness and sayiing, "I'd like to talk to you about this." By the way, are you black or white or Catholic, Protestant or Jew?" And then making a note of it and then turning that over to the government or something like that.

That's what this whole darn thing reads like.

They say, for example, "Please state the name and address of each black and Puerto Rican individual who has applied for a position of any kind with Trump Management in the past three years." Well, this doesn't charge employment discrimination on the part of Trump in hiring its management personnel -- it is a fair housing proceeding. When I called Mr. Trump and read it to him, he said, "How can I do that? I couldn't tell you if the Court ordered me to answer it, because I would have thought it highly improper when we employ somebody to say, 'what is your race?'"

He said, "I don't know what their race or religion is. All I know is, if they have good references and they meet the qualifications, they get the job, and whoever our personnel people are, do that. We don't ask race." He said, "And I haven't even seen most of these people and I wouldn't know if they are black or Puerto Rican or white or Catholic, Protestant or Jew," and he said, "I would think the most improper thing in the world for me to do would be to have questions concerning a person's race or religion or something like that on employment applications when we give out jobs in or organization."

Now, when it comes to the units, oh, they want

to know things like, decreases and increases in rental rates and since January 1, 1968. You are talking about 14,000 units here. When you get down to the question of the actual 14,000 units, they ask us to tell them the number of persons per month by race making inquiry concerning the availability of an apartment between January 1, 1969 and present. We deny any discriminatory practices, and obviously the Trumps have never permitted, would never dream of permitting an application which is given out for a broker renting an apartment to say to a person, "What's your race or religion?" We would have no way in the world of knowing.

The next thing they ask us to do is to canvass our 14,000 units and findout — there are definitely a number of blacks who live in there, that we know visibly. I have taken a ride and looked at some of them and blacks walk in and out and I assume they are not there for any improper purpose and they live in the place. But they want us to go, apparently, and canvass all 14,000 of these units and find out how many blacks live there and how many non-blacks live there, and I suppose how many Puerto Ricans live there or non-Puerto Ricans.

The whole tenor of the thing seems to be offensive. If they have some proof that the Trumps have been discriminating and have applied discriminatory

policies -- and I know there are a considerable number of blacks, we represent that to the Court, who live in these units -- but if they have some specific proof to support a complaint that discriminatory practices have been followed, all we ask them to do is not to tell us to go out and make an investigation and in so doing, note the race of every witness we interview, or every person I talk to about it, but ask them to put in a proper complaint, which advises us at least of the minimum facts, not statutory language, which they claim shows some discriminatory action by us so that we can meet that charge and say in that building in those units or on this application or in this situation it is not a fact we discriminated, and here's what happened. That's all we ask.

I would respectfully submit to your Honor the concept that a barebones complaint, without one fact in it, followed on its heels by 16 pages of interrogatories telling us to go out and find and conduct our own investigation, which would be long, expensive and, in many instances, impossible, is not the way in this country you do something like this.

So we therefore ask your Honor to hold the interrogatories in abeyance, and if we ever get to this point, we are going to ask leave to make a motion to

strike some of these, and ask your Honor to dismiss this complaint -- and if your Honor feels that total dismissal is not warranted, at least ask them to replead and give us some facts.

The government cites some cases which they say could actually justify a complaint like this. I don't think one of them that they cite is of significance insofar as this complaint is concerned, a reported case. They have been kind enough to supply us with a pile, knowing, I'm sure, the expertise of their Civil Rights Division, they have them at their fingertips and they were nice enough to mimeograph off for us a list with a table of contents of the unreported cases. I have gone through these and I don't think -- don't find one of them that supports a complaint like this. I am not going to cite the general lack.

There are, of course, somethings which say in a complaint you don't have to set forth every evidentiary detail. Your Honor has heard to the point of boredom that argument every time there is a motion for a bill of particulars before you in a criminal case. The defendant says, "I don't know anything." The government says, "They want all our evidence." And your Honor strikes a happy balance and says, "Well, tell them enough so they know of the specifics here

they are supposed to meet. But you don't have to tell them all your evidence and all of that." Okay. They cite this Connelly case with which I have some familiarity, which cuts both ways, of course. It says you don't have to tell everything but you have to tell something; you have to tell them what they are charged with and what they feel someone is supposed to have done, and I think that case cuts most heavily in our favor.

Then they go to these unreported cases. Just to talk about a few of them and not to be discriminatory myself here, I will just take them in the order in which they set them forth in their memorandum. They start with a case called the Raymond case. It is obvious from that case, your Honor, there was a wealth of detail. They don't set forth the actual complaint so I just have to piece together what the complaint might have been and the preliminary pleadings from the papers they have here.

In the Raymond case, your Honor, first of all, this was a small situation. They would say, I think, less than 40 apartments involved, not 14,000, such as we have in this case. What they say there is the land-lord publicly announced and admitted, "I will never rent a place to a black. Forget about it." And,

furthermore, when a white family entertained some black friends of theirs, they promptly told the white family their lease was terminated and to get out of the place. I can understand a charge like that in its impropriety and fact that that should have been met.

They go then to this Palmer case, which was against the City or Township of Palmer, I think, in Ohio, and there there was a specific charge that the Township refused to go forward with a housing project, a specifically enumerated housing project to be done with Federal funds, on the grounds that this might bring about an influx of blacks into a community or area. The issue there was whether this housing project should be blocked or not then and the defendant township was specifically so charged and had the opportunity to meet the charge.

In the Smythe case, the issue was whether a single family exemption to this law applied or didn't apply.

In the Goldberg case, your Honor, they did just—
the government did just what it had not done in this
case: they set forth a schedule, a list of properties
in which claimed discriminatory practices have been
followed and enumerated lots. The issue there was
whether lots were being denied to people because of

race, and they set forth a list of lots which were so involved.

As you go through this whole thing, I don't find any case or anything which says that the only facts that have to be in a complaint are the names of the defendants, and beyond that you just photostat the statute and then file a list of interrogatories and put the defendant to its proof and shift the burden-really, your Honor, what this is, is a shifting of the burden on the defendant to establish in preliminary proceedings, its innocence of a charge which has never been made specifically against it.

(Continued on next page).

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I don't see what reason, in the name of fairness, candor and type of fair play, the Government should stand for, that can occasion the Government not to be willing in this case to give us some factual specifics as to when, where and how they claim there has been discriminatory practice in this case.

Having failed to do so, at this point, we ask your Honor most respectfully to dismiss this complaint or make them replead in conformity with the practice in this District, and, as far as I know, in every Court and District in the United States.

The only other motion -- I have covered the interrogatories, your Honor, and I would say we certainly do want to be heard on that, as your Honor might gather, but I would think we would allagree that is probably appropriately dealt with after we all get your Honor's disposition about how this complaint should be handled.

I had a little conversation with the very nice representative of the Government, and I don't think we will have any problem on that. They have made a motion to dismiss our counter-claim. We have sued for a hundred million dollars, which is a possibly --

THE COURT: A tidy sum.

MR. COHEN: A tidy sum, your Honor, right.

They say it is 90 percentlogic, or something, than

anything that's been sued for in previous cases like this, and I am not prepared to dispute them factually on that.

The basis of the suit is that the action in bringing the action was unauthorized; that it is something that goes beyond an abusive process.

The Government contends that what we are really saying is -- here's what they say, they say three things, your Honor -- they say four things, they say, first of all, that our pleading is defective in that an attorney of record did not personally sign it.

And they might have me on that.

If they do, I would be willing to sign a pleading, and they might be right about that, and I would be willing to sign it.

The second objection them make, is that it is not timely, that the time to file something like this after an answer has been -- after the motion before your Honor on the complaint is disposed of, and after an answer, if that becomes necessary, is filed by us.

But it seems to me they then go on to say we have something here which is a compulsory counter-claim meaning that it must be asserted at an early stage of the proceedings, and I don't know how point two fits in with point three. If the fact is there should be

made at a later time, we would be agreeable to a severance without prejudice on their part to -- when we renew it, to raise whatever objections they want.

Now, they come to number four, which is a basic objection, and they say that the Government without its consent, which it has not as yet given, -- I am hopeful, of course, in the interest of fair play, they probably are going to advise your Honor this morning that they intend, as a matter of fairness, to give it, because they have nothing to fear insofar as any damage verdict from your Honor or a jury in this case, because their actions have been entirely proper. So I know in the spirit of fairness that now prevails, I am looking forward hopefully for such a gesture from the Government.

Absent that, they say that we would be entitled to come in here under the Federal Tort Claims Act, if there was an action by the Government officials even within the scope of their duties, which results in injury and damage to the defendants.

But they say that there are exclusions from the Federal Tort Claim Act, namely, libel, slander and abusive process, and they construe our counter-claim in this case, to amount to a contention of libel, slander and abusive process and therefore, not proscribed but not within the permissive features of the Federal

Tort Claims Act without first consent by the Government.

We don't view it that way. We say in a pleading stage, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and in a pleading stage, where we are now, that our counter-claim is sufficient under the lack of the Federal Tort Claims Act to spell out damage and injury, and it cannot be determined that the only damage and injury, would be libel, slander or abusive process.

It might be damage to property and damage to reputation, other than by libel and alander, and things which are not proscribed by the Act, and which do not require the consent of the Government in order to be sued.

However, if they are right on the lack of timeliness in the raising of this issue, we are perfectly agreeable to a severance as to that, and as to a renewal when, as and if an answer has to be filed in this case, with the reservation of their rights, and with an opportunity on their part to consult with what I guess all of us hope will be an Attorney General with some degree of permanence, unlike the one who signed this complaint, as to whether the Government would be willing to be sued in this action.

Your Honor has been very patient with me and I think that's all I would like to say on these motions.

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THE COURT: All right. Now, let me hear on the matter of the complaint. I take it you are going to proceed with Miss Goldweber on that?

MS. GOLDWEBER: Good morning, your Honor.

Firstly, I would like to remark that this action is a civil action and not a criminal action. The United States filed its complaint in this action on October 15, 1973, and alleged that the defendants have engaged in racially discriminatory conduct with respect to the rental of their apartments, in violation of the Fair Housing Act.

The defendants, and if I understand their argument correctly, have moved this Court to dismiss the Government's complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The United States contends to the contrary, that its allegations contained in paragraph five of the complaints specifically state a claim upon which relief can be granted by alleging, firstly, that the defendants have refused to rent apartments to persons on account of their race and color; that they have required different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of those dwellings on account of a person's race and color.

They have made discriminatory statements with

respect to the rental of these dwellings, and that they have represented their dwellings were unavailable for rental, when, in fact, such dwellings were available.

We claim in paragraph six of the complaint, that this conduct constitutes both a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, and a denial to groups of persons of rights secured to them by the Fair Housing Act.

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, plaintiff's allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted and the only thing that is contested, is plaintiff's right to recover under the law.

Obviously, if the United States can prove at trial, among other things, that the defendants have refused to rent apartments to persons on account of race and color, then the United States will be entitled to both affirmative and injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 USC 3613.

Now, Mr. comm has said that the other cases that we have cited in our brief, specifically pages five and six, have all pleaded evidentiary matter.

I respectfully disagree with him since each and every complaint that has been filed under the Fair Housing Act by the Attorney General, has been written in the same Section of the Government, signed by the same

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people, and all have been substantially similar, and none of them have pleaded any kind of evidentiary allegations.

Also, for the cases where this has been discussed, which are referred to on page five of the brief, they go on to say that a complaint such as this, couched as this one is in the very language of the Fair Housing Act, is sufficient because it meets the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, because it clearly apprises the defendants of the nature of plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests.

Accordingly, the United States respectfully urges that defendant's motion to dismiss, would be denied.

motion. I have a few questions that do arise with this complaint, and even though, as you point out, this is a civil action and not a criminal action, the fact is, it is an action brought by the United States Government, which does charge a somewhat serious course of conduct, which, if true, would be clearly in violation of fundamental national policy, which certainly imply perjorative inferences, so far as the defendants were concerned, and the like.

I have looked at your paragraph five and I realize that under our very liberal notice form of pleading permitted in civil actions that in essence what you seem to say in five, is to the defendant, "You have violated the law." And you say, in effect, "You have violated the law by refusing to rent rentals, making statements and so forth, and so to some extent" -- how does a plaintiff faced with such a complaint, deal with it? There is no allegation, as I see it, of time or place, and I notice, under Role 9, which follows Rule 8, that for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, of averment of time and place or material, and shall be considered like all other averments, in a material matter.

The reason that I bring that up is because of other motions now pending before the Court, with respect to interrogatories served on the defendants by the plaintiff, asking for information, dating back to 1968, which I take it, was even the year of the enactment of this Act.

MS GOLDWEBER: Right.

THE COURT: And yet there is no statement of time or place in this pleading, which would enable a defendant perhaps to challenge interrogatories that go back to 1968, as not being consistent with the causes of action pleaded.

For example, while I assume that the Government does not make this charge in a capricious way and undoubtedly believes it has the proof or will certainly be able to prove these allegations, I do have some doubt, despite the array of authority which you have cited to me, and which I have examined, that I find it difficult to assimilate this case to Connolly-Gibson type situations which involved a small band of negro workers, who felt themselves discriminated against by their union.

While the Court does not set forth the exact allegations, the case is reminiscent of others that Mr. Cohn pointed out in your supplemental appendix of opinions, such as preventing the construction of one apartment house or dealing with a situation of not permitting colored people to visit white people in a particular building, have a certain definitionabout them that make it possible for a defendant so charged, let us say, to deal with them in a reasonable manner.

I am raising this question not capriciously either, because we have many administrative agencies coming before this Court, and a very recent case brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, seeking the same kind of relief that you seek, that is to say, affirmative injunctive relief, in which, when you look at the complaint, no defendant could complain about it

because it tells him very definitively what he is being charged with, in effect, having violate the Securities Exchange Act, specifically, definitely, and this, as I say, may be doing more than is required.

But all I am pointing out is that I think
Mr. Cohn's complaint about the complaint is not altogether
without basis. I am not certain that it is an answer
to say that he can get all these particulars by interrogatories when part of his job is to resist your
interrogatories on the basis of the complaint that
sets no time limit, does not give any particulat
location of building, or what nature of statements were
made or what particular practice.

So I do think a problem is presented here, and I am wondering whether the Government in fairness to a defendant, doesn't have more of an obligation than does the private litigant versus the private litigant, to inform someone it sues in this manner — and as I say, sues in this particular area, which, although not criminal, might well be because we know there are criminal statutes, that persons who conspire to deprive others of civil rights, may well be charged criminally, under 18 US 241, for example.

That includes invading a psychiatrist's office and looking in his file -- you just saw that in the

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paper yesterday. So I must say that many of these cases you cite, I feel do not perceive the problems in an area such as New York City, where you are dealing with a landlord of not one hundred apartments, but fourteen thousand apartments, a far flung, widespread organization; that something in the way of a definition should be conveyed in the Government's initial pleading, so that proper interrogatories might even be served on that basis, and issues more readily brought into sharper focus.

Ar the moment, as I see it, this is a very broad, undefined picture, of a pattern, and the defendant is saying "I can't even see the pattern."

MS. GOLDWEBER: I would like to respond to that.

THE COURT: I understand and I am perfectly happy to have you do so.

Do you feel or don't you feel there is some justice to the complaint that in this type of situation there ought to be a more definitive depiciton -- and I am not saying evidentiary facts -- but something that says beginning at such and such a time, in buildings located at so-and-so -- they might even be separate causes of action, I don't know whether that would be required -- so that the proof could be dealt with in terms of more definitively stated claims that appear in

this document.

As I say, I would be perfectly willing to supply you with the latest SEC production, to illustrate what I mean when I say that this would not bring about the sort of controversy we have here, since it so clearly lays out for the defendant in that case, what they have done wrong.

MS. GOLDWEBER: Well, your Honor, in this case,
I respectfully have a bit of a different interpretation.
I think, first of all, one of the defendants, Donald
Trump, and defendant's counsel, they have both filed
affidavits with this Court, denying that there was any
discriminatory conduct on the part of any of the defendants, to their knowledge, and the Government's charges
are totally unfounded.

THE COURT: Of course, that is all conclusory, isn't it? It is conclusions opposed to conclusions; I deny what you say, but I frame my denial in an affirmative way, rather than in a negative way.

MS. GOLDWEBER: I understand that, but I seem to believe that if they had done that, then they would have been able to answer the complaint and that's all they would have to do.

THE COURT: From the standpoint of dealing, let's say, with your interrogatories, how can they successfully

object to interrogatories going back to 1968, if they don't know whether or not you may be seeking a broader scope of information, time-wise, chronologically, than would be demanded by the allegations of your compaint?

I don't say that those are necessarily limiting of discovery, but very often, Courts will, when confronted with objections, to interrogatories, look at the complaint in terms of time, and, for example, one of the things that occurs to me, doesn't a statute of limitations ever run against a claim such as this?

MS. GOLDWEBER: We are not allowed to prove racial discrimintation, based on things that happened prior to the effective date of the Act, but we can bring in evidence to --

THE COURT: I can understand the probative value of prior conduct, on issues of intent and design, and so forth; I understand that.

That is a different question.

We are getting into the area of evidence, and, of course, I understand that discovery is designed to enable parties to call upon the parties -- call upon the other parties to produce information, even leading to the discovery of evidence, as well as evidence, in order to support a claim or defense against a claim.

These are commonplace. I am sure you understand

that.

When you are talking about a large, complex, fourteen thousand apartments -- and again, where it does occur to the Court that there are certain laws which prohibit inquiries directed to race, for example, I don't believe in its employment policy-- I am not passing on it -- Iwas suprised to see that interrogatory in this case, I will be frank to say that, but I believe it would be against the law to require in an employment situation as to the race of any particular person. I believe so. That is my understanding.

MR. SCHWELD: Could I say one thing about that, your Honor. We have done a lot of employment work.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHWELD: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires each employer of over 15 or 20 employees, I believe, to keep a racial census because it has helped the EPOC in enforcing Title 7.

THE COURT: That is now a new policy since the enactment of that Act, as I recall it. But, for example, here in New York, it was against the law for any employment agency to inquire as to the race of any person trying for a job. I understand that supremacy demands that the Federal law take precedence, but there

may be, and I don't know when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act -- is this under regulations of the
Commission?

MR. SCHWELD: Yes, your Honor, pursuant to Title 7, which we have had since '64.

THE COURT: I don't know when these regulations were adopted. They may be comparatively recent.

MR. SCHWELD: I don't mean to interrupt my colleague, your Honor, but it has been about seven or eight years ago, at least.

THE COURT: It is that long ago?

MR. SCHWELD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I see. There are problems such as that that may crop up in terms of the way this case appears in the light of what I have seen in the papers before me. I am simply mentioning these things to point out again the interests that can be served by some attempt at definition rather than simply a charge that you have violated the law, which is the way I have to read this complaint.

MS. GOLDWEBER: I think there are two separate issues that are involved here. In response to the interrogatories, in which we ask for fairly detailed information, if your Honor will still entertin defendant's objection that they could file with their answers to

these interrogatories, then we will be prepared to defend each and every interrogatory, and if your Honor felt at that time that we did not defend it well enough, then the defendants would not be ordered to answer that interrogatory.

The fact is we have sued people, filed complaints across the country against a lot of defendants who are in control of many units, ten, twelve thousand units, and in all of those complaints, as I said before, they were very similar to this, and in the Raymond complaint, which Mr. Cohen referred to, it did not allege specific facts in the complaint, and none of the complaints have.

The fact which is not really at issue here today is that we ask for -- we allege employment relief in the complaint, and we inquire about it in the interrogatories. Well, there have been three cases that have held that employment relief, once the Government has proven a Fair Housing case, and the Court has ordered relief, they have been entitled to also get employment relief as an incident to the housing affirmative relief they have been able to obtain.

We are certainly ready and willing, if we are served with interrogatories, or depositions are taken of our witnesses, to give any kind of proper evidence

that we don't object to to the defendants, to apprise them more clearly of what is happening.

I believe that because they have filed these affidavits denying it, that they can just deny the complaint, and their motion for more definite statement, which requests specific facts, as to the names, dates and persons involved in the alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, is just the kind of thing that a motion for more definite statements should not be utilized for.

(Continued on next page.)

THE COURT: Well, I understand that interrogatories are demanding in terms of specifity, and that might have been better remedy for defendants to seek.

I think, however, what concerns me is that you get a complaint like this followed by a fairly exhaustive demand for interrogatory answers by the Government, that is on the part of the Government, there is no time period, no time frame possible to determine from the face of the complaint as to whether such an enermous request going back six years would be justified, at least in the first instance, without some more of a showing that what was asked for was truly relevant to the issues that were going to be litigated.

MS. GOLDWEBER: Could I suggest that one thing —
the Court's purpose is served as well if the defendants
knew he filed a denial, general denial to the complaint,
and then filed with this Court, either a motion for
protective order to give them further time to object
or an answer to the interrogatories, and then filed
their answers or objections, and then each specific
thing that is contained in that interrogatory, so we
would understand exactly what everyone was objecting
to, and it wouldn't be just sort of a vast array of
things, but we would know specifically what interroga—

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United States would be able to try to defend that specific interrogatory or however many there are.

THE COURT: As I say, I recognize that the purpose of the rule was to try to do away with the unnecessary focussing on pleadings and papers and get down to the merits of the claim. I heartily believe in and will endorse that principle. I would be inclined here to give the defendants an opportunity to serve upon the Government a set of interrogatories seeking definition, without depriving the Government of any opportunity to object to anything about those that they might think should be objected to, and I would, in effect, deny the motion to dismiss the complaint with that understanding, that you will have an opportunity within —

What would be a reasonable time in which you could put together something like that?

MR. SCHWELD: You mean to answer them or to file them?

THE COURT: To file them. How much time would it take to file them?

MR. SCHWELD: Mr. Cohn says 45 days to file them. I would think we could file them informally if we write down what he wants to know and then answer

them in twenty days.

THE COURT: Could you get up a set in two weeks?

MR. COHN: Sure.

you, this is not intended to be an exhaustive draft upon the Government, but rather a preliminary attempt to obtain some more definition of matters, let us say, covered in five. I think that seems to be the sensitive paragraph of the complaint, as a starter. That would be, of course, without prejudice to further interrogatory work or discovery work of one kind or another as time goes on.

I would deny the motion to dismiss the complaint on that basis.

MR. COHN: That would be a very fair disposition, your Honor. Within two weeks, we will file in effect, interrogatories cast in the form of a Bill of Particulars to try to define some of these things.

MR. SCHWELD: Does that include the more definite statement motion, your Honor, also?

THE COURT: Yes. It would dispose of that as well. Obviously, yes.

With respect to the Government's demand for interrogatories, I would, assuming that Government is willing, extend a reasonable period of time to the

defendants to object, because, apparently, they have been operating on a misunderstanding here as to how the Federal procedure operates.

I would expect that, to the extent possible, any interrogatory not objected to, would be answered within a reasonable time, so that there wouldn't be a complete delay in progress.

In other words, I assume you will make a selection of those interrogatories that you feel you have a good objection to, and you urge that, and that as to others, an attempt will be made to answer them.

Now, let me pointout to you, I believe it to be the rule, that you don't have to answer something you can't answer. You are at liberty to state that.

There is also a problem of burden which you may consider raising, that is to say the making of revelations, but it may be that you will then be faced with the Government's demand for productions, the right to inspect and copy your records.

That may be an alternative, since the Government has its resources, and I take it you would contend that your client's resources are somewhat limited.

MS. GOLDWEBER: We have made that offer in the interrogatories, that if defendants didn't want to compile all this information, we would, at their

convenience come in, and inspect their documents.

MR. COHN: YourHonor, I think we all get your reasoning, and I think it is a very fair disposition on the matter. Should we try to agree on an order fixing time limits?

THE COURT: Could you work that out?

MR. COHN: Sure. I don't see why we can't.

We will take the two weeks suggested by your Honor,

and consider that a firm date by which we serve

interrogatories on the Government. They will want how

long to answer?

THE COURT: Why don't you work those things out?

MR. COHN: We will work those out and submit
an order to you that will provide for that.

A certain period of time after they answer the interrogatories, so we have a little better idea what this complaint -- what periods of time this complaint covers, and all of that, then shortly thereafter we will answer those interrogatories we can, and move against those, we don't think we ought to answer.

What does this do to a formal answer to the complaint, may that be deferred?

THE COURT: No. I would suggest that you answer the complaint as best you can. However, I would suggest that you don't include your counter-claim, because I am

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going to dismiss it.

MR. COHN: We won't include the counter-claim.

THE COURT: I have to say that there are simply too many hurdles in that counter-claim, not the least of which is, no matter how you slice it, Mr. Cohn, it still comes out as a claim of tortuous conduct.

It certainly fits squarely, in my judgment, within the framework of the Federal Tort Claims Act --

MR. COHN: Which would require consent --

THE COURT: Yes, it would, under 2680. It is, in my judgment, an accepted type of claim, and if the party consented to be sued within the framework of that Act, as I say, I think you would be wasting time and paper, and diverting yourself from what I consider to be the real issues you have to meet if you do so.

The Court is very mindful of the importance of the interests involved here to both sides, the Government -- the Attorney General has a job to do, and it is not discretionary, it is imposed by law.

If your clients are violating the law, it is, -- it is his duty to take action. On the other hand, if you believe they are not, it is your duty to do something about it.

I am giving you that opportunity.

MR. COHN: I appreciate it very much. we all understand the purport of your Honor's views, and

we will try to draft an order covering all these things and submit it to your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. Is there anything that has not been covered here?

MR. BRACHTL: Just one question with respect to the dismissal of the counter-claim. Do you wish an order?

THE COURT: That could be included. Whatever order you submit could include that. If you wish it separately, I see it as sort of an anomalous document, it sort of walked into court, it wasn't an answer, it was a counter-claim.

MR. COHN: What we will do probably is just omit it from an answer, and they don't have to do anything.

MR. BRACHTL: We would suggest, your Honor, that would be appropriately amended, and because the counter-claim cannot be asserted except in a pleading, and, hence, the pleading which has been asserted, contains no --

THE COURT: I think Mr. Cohn gets the point.

It drops out of the picture entirely, and he will

serve a proper answer to the existing complaint the

best he can. But he will have the opportunity to frame

the questions in preliminary interrogatories, if you

want to call them that, to give you an opportunity so

that you may amend your answer if you think that is

called for. Do you understand?

MR. COHN: Perfectly, your Honor. 2 MR. BRACHTL: We will submit a short form order 3 with respect to the dismissal. 4 MR. COHN: Why don't we agree on a total order 5 and just submit it? MR. SCHWELD: We have an order which you might 6 7 conwider signing on the motion --8 MR. COHN: Why don't we submit one order? 9 I think we are looking for another press release 10 or something --11 MS. GOLDWEBER: No, we are not. 12 THE COURT: I have your proposed order here. 13 I would believe that the order ought to encompass what 14 we have discussed here this morning. If you wish a separate order on the counter-claim, that is immaterial. 15 So far as you are all here together, the counter-16 claim stands dismissed. 17 MR. COHN: May we do this, could we have an 18 understanding from here on in -- and I think we will 19 probably get agreement to this -- that they stop putting 20 out press releases and try this case in court? 21 THE COURT: Mr. Cohn, having served as a 22 United States Attorney -- and I think you were an 23 Assistant -- you know that the Government, unlike a 24 private litigant, does have to keep the public informed. 25

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I must say that I have to agree that I think the document they issued was most chaste, and under the circumstances, it is just one of the things that you have to grin and bear when you are a litigant.

On the other hand, there is such a thing as fair trial as well as free press, and consequently, I would hope that the Government will not be putting out anything which will appair or prejudice the rights of these defendants to a fair trial of the issues involved in this case.

MR. COHN: They have indicated to me by a nod there will be no press release.

MR. SCHWELD: Wait a minute. He said the motion about a definite statement. I think your Honor is acquainted with what you do when a judgment comes out in a case, your Honor; it is usually released to the press when a complaint is drawn, but I think, as your Honor said, this was extremely chaste.

THE COURT: You don't have to apologize.

MR. SCHWELD: I am not.

MR. COHN: I indicate we are going to try this in court and not in the press. Is that fair?

MR. SCHWELD:. It is fair.

MR. BRACHTL: But it is not a limitation upon informing the public.

MR. COHN: Prior to a determination.

Are you planning any press releases on any of these proceedings?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. COHN: You are not planning further press releases, is that right?

MR. SCHWELD: If there is a judgment in the case at some time, it will be given to the press.

As to the judgment whether the counter-claim has been released, I don't know whether the public information will press release that or not. I am not going to give any assurance they won't. When they brought this hundred million dollar counter-claim, they definitely wanted mentioned that it was dismissed.

MR. COHN: I want it mentioned that the Judge stated that we have the opportunity, if you are going to start this again -- these people have to rent, your Honor, and do business in this community. If they are going to start parading around, stating that the counter-claim is dismissed or something, I am going to have to start with the fact that your Honor has given us leave to file interrogatories against the complaint, which was not --

THE COURT: Let me put it this way, Mr. Cohn.
Unfortunately for your clients, because they are so

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large and well known, they become objects of newsworthy interest. For all I know, the press is here right now. But I do think that so far as the Government is concerned, it understands at this point, now that the matter is in litigation, it has announced what has occurred and I assume it will await that blessed day, one way or the other, when they win the lawsuit, as they confidently think they are going to do, you see, and that we won't have any intervening communiques between opposing capitols.

> That's fine, your Honor. MR. COHN:

MR. BRACHTL: All of this must be in context, of course, of the continuing interest of the press, and inquiries which are made, which require, I think, as a public obligation, a response.

THE COURT: Mr. Brachtl, if your fellows upstairs would apply your time and attention to the prosecution of the business of the office and let the press ferret it out, that would perhaps resolve the problem.

MR. COHN: One further thing, I would appreciate it, if your Honor would hold the orders and sign everything at the same time.

THE COURT: When I see new orders come in, I will take tare of them.

One thing I would remind you of, and in this

District and in the Southern District, too, we have a local rule, where objections to interrogatories are made, it is the responsibility of the lawyers to first try and iron out their differences, and only plague the Court, which has enough to do in this District, so much larger than the Southern District, and with so many fewer Judges --

MR. COHN: But by their competence, they make up in quality for what is lacked in quantity.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cohn. But that won't get you anywhere.

You are under obligation to try and discuss the matter --

MR. COHN: As long as they promise not to talk about a consent decree, we will have a meeting.

MR. SCHWELD: We love to litigate the case, your Honor.

MR. COHN: Thank you for your time.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE IN CLERK'S OFFICE OF NEW YORK U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	★ MAR 6 1974 ★  NAR 6 1974 ★  CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CLV, 1529
v.	PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,  Defendants.	TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES  O

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney answers the interrogatories served on it by the defendants and sets forth below the factual elements of the allegations of discrimination contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint by providing the names of persons who have knowledge of information relevant to the subject matter of the claim. The evidence which supports paragraph 5 of the complaint also supports paragraph 6.

## Answer to Interrogatory Number 1 and Number 2

The defendants through their agents or employees have made apartments unavailable on account of race in the following ways which are presently known to the plaintiff:

(A) Several black persons have been advised by agents of defendants, on account of race, that apartments were unavailable when apartments were, in fact, available; the defendants have quoted different terms of rental to certain black persons from those quoted to white persons; and statements were made by agents of the defendants with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicated a preference on account of race.

(23)

The following individuals have provided information with regard to the above:

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Fontainebleau Apartments 8855 Bay Parkway Brooklyn, New York 160 units

1. On July 22, 1972, Ms. Henrietta Davis, black, (10 Plaza Street, Brooklyn, New York) tried to obtain an apartment at the Fontainebleau. The superintendent, believed to be Ken Fici, told her he had no authority to accept applications for rental. Muriel Salzman, white tester from the Urban League, (2820 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, New York) went to the Fontainebleau directly after Ms. Davis and was told by the same superintendent that she could immediately rent either one of two available apartments. \*/

Beachaven Apartments Sheepshead Bay Brooklyn, New York 1200 units

2. On July 31, 1972, Godfrey Jacobs, a black tester from the Urban League, (2401 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn, New York), came to the Beachaven in response to an advertisement of a vacancy. The rental agent, believed to be Mr. Levy, told him that no one-bedroom apartments were available at Beachaven. Later on July 31, 1972, George Sim Johnston, white, employed by the Urban League, (131 East 69th Street, New York, New York) was shown a one-bedroom apartment at this complex which the rental agent told him could be rented immediately.

<sup>\*/</sup> All of the persons with relevant information to this lawsuit, set forth in plaintiff's answers to defendants' interrogatories were interviewed by Elyse S. Goldweber, a Departmental attorney, unless otherwise specified.

- 3. In December, 1972, Beverly Best, black, (2681 West Second Street, Brooklyn, New York) after being telephonically advised by an agent identifying himself as Mr. Rosenberg that a one-bedroom apartment was available was told by said agent upon her arrival the following day at the Beachaven, that no apartments were available for rental. Ms. Best was treated rudely. Ms. Best filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission and was subsequently admitted to tenancy. Phyllis Kirschenbaum, (1833 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, New York) a white tester who dealt with the same agent a few days after Ms. Best, was offered a rental application for a one-bedroom apartment.
- 4. On March 10, 1973, Muriel Silberberg, black, an employee of the New York Human Rights Commission, (52 Duane Street, New York, New York) was told by the rental agent at Beachaven who identified himself as Paul Ziselman that no one-bedroom apartments were available. Later on the same day, the same rental agent at Beachaven volunteered to Phyllis Spiro, white, an employee of the Urban League, (150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York) that although he had no one-bedroom apartments available at that time, a one-bedroom apartment would be available as of April 1, 1973. Mr. Ziselman also acknowledged to Ms. Spiro that he followed a racially discriminatory rental policy at the direction of his superiors, and that there were only very few "colored" tenants at the Beachaven.

- 3 -

Lawrence Gardens
3301-3315-3223 Nostrand Avenue
Brooklyn, New York
160 units
10, 1973, Ms. Silberberg, black,
Ty Human Rights Commission, was all

5. On March 10, 1973, Ms. Silberberg, black, an employee of the New York City Human Rights Commission, was also told by the rental agent at Lawrence Gardens who identified himself as Mr. Limani that there were no one-bedroom apartments available for rental. Later that day, Ms. Spiro, white, an employee of the Urban League, was shown two vacant one-bedroom apartments by the rental agent at this complex.

1 - To 1

Shorehaven Apartments 1483-93 Shore Parkway Brooklyn, New York 1100 units

6. On July 22, 1972, Henrietta Davis, black, (10 Plaza Street, Brooklyn, New York) was told by the rental agent at the Shorehaven, believed to be Mr. Sarnell, that no apartments were available, but that she should try to obtain an apartment at Patio Gardens. Ms. Davis was not similarly encouraged to apply at any other Trump buildings, most of which are believed to be substantially all-white. Patio Gardens is substantially integrated, and Mr. Sarnell encouraged Ms. Davis to apply there by relating that a black judge had recently become a tenant.

Highlander Hall 164-20 Highlander Avenue Jamaica, New York 165 units

7. On April 21, 1973, Annette Gandy, black, (164-20 High-landAvenue, Jamaica, New York) went to the above apartment complex in response to a newspaper advertisement indicating that studio apartments were available. The superintendent, who identified himself as Mr. Zeller, told Ms. Gandy that there were no vacancies

and the apartments that had been advertised in the newspaper had already been rented.

On April 23, 1973, Monique Golden, a white tester from the Urban League, (170-25 Highland Avenue, Jamaica, New York) went to the above complex to inquire about renting a studio apartment. The same rental agent indicated that he had three vacant studio apartments in the building and offered Ms. Golden an application.

On April 24, 1973, Ms. Gandy filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission and was subsequently admitted to

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Kendall Hall Apartments 41-10 Bowne Street Flushing, New York 165 units

tenancy.

8. On February 6, 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Ronald Bunn, black, (41-10 Bowne Street, Flushing, New York), applied for an apartment in response to a New York Times advertisement. The superintendent, who identified himself as Mr. Spitrey, told the Bunns that there were no 3 1/2 or 4 1/2 room apartments available. On February 7, 1970, Ralph Stein, white, (134-54 Maple Avenue, Flushing, New York) was offered an application for a 3 1/2 room apartment. On April 9, 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Bunn filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission and were subsequently admitted to tenancy.

Westminster Apartment 405 Westminster Road Brooklyn, New York 165 units

9. On February 26, 1972, in response to a newspaper advertisement of a vacancy, and on March 18, 1972, Alfred Hoyt, black,

(11728 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California) was told by Mr. Cannon, who identified himself as the superintendent, that no two-bedroom apartments were available for rental. On March 19, 1972, Mrs. Sheila Hoyt, Mr. Hoyt's wife, who is white, was offered an application to rent a two-bedroom apartment at this complex. Mr. Hoyt filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission and the Hoyts were subsequently admitted to tenancy.

#### \* \* \* \*

In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff is aware of seven complaints of alleged discriminatory practices by the defendants filed with the New York City Human Rights Commission. To date, only two of these additional seven complainants have been located:

- (a) During the summer of 1960, Harriette
  Bolling, black, (77-79 Columbia Street, New York,
  New York) was told by the rental agent at the
  Shorehaven Apartments that she could not rent an
  apartment at that complex because blacks were not
  being admitted. Ms. Bolling filed a complaint with
  the New York City Human Rights Commission and was
  admitted to residency. (Interviewed by Special Agents
  Robert F. McCarthy and Michael J. Hayes).
- (b) In early 1964, Mrs. Mae F. Brown, (163-17 130th Avenue, Jamaica, New York) was told there were no vacancies at the still uncompleted Wilshire Apartments, Mrs. Brown subsequently filed a complaint with

the Commission and was offered an apartment, which she declined. (Interviewed by Special Agents Edward F. DeRosa and John Aherne). The following complainants have not been located by plaintiff: (a) James Chestnut - Last known address was 166-05 Highland Avenue, Jamaica, New York. (b) Charles Hall - Last known address was 89-31 161st Street, Jamaica, New York. (c) Mrs. Carl Nickelson - Last known address was 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. (d) Lorraine Haynes - Last known address was 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York. (e) Robert Edward Harris - Last known address was 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. (B) 1. Defendants' comptroller, Mr. Stuart Hyman, Mrs. Williams and Ms. Sophie (LNU) at Trump Management Inc. have instructed a former superintendent at Kendall Hall, Mr. Thomas Miranda (39-89 50th Street Woodside, New York) to attach a separate sheet of paper to every application submitted by a prospective "colored" renter. On this separate sheet of paper, Mr. Miranda was instructed to write "C" in order to indicate that the prospective tenant was "colored." 2. Mr. and Mrs. Harry Schefflin, last known address 33-24 Parsons Blvd., Whitestone, New York, have advised counsel  $\underline{*}/$  for plaintiff that they were \*/ Frank E. Schwelb and Elyse S. Goldweber - 7 -

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employed in a general rental capacity at the Briarwick Apartments during the fall of 1973. This building was purchased by the Trumps during the late summer of 1973, and was substantially integrated at the time. The Schefflins advised that Mr. Fred Trump and other agents, including Mr. Wiss, wanted them to rent only to "Jews and Executives" and discouraged rental to blacks. They advised that a racial code was in effect, blacks being referred to as "No. 9." It appears that Mr. Schefflin was discharged by the defendants after working for them for a few months.

- (C) The following persons have been interviewed by representatives of the Department of Justice and have indicated that the defendant Trump Management Inc. does not always follow objective rental criteria in the renting of apartments, but often makes rental decision based on the subjective impression of the rental agent:
  - 1. Guido Lara: (2650 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, New York) Complex: Ocean Terrace Apartments. Mr. Lara advised that only 1% of the tenants at this complex were black. (Interviewed by Special Agents R. Patrick Welch and Robert F. Kaminski).
  - 2. Vikentije Besu: (2727 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, New York) Complex: Lincoln Shore

Apartments. At the time Mr. Besu was interviewed by the FBI, there were no black tenants at the Lincoln Shore Apartments. (Interviewed by Special Agents R. Patrick Welch and Robert F. Kaminski).

3. Walter Rohr: (580 Flatbush Avenue,
Brooklyn, New York) Complex: Patio Gardens.
From visual observation and tenant interviews
by Departmental attorney, Elyse S. Goldweber,
Patio Gardens is approximately 40% black.
(Interviewed by Special Agents Robert A.
Scigalski and Jeffrey C. Satchwell).

#### \* \* \* \*

The foregoing constitutes the information presently available to plaintiff to the effect that defendants have engaged in a "pattern or practice" of racial discrimination in housing and have denied equal housing opportunity to a group of persons, such denial raising an issue of "general public importance."

Plaintiff objects to so much of the interrogatories as seeks disclosure of the identities of "informers," on the ground that such information (once the evidence of discrimination has been disclosed) is irrelevant and that disclosure of the identities of informants interferes with the free flow of information to the Attorney General. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Northside Realty Associates</u>, 324 F. Supp. 287, 296 (N.D. Ga. 1971), <u>Wirtz v. Continental Finance and Loan Co.</u>, 326 F. 2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964). Except insofar as

disclosure has been made herein, plaintiff further objects to so much of these interrogatories as seeks to inquire into what action plaintiff took to verify the complaint, on the grounds that:

- 1. The Attorney General's determination that reasonable cause exists to bring the action is not judicially reviewable;

  <u>United States</u> v. <u>Northside Realty Associates</u>, 474 F. 2d 1164,

  1168 (5th Cir. 1973); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Bob Lawrence Realty</u>,

  474 F. 2d 115, 125 (5th Cir. 1973).
- This Court has dismissed defendants' spurious counterclaim, which alleged in substance that the action was brought without cause.

# AFFIDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

SS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

- I, Elyse S. Goldweber, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Fred C. Trump</u>, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. I am informed of the facts of this case and I have prepared and signed Plaintiff's Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories.
- 3. Those answers are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

Elyse S. Goldweler

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  $\frac{28^{12}}{1974}$ .

NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires:

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 28, 1974, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Answers and Objections to Defendants' First Interrogatories were placed in the United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Jeffrey A. Shuman, Esq. 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Elyse S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

- against -

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA will take the deposition of defendant TRUMP

MANAGEMENT, INC. as an adverse party upon oral examination,
by the officers, agents and employees and at the dates and
times set forth in the Appendix hereto, at the office of
the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth
Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a
Notary Public or before some other officer authorized by
law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to
attend and cross-examine.

----x

Dated: Brooklyn, New York March /9, 1974

Yours, etc.

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

(24)

TO:

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

- 1. Fred C. Trump
  Chairman, Trump Management Inc.
  March 22, 1974 2:15 p.m.
- Donald Trump
   President, Trump Management Inc.
   March 22, 1974
   10 a.m.
- Mr. Stuart Hyman Controller Trump Management Inc. March 25, 1974 10 a.m.
- Ms. Sophie Friedwald
   Office Manager, Trump Management Inc.
   March 25, 1974 2 p.m.
- 5. Ms. Marrazzo
  Resident Manager: 3901 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn
  April 18, 1974 10 a.m.
- 6. Ken Fici Superintendent: Fontainebleau Apartments, 8855 Bay Parkway, Brooklyn April 18, 1974 2 p.m.
- 7. Mr. Levy
  Rental agent: Beachhaven Apartments,
  Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn
  April 18, 1974 4 p.m.
- 8. Mr. Abe Rosenbery Rental Agent: Beachhaven Apartments, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn April 19, 1974 10 a.m.
- 9. Paul Ziselman Rental agent: Beachhaven Apartments, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn April 19, 1974 2 p.m.
- 10. Mr. Limani
  Superintendent: Lawrence Gardens, Brooklyn
  April 19, 1974 4 p.m.
- 11. Mr. Lou Sarnell
  Rental agent: Shorehaven Apartments, Brooklyn
  April 22, 1974 10 a.m.
- 12. Mr. Zeller
  Superintendent: Highlander Hall, Brooklyn
  April 22, 1974 2 p.m.
- 13. Rene Canon
  Superintendent: Westminster Apartments, Brooklyn
  April 22, 1974 4 p.m.

APPENDIX

JDP:HAB:eh F. #730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

- against -

:

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP

Civil Action

and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

No. 73 C 1529

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 2:15 p.m. on the 22nd day of March, 1974, at the Office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA will take the deposition of FRED C. TRUMP as an adverse party upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Brooklyn, New York Dated: March 19, 1974

Yours, etc.,

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney 225 Cádman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

TO:

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

JDP:HAB:eh F. #730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN CLERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, TIME A.M.:

- against -

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:00 a.m. on the 22nd day of March, 1974, at the Office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA will take the deposition of DONALD TRUMP as an adverse party upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Brooklyn, New York Dated: March 19, 1974

Yours, etc.,

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

HENRY A. FRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

TO:

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021



JDP: HAB: ec P. #730959 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

f Lem En Sant IN CLERK'S OFFICE . S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

\* x APP > 1974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

TIME A.M.....

STIPULATION

- against -

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Defendants.

Plaintiff,

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the undersigned counsel to the parties that the depositions of defendants to be taken upon oral examination by plaintiff in accordance with notices dated and served March 19, 1974 are, at defendants' request, adjourned to the dates and times set forth in the attached Schedule.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York March 19, 1974

> EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Rastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney

SAXE, BAÇON, BOLAN, & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants

A member of the firm

By:

SO ORDERED:

Brooklyn, Fow York Dated:

1. Donald Trump, individually and as President, Trump Management Inc. March 27, 1974 9 a.m.

Fred C. Trump, individually and as Chairman, Trump Management Inc. March 27, 1974 2:15 p.m.

Telen Zahen

3. Mr. Stuart Hyman Controller, Trump Management Inc. April 18, 1974 10 a.m.

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4. Ms. Sophie Friedwald Office Manager, Trump Management Inc. April 18, 1974 2 p.m.

- Ms. Marrazzo Resident Manager: 3901 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn April 18, 1974 4 p.m.
- Ken Fici Superintendent: Fontainebleau Apartments, 8855 Bay Parkway, Brooklyn April 19, 1974 10 a.m.
- Mr. Levy Rental agent: Beachhaven Apartments, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn April 19, 1974 2 p.m.
- Mr. Abe Rosenberg Rental Agent: Beachhaven Apartments, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn April 19, 1974 4 p.m.
- Paul Ziselman Rental agent: Beachhaven Apartments, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn April 22, 1974 10 a.m.
- 10. Mr. Limani Superintendent: Lawrence Gardens, Brooklyn April 22, 1974 2 p.m.
- 11. Mr. Lou Sarnell Rental agent: Shorehaven Apartments, Brooklyn April 22, 1974 4 p.m.
- 12. Mr. Zeller Superintendent: Highlander Hall, Brooklyn Adjourned without date
- 13. Rene Canon Superintendent: Westminster Apartments, Brooklyn Adjourned without date

IN CLERK'S OFFICE

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

APR 23 1974 🖈

NEW YORK

TIME A.M.... P.M ....

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, et. al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant United States Attorney Department of Justice Brooklyn, New York 11201 FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530



# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

NEW YORK

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, et. al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

HENRY A. BRACHTL
Assistant United States
Attorney
Department of Justice
Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

#### INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The United States has moved this Court for appropriate sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of defendants' continual, unexcused, and almost total failure to make discovery and to comply with the orders of this Court. Defendants have wholly ignored two deadlines - one set by the Federal Rules, a later very generous one agreed to by the parties and ordered by the Court - to answer interrogatories, and have filed neither objections nor any protective motions with respect to them. of continuous efforts by plaintiff to schedule discovery as to accommodate the convenience of defendants' principal counsel, Roy Cohn, Esq., only one abbreviated deposition has been taken to date. Moreover, Donald Trump, president of defendant, disclosed in that deposition that defendants have had the practice of destroying company records to save space, and that he was unaware of any orders to his employees to discontinue this practice since the litigation began or since plaintiff's interrogatories were served on him. Accordingly, plaintiff has been almost totally frustrated in its attempts to conduct this litigation expeditiously in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 3614, and, half a year after the complaint was filed, the suit has gone nowhere.

Defendants' noncompliance as to plaintiff's interrogatories has included, among other things, blithe disregard of this Court's very generous Order of February 5, 1974 granting defendants an unusually long time to answer, and we believe that meaningful sanctions would be appropriate. Nevertheless, courts abhor forfeitures, and we do not press the Court to preclude defendants from defending in the merits without one last chance. Accordingly, we ask the Court to enter an Order barring defendants from asserting any defense with respect to matters which are the subject of unanswered interrogatories unless defendants come into compliance as to all of their discovery obligations immediately.

### HISTORY OF THE CASE \*/

The Complaint in this action was filed on October 15, 1973. On December 12, 1973, after no fewer than three stipulated extensions, defendants filed motions to dismiss and, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. They further asserted a patently frivolous counterclaim against the United States seeking damages in the amount of 100 million dollars on the basis of claims explicitly barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act. On February 5, 1974, defendants' motions were denied and their counterclaim was dismissed.

On November 7, 1973, plaintiff served on defendants, by mail, a set of interrogatories. These interrogatories were neither answered nor objected to within the thirty days prescribed in the Federal Rules

<sup>\*/</sup> Elyse Goldweber, one of the attorneys for plaintiff, has sworn in the attached affidavit that the history that follows is true.

of Civil Procedure. Instead, they were ignored. On January 21, 1974, after having sought informal compliance pursuant to Local Rule 9(f), the United States served a motion to compel defendants to answer interrogatories. On February 5, 1974, this Court, after disposing of defendants' motions and counterclaims, entered an Order implementing an agreement of the parties as to when various interrogatories were to be propounded and answered. Defendants were directed to propound initial interrogatories to plaintiff on or before February 8, 1974. Plaintiff was directed to answer the interrogatories in 20 days. Finally, defendants were directed to respond to plaintiff's original interrogatories, filed four and a half months earlier on or before April 1, 1974. Plaintiff was reluctant to agree to this unusually generous time frame for defendants to respond to interrogatories which they had previously ignored, but consented nevertheless in the hope that the case would then proceed expeditiously. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

Plaintiff complied fully with its obligations under the foregoing Order and, on February 28, 1974, served detailed answers to defendants' interrogatories which disclosed alleged discrimination at seven of defendants' buildings, \*/ as well as a number of extrajudicial admissions of a discriminatory policy. Such proof easily meets the standards for relief in cases under 42 U.S.C. 3613. See,

 $<sup>\</sup>star$ / At his deposition, Donald Trump testified that defendants did not own the part of the complex involved in one of the incidents.

e.g. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Pelzer Realty Co.</u>, 484 F. 2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), <u>cert. den.</u> U.S. (April 15, 1974) (refusal to sell to two blacks is a pattern and practice); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Reddoch</u>, P.H. E.O.H. Rptr. Para. 13,569 (Conclusions of Law Nos. 11, 13-15) (S.D. Ala. 1972), <u>aff'd per curiam</u> 467 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972) (discriminatory instructions and admissions are a pattern and practice); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Gilman</u>, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (pattern and practice found as to large operator of apartments based on two incidents at a single building). April 1 passed, however, with not a word from defendants in response to plaintiff's interrogatories.

On April 11, 1974, pursuant to Local Rule 9(f), Elyse S. Gold-weber, an attorney for the United States, telephoned Jeffrey Shuman, an attorney for the defendants to discuss defendants' failure to respond to plaintiff's interrogatories. Mr. Shuman informed her that the defendants were not in the process of answering the interrogatories and were unsure of when they would begin answering them. He stated that they might possibly do so some time in May, 1974. As of the date of this motion, plaintiff has not received any response to its interrogatories, and no motion for a protective order has been filed.

Plaintiff's difficulty in securing answers to its interrogatories has been compounded by its inability to bring the defendants, their agents, and their counsel, into any room for any length of time sufficient to take appropriate depositions. After extensive efforts

by plaintiff to accommodate counsel for defendants, who first agreed on and then cancelled depositions which were scheduled for March 22 and 25, 1974, an agreement was reached to depose both Donald and Fred Trump, the two named defendants, on March 28 and 29. Two Departmental attorneys travelled to New York on March 27, but learned on arrival that Mr. Cohn, the lead counsel for defendants, would be available only for about two hours on the morning of March 28th and for about two hours on the afternoon of the 29th. One abbreviated deposition was taken during that time. \*/ An attempt was then made, and a stipulation reached, scheduling additional depositions for April 17 through 22, including that of defendant Fred Trump, but counsel for defendants advised Ms. Goldweber on April 15, on 48 hours notice that these depositions would have to be cancelled too. After being advised that plaintiff would apply for sanctions,  $\pm *$  Mr. Cohn offered to hold depositions on April 23 and 24. While Mr. Schwelb had to reschedule a trip to Texas, plaintiff immediately agreed to these revised dates, subscribing to the ditty that "hope beats eternal in the human breast." Within hours of the new agreement,

<sup>\*/</sup> Plaintiff's counsel suggested that progress could be made if only junior counsel, Ms. Goldweber and Mr. Shuman, participated in depositions while Mr. Cohn was unavailable. Even though the two juniors were classmates, Mr. Cohn declined this offer, but generously advised plaintiff's senior counsel, Mr. Schwelb, that he could do as he chose.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Attachment "A."

however, Mr. Cohn cancelled the depositions scheduled for April 24, citing imperative business which would take him to Europe, back to New York, and to St. Louis in less than a week. This left him only one day for a case dealing with rights to which Congress has accorded "the highest national priority." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).

Plaintiff also proposes to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 34, F.R.Civ.P., and hopes soon to inspect and copy pertinent records. Mr. Donald Trump and his attorney were fulsome in their assurances that this would be permitted. Since defendants have not responded to interrogatories seeking a description of their records, and since Donald Trump disclaimed detailed knowledge of these records during his deposition, \*/ plaintiff has been hampered in serving a proper request pursuant to Rule 34.

<sup>\*/</sup> Mr. Trump described certain employees, including Stuart Hyman, as being the persons with this and other pertinent information. Mr. Hyman is among those who were scheduled to be deposed on April 18 pursuant to stipulation, but whose depositions were cancelled on short notice by counsel for defendants.

#### ARGUMENT

As related in our introduction, Congress has decreed that this kind of case be "in every way expedited." 42 U.S.C. 3614. In view of the national priority given to equal housing opportunity, Trafficante, supra, these cases, like employment discrimination suits, are "pregnant with an urgency" which precludes the kinds of delays to which defendants have been subjecting this litigation. United States v. Ironworkers Local No. 1, 438 F. 2d 679, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 830 (1971); see also <u>United</u> States v. Gustin Bacon, 426 F. 2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1970); cert. den. 400 U.S. 832 (1970). The right to equal opportunity is a "warrant for the here and now," and not for some distant hereafter. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). While we appreciate that any litigant is entitled to counsel of his own choice, and while the United States is prepared to make any reasonable accommodation to counsel's schedule consistent with the statutory directive of expedition, it is obvious that, on defendants' current schedule, we will be lucky to have a case of this magnitude resolved by 1984. It is particularly in cases like this one that the procedures outlined in the Federal Rules must be followed, so that each party can enjoy its full procedural and substantive rights in orderly fashion.

Accordingly, in the light of the record of consistent, unexcused noncompliance, the sanctions prescribed in Rule 37 are particularly appropriate.

Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that

if a party . . . fails to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service . . . the court . . . may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just . . .

The Rule cites as examples any action authorized under paragraphs "A", "B" and "C" of Rule 37(b)(2), which include

- (A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
- (b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
- (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.

These sanctions are authorized even without a pre-existing Order compelling discovery, where, as here, a party has inexcusably failed to answer or object to properly served interrogatories and where no protective order has been sought. Moreover, "the failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c)." See Rule 37(d). While we do not see how defendants' repeated noncompliance, at least to the interrogatories, can be described as other than willful, the 1970 amendment to Rule 37(d) eliminated the requirement of "willfulness" as a condition precedent to the imposition of sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories. Presently, the only relevance of "willfulness" is "in determining the severity of the sanction chosen by the Court." 4A Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., para. 37.05, p. 37-95. In deciding the issue of severity, the Court might consider that these sanctions would be applicable even if defendants had not ignored this Court's Order of February 5, and must be even more appropriate since they have ignored it. Cf. Rule 37(b).

Sanctions under Rule 37(d), in cases involving inexcusable failure to answer interrogatories, have included dismissal and entry of default judgment. Weiss Noodle Co. v. Aprile, 272 F. 2d 923 (6th Cir. 1959) (unconditional default for failure to answer interrogatories); Brookdale Mill, Inc. v. Rowley, 218 F. 2d 728 (6th Cir. 1954) (unconditional dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories); Sivelle v. Maloof, 373 F. 2d 520 (1st Cir. 1967) (unconditional default for failure to answer interrogatories); Hesse v. Brunner, 172 F. Supp. 284 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) (conditional default judgment for failure to answer interrogatories); See 4A Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., para. 37.05, p. 37-102 and cases cited therein. Some courts have imposed as the proper sanction a prohibition against the introduction of certain evidence relating to the issues as to which the opponent has failed to make discovery, Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); Bernat v. Pennsylvania RR, 14 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1953), and have designated that certain facts, with respect to such issues, be taken as established. McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278 F. 2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960); Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).

It appears from the foregoing that litigants have forfeited unconditionally their rights to litigate on the merits for non-compliance no more sustained than that of defendants in this case. Accordingly, we think the Court has the authority to strike defendants' answer and enter default judgment without any further opportunity for defendants to respond. Nevertheless, in the interest of fair play, plaintiff has no objection to defendants having another brief opportunity to come into compliance before more draconian measures striking their defenses are made absolute. We believe that if the interrogatories are answered immediately, and depositions taken without further dealy, the case can still be litigated on the merits.

While plaintiff does not presently seek a forfeiture, but rather an ironclad assurance that defendants will make discovery immediately, we believe that the availability under the Rules of the sterner unconditional remedy, suggests that further unilateral disregard of the Rules by defendants should be dealt with promptly and finally. Defendants should be required to make full and complete discovery <u>now</u>; failing that, they should be held to be in default.

We wish to observe, in connection with defendants' obligations now, that their failure to make timely objection, or indeed any objection, to plaintiff's interrogatories waived their right to do so even if any objection were substantively well taken, see Rule 37(d), quoted at p. 9, supra. As the court said in Davis v. Romney, 53 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1971), in which the defaulting party was far more diligent than the Trumps have been in this case,

The passing of the forty-five day period without any objection being made to the questions set forth in the interrogatories clearly must be considered a waiver by the defendants of any objections they might have had. Cephus v. Busch, 47 F.R.D. 371 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Regardless of how outrageous or how embarrassing the questions may be, the defendants have long since lost their opportunity to object to the questions. If they feel that the questions are unfair they have no one to blame but themselves for being required to answer them now. If discovery rules are to have "any effect or meaning, the failure to serve such objections within the time prescribed \* \* \* should be considered a waiver of such objections." Bohlin v. Brass Rail, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). The plaintiffs' patience in agreeing to wait for answers beyond the forty-five day period cannot be considered as a stay or an extension of the time for filing objections. Sturdevant v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 32 F.R.D. 426 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

#### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff prays that its motion for sanctions be granted, with the defendants being provided the opportunity described in the motion to come into compliance by

- (1) fully answering all interrogatories;
- (2) making themselves and their agents promptly available for deposition; and
- (3) providing the Court with an assurance of full future cooperation.

In the event that defendants fail to take these steps, we ask that the answer be stricken and the defendants be precluded from contesting the allegations of discrimination.

We further suggest that, if the defendants come into prompt compliance as to the immediate controversy, the Court set a schedule for future discovery which both permits each party to prepare fully and ensures compliance with the expedition provisions

of 42 U.S.C. 3614. The schedule will then be clear, and any attorney on either side \*/ who is unable to meet this schedule will then be required to withdraw or delegate accordingly.

Respectfully Submitted

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attorney

Department of Justice

Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

washington, D.C. 20330

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

<sup>\*/</sup> Mr. Cohn is not alone in being busy. Mr. Schwelb is in charge of the Housing Section's entire litigation program and active in many of the cases. 67 fair housing suits or amicus participations were initiated by the Housing Section in 1973 alone, and earlier and later cases remain open.

#### ATTACHMENT A

JDP:HAB:ec

BY HAND

April 16, 1974

Same, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 Mast 63th Street New York, New York 10021

Attn: Roy M. Cohn, Esq.

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Sirs:

We are sorry to learn from your associate Jeffrey Schuman, Esq. that you will not honor your commitment to produce previously designated officers, agents and employees of defendants in the above action for depositions on April 17, 18, 19 and 22, 1974, notwithstanding your written stipulation, by Mr. Schuman, so ordered by the Court on April 1, 1974, and the oral representation of Mr. Cohn of your firm to Government counsel on March 29, 1974. To avoid obviously futile expenditure, we have cancelled our request for a stanographer to record the depositions on those dates.

We regret, too, that defendant has chosen to violate the Court's order of February 5, 1974 which ordered defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories on or before April 1, 1974.

We will, of course, apply for appropriate sanctions against defendants.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney

By:

HENRY A. BRACHTL

. We ame U. S. Abtorney

cc: The Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE	EASTERN DIS	TRICT OF IN CLERK'S OFFICE IN CLERK'S OFFICE COURT E.D. N.Y.
	NEW YORK	C DISTRICT COO
		★ APR 23 1974 ★
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	, )	TIME A.M.
Plaintiff,	<u> </u>	CIVIL ACTION
v.	)	NO. 73 C 1529
	)	MOTION AND NOTICE OF
FRED C. TRUMP, et. al.,	Ì	MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Defendants.	ý	
	)	

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff, United States of America, will move this Court, before the Monorable Edward R. Neaher, District Judge at the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York in Courtroom 9, on the 3rd day of May, 1974 at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an Order striking the Answer herein and precluding defendants from contesting plaintiff's contention that defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 3613, and have denied equal housing opportunity to groups of persons, which denial has raised an issue of general public importance, also within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 3613, unless defendants

(1) File complete and responsive answers to all interrogatories heretofore propounded to them by plaintiff within ten days of the entry of this Court's Order; and

3

- (2) Provide and adhere to a firm schedule of availability for depositions of the defendants and their agents heretofore noticed for deposition; and
- (3) File with the Court an assurance that they will proceed with and respond to discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any Orders which may be entered by this Court in relation thereto.

This motion is made pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the grounds therefor are set forth with particularity in plaintiff's supporting memorandum and in the attached affidavit of Elyse Goldweber. Plaintiff further prays for such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: April /9<sup>44</sup>, 1974 Brooklyn, New York

To: Roy M. Cohn, Esq.
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan
and Manley
39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Yours, etc.

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Frank E. Schwell

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant United States

Attórney

Department of Justice Brooklyn, New York 11201

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

# AFF IDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

Elyse S. Goldweber, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Fred</u> C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73-C-1529.
- 2. I have prepared the factual statement in plaintiff's Memorandum for Sanctions and have personal knowledge of the facts contained therein. It is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Elyse S. GOLDWEBER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  $18^{TL}$  day of April 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTURO DISTRICT COURT E.D. N. MAY 8 1974 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	TIME A.M ) P.M
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529 )
v •	) }
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Defendants.	) )

Plaintiff hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendants produce and permit plaintiff to inspect and copy the documents and records listed and described in Attachment A to this request.

It is requested that the aforesaid production shall commence on the 12th day of June, 1974, at 10:00 a.m. at the main office of defendant Trump Management Inc., 2611 West Second Street, Brooklyn, New York, and that the aforesaid production shall continue as such other offices of Trump Management Inc. as necessary to inspect and copy the requested documents and records, and that the documents and records shall remain available until such inspection and copying can reasonably be completed.

Inspection, copying and photographing will be performed by or under the supervision of an attorney of the United States Department of Justice.

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney Eastern District of New York

Xuchir

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Respectfully submitted,

S. Soldwelier FRANK E. SCHWELB ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorneys, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

## ATTACHMENT A

# LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED FOR INSPECTION AND COPYING

All deeds, contracts, leases, application forms, vacancy lists, correspondence, memoranda, ledger sheets, accounts, cancelled checks, W-2 forms, journals, receipts, waiting lists, and other written records, books, documents, and writings in the possession, custody, or control of the defendant, or any firm, association, company, corporation, or other business entity of said defendant Trump Management Inc. \*/ which contain, constitute, or in any way reflect any of the following information since January 1, 1968:

- 1. The names and addresses of all apartment buildings, residential lots and all other dwellings \*\*/ owned and/or managed by or through said defendant for any period of time since January 1, 1968, in New York and elsewhere.
  - 2. A. The address and apartment number of each dwelling available for rental by or through said defendant for any period of time since January 1, 1968;
  - B. The size and rental range of all dwellings available for rental for any period of time since January 1, 1968;

<sup>\*/</sup> For the purposes of convenience, the word "defendant" as used in the remainder of this Request, shall include defendant Trump Management Inc. or any firm, association, company, corporation, or other business entity of said defendant, or any agent, or employee of said defendant, and shall include Fred Trump and Donald Trump.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> For purposes of convenience the word "dwelling" as used in the remainder of this Request shall include any apartment, house, building lot, or any other dwelling as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. 3602(b).

C. The dates each apartment was available for rental since January 1, 1968. The name, address, race, and date of inquiry of each prospective tenant who has inquired regarding the rental of a dwelling; The preferences expressed by the prospective tenant regarding a particular apartment building, dwelling size, date of occupancy, and/or rental rate; The information provided by each prospective tenant in satisfaction of the qualifications and criteria to be met by prospective tenants; The results of any credit, employment, priorlandlord, or personal background checks or verifications made in deciding whether to accept or reject each prospective tenant; The name of the person with whom the prospective tenant dealt; The name of the person whom processed the application of the prospective tenant; The address and apartment number of each dwelling shown to the prospective tenant; Whether the prospective tenant submitted an application to rent a dwelling, and if not, why not; The name, address, race, and dates of occupancy of tenants and the forwarding addresses of former tenants; - 2 -

J. If the prospective tenant was not accepted as a tenant, the reason for his rejection; and If there were no vacancies at the time of the prospective tenant's application any memoranda which would reflect whether the applicant's name was put on a waiting list. 4. A. The qualifications or criteria taken into account in deciding whether to accept or reject applicants; The credit, employment, prior-landlord, В. or personal background checks or verifications made in deciding whether to accept or reject applicants; The policy or practice of the defendant regarding the rental of dwellings to black persons; The instructions given to the defendant's employees or agents regarding the rental of dwellings to black persons; and The instructions given to any real estate company, rental agency, or other such company engaged to refer prospective applicants to the defendant regarding the rental of dwellings to black persons. All written instructions, memoranda of oral instructions, correspondence, or other written records or documents to agents or employees of said defendant or to other persons, organizations, or agencies concerning the procedures and standards to be followed by such persons with respect to - 3 -

the rental of dwellings to any person, including black persons, and the treatment to be accorded prospective tenants of dwellings, including black prospective tenants of dwellings since January 1, 1968.

6. All documents or papers containing any reference to

- 6. All documents or papers containing any reference to race between or concerning said defendant or its previously referenced tenants since January 1, 1968.
- 7. All correspondence, agreements and other documents or papers, or communications which make reference to the Fair Housing Act. or to discrimination or nondiscrimination in rentals.
- 8. All advertisements placed by said defendant in newspapers, magazines, trade publications, brochures, radio, television,
  and other publications or media which advertised the availability
  of apartments for rent by or through said defendant since January 1,
  1968.
- 9. All records, payroll reports, contracts, W-2 forms, cancelled checks and other documents which contain the name, address, race, position and date of employment of any rental agents or other employee employed by the defendants at any time since January 1, 1968.
- 10. Copies of all EEO-1 reports furnished to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by the defendant, and of all other documents reflecting the race or national origin of defendant's employees.
- 11. All correspondence between defendants and the New York City Commission on Human Rights or with any other agency with civil rights responsibilities, other than the U.S. Department of Justice.

12. All correspondence, documents, memoranda and papers, formal and informal, reflecting or alleging racial discrimination in housing by defendants or any of them, such documents to be produced irrespective of the merit or lack of merit of the allegation and irrespective of the formality or informality of the complaint.

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elyse S. Goldweber, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Request for Production of Documents on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This the 6th day of May, 1974.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

JDP:HAB:sm F.#730959 IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

★ MAY 3 0 1974 ★

-x

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

TIME A.M......

Plaintiff,

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

-against-

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT,

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA will take the deposition of defendant TRUMP
MANAGEMENT, INC. as an adverse party upon oral examination,
by the officers, agents and employees and at the dates and
times set forth in the Appendix hereto, at the office of
the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth
Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a
Notary Public or before some other officer authorized by
law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to
attend and cross-examine.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York May 30, 1974

Yours, etc.,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By: -

HENRY A BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York TO:

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

1. Ms. Marrazzo
 Resident Manager
 3901 Nostrand Avenue
 Brooklyn, New York
 June 18, 1974 - 10:00 a.m.

 $\underline{A} \ \underline{P} \ \underline{P} \ \underline{E} \ \underline{N} \ \underline{D} \ \underline{I} \ \underline{X}$ 

- 2. Mr. Ken Fici
   Superintendent
   Fountainbleau Apartments
   8555 Bay Parkway
   Brooklyn, New York
   June 18, 1974 2:00 p.m.
- 3. Mr. Levy
  Rental Agent
  Beachaven Apartments
  Sheepshead Bay
  Brooklyn, New York
  June 18, 1974 4:00 p.m.
- 4. Mr. Paul Ziselman
  Rental Agent
  Beachaven Apartments
  Sheepshead Bay
  Brooklyn, New York
  June 19, 1974 10:00 a.m.
- 5. Mr. Limani
  Superintendent
  Lawrence Gardens
  Brooklyn, New York
  June 19, 1974 2:00 p.m.
- 6. Mr. Lou Sarnell Rental Agent Shorehaven Apartments Brooklyn, New York June 19, 1974 - 4:00 p.m.
- 7. Mr. Zeller
  Superintendent
  Highlander Hall
  Brooklyn, New York
  June 20, 1974 10:00 a.m.
- 8. Rene Canon Superintendent Westminster Apartments Brooklyn, New York June 20, 1974 - 2:00 p.m.
- 9. Mr. Abe Rosenberg
  Rental Agent
  Beachaven Apartments
  Sheepshead Bay
  Brooklyn, New York
  June 20, 1974 4:00 p.m.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

JUN 5 1974

	TIME A.M
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) P.M
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION No. 73 C 1529
V.  FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,  Defendants.	DEFENDANTS FIRST ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES  ) )

The defendants, answering the interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff, state as follows:

- 1. The sole shareholder in Trump Management Inc., hereinafter referred to as "T.M.I.", is Fred C. Trump. He acquired such interest on June 24, 1969.
- 2. T.M.I. was incorporated in Queens County, New York, on April 22, 1969; Fred C. Trump, 8814 Midland Parkway, Jamaica Estates, New York, is President; Donald Trump, 8814 Midland Parkway, Jamaica Estates, New York, is Vice-President; Matthew J. Tosti, 8620 Avon Street, Jamaica Estates, New York, is Secretary. The duties of each officer are set forth in standard New York corporate printed by-laws.
- 3. The supervisory roles of Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump were explained in detail in their respective examinations before trial conducted by the plaintiff.
- 4. Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump own an interest in Starex City, a moderate-income housing development consisting of approximately 6,000 units located in the East New York section of Brooklyn, New York, in a low-income racially integrated neighborhood. The Trumps have no managerial control over this complex.

The renting process has just begun and the apartments have not been rented to date. However, it is expected that an extremely high percentage of the apartments would be rented to blacks.

5. This information has previously been supplied to the Department of Justice by the following communications: a letter to the attention of Thomas F. Drumm, at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., from Matthew J. Tosti, dated October 11, 1972, and a subsequent memorandum from Tosti to Miss Elyse S. Goldweber at the Housing Section of the United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., dated March 15, 1973.

With regard to 5 0., no records are maintained in connection with the race of employees. However, the remaining information requested is being compiled by Stuart Hyman and will be furnished to the plaintiff.

- 6. The defendants have never had in effect any policy which discriminated against non-white applicants.
  - 7. Annexed as Exhibit I.
- 8. Defendants have never had a policy not to employ negroes or members of any racial or ethnic group.
  - 9. No information available.
- 10. The executed leases and applications of tenants who were accepted are located in the T.M.I. office at 2611 West Second Street, Brooklyn, New York, under the supervision of Stuart Hyman.
  - 11. No information available.
- in all of their rental offices. Defendants have told the respective superintendents orally that T.M.I. absolutely does not allow any discrimination in renting. Detailed responses to this question are contained in the examinations before trial of Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump.

13. This information is being compiled by Stuart Hyman and will be supplied to the plaintiff as soon as possible.

14. This was answered in detail in the examination before trial of Stuart Hyman.

15. No information available.

DATED: New York, New York
May 15, 1974

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for defendants Office and Post Office Address: 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

	BLACK	an	d PUERTO RICAN EMPLOY	ZEES	<u> </u>
C.	Flores	J.	Garcon	S.	Terry
Α.	Serapio	Р.	Taylor	J.	Brown
J.	Bennett	Н.	Culbrehda	Α.	Countil
Α.	Cambel1	Н.	Rodrigues	L.	Cordero
C.	Echavarria	J.	Williams	F.	Lorenzo
J.	Maldonado	Ο.	Curtis	D.	Alvarez
M.	Perez Jr.	М.	Adams	Α.	Hampton
M.	Perez Sr.	Α.	Alphonzo	٧.	Matos
L.	Perez	R.	Robinson	M.	Matos
W.	Martinez	L.	Bidal	٧.	Gregaria
S.	Vasquez	Α.	Andersen	W.	Reyes
A.	Diaz	Н.	Solar	Mor	nurle
S.	Diaz	R.	Garcia	T.	Logan
E.	Aquino	С.	Pradera	Α.	Clemens
R.	Nieves	Α.	Fuentes	C.	Roles
М.	Marquez	R.	Garcia	Ε.	Iglesia
R.	Delgado	٧.	Rodiguez	Ε.	Mosely
J.	Rivera	Μ.	Wilson	Per	rez
F.	Alvarado	R.	Joyner	J.	Alicea
G.	Rosado	G.	Lara	Н.	Dolphin
C.	Gouzalez	Sa	lastro	D.	Banks
P.	Alvelo	Рe	rez	Н.	Witherspoon
R.	Cardona	Ka	stro	J.	Brownhill
J.	Nunez	Pa	blulla	F.	Santiago
J.	Medina	Υ.	Augiston	Н.	Dunlap
Μ.	Tilghman	D.	Lugo	Α.	Green
0.	Jenkins	L.	Vega	J.	Herlero
J ]	Raso	R.	Urena	D.	Reyes
I.	Pedro Matos	J.	Grullion	J.	Garcia
Jo	se Luis De Jesus	Н.	Quel	J.	McLean
C.	Comrie	R.	Munog	L.	Hurlston
I.	Butler	Α.	Escalante	J.	Sandiego
W.	Parma	Μ.	Hunt	W.	Spruill
S.	Boston	V.	Jerome	R.	Bullock
Α.	Magana	N.	Nelson	Т.	Leach

R. Yocono

R. Rodrigues

J. Betancourt

R. Condon

C. Litvak

J. Rosado

W. Sanders

A. Clanton

J. Wyatt

ADDRESS REPLY TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY AND REFER TO INITIALS AND NUMBER

JDP:HAB:jdp

F#730959

# United States Department of Justice

Afile

#### UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FEDERAL BUILDING BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11201

U. S. DISTRICI COURT E.D. N.Y.

BY HAND

June 13, 1974

JUN 1 4 1974

F.M....

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Attention: Scott Manley, Esq.

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Sirs:

As you know, Attorneys Donna F. Goldstein and Norman Goldberg of the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and Assistant U.S. Attorney Henry A. Brachtl of this Office with others from our staff, appeared at the offices of defendant Trump Management, Inc., 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York, at 10:00 A.M. on June 12, 1974, to commence inspection and copying of records required to be produced under the Government's request pursuant to Rule 34, F.R. Civ. P., served upon you as counsel to defendants on May 6, 1974.

At that time, employees of Trump Management, Inc., including Stuart Hyman, Controller, expressed complete surprise at the visit of Government counsel, professed never to have been advised of the appointment, and declined to produce the requested documents for inspection.

No objection to the Government's request for production - either formal or informal - has been previously made by or on behalf of defendants, no application for a protective order has been made, and no notice of intended non-compliance with the request had been given, though minimal professional courtesy would have required as much.

In response to our telephone inquiry to your office for an explanation, we listened later in the day to your letter, read by your secretary, offering to discuss today the breadth of the request for production and proffering the possibility of some production of documents at your office on Friday, June 14, 1974.

We find your proposal to begin negotiations over the breadth of the Government's request for production now - thirtyfive days after service of the request, one day after production was to begin and after Government counsel have travelled from Washington, D. C. for the inspection - entirely unacceptable.

We write now in a final effort to secure, without judicial assistance, the Government's right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to inspect and copy the designated records and documents.

We are willing to commence the inspection at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, Friday, June 14, 1974. The inspection is to proceed in all other respects in accordance with our May 6, 1974 request, i.e., with the production of the documents designated in the request at the office of Trump Management, Inc., 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York, and other offices of Trump Management, Inc., as necessary.

If you accept this accommodation, please advise by telephone call to the undersigned at this Office, (212) 596-3563 or 596-3562, before 3:00 p.m. today, Thursday, June 13, 1974.

If you decline our offer, or do not respond, we shall very promptly move the Court - once again - for sanctions and an order appropriate in the circumstances.

Depositions of Trump Management, Inc. employees are to recommence next week on June 18, 19 and 20, 1974. We received yesterday your letter declaring that the scheduled dates are not convenient for you and that, therefore, neither defendants' counsel nor witnesses will appear. You did not suggest alternative dates. Unless you supply proposed alternative firm dates for the depositions before 3:00 p.m. today, we shall also apply to the Court for an ordered schedule with conditional sanctions so that these much delayed depositions may proceed.

Very truly yours,

DAVID G. TRAGER

United States Attorney

By:

BRACHIL Assistant U. S. Attorney

onna

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, Attorney

Civil Rights Division

U. S. Department of Justice

To: Saxe, Bacon, et al. - 3 - June 13, 1974

Copy: Hon. Edward R. Neaher

United States District Judge

United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

(BY HAND)

U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.	N.Y
₩ JUN 25 1974	☆

TIME A.M....

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

P.M....:
: Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 -against-

FRED TRUMP, et al. ,

Defendant.

United States District Court Eastern District of New York United States Court House Brooklyn, New York 11201

May 3, 1974 12:00 Hoon

#### BEFORE:

HONORABLE VINCENT A. CATOGGIO United States Magistrate

#### APPEARANCES:

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Assistant United States Attorney

Frank E. Schwell, Esq. Department of Justice

Alice Goldweber, Esq. Department of Justice

Scott Manley, Esq. Attorney for Defendant, Fred C. Trump, et. al.

> TRANSCRIBED BY: Eastern Transcription Service



MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, we are going to record the case of the United States vs. Fred C.

Trump, Donald Trump, and Trump Management, Inc.

Defendant, no the plaintiff has made a motion for sanctions against the defendant for the defendant's failure to answer interrogatories. Now, we have present for the United States, Henry A. Brachtl, and Mr. Frank

H. Schwell, and Miss Goldweber, Alice S. Goldweber, attorney for the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice. And for the defendant, we now have been graced by the appearance of Mr. Manley...

what is your first name Mr. Manley?

MR. MANLEY: Scott.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Scott...Scott Manley.
Alright, it is now 12:00 AM, and we shall proceed
after a two hour delay. Now...

MR. BRACHTL: Let the record show, Your Honor that the two hour delay was not by the plaintiff.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, all of the Government's employees were here promptly. Now, the statute under which this action has been instituted, provides in 42 US 33614, that any court in which the proceeding is instituted under Section 3612 or 3613 of this title, shall assign the case to a hearing at the

earliest practicable date, and cause the case to be in every way expedited. So that this case has to be given priority by not only the court, but by the attorney. The court probably will not countenance this case, this case being second billing to anything else. So from here on in, or at least as long as any phase of the matter is before me, I will insist on prompt disposition. Now, I want to ask the Government a question. Is there any criminal...do you want to come up...or any way you want, go ahead. Pull up chairs if you want .. it might be wise. Now, I want to ask the Court. As I indicated before, this is a motion to impose sanctions on the defendant for the defendant's failure to comply with the demand to answer interrogatory served on the defendant's counsel by the plaintiff's counsel. The interrogatory started out, they were filed in this court by the plaintiff, the Government, on November 15, 1973. On January 24, 1974, there was filed in this court a motion to compel answers to those interrogatories. And this motion to impose sanction was filed on April 23, 1974. Now, in a conference in an appearance before Judge (inaudible), I think it was January 25, but I won't...

MISS GOLDWEBER: It was, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: But I won't hold to that date...alright, it was directed that the interrogatories should be answered on or before April 1. And the Government says that they have not yet been answered. Now, Now, the defendants have not filed any exceptions to any of the interrogatories, and I do believe thathad they filed the exception to many of the interrogatories they would have made questions that would have been rather sticky, and (inaudible). Now, what is the defendant's...oh, let me ask one question. There is also in the papers, schedule for the taking of depositions. In a conversation I had yesterday with Mr. Cohen, who represents the defendants, the...he made great stress on the fact when I charged him with not doing his homework in this case, and he said yes, we have produced five, seven or more people for depositions. Is that correct Miss Goldweber?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, I would like to be heard on that. We tried to schedule...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Did you have five depositions?

MISS GOLDWEBER: We did have five depositions.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Was it seven or five?

MISS GOLDWEBER: It is five...but..under very

trying circumstances, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, but you have them.

MISS GOLDWEBER: We had them.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, where are the depositions?

MISS GOLDWLBER: Well, we have one witness, the other four are being **filed**.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, now, is it your intention to file them? With the court clerk?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes.

MR. BRACHTL: Your Monor, may I interject...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: You name is?

MR. BRACHTL: Henry Brachtl.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Go ahead.

MR. BRACUTL: We believe that the depositions were in all instances completed. Were they? In other words, the depositions were completed?

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Miss Goldweber...

MISS GOLDWEBER: (inaudible).

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Miss Goldweber shakes her head and indicates that she has...

MISS GOLDWEBER: Those depositions were completed.

MAGISTREATE CATOGGIO: They were filed?

UNIDENTIFIED: They were filed.

MR. BRACHTL: I stand corrected.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright. Now, well...

MR. SCHWELL: I think we should say that getting...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Your name?

MR. SCHWELL: Schwell.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, Mr. Schwell?

HR. SCHWELL: That getting those depositions taken...produced some adventures, the likes of which I have never seen before. But we did get a lot of (inaudible).

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, there is nothing like adventure. But you have the depositions.

MR. SCHWELL: Those five, yes sir.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes sir.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, is that where we are next? Now, do you need more depositons? How many?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Your Honor, there were approximately nine other people who...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Nine?

MISS GOLDWEEDR: Nine, nine more people noted for depositions under the original notice. However,

I have repeatedly asked Hr. Colin to inform me of which of those persons night possibly be dead or no longer work for this defendant, therefore, they would not be obligated to produce them.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Also, when I first contacted Mr. Colin about arranging such depositions at his request, and as a courtesy to him, I agreed, I did not notice everyone that I wanted for deposition at that time. I felt first we would work on the first eleven or twelve people, and then the Government could notice for additional people if it was necessary.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Ycs, well now....

MISS GOLDWEBER: Now I do believe it will be necessary at this point to notice several.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, well, let's not run a hate Mr. Colin week...

MISS GOLDWEBLR: I don't... don't...

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: Our purpose is to try to get this case moving. How, can Mr. Manley shed any light on the question of these other depositions. Do you have any...

MR. MANLEY: I hope so, Your HOnor, on the entire thing first. My apologies for (inaudible). I

had a couple of things beyond my control. Secondly, Mr. Colin wanted to be here, but he is in St. Louis on a case called Diversified Metals, and he has like a year and a half commitment to try this case.

MACISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, as I mentioned before, the mandate of the statute is that the court give it preference...

MR. MANLEY: Yes sir.

MAGISTRATH CATOGGIO: And since the court has to give it preference, I say the lawyers have to give it preference. It is a hard thing for anyone with judicial authority to say, and I am not forgetting that I practiced law for many years...but Irving Kaufman, always...Judge Irving Kaufman...used to remind lawyers, if you are too busy, say so. If you cannot handle the cases that you have, say so.

MR. MANLEY: Well, I am not saying Mr. Colin is too busy, I am morely saying...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, it seems...it seems...
MR. MANLEY; He is in St. Louis...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, it seems that... yesteday, there were a half a dozen of us trying to get Mr. Colin on the telephone. Nobody could reach him. I gave Mr. Colin a real mandate that he be here today

and he is not here. And he is always, I have read most of the papers here, and this has been an awful battle for the Government to make any headway in.

HR. MANLEY: Well, just very briefly. The point here is that we are anxious, Mr. Colin is just as the Government is. Not that this case is on the second rung with us. He....this was purely mechanically impossible at the time that the interrogatives were imposed, and the depositions to (inaudible) to prepare the witnesses and the five major witnesses have already been completely deposed. Can I finish please? And besides the fact that the five major witnesses in this case have been deposed. The very same questions were aksed in a written form in the interrogatories, were also asked orally and put forth to these witnesses. But, would...ve would like is a few days, possibly ten days to complete the answers to the interrogatory statements, that we couldn't mechanically handle both responding to the interrogatories and conferring the witnesses who didn't already testify at this same time. (inaudible) that the five major witnesses, the five heads of the Trump Organization, who had already been deposed to answer the same questions that were written on paper in the interrogatories.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, if you ask me to make a guess, I would say that if you got in answers to the interrogatories, you probably would obviate the need for taking further depositions.

Are you willing to allow that as a possibility, Mr. oh, Miss Goldweber?

MISS GOLDWEBER: I...there is no possible way I could answer that. I don't know what kind of answers to the interrogatories I would have had.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes, well that is a question.

MISS GOLDWEBER: We don't know really what the names of the people ward..

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes...

MISS GOLDWEBER: One other point I would like to make. These interrogatories were served six months ago.

HAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: I know that. I said that before. You know. They were served November 15th That isn't six ronths though. Is it? Or is it?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Five and one-half.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Oh, I sec.

MISS GOLDMEBER: I was never any good at Math MAGISTRATE CATTOGIO: Alright, now tell me some of the information, interrogatories are...are really rough. Are you at all slastic on them?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, I feel that the defendants have waived their objection and...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, that is a good,
I am glad you brought that up. Under the old rule I
would have said yes. But under the new rule...within ten, this is Rule 33, within ten days after service
of interrogatories, the party may serve written objections to, together of a notice of their objections at
the earliest practical to both parties. Where is that
now. Oh, that is the old rule...that's right that is
the old rule. Now, now I get scared when I...

UNIDENTIFIED: Alright, so we had both, the service of the interrogatories and audits in this case.

party (inaudible) interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the ansers and objections, if any, within thirty days. They raised it from ten days, after the service of the interrogatories. Except that a defendant may serve answers or objections within forty-five days after service or summons of complaint upon that defendant. The court may allow a shorter or a longer time. Now that might give us authority to enlarge the time for exceptions. I don't know. And

in a case of this character, I would venture a guess that possibly the court might hear objections, I don't know. But anyway, in order to move the case ahead, and to, to...and in fairness, I think it would be well if the Government were in some regard elastic with respect to some of these interrogatories which seem real dillies. Take the first one, please state the name, race and address of all persons who own stock, well, that's alright. Or have any other ownerships entered direct or indirect, oh, in top management, Inc.

MR. BRACHT: It's a family management, or corporation, Your Honor.

the date they acquired such interest...or supposed, suppose there is a bank loan that the company has and they have pledged some of their assets, I am just looking at the first of the interrogatories. And you want to know the race of everybody who works in the First National City Bank or every stockholder in the First National City Bank? These interrogatories are so broad that they allow for some possibilities.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Your Honor. We mean a substantial type of interest, and that interrogatory could be handled if they did have bank loans, it is

merely a sentence.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, alright. I just wanted to say that if they give you a substantial answer, then hopefully you will be satisfied with it.

Okay. Now, Mr. Manley, it is your proposal that within ten days you will have some kind of answers...

MR. MANLEY: That's right, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, let's say ten days from Monday. Instead of ten days from today. Is that better?

MR. MANLEY: Yes, ten days from Monday would be fine.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: That would makeit the 15th of January...no of May. The 15th of May. Wouldn't it?

UNIDENTIFIED: The 16th of May.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: The 16th of May, guaranteed you will have answers to these interrogatories?

MR. MANLEY: Yes sir.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Is that alright for the Government?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Your Honor, would it be possible that there could be some kind of conditional

sanctions imposed, but it would be lifted as soon as ...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: I could only recommend I could not imposed any restrictions, or sanctions myself.

MISS GOLDWEBER: No, I understand that.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes.

MR. MANTEY: What is the point, Your Honor?

Is the point to punish the defendant, or to give the answers to the interrogatories?

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: Well, we have not gotten to that yet. The point is to get the answers to the interrogatories, and what they are saying is, I think, they havent expressed it exactly correctly, yes, until the 16th of Pay, answer the interrogatories and if they are not answered by then, then the sanctions would come into play. You see. But I am not going to handle it that way. I am not going to make any recomendation. And since you are dealing with mature people then they do run into difficulties in the practice of the law, and I know what it is. You can get into a period of two or three months when you don't know your own name, and you try, and then you get slack periods...it may be that we have just gotten Mr. Colin and Mr. Hanley's firm in a period when they are

up to their ears ina lot of work and maybe in a couple of weeks or in a month or so it will clear away. Alright. The 16th of May or Defore that, and now...What about the depositions. Do you want to hold further depositions in advance until you get answers? I would think so.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, let me just say ...

HAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Thy go through a lot of motions and beat yourself...

MISS GOLDWIBER: The other persons that were planning to depose, are resident managers of buildings that the defendants who were involved in the alleged incidents of racial discrimination, and so they might possibly have personal knowledge of those incidents since they would be resident managers of the victims, that the alleged victims dealt with.

of such stature that, now because what they say would not be of admission against Fred Trump individually would it?

MISS GOLDWEBER: No, not against Mr. Trump individually, but they...

NAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Or his son (inaudible).
UNIDENTIFIED: He predicts they did sir.

MISS GOLDWEDER: Right.

MAGISTRATE CATCGGIO: Well, this is not on the question of agency. To...to use as an admission anything that they say. You have to have them in a supervisory or in a what capacity shall I say here?

MR. BRACHTL: Managerial.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Managerial. Well no, he meant, it is more than managerail. The representative capacity.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, an interesting thing here is...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, just because the man is in charge of a house and puts out the ash barrels and the garbage barrels...

MR. BRACHTL: We are talking agents under Rule 43, Your Honor, people who run the,,who run the building where the people were (inaudible).

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes, but can he can contract for the landlord?

THISS GOLDWEBER: Your Honor, an interesting thing happened during the depositions. While we were questioning Mr. Fred Trump and his son, Donald Trump, they indicated during their depositions that they didn't have much control at all over the appli-

tenant, and who will become a tendant was really in the hands of these resident managers. And there are a number of their Fair Housing Lawsuits that have held that the duty of an owner of abuilding or a real estate company, their duty to comply with the Fair Housing Act is non-delagable. They cannot delagate that to anyone. And that they are liable for the action of their employees under Respondent Superior. Because the whole impetus of the Fair Housing Act would come to naught if the persons who worked for a large organization could continue as we alleged discriminate and no one would be held accountable for that.

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: You mean Hayor Beame would be liable if somebody managing a city housing development would be...was discriminatory? Is that would..is that what you are talking about?

MISS GOLDWEBER: The City would be liable.

Because there was just a recent case of Otaro vs.

The City, The City Housing Authority, and they held
the City Housing Authority you know, would be responsible.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: The male so called,

wouldnt, right? I mean the mayor...

MISS GOLDWEBER: Woll, the City Housing Authority is part of the mayor's agency.

ITR. BRACHTL: The Mayor could be liable if he had a duty to supervise and failed to...failed to supervise adequately. The case is..under the Mousing Law, probably are broader on the principal responsibility of any other.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, what do you want to do now. Do you want to wait to see what answers he gives you before you approach any more depositions?

MISS GOLDWEBER: That would be...alright, but...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright, we must make a schedule.

MISS GOLDWEBER: We would like a schedule so that, you see, some of the problems with the case, and I don't want to say this harshly, but Mr. Colin is extremely busy, and we feel that if he had a schedule from the court, then Mr. Colin would then be able to plan enough ahead of time to have responsibility in this case consistent with his other obligations. Such as like depositions are to be completed within sixty days.

And then they could take depositions of our witnesses from the time of receiving the interrogatories.

Another sixty days to complete the record inspection any other supplemental interrogatories. Then everyone would know their obligations in the case. And if Mr. Colin at that time would continue to be too busy, then he...another attorney could take over.

HAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: I see...there was...

I did come across a list of the people to be deposed.

Do you have that handy?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: You did have such a schedue before.

MISS GOLDWEBER: That is right, which has been changed and numbered. Would this help you?

MAGISTRATE CATOGIO: Yes, that was it. Now.. oh yes, here it is right on the top. Fine. Alright, now, let's go through that list. Donald Trump, has his been taken?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Fred Trump, taken?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Stewart Hyman?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Yes.

MISS GOLDWEDER: Yes.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Ms. Baretzo (phonetic)

MISS GOLDWEBER: None of the rest of them were taken, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: But that is only four taken?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, there was a fifth, who wasn't on this list.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Who was he?

MISS GOLDWEBER: It was a Mrs. Buckley. And the Trumps produced her because it was easier for them, and it was alright.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Was she a manager of theirs?

MISS GOLDWEBER: She was what they called an a Section Manager. She reviewed the applications after they were submitted.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright. Mr. Manley.
Do you have the list before you?

MR. MANLEY: No, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Can you show it to Mr. Manley? Do you know anything about the availability of any of these people?

MR. MANLEY: Not too much, Your Honor. I would (inaudible). I am not sure. All of these people are still working for the Trump Organization, I think. But if they aren't the people who remained working for the Trump Organization, they would be I was about to say very available.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright. Point One. Will you within one week advise the Government of who of these people taking number five down through thirteen of the list that form part of the stipulation of April 1, 1974. Who of these people are still under the employ of the Trump Organizations. By that I mean Trump Management, or the Trumps individually.

MR. MANLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Alright. that is what did I say? Ten days?

UNIDENTIFIED: One week, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: One week. Alright, so that...Friday the 10th?

MISS COLDWEBER: Yes, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATCGGIO: Alright, I will give it to you until the 13th. By May 13th. Alright?

MR. MANLEY: Yes, Your Monor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Mr. Manley? Okay. You

will notify the ... who?

MISS GOLDWEBER: Myself, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Miss...

MISS COLDWEBER: Goldweber.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Goldweber. Copies to Bracht and..

MR. BRACHTL: I don't think that is necessary Your Honor.

HISS GOLDMEDER: Mell, one for Mr. Schwell.

I work for Mr. Schwell, so...

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Oh. Alright, so a copy to Mr. Bracht, and a copy to Mr.

MISS COLDWIBER: One other thing, Your Monor. I just want to make clear that this won't preclude us after we get our answers from the interrogatories if we wanted to (inaudible).

MAGISTRAME CATOCGIO: Mo...no. It will not.

MR. MANLEY: Let me say that I will definitely communicate with the Covernment and this court in regard to the remaining witnesses.

MAGISTRATE CATOGCIO: Alright. So, and on the 16th, you will, May 16th you will answer, or before youvwill answer all interrogatories.

MR. MANLEY: Yes, Your Monor.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: In some way, shape or manner. Alright.

MISS GOLDWBER: Your Monor, we hope that those answers would try to be somewhat responsive to the questions.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, if an interrogatory is too complicated, it defeats its own purpose.

That's been my experience.

MISS GOLDWEBER: Well, I don't think that they are exceptionally complicated, really. Most of the information concerned in them...

pared interrogatories, I made them short. Each interrogatory, not involved. The more involved the interrogatory is, the less good it is. Own or have any interest in...they're bad in my opinion. Alright, anything else you want to trouble Mr. Manley with?

MR. BRACHTL: I don't think so. I think one thing with that is...what I have in mind is this. That even if they have sent out the most obvious long ones, but I do think that they have an obligation to do...to give us meaningful answers as to the information (inaudible).

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: I am depending on

the facts and ...

MR. BRACHTL: 32 I don't know if I have a duty to know, but had they been acceptable...which i...under the rules, they have an obligation to know somethings, and to find them out.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes. Well, let's see what we get. Now, all I am trying to do is to impress on Mr. Manley and Mr. Colin that they must move this thing and...because they are building up a record where they are inviting trouble. Don't let that happen.

MR. SCHWELL: Your Honor, just two points that I wish to make for the Government, and first of all, both the order requiring the subject to answer the interrogatories by April 1st, and the stipulated schedule of depositions to be taken were orders of the court.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Yes.

MR. SCHWELL: Thus, we are now in a period of second-round orders, and to affect the same results under those circumstances, I wish to reiterate the Governments' request that conditional sanctions would be appropriate at this time, and we request that in your report and recommendations to the Court, that

you request for a regulation that such conditioned sanctions be imposed and be granted.

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: Well I...

MR. SCHWELL: Secondly,

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, it is difficult what you are asking is the court to impose sanction on a lawyer who finds himself when he finds himself at a time when he is a little too busy...busier than he wants to be maybe. And that at a time when a judge finds himself too busy. The judge is not able to take it today because the judge is out in Westbury, you see. So what is good for one is good for the other.

MR. SCHWILL: The other item, Your Honor, is
I believe our motion to include a request for an order
including costs of this motion, which would be appropriate and we would ask that those costs be granted
and we would be pleased to submit the affidavits regarding counsel's time and expenses with respect to this
motion.

MAGISTRATE CATOGGIO: Well, that is a difficult one. If the...if the defendant's produce answers let's get those in. If they produce answers to these interrogatories, our troubles will be a lot less than they are. Let's not defog the issue. We want answers.

We want to move the case. Now, if they don't comply alright, then we will go to work on it. On your line, alright? So please Mr. Hanley, convey my thoughts to Ar. Colin, and anyone else in your office touching this case. They can't fool around. It can't be handled the way it has been handled, and you have to give it attention. Can you do that?

MR. MANLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

MAGISTRATE CATOCGIO: Alright, fine. Now, that's it.

MR. MANLEY: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

MR. SCHWELL; Thank you, Your Honor.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

Transcribed by Eastern Transcription Service June 24, 1974 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT UFOR THE COURT ED. MLY

EASTERN DISTRICT OF

JUL 12 1974

NEW YORK

TIME A.M. P.M.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
v.	
FRED C. TRUMP, ET AL.,	) ) NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS
Defendants.	) UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

To: Roy Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68 Street New York, New York 10021

Please take notice that commencing on the 30th day of July 1974, the plaintiff, United States of America, will take the depositions of the agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc., whose names are set forth on the time schedule attached hereto as Appendix A, at the office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York. These depositions will be upon oral examination pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths and take testimony. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed.

Also, pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Documents designated in Appendix B attached

hereto are being subpoenaed to be produced by deponents at the taking of this deposition.

Dated this 9th of July, 1974.

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney DONNA GOLDSTEIN
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorneys, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

### APPENDIX A

## To Notice to Take Depositions Upon Oral Examination

To: Roy Cohn, Esquire
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley
39 E. 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

1. Ms. Minerva Gilbert
res. 3000 Ocean Parkway
Brooklyn, New York
emp. Trump Management, Inc.
2611 W. 2nd Street
Brooklyn, New York

Tuesday, July 30, 1974, 9:00 a.m.

2. Ms. Margueritte Marrazzo
res. 2457 Grogg Street
Brooklyn, New York
emp. Trump Management, Inc.
2611 West 2nd Street
Brooklyn, New York

Tuesday July 30, 1974 12:30 p.m.

3. Mr. Skender Fici Superintendent Fountainbleu Apartments 8855 Bay Parkway Brooklyn, New York Tuesday, July 30, 1974 3:00 p.m.

4. Mr. Guido Lara
Superintendent
Ocean Terrace Apartments
2650 Ocean Parkway
Brooklyn, New York

Wednesday, July 31, 1974 9:00 a.m.

5. Mr. Louis Sarnell
Rental Agent
Shorehaven Apartments
8850 19th Avenue
Brooklyn, New York

Wednesday, July 31, 1974 12:30 p.m.

 Mr. Walter Rohr Superintendent Patio Gardens Apartments 590 Flatbush Avenue Brooklyn, New York Wednesday July 31, 1974 3:00 p.m. 7. Mr. James T. Green
Superintendent
Westminster Hall Apartments
405 Westminster Road
Brooklyn, New York

Thursday, August 1, 1974 9:00 a.m.

8. Mr. Daniel Borth
Superintendent
Kendall Hall Apartments
41-10 Bowne Street
Flushing, New York

Thursday, August 1, 1974 1:00 p.m.

9. Mr. Joseph Zecher
Superintendent
Trump Village Apartments
2940-3000 Ocean Parkway
Brooklyn, New York

Thursday, August 1, 1974 3:00 p.m.

10. Mr. Milan Mitijevick
Superintendent
Wexford Terrace Apartments
86-75 Midland Parkway
Jamaica, New York

Friday, August 2, 1974 10:00 a.m.

11. Mr. Raymond E. Travis
Superintendent
Wedgewood Hall Apartments
2580 Ocean Parkway
Brooklyn, New York

Friday, August 2, 1974 1:00 p.m.

#### APPENDIX B

## To Notice to Take Depositions Upon Oral Examination

To: Roy Cohn, Esquire
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley
39 E. 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

The documents\*/ set forth below are being subpoensed from the following agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc., to be brought at the time of each employee's deposition:

Mr. Skender Fici

Mr. Guido Lara

Mr. Louis Sarnell

Mr. James T. Green

Mr. Daniel Borth

Mr. Walter Rohr

Mr. Joseph Zecher

Mr. Milan Mitijevick

Mr. Raymond E. Travis

- 1. All completed leases, applications and records of payment of deposits in the possession, custody or control of the deponent.
- 2. All records, cards, waiting lists or other forms of documentation in the possession, custody or control of the deponent which contain the names, addresses and dates of contact of any prospective tenant or any individual who has applied, sought to apply or made inquiry concerning residing at an apartment building owned by the defendants.
- 3. All written documents, correspondence, forms or other writings in the possession, custody or control of the deponent which contain instructions, advice or stated or

<sup>\*/</sup> Documents previously made available to the government pursuant to the May 6, 1974, Request for Production of Documents need not be reproduced here.

suggested policies or practices with respect to the rental of apartments or the processing of applications at the defendants' buildings.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Donna Goldstein, an attorney for plaintiff, hereby certifies that I have served a copy of the foregoing Notice to Take Depositions upon Oral Examination on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

> Roy Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

976 day of July, 1974. This

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

NPG:jfb DJ 175-52-28

> Mr. Roy Cohn Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68 Street New York, New York 10023

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. C.A. No. 73 C1529

Dear Mr. Cohn:

Pursuant to Magistrate Catoggio's order of August 8, 1974, we have set forth below the remainder of discovery that is necessary for us to complete that phase of our preparation of this lawsuit

# 1. Depositions:

- a. Ms. Carol Falcone
- b. Mr. Thomas Miranda
- c. Mr. Louis Sarnell, Supt., Shorehaven (deposition previously postponed)
- d. Al Weber, Superintendent Edgarton Hall
- e. Mr. Henry Neher, Supt. The Belcrest Apts.
- f. Mr. W. Volz, Supt. Winston Hall
- g. Mr. John Raymond, Supt. Nautilus Apts.

We are planning to notice these depositions for August 22-23, 1974. If this date is unacceptable to you, please contact us by Wednesday, August 14, 1974; otherwise, notices shall be sent out accordingly.

## 2. Request for Production of Documents

We are sending under separate cover a request for production of the following documents that have not previously been produced:

- a. Current tenant applications and leases for the following buildings:
  - 1. Chelsea Hall
  - 2. Nautilus Hall
  - 3. Ocean Terrace
  - 4. Lincoln Shore
- b. Receipt books or other documents which contain records of payment of deposits for the rental of apartments for each of defendants' buildings situated in the New York area.

We propose that this production take place at your office on Monday, August 26, 1974. If this date is inconvenient to you, please provide us with an alternative date that is not inconsistent with the discovery deadline set by Magistrate Catoggio.

We are also sending under separate cover a request for the following documents relating to the operations of defendants' apartment buildings in Norfolk, Virginia,\*/
(Hague, Pembroke, Oceanaire and two smaller buildings):

Current tenant applications and leases Employee payroll records Waiting lists Rejected applications

<sup>\*/</sup> See paragraph 3 of the Complaint which states that the defendants operate dwellings "in the New York area and elsewhere."

We are proposing that the documents be made available at the Oceanaire on August 29, 1974. If this date is inconvenient to you, please advise us in advance of that date so that we may make new arrangements.

I look forward to hearing from you by August 14, 1974, to confirm the schedule set forth above.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney Housing Section

cc: The Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio

JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

- against -

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

Civil Action
No. 73 C 1529

IN CLERICS OFFICE

J. S. DISTRICT COURSE

U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

AUG 2 1974

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 4:00 P.M. on the 8th day of August, 1974, at Room 290, 225 Cadman Plaza East, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action will take the deposition of CAROL R. FALCONE as a witness upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before the Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio, United States Magistrate, or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York August 2, 1974

Yours, etc.,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

JAMES D. PORTER, JR.
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

TO: SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

(27)

21.

JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIME A.M. P.M,

\* AUG 2 1974

U.S. D. T. WOTTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

- against -

Plaintiff,

- - - - - X

ORAL EXAMINATION Civil Action

No. 73 C 1529

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:00 A.M. on the 9th day of August, 1974, at Room 409, 90-04 161st Street, in Jamaica, Borough of Queens, City of New York, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action will take the deposition of THOMAS MIRANDA as a witness upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public, or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York August 2, 1974

Yours, etc.,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By;

JAMES D. PORTER, JR.
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

- against -

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 3:00 P.M. on the 9th day of August, 1974, at the Office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Room G-80, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA will take the deposition of DONALD TRUMP as an adverse party upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public, or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York August 2, 1974

Yours, etc.,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

JAMES D. PORTER, JR.
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

TO: SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

(39)

FILED IN CLEAK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT ED. N.Y.

JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \* AUG 2 1974 \*

\_ JIME A.M.... P.M....

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:00 A.M. on the 12th day of August, 1974, at the Office of the United States Attorney, 900 Ellison Avenue, in Westbury, New York, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action will take the deposition of PAUL ZISELMAN as a witness upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public, or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York August 2, 1974

Yours, etc.,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

JAMES D. PORTER, JR. Assistant U. S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

- against -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

- against -

NOTICE OF MOTION

TIME A.M...

P.M....

U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

\* JUL 3 0 1974

Civil Action No.

73 C 1529 (EN)

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

MISS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed affidavit of ROY M COHN, the affidavits and statements attached as exhibits hereto and upon all the proceedings heretofore had herein, the undersigned will move this Court on the 16th day of August, 1974, in the Federal Court, Cadman Plaza E., County of Kings, City and State of New York, at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an order finding DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, Esq., Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, guilty of contempt of the court, and for a cease and desist order against the said DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN and any and all other agents of the U. S. Government, ordering the said parties to cease and desist from making any express or implied threats upon any potential witnesses in this proceeding, including, but not limited to, former employees of the defendant, TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.

Dated: New York, New York July 26, 1974

Respectfully,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY Attorneys for Defendant

BY:

(Member of Firm)

Office & P.O. Address
39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
Telephone (212) 472-1400

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, Esq. Civil Rights Division TO: c/o Henry Bracthl, Assistant U. S. Attorney United States Department of Justice 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

- against -

AFFIDAVIT

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

STATE OF NEW YORK )

SS.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

ROY M. COHN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am senior partner in the firm of SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY, attorneys for the defendants, and make this affidavit in support of defendants' motion.
- 2. The investigation of this case for the Justice Department was initiated by Miss Elyse Goldweber of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice. At all times that she was in charge of the said investigation, Miss Goldweber pursued her duties with diligence, but observed legal and ethical strictures.
- 3. At some time during the investigation, Miss Gold-weber was replaced by one DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, Esq. Commencing with her entry upon the scene, the investigation, which had been conducted within the boundaries of legal propriety, turned into a gestapo-like interrogation. Former employees of the defendants contacted them to complain that Miss Goldstein had berated them with threats of jail and accusations that they were

"lying" and had been "taped" by the government while working for the defendants. Statements of some of these witnesses describing what happened have been obtained and indicate a course of conduct requiring action by this Court. (We attach as Exhibit I the affidavit of Carol R. Falcone, formerly employed as a clerk by Trump Management, Inc.; as Exhibit 2 we attach the affidavit of Thomas Miranda, formerly employed by the defendant; as Exhibits 3 and 4 we attach the witnessed statements of Paul and Paula Ziselman, formerly employed as rental agents by the defendant.) Miss Goldstein's harassment, abuse and disregard for the rights of these prospective witnesses has interfered with, and continues to interfere with, the orderly and proper conduct of this case.

- 4. On or about June 12, 1974, Miss Goldstein,bypassing counsel, literally descended upon the defendant with
  representatives of the Civil Rights Division and Student Interns
  demanding entry into the offices of Mr. Donald Trump, officer of
  the defendants' corporation, and production of defendants'
  records. When informed that Miss Goldstein and her associates
  should contact our offices they persisted in their demands, and
  only after contacting the United States Attorney for the Eastern
  District of New York were we able to get them to leave the
  defendants' offices. (See attached letter of Scott E. Manley,
  Exhibit 5.)
- 5. In order to be as helpful as possible to Miss Goldstein and her associates, we provided them with over fifty (50) boxes of defendants' files, which were conveyed to our offices and were completely open to them. We were informed by Miss Goldstein that this investigation would take only a very

"short period" when in fact she and her associates spent from two to three weeks examining the defendants' files in our offices, thereby completely disrupting the functioning of our firm's legal work.

- 6. The conclusion to be drawn from this conduct is the correctness of our allegation that there is no case here and that there was none when the well-publicized charge was made. Having made such a serious legal charge and having accomplished a publicity blast, the plaintiff is now attempting to build a case by illegal means and to lend artistic verisimilitude to its unsupported complaint.
- 7. I have been informed by representatives of the defendant of the recent activities of Miss Goldstein, badgering and threatening past employees of the defendant, and submit that her tactics are completely out of character for a representative of the United States Government.

WHEREFORE, I respectfully request that the defendants' motion by granted in all respects.

ROY M COHN

Sworn to before me this

day of July, 1974

Notary Public

Notary Public. State of New York
No. 31-8872220
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1967.

July 19th 1974 Hat the following Abdenied are Sur and corse I was externewed by a Ms. Donna Told Dein, attorney for the Civil Lights Discussor of the Justice Department and by another attorney my place of business in connection with the Owel Aght Suit against My former employer Sump Wanagend During the lengthy interview which lasted approximately 3's hours I staked and sepeated that I did not discriminate en housing practices during the period of my employment with themy Managent which was about 3' years. Was that of a clerk the immediate supervisor was tops thebest I personally have never descriminated in my position with the Company which I sepeated several James in my Hatement to the Sovernmen Horneys. Mr. Holdsten embarrassed and accused me of lying and withholden

EXHIBIT 1

information and then Threatened Shot I would be keld for perjure and the sown into fail The accused me of not legetamaly owning my own business and Stated that the money I weed for its surchase was ellegally abtained which it was not The accused me of alling Donald Sump in februt of mes husband which was where and Very embassessing now did Donald Sump over ask for a dolake. The also Stated the manager Office phones were Japped and Hat The knew throught Japes that Dwas quely which I am not She acted in a hostile manner during the 3's hour interogation In fact they make me feel I was a Criminal being held on a muder charge Uffer all I was only in a position of a client for the Company and my low sate of pay would bear this out. Before Georges She premises, she Walled Sher would setur again

for fature interrogation with FBI
agents and would pee to it that if
I don't stidly in her gavor sole
would have me Strown in juil
I believe the attorning for
the United State Somewhat thought
be stopped at once from wairy
these Stestago Vactices since we
are still in a feer aunter

Carol & Taleone

Sworn to before me this country of Kings, Hate of ny.

WILLIAM PREISS
Notary Public State of New York

Notary Public, State of New York
No. 8431925
Qualified in Queens County
Commission Expires March 30, 1976

#### TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Thomas Miranda, residing at 3989 - 50th Street, Woodside, New York, N.Y. 11377 seek protection from the harassment of the U.S. Department of Justice and specifically Ms. Donna Goldstein.

Despite the fact that I have stated on numerous occasions that I have never discriminated or have never been told to discriminate while working for Trump Management, and although I have no great liking for Trump Management, I have constantly and persistently been called upon by Ms. Goldstein to go against Trump Management, even though, if I did, I would be lying.

Additionally, she stated that if I did not cooperate with her and in effect "lie" in order to help her in her ambitions and winning her case, "I will be thrown into jail".

I can no longer tolerate this persecution and am asking for the immediate ceasation of any further dealings with Ms. Goldstein.

I refuse to change my testimony in that I will not lie under any circumstances regardless of Ms. Goldstein's unyielding threats.

Additionally, I would like to add that I am a Spanish speaking Puerto Rican hired directly by Mr. Donald Trump.

Sworn to before me this 22nd day of July 1974

County of Kings
State of New York

Notary Public, State of New York
No. 8431925

Oualified in Queens County Commission Expires March 30, 1976

EXHIBIT 2

100 Jedwood Place Valley Stream, L.I., N.Y. July 19th, 1974

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Paul Ziselman hereby make the following true and correct statements of my own free will:

I was formerly employed by Trump Management on a parttime basis as a rental agent at Beach Haven Apartments, 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York. During my period of employment I personally never discriminated against any prospective tenants regardless of race, color or creed.

Additionally, I have never been instructed by any superior of the Trump Office, nor was it ever suggested or stated to me in any way, manner or form to follow a racially discriminatory rental policy while I was employed by this company. In fact, during such employment I rented many apartments to minorities, including blacks.

Despite the above mentioned, I was visited by a representative of the Justice Department who stated that an "FBI Agent" would be back to continue the interrogation. These statements were made in a threatening manner and I strongly resent and object to it. I was especially harassed and intimidated by a Donna Goldstein and in my opinion, her unethical conduct in itself should be a matter of investigation.

WITNESSED:

PAUL ZISELMA

100 Jedwood Place Valley Stream, L.I., N.Y. July 19th, 1974

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Real Ziselman hereby make the following statements of my own free will, which are true and correct.

I was formerly employed by Trump Management on a part-time basis as a rental agent at Beach Haven Apartments, 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York. During my employment under no circumstances did I ever discriminate, nor was I ever told to discriminate by any superior of Trump Management against any person regardless of race, color or creed desiring the rental of an apartment.

PAULA Z'ZELMAN

WITNESSED:

Jaxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 EAST GOTH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (909-1953)

(212) 472-1400

Thomas A. Bolan COUNSEL

FOGERS H. BACON (1919-1932)

ROY M. COHN. SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL

HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN

June 13, 1974

#### BY HAND

Henry A. Bracthl, Assistant U.S. Attorney Donna F. Goldstein, Attorney-Civil Rights Division United States Department of Justice Federal Building Brooklyn, New York

Dear Mr. Bracthl:

I am in receipt of your letter dated today which was waiting for me at my office upon my return from the Cohen v. Cohen trial this afternoon at 5:00 p.m.

We stand ready to let you begin inspecting and copying records in U.S.A. v. Trump tomorrow morning, June 14, as per my agreement with Miss Goldstein reached over the telephone on Wednes-While I regret the misunderstanding that led to your descending upon the Trump offices with five stormtroopers Wednesday morning banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all of the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine, I do not feel that there is any point is carrying the argument any further. I would assume that your objective is the same as ours in this matter, namely, proceeding orderly with pre-trial discovery so as to enable both sides to continue preparing for a fair trial in this matter. Toward that end, we look forward to cooperating with you Friday mouning at our offices.

Miss Goldstein and I agreed that the inspection would take place at my offices instead of Trump so as to not have to unnecessarily totally disrupt the Trump necessary business rou-I would assume that by your demand in your letter to inspect the materials at Trump offices that Miss Goldstein neglected to inform you of our oral agreement to the contrary.

ExHIBIT 5 We are ready to provide you with over 1,000 files Friday on both old and current tenants of Trump. Because Trump cannot function at all with all of its current leases and files out of its offices, we will have to work out a schedule whereby as soon as you have completed inspecting and copying this very substantial amount of material that this material will be returned to the Trump office and additional material will be sent to our offices for your inspection.

With regard to the depositions of further Trump personnel tenatively scheduled to begin on June 18, I already have advised the Government that this date is impossible as both Mr. Cohn and myself will still be on trial before Justice Gomez in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Cohen v. Cohen and Judge Gomez absolutely refuses to hear any application for even a half-day adjournment in that case. I will supply you with alternate dates as quickly as possible and I am sure we can come to an agreeable solution which will neither delay the matter unnecessarily for you nor prejudice the rights of the defendants by denying them the right to counsel in these proceedings. I would respectfully suggest that is completely unfair on your part to set forth ultimatums in the way of 3:00 deadlines to respond or else in view of the fact that you are completely aware of both Mr. Cohn and myself being on trial before Judge Gomez from 9:00 to 4:30 daily. are completely ready to cooperate in discovery; all we require is a little time in which to assemble matter in view of our extremely heavy present litigation schedule.

Finally, I sincerely wish that at least from this point forward, that we could attempt to cooperate better in all of these matters. If your goal is to expedite discovery and to prepare for a fair trial for both sides as is ours, I think that this end would be better served by cooperation and observation of the basic courtesies normally extended between private counsel in litigation instead of continual threats by the Government and its treating the rules of civil procedure as some kind of undeviating Bible which cannot bend its timetables for even a few hours to promote the ends of justice.

Very truly yours,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY By: Scott E. Manley

SEM/ap cc: Hon. Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> Honorable Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate United States Courthouse Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East

Mader

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CT COURT E.D. N.Y

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ON THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CT COURT E.D. N.Y

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

P.M.

P.

The United States of America, plaintiff, responding on its own behalf and on behalf of its attorney, Donna F. Goldstein, to defendants' 'Notice of Motion' seeking an adjudication of contempt against said attorney and a "cease and desist" order against the United States, alleges as follows:

- 1. The United States denies each and every allegation of improper conduct by Donna F. Goldstein or by any other representative of the United States in connection with the interviews of Carol R. Falcone, Thomas Miranda, Paul Ziselman, Paula Ziselman, or any other prospective witness or other person in this case.
- 2. The United States alleges that said allegations of improper conduct, including allegations of threats and other devices to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses, are false and scurrilous, and consequently constitute an abuse of the processes of this Court.

WHEREFORE the United States prays as follows:

1. That expedited discovery be had with respect to the allegations of misconduct by the United States and its attorney;



- That depositions taken during said discovery be supervised by a master;
- 3. That a full evidentiary hearing be held before this Honorable Court on August 16, 1974, as prayed for in defendants' Notice of Motion;
- 4. That following the evidentiary hearing, the allegations of misconduct by the United States and its attorney be stricken as scandalous, in accordance with Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the motions for contempt and a cease and desist order be in all respects denied; and
- 5. That following this evidentiary hearing, this Honorable Court determine whether there has been an abuse of its processes and, if so, enter any appropriate disciplinary or other Order.

The United States further prays for such additional relief as the interests of justice may require, together with the costs and disbursements of this proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES PORTER Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division AMES P. TURNER

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney

Housing Section
Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD

TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES

TO THE COURT ON THE STATUS

OF DISCOVERY

In accordance with the instructions of the Honorable Vincent Catoggio, United States Magistrate, plaintiff, United States of America, submits its report on the status of discovery in this action. On May 3, 1974, Magistrate Catoggio made reference to the obligation of defense counsel as well as the Court to expedite the action in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614, and rebuked defense counsel for not having done so.

#### I. DISCOVERY IN PROCESS: DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES

Defendants.

#### A. Depositions

Prior to the hearing of May 3, 1974, plaintiff encountered substantial difficulties in taking any depositions because of defense counsel's continuous cancellations and rescheduling.

This activity resulted in a substantial waste of the time and resources of counsel for plaintiff, as described in detail in plaintiff's memorandum in support of its motion for sanctions, dated April 19, 1974, at pp. 4-6. Several notices of deposition were outstanding at the time of that hearing, but plaintiff agreed to postpone these until defendants had answered the interrogatories propounded to them in November of the previous year. Abbreviated and incomplete answers to these interrogatories were finally provided on May 16, 1974. (See pp. 10-13, infra). Thereafter, plaintiff attempted to reschedule depositions, as follows:

- 1. On May 28, 1974, Ms. Donna Goldstein, a new attorney for the plaintiff, replacing Ms. Elyse Goldweber, telephoned Mr. Scott Manley in order to advise him that the plaintiff was noticing depositions for June 18-20, 1974.\*/ In deference to Mr. Cohn's busy schedule, Mr. Manley was provided with an opportunity to propose alternative dates within the next few days.
- 2. Between May 28 and June 3, Ms. Goldstein telephoned
  Mr. Manley on at least three occasions to discuss the contemplated
  depositions. Mr. Manley proposed no alternative dates on the two

<sup>\*/</sup> These depositions were noticed on May 30, 1974.

occasions he was reached, and failed to call back in response to the message left on the third call.

- 3. On June 5, 1974, Ms. Goldstein sent a special delivery letter to Mr. Manley indicating that the government intended to proceed with the depositions as noticed, since no alternative dates had been offered.
- 4. On June 11, counsel for the plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Manley dated June 6 cancelling these depositions on the grounds that they conflicted with Mr. Cohn's schedule, but promised to suggest alternative dates the following week.\*/
- 5. Counsel for plaintiff periodically visited the offices of defense counsel between June 14 and June 28, 1974, as a part of the records inspection described below. On June 26, after an inquiry by counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Manley stated that firm dates for the taking of depositions would be provided no later than July 2, and that in no event would these dates be later than the third week in July.
- 6. Having heard nothing from defense counsel by July 3, Ms. Goldstein telephoned Mr. Manley and was told that he still could not provide firm dates for the scheduling of depositions.

<sup>\*/</sup> This letter included a list of those employees scheduled to depose who were no longer employed by the defendants. This information, which plaintiff had been attempting to secure for many months, was to be given to the plaintiff no later than May 13, 1974, at the direction of Magistrate Catoggio at the May 3 hearing.

Mr. Manley promised, however, to call back on July 8 with recommended dates.

- 7. Mr. Manley did not call back on July 8, or for that matter, thereafter. On July 9, plaintiff served notice on defense counsel of the scheduling of depositions of eleven agents of Trump Management for July 30 August 2, 1974.

  Subpoenas were served on each of the prospective deponents.
- 8. On July 26, 1974, Mr. Cohn, by telephone, advised Mr. Goldberg that the eleven scheduled depositions would have to be taken on July 30-31 only, since his schedule could not permit him to attend at any other time. Yielding to these time strictures, plaintiff took the depositions of eight agents on July 30 and 31, 1974. The first attempt to take these depositions had been made on March 19, 1974.

## B. Inspection of Defendants' Records

On May 6, 1974, plaintiff served and filed a Rule 34

Request for Production of Documents on defense counsel Roy Cohn.\*/

On May 15, 1974, Mr. Scott Manley, an associate of Mr. Cohn,

telephonically requested that plaintiff's former attorney Ms.

Elyse Goldweber forward to him a copy of the Request, saying

that he knew nothing about it. This was done immediately.

<sup>\*/</sup> See Appendix A.

On May 28, 1974, during the course of one of their discussions about the scheduling of depositions, Ms. Goldstein reminded Mr. Manley of the proposed records inspection.

Mr. Manley again stated that he knew nothing about the proposed inspection, and requested that Ms. Goldstein forward him another copy of the Request, which she did on the same day.\*/

On at least two occasions between May 28 and June 3,
Ms. Goldstein telephonically reminded Mr. Manley that representatives of the plaintiff would travel to New York on June 12,
1974, to inspect records as noticed. At no time during these
conversations did Mr. Manley express any objection to the
inspection or indicate that the records would not be made
available at the designated time and place. Defendants also
filed no objection to the records inspection, nor did they
suggest any alternative site or date, or any limitation on what
the United States would be permitted to inspect.

On June 12, three attorneys for the United States and two law clerks arrived at 10:00 a.m. at the offices of Trump Management, 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York, in accordance with the notice of records inspection. The Trump agents and employees present expressed surprise at their arrival.

<sup>\*/</sup> See Appendix B.

Mr. Stuart Hyman, controller of Trump Management, asked Mr. Henry Brachtl, Assistant United States Attorney, into his office. The other attorneys, Norman Goldberg and Donna Goldstein, and the assistants Frank Phillips and Larry Rogers, law clerks at the United States Attorney's office, remained in the anteroom of the Trump offices. After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Mr. Hyman asked the remaining representatives of the United States into his office and stated that he had not been informed that a records inspection was scheduled. He further stated that be could not produce any records until he contacted defendants' counsel and that he had been unable to reach counsel. Ms. Goldstein placed a call to Mr. Manley from Mr. Hyman's office. Mr. Manley was not in and a message was left to have Mr. Manley contact Ms. Goldstein at the United States Attorney's office. Plaintiff's representatives then left the Trump Offices and returned to the United States Attorney's office. Contrary to the allegations in Mr. Roy Cohn's affidavit, there was no banging on doors, overreaching, or other improper conduct by any of the representatives of the United States. Mr. Cohn was not present at the Trump offices, nor were any calls placed to the United States Attorney's office by defendants or their counsel complaining about the conduct of representatives of the plaintiff.

telephoned Ms. Goldstein at the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York and, for the first time, expressed his objections to Plaintiff's Request. He claimed that he had communicated these objections earlier. Ms. Goldstein informed him that no objections had been transmitted, either formally or informally, and that if defendants would not permit a records inspection to begin, as noticed, plaintiff would have no recourse but to apply to the Court once again for appropriate sanctions under Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After some negotiations between counsel, plaintiff was authorized to begin inspecting defendants' records on Friday, June 14, 1974, at the law offices of defense counsel.

When plaintiff's representatives arrived at these offices on the morning of June 14, Mr. Fanelli, a clerk to Mr. Manley, handed them a letter from Mr. Manley which characterized their conduct at the offices of Trump Management on June 12, as "descending upon the Trump offices with five stormtroopers . . . banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine." (See Letter of Mr. Manley dated June 13, 1974, a copy of which was sent to this Court.) Counsel for plaintiff responded by a brief letter of June 14 denying the veracity of these rhetorical flourishes.

From Thursday, June 13, 1974, until the completion of the records inspection, counsel for plaintiff communicated almost exclusively with Mr. Fanelli since neither Mr. Cohn nor Mr. Manley was then available. On Tuesday afternoon, June 18, 1974, after 2-1/2 days of records inspection, Mr. Fanelli informed counsel for the plaintiff that records would not be available for inspection on the following day, June 19. However, Mr. Fanelli did give assurances that records would be available on Thursday and Friday, June 20 and 21, beginning at 10:00 a.m.

On June 20, however, the records were not made available at 10:00 a.m., as agreed. At 11:30 a.m., Mr. Fanelli informed plaintiff's counsel that the automobile carrying the records had broken down and that records would not be produced until 2:00 p.m.\*/
Records were inspected on Thursday afternoon, June 20, and Friday, June 21. On June 19 and 20 alone, plaintiff's two counsel from Washington lost a day and a half of their time for no purpose as a result of these cancellations.

<sup>\*/</sup> When the records arrived on Thursday afternoon, the driver of the automobile, Mr. Simon Wiss, recounted to plaintiff's counsel the many errands he had to run for Trump Management by auto that morning, and extolled the virtues and dependability of the automobile carrying the records.

On Friday, June 21, 1974, Mr. Fanelli indicated that additional records could not be available for inspection until Wednesday, June 26, 1974. Counsel for plaintiff returned to Washington, D. C. and travelled back to New York to complete the records inspection on June 26, 27, and 28, 1974. Thus, during a period of thirteen working days, records were made available for a little over seven days. Not only time but travel money could have been saved had these interruptions not occurred.

#### \* \* \* \*

We are reluctant to belabor the Court with the foregoing details. We believe, however, that while each item individually may be relatively minor, the total impact has been to waste a large amount of the time and money of counsel for the United States.

While it is petty harassment, it seems to us harassment none the less, quite out of keeping with Magistrate Catoggio's directions of May 3. Moreover, in view of the repeated efforts to deal with defense counsel about this records inspection, the allegations in defendants' papers that the United States tried to "by-pass" counsel are without foundation in fact.

# 'II. 'DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF

## A. <u>Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories</u>

Plaintiff's First Interrogatories to defendants were propounded on November, 1973, and were not answered or objected to for more than six months. On May 16, 1974, after two Orders of this Court directing defendants to answer the Interrogatories, defendants finally submitted their response. That submission consisted of slightly more than two pages.\*/ In response to at least three interrogatories, defendants indicated that responses would be forthcoming by the following week (letter from Scott Manley of May 16, 1974). Dut more than ten weeks since that promise was made, plaintiff is still waiting for defendants to complete their answers. As noted below, the information defendants have failed to provide goes to the heart of the case.

While this memorandum is not intended to be a substitute for a renewed Rule 37 motion dealing with the deficiencies of defendants'

<sup>\*/</sup> The unusual brevity and incompleteness of these responses may be explained, in part, by the fact that on May 15, 1974, one day before the interrogatories were due, defendant Donald Trump called former Departmental attorney Goldweber and indicated that he had only recently heard about his obligation to answer the interrogatories and wanted to know if there were any penalties for filing untimely answers. Ms. Goldweber referred Mr. Trump to his counsel.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Appendix C.

responses to Interrogatories, and while we wish to reserve our right to file such a motion in the future, we believe that a brief examination of some of defendants' responses should be brought to the Court's attention.

(a) Interrogatory 5, requests 16 items of basic information for each apartment complex owned or managed by defendants. The information sought includes a racial breakdown of the tenant force of each building. response, defendants referred to two documents which defendants claimed to have previously furnished to plaintiff. One of those documents had in fact been furnished to plaintiff. Plaintiff has no record of ever having received the other, which is purported to be a memorandum to Ms. Goldweber dated March 15, 1973. The document that was furnished to plaintiff merely contains a list of the Trump buildings and their superintendents as of October, 1972, almost two years ago. In eight months, defendants have surely had the time to write to their superintendents and to provide racial occupancy information in at least approximate form, particularly since Donald Trump characterized the racial makeup of Trump buildings

in an affidavit December 11, 1973, but they have made no attempt to do so. Statistical information of this kind is, of course, important in cases of this kind. See <u>United States</u> v. <u>Real Estate Development Corporation</u>, 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Defendants have an obligation to secure such information from their superintendents. <u>City of Philadelphia</u> v. <u>Westinghouse Electric Corp.</u>, 205 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

(b) In response to Interrogatory 7, which requests the name, address, race, job title, job location and dates of employment for each and every employee of Trump, the defendants attached Exhibit 1 to their Answers. That Exhibit, however, contains only the last name and first initial of black and Puerto Rican employees of the defendants - facts insufficient to locate them for interview - and none of the other requested information was provided.\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> Plaintiff has subsequently secured some of this information during the inspection of defendants' records. The identities of former employees, of course, constitute critical information. See <u>United States v. Youritan Construction Corp.</u>, 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Calif. 1973), and cases there cited, holding that proof of discriminatory instructions to employees meets the Attorney General's burden of proof.

The names of black tenants (Interrogatory 11), complaints about racial discrimination (Interrogatory 13) and the identities of tenants who secured apartments after complaining or threatening to complain about racial policies (Interrogatory 14) have never been provided by defendants.

### B. Failure to Produce Rejected Applications

In Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendants served on November 7, 1973, plaintiff first requested that defendants furnish certain information relating to rejected applicants. On March 28, 1974, defendant Donald Trump testified, on deposition, that there was no particular policy with respect to either retaining or destroying these records and that some of these records may still exist. (Dep. p. 33). Mr. Trump also stated that some of these records may also have been destroyed since the Interrogatories were propounded (Id., p. 99), so that defendants' capacity to answer those interrogatories calling for information as to rejected applicants was impaired, if not destroyed, by their own conduct.

taking of this deposition, Mr. Cohn did, however, provide a measure of assurance that his clients would preserve all relevant records, including those pertaining to rejected applicants. (Id., pp. 99-100).

During the June 1974 records inspection and after repeated requests for the production of rejected applications, plaintiff was provided with a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Stuart Hyman, comptroller of Trump Management, stating that "effective March 28, 1974" there were no rejected applications.\*/ Whatever the meaning of Hyman's memorandum, it taxes credulity to suggest that between March 28, 1974 - the day that the defendants are supposed to have stopped destroying these applications - and June 28, 1974, the defendants, who have 2500 - 3000 vacancies a year (Hyman Dep. p. 73) and who have repeatedly testified through their agents that applications are closely reviewed, have not rejected a single application.\*\*/

Defendants now go even further than Mr. Hyman's memorandum and claim that there have never been any rejected applications. Minerva Gilbert, office manager for the past seven years, who has the

<sup>\*/</sup> See Appendix D.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> On July 3, 1974, we sent a letter to Mr. Manley reiterating our concern that none of the rejected applications had been produced and requesting that the defendants furnish us with an explanation for the reproduction of these documents prior to this hearing but no explanation has been forthcoming.

responsibility for approving or rejecting applications, testified during the depositions taken on July 30 and 31 that she cannot recall ever having rejected a single application for tenancy.

Each of the six superintendents\*/ whose depositions were taken on July 30 and 31 likewise stated that even though they accepted applications from anyone, they have never had an application rejected by the main office. The six superintendents whose depositions were taken were also served with subpoenas directing them to bring certain documents including "records of the payment of deposits in the possession, custody or control of the deponent."

Only one superintendent produced these records (Raymond Travis), the others stating that no such records existed.

Mr. Travis, superintendent at Wedgewood Hall Apartments for the past five years, also produced a book of receipts which he described as having been supplied by the main office when he was first hired as superintendent. Mr. Travis tesitfied that he was instructed to give a receipt to each applicant when a deposit is submitted with the application. A number of these receipts are marked "refunded." While early in his deposition Mr. Travis stated that he has never had an application rejected, he later explained

<sup>\*/</sup> Mr. Skender Fici, Mr. Guido Lara, Mr. Walter Rohr, Mr. Daniel Borth, Mr. Joseph Zecher and Mr. Raymond Travis.

that "refunded" signifies applications which were rejected by

Ms. Gilbert. In Mr. Travis' receipt book alone, which is used for
an apartment complex of only approximately 94 units, there were
at least six such "refunded" receipts since the date of service of
plaintiff's interrogatories in November 1973 requesting such information. Accordingly, it is apparent that rejected applications
exist but that information about them has not been made available
to plaintiff.

#### CONCLUSION

While some progress has been made in discovery following the hearing before Magistrate Catoggio, defendants remain in substantial noncompliance with their responsibilities in relation to discovery. Some of the noncompliance involves material critical to the disposition of this case, while other conduct has been of a harassing and disruptive nature. Even aside from the false and scurrilous charges assembled by defendants against one of plaintiff's counsel,\*/ there has been sufficient resistance to the orderly conduct of discovery to warrant consideration of a new motion

<sup>\*/</sup> On or about July 26, 1974, defendants noticed a motion for a contempt citation against Ms. Goldstein. While we generally avoid the argument by inflammatory rhetoric which has characterized defense counsel's submissions, we can only say that, for reasons set forth in our other papers filed herewith, these charges are utterly fantastic.

for sanctions after present discovery proceedings have been completed.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES PORTER
Assistant United States
Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Frank E. Schwell

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 T. 5-6-74

MAY 6 1974

JSP:FES:ESG:cmk DJ 175-52-28

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Roy:

Please find enclosed two copies of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

cc: Records
Chrono
Goldweber
Trial File
Hold

By:

ELYSE S. COLDWEBER
Attorney
Housing Section

### APPENDIX B

T. 5/28/74 JSP:DG:mlp DJ:175-52-28

MAY 281974

....

Scott Manley, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

### Dear Mr. Manley:

In response to our telephone conversation of May 28, 1974, please find enclosed a copy of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, scheduled to commence on June 12, 1974. Also, please note the attached proposed schedule for continuing depositions of the agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc. Formal notice will be forthcoming. These depositions had been previously scheduled for April 18 - April 22, 1974.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon to confirm the attached discovery schedule.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

Cc: Records
Chrono
Ms. Goldstein
Trial File
Henry Brachtl

DONNA GOLDSTEIN
Attorney
Housing Section

APPENDIX C Saxe, Bacon, Bolan V . Hanley 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 1. JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) (212) 472-1400 ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) DOCKETED ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MAY 22 19/4 MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL May 16, 1974 CIVIL RIGHTS HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN Miss Donna Goldstein United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Re: Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 Dear Miss Goldstein: Enclosed please find a copy of defendants' answers to plaintiff's interrogatories. It is my understanding from speaking with Miss Goldweber that you are taking her place on this case since she has left to work in New York. As you will note from our answers, most of the information requested by the Government in the interrogatories already has been supplied in the five examinations before trial which you already have completed. We could not make specific reference to page numbers due to the fact that the transcripts have not been completed. You will note that there are three questions requiring detailed information from records, which Stuart Hyman has been compiling and hopes to complete next week. We will supply you with this information as soon as Mr. Hyman completes same. Very truly yours, Scott E. Manley SEM/ew Hon. Vincent Catoggio cc: United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York United States Courthouse DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 MAY 27 1974 EN

6/27/14 Torological Scientilli Trong. Marit Elfrian Rejected applications Mad us rejected applications. However the endoned hill Conces applications of perspective thereof whis Conselled out Most.

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have on this date mailed copies of the following documents, postage prepaid, to:

Roy Cohn, Esquire 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

- Response of the United States to Defendants' Motion of July 26, 1974
- 2. Supporting affidavits
- 3. Order to Show Cause (proposed)
- 4. Memorandum of the United States
- 5. Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendants
- 6. Report of the United States to the Court on the Status of Discovery

August 5, 1974

Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES D	DISTRICT COURT FOR THE LET
EASTERN DISTRIC	
	AUG 6 1974
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) TIME A.M
Plaintiff,	j P.M
v.	) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Defendants.	) )

The United States having applied to this Court by affidavit for an Order to Show Cause, and it appearing that a hearing is scheduled before this Court on August 16, 1974 to determine motions involving alleged misconduct by one of the attorneys in this action, which alleged misconduct is denied; and it further appearing that expedited discovery is necessary and appropriate, so that this motion may be expeditiously determined in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614; and it further appearing that the nature of the respective parties' allegations justifies judicial supervision of depositions relating to the pending motion; and the Court having considered the pertinent submissions,

NOW, THEREFORE, upon the affidavit of FRANK E. SCHWELB and for good and sufficient reason,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants show cause, if any there be, in the chambers of this Court at 225 Cadman Plaza, Brooklyn, New York, on August 8, 1974, at 7.00 6M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why

(42)

- (1) defendants should not be required to answer plaintiff's interrogatories with respect to the pending motion within five days of service thereof; and
- (2) the depositions with respect to this motion should not be conducted under the supervision of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service upon counsel for defendants shall be done by ferrous Service no later than august 6,1974, at 1:00, and that this shall constitute good and sufficient service.

IT IS SO ORDERED this JTL day of August, 1974.

Loward R. Neaher United States District Judge

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
Plaintiff, )	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
y. )	(21,7)
Ś	MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP )	SUPPORT OF THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER
and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC., )	TO SHOW CAUSE
Defendants. )	

On or about July 26, 1974, defendants filed a Notice of Motion seeking an adjudication of contempt against Donna F. Goldstein, a Department of Justice attorney assigned to this case, and a "cease and desist" order against the United States. In five affidavits including that of defense counsel Roy Cohn, defendants allege that Ms. Goldstein has, among other things, threatened and sought to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses in this case. The defendants have requested a hearing on this matter on August 16, 1974.

The United States has filed a response supported by affidavits of Frank E. Schwelb, Chief of the Housing Section, Civil Rights

Division, Department of Justice, and of Ms. Goldstein denying each and every allegation of improper conduct. In preparation of the

hearing on August 16, 1974, the United States has noticed the depositions of several of the affiants who have made accusations against Ms. Goldstein, as well as of defendant Donald Trump. Brief interrogatories have also been served on counsel for the defendants to determine the pertinent details of any alleged incident of misconduct by plaintiff's attorneys. In addition, the United States has applied for an Order to Show Cause why

- (1) defendants should not be required to answer plaintiff's interrogatories with respect to the pending motion within five days of service thereof; and
- (2) the depositions should not be supervised by an officer of the Court.

### A. <u>Defendants Should Be Required to Respond to the Interrogatories</u> Within Five Days of Service.

Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vests the Court with discretion to shorten the time permitted for responding to Interrogatories. In this case, defendants have made serious accusations against the United States and, in particular, against one of its counsel, Donna F. Goldstein. They seek to bring the matter on for hearing on August 16, 1974. The United States is entitled to take the depositions of several persons who have information about these charges and to otherwise prepare for the hearing, and cannot do so unless their identities are disclosed.

Defense counsel Roy Cohn in his affidavit indicated that only some of the persons who had complained of attorney Goldstein's behavior had signed statements for submission with defendants' pleading. In order to prepare for the hearing and assure that Ms. Goldstein's rights are fully protected, plaintiff is entitled to advance knowledge of the purported case against her. Plaintiff's interrogatories are brief and can be responsively answered in a short time, and there is no reason why an immediate response cannot be forthcoming.

### B. The Depositions Should Be Supervised by an Officer of this Court.

The basic thrust of defendants' motion is that plaintiff's counsel have unduly influenced the testimony of prospective witnesses. Plaintiff contends, however, that the allegations are false and have the effect of preventing the expedited consideration of the case which the statute requires. 42 U.S.C. 3614. The affidavits of two of plaintiff's counsel -- Elyse Goldweber and Donna F. Goldstein -- disclose that at least one of the prospective deponents -- Thomas Miranda -- has on two separate occasions expressed fear of reprisal from defendants if he should testify to the discriminatory practices of which he is aware. Magistrate Cattogio has found the defendants to have been in noncompliance with discovery procedures.

with the issue herein being whether either side has used unlawful tactics vis-a-vis witnesses, it is imperative that their sworn testimony be given without interference or pressure from any source. Accordingly, the depositions should be conducted before an officer of this Court. 4 Moore's Federal Practice §28.02, p. 1915; Fisher v. Harris, 61 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); see also First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 245 F. 2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 871 (1957).

JAMES PORTER Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division JAMES P. TURNER

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Frank & Schwell

Washington, D. C. 20530

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN)
v.	)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	) PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES ) TO THE DEFENDANTS
Defendants.	) )

To Counsel for the Defendants

The following interrogatories are addressed to you pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and you are required to answer each interrogatory separately and fully, in writing, under oath, and to serve copies of your Answers on counsel for plaintiff within the time to be prescribed by the Court. The United States is applying to the Court for an Order that your time to respond be shortened to five days from the date of service.

- 1. Please state the name and address of each person known or believed by counsel for defendants, by the defendants or any of their officers, agents, or employees to have any information with respect to any alleged misconduct engaged in by Donna Goldstein, Esquire, or by any other representative of the United States in connection with the above-styled case.
- 2. With respect to each person identified in response to the preceding interrogatory, please provide the following information:

- (a) The nature of the alleged misconduct by a representative of the United States alleged by such person;
- (b) The time and date upon which such misconduct took place;
- (c) The names and addresses of all persons who witnessed or who may have information about the incident;
- (d) The means and date by which such information was brought to the attention of the defendants or their counsel; and
- (e) A full description of the alleged wrongful conduct by the representative of the United States.

JAMES PORTER Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney
Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

AFFIDAVIT OF

PERSONAL SERVICE

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

-against-

No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

· NOILED Defendants. U. S. DISTR

AUG 7 1974

STATE OF NEW YORK

JIME A.M.... ss.:

COUNTY OF KINGS

JOHN HUNTER, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

:

I am employed in the Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

On August 6, 1974, at 12:00 Noon, I personally served an Order to Show Cause dated August 5, 1974, and related documents, on the offices of Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley, Esqs., attorneys for defendants herein, located at 39 East 68th Street, New York, New York, by leaving a certified copy of said Order and copies of said related documents with Phyllis Goldman, a secretary in said office, and receiving a signed receipt therefore.

Sworn to before me this 6th day of August, 1974.

Jonnet

EVELYN SOMMER
Notery Public, State of New York
No. 24.4502158
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 19

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF

U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y

AUG 19 1974

NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	TIME A.M.  CIVIL ACTION NO. 73P.NC 1529
v.	) )
FRED C. TRUMP, ET AL.,	) ) NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS
Defendants.	) UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

To: Roy Cohn, Esquire
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley
39 E. 68 Street
New York, New York 10021

Please take notice that commencing on the 22 day of August 1974, the plaintiff, United States of America, will take the depositions of the present and former agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc., whose names are set forth on the time schedule attached hereto as Appendix A, at the office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Fifth Floor, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York. These depositions will be upon oral examination pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths and take testimony. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed.

Also, pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Documents designated in Appendix B attached



hereto are being subpoenaed to be produced by deponents at the taking of this deposition.

Dated this 16th of August, 1974.

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney DONNA GOLDSTEIN
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG
Attorneys, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

### APPENDIX A

Ms. Carol Falcone
 2771 Stillwell Avenue
 Brooklyn, New York

Thursday, August 22, 1974, 9:30 a.m.

2. Mr. Thomas Miranda 39-89 50th Street Woodside, New York Thursday, August 22, 1974, 1:00 p.m.

3. Mr. Louis Sarnell
Rental Agent
Shorehaven Apartments
8850 19th Avenue
Brooklyn, New York

Thursday, August 22, 1974, 3:00 p.m.

4. Mr. Al Weber
Superintendent
Edgerton Hall
178-10 Wexford Terrace
Jamaica, New York

Friday, August 23, 1974, 9:30 a.m.

5. Mr. Henry Neher Superintendent, The Belcrest Apartments 162-15 Highland Avenue Jamaica, New York

Friday, August 23, 1974, 11:00 a.m.

6. Mr. W. Volz
Superintendent
Winston Hall
178-60 Wexford Terrace
Jamaica, New York

Friday, August 23, 1974, 1:00 p.m.

7. Mr. John Raymond
Superintendent
Nautilus Apartments
1230 Avenue Y
Brooklyn, New York

Friday, August 23, 1974, 3:00 p.m.

#### APPENDIX B

The documents\*/ set forth below are being subpoensed from the following agents and employees of Trump Management,

Inc., to be brought at the time of each employee's deposition:

Mr. Louis Sarnell

Mr. Al Weber

Mr. Henry Neher

Mr. W. Volz

Mr. John Raymond

- 1. All completed leases, applications and records of payment of deposits in the possession, custody or control of the deponent.
- 2. All records, cards, waiting lists or other forms of documentation in the possession, custody or control of the deponent which contain the names, addresses and dates of contact of any prospective tenant or any individual who has applied, sought to apply or made inquiry concerning residing at an apartment building owned by the defendants.
- 3. All written documents, correspondence, forms or other writings in the possession, custody or control of the deponent which contain instructions, advice or stated or suggested policies or practices with respect to the rental of apartments or the processing of applications at the defendants' buildings.

<sup>\*/</sup> Documents previously made available to the government pursuant to the May 6, 1974, Request for Production of Documents need not be reproduced here.

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Donna Goldstein, an attorney for plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Notice to Take Depositions upon Oral Examination on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This \_\_/S day of August, 1974.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

MOTER'S OFFICE S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE AUG 20 1974 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIME A.M.....

	P.L
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529
v.	) ) PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	) PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Defendants.	Ź

Plaintiff hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendants produce and permit plaintiff to inspect and copy the documents and records listed and described in Attachment A to this request.

In accordance with the discovery deadline set by Magistrate Vincent A. Catoggio on August 8, 1974, it is requested that the aforesaid production shall commence on the 29th day of August, 1974, at 10:00 a.m. at the rental office of Ocean Air Apartments, 725 East Chester Street, Norfolk, Virginia and that the aforesaid production shall continue at such other offices of Trump Management, Inc. as necessary to inspect and copy the requested documents and records, and that the documents and records shall remain available until such inspection and copying can reasonably be completed.



Inspection, copying and photographing will be performed by or under the supervision of an attorney of the United States Department of Justice.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant U.S. Attorney Eastern District of N.Y. 225 Cadman Plaza Brooklyn, New York DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG
Attorneys, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

### Attachment A

# LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED FOR INSPECTION AND COPYING

The records and documents listed below are requested for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed by Trump Management, Inc.:

- 1. The Hague Apartments, Norfolk, Virginia
- 2. Pembroke Apartments, Norfolk, Virginia
- 3. Ocean Air Apartments, Norfolk, Virginia
- Any other apartment buildings owned and/or managed by Trump Management, Inc. in Norfolk, Virginia.
- A. Tenant files containing leases, applications, receipts of payments, correspondence or any other documents relating to the tenancy of all individuals residing at the apartment complex since January 1, 1969.
- B. All applications for tenancy which have been rejected or which have been cancelled, since January 1, 1969.
- C. All waiting lists or other forms of documentation containing the names of individuals who have expressed an interest at living at the apartment complex since January 1, 1969.
- D. All written instructions, memoranda of oral instructions, correspondence, or other written records or documents to agents or employees of said defendant or to other persons, organizations, or agencies concerning the procedures and standards to be followed by such persons with respect to

the rental of dwellings to any person, including black persons, and the treatment to be accorded prospective tenants of dwellings, including black prospective tenants of dwellings since January 1, 1969.

E. All correspondence, agreements and other documents or papers, or communications which make reference to the Fair Housing Act, or to discrimination or nondiscrimination in rentals, including correspondence, documents, memoranda and papers, formal and informal, reflecting or alleging racial discrimination in housing by defendants or any of them, such documents to be produced irrespective of the merit or lack

F. All records, payroll reports, contracts, W-2 forms, cancelled checks and other documents which contain the name, address, race, position and date of employment of any rental agents or other employee employed by the defendants at any time since January 1, 1968.

of merit of the allegation and irrespective of the formality

or informality of the complaint.

G. All receipt books or other documents maintained since January 1, 1969, which contain records of payment of deposits for the rental of apartments.

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Norman P. Goldberg, an attorney for the plaintiff, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Request for Production of Documents on the defendants by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to their attorney at the following address:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

This the  $\frac{13}{1}$  day of August, 1974.

. . . **.** 

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

FILED
IN CLERKS OFFICE
EDISTRICE COURT E.D. N.Y.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AUG 2 0 1974

UNITED	STATES	OF AMERICA,	TIME A.M P.M
		Plaintiff, )	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529
FRED C	v. TRUMP	) ( et al., ) ( Defendants. )	PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendants produce and permit plaintiff to inspect and copy the documents and records listed and described in Attachment A to this request.

In accordance with the discovery deadline set by Magistrate Vincent A. Catoggio on August 8, 1974, it is requested that the aforesaid production shall commence on the 26th day of August, 1974, at 10:00 a.m. at the law offices of Saxe Bacon, Bolan & Manley, 39 E. 68 Street, New York, N.Y., and that records shall remain available until such inspection and copying can reasonably be completed.

Inspection, copying and photographing will be performed by or under the supervision of an attorney of the United States Department of Justice.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant U.S. Attorney Eastern District, N.Y. 225 Cadman Plaza Brooklyn, N.Y. DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG
Attorneys, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530



### Attachment A


• • • • • • • • • • • • •

### LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED FOR INSPECTION AND COPYING

- 1. Current tenant files containing applications for tenancy, leases, correspondence between the tenant and the defendants or their agents, receipts of payments, or any other documents maintained by the defendants or their agents which relate to the tenancy of present tenants at the following apartment buildings owned by the defendants:
  - a. Chelsea Hall Apartments
  - b. Nautilus Hall Apartments
  - c. Ocean Terrace Apartments
  - d. Lincoln Shore Apartments
- 2. Receipt books or other documents which contain records of payment of deposits for the rental of apartments, maintained since January 1,1969 for each of defendants' buildings situated in the New York metropolitan area listed in Attachment B.

### ATTACHMENT B KINGS COUNTY PROPERTIES

NAME OF BUILDING	ADDRESS	SUPERINTENDENT
Argyle Hall	400 Argyle Road Brooklyn, New York	Paul Rault
Chelsea Hall	8700 25th Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Al Caudalli
Nautilus Hall	1230 Avenus Y Brooklyn, New York	Gene Raymond
Ocean Terrace	2650 Ocean Parkway Brooklyn, New York	Guido Lara
Wedgewood Hall	2580 Ocean Parkway Brooklyn, New York	Ray Travis
Westminster Hall	405 Westminster Road Brooklyn, New York	Renee Connan
Lawrence Gardens	- 3301 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Ray LaMani
	6 3315 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn, New York	
,	3323 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn, New York	
Sea Isle	a, 3901 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Frank Finnegan
4	<ul> <li>3903 Nostrand Avenue</li> <li>Brooklyn, New York</li> </ul>	
Laurence Towers	-3280-3310 Nostrand Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Jim Gardner
Lincoln Shore Apts.	2727 Ocean Parkway Brooklyn, New York	Victor Besu
Fontainebleau Apts.	8855 Bay Parkway Brooklyn, New York	Skender Fici
Flatbush Patio #1	590Flatbush Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Walter Rohr
Flatbush Patio #2	580 Flatbush Avenue Brooklyn, New York	Walter Rohr
Park Towers	370 Ocean Parkway Brooklyn, New York	Joe Reid
Falson Apts.	8800-20th Avenue Brooklyn, New York	John Giordano
Fiesta Apts.	8635-21st Avenue Brooklyn, New York	John Rosado
Southampton Apts.	1429-1445-1461 Shore Pkwy. Brooklyn, New York	Real St. Cyr
Trump Village Sec. 1 Trump Village Sec. 2	2940 Ocean Parkway, Bkln., N.Y. 3000 Ocean Parkway, Bkln., N.Y.	Joe Zecher Joe Zecher



### KINGS COUNTY PROPERTIES - PAGE 2

Beach Haven Apis.

21 Building Locations at the following addresses:
2775 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.
2795 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Nine Nixon Court, Brooklyn, New York

49 Nixon Court, Brooklyn, New York

Nine Murdock Court, Brooklyn, N.Y.

29 Murdock Court, Brooklyn, New York

49 Murdock Court, Brooklyn, New York

675 Avenue Z, Brooklyn, New York

2612 West Street, Brooklyn, New York

2634 West Street, Brooklyn, New York

2662 West Street, Brooklyn, New York

2684 West Street, Brooklyn, New York

2681 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

2661 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

2631 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York

2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

621 Avenue Z, Brocklyn, New York

2612 West 2nd Street, Brocklyn, N.Y.

2632 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

2662 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

2682 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.

\* Abe Rosenber, (Rental Agent) Shore Haven Apts.

32 Buildings Located at the following addresses:

2034 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2036 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2038 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2044 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2056 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2058 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2064 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, K.Y.

2074 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2076 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

2078 Cropsey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

Lou Sarnell (Rental Agent)

8831-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

8841-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

8851-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

8861-20th Avenue, Brocklyn, New York

8869-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

8871-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

8891-20th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York

2040-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2044-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2049-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2050-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

1483 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1485 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1.487 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1489 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1491 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1493 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

1535 Shore Parkway, Brooklyn, N.Y.

2070-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2072-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2074-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

2076-20th Lane, Brooklyn, New York

VANE OR PULLDIAN	ADDRIGO	SUPERINTENDENT
Belorest Hall	102-15 Highland Ave. Jampien, New York	M. LaRecord
Coronet Hall .	172-70 Highland Ave., Jamaida, New York	A. Huhman
Ciyde Hall	87-05 166th Street, Jamaica, New York	F. Candlen
Edgeston Hall	178-10 Wexford Terrace, Jamaica, New York	Horst Weber
Green Park Essex	143-03,11,23,29 Barolay Ave. Flushing, Naw York	Ed Dier
Green Park Sussex	143-06, 10 Parclay Ave. Flushing, New York	Ed Dier
Highlander Hall	164-20 Highland Ave. Jamaica, New York	Joe Hache
Kendall Hall	41-10 Bowne Street Fluching, New York	T. Miranda
Park Bria. Apts.	110-45 Qudens Blvd. Queens, New York	G11 Rodgers
Saxony Hall	67-15 169th Street Jamaica, New York	K. Marscheider
Sunmaside Towers	45-01 39th Evenue Sunnyside, New York	K. Musijtshuk
Sussex Hall	166-65 Highland Avenue Jamaior, New York	E. Pajumae
Wexford Hall	86-75 Midland Parkway Jamaica, New York	Milan Matijevick
Wilshire Hall	182-30 Wexford Terrace Jamaica, New York	F. Hall
Winston Hall	178-60 Nexford Terrace Jamaica, New York	. W. Volz
ST: TEN	ISLAND, RICH OND COUNTY, PAGPER	(PTES
Grymes Hill .	22 Arlo Road *	Clara Jacobs

OI ymos	i i de de de		,	Richmond, New York		Chola Date	
Tysens	Park :	Sec.	1	655 Typens Lane Richmond, New York	*	Francis C	uardi
				675 Typens Lane Richmond, New York	*	Helen Wre	nne
				285 Mill Road, Richmond, New York	*	Elizabeth	Kapleu
Tyseau	Paris S	Sec.	3	245 Hill Road, Richma, N.Y. 255 Hill Road, Richma., N.Y. 255 Mill Road, Richma., N.Y.			•
Typens	Park 2	Sc 0 .	ز	2d Ebbitts Ave., Richal., N. 30 Ellists Ave., Richad., N.	Y		

39 EAST 68TH STREET

#### NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

(212) 472 - 1400

THOMAS A. BOLAN COUNSEL

ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN

August 20, 1974

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN

LORIN DUCKMAN

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

SEP 5 1974

Hon Vincent Cattagio United States Magistrate Federal Court House 225 Cadman Plaza East - 2nd Floor Brooklyn, New York

TIME A.M.... P.M.....

U.S. v. Trump - Civil Rights Case Re:

Dear Judge Cattagio:

Following the helpful conference with Your Honor, and your direction that discovery and depositions be completed by September 1, 1974, the Government has done the following:

- Noticed seven more depositions of employees and former employees.
- Made new demands for production of large quantities of records.
- In plaintiff's letter of August 12, 1974, for the first time since the filing of the complaint in the fall of 1973, it has now attempted to enlarge it by indirection to all units operated by the defendants in Norfolk, Virginia and surrounding areas - and demanding production of extensive records down south from these buildings nowhere before cited in this case - in the complaint or in the answers to interrogatories and bill of particulars furnished by the Government at the specific order of Judge Neaher, who found the complaint far too general, and directed specification of locations, dates, details, etc. of the charges of discrimination.

A ten page response to Judge Neaher's order filed by the Government on February 28, 1974, listing said locations and dates in detail - at no point mentioned directly or indirectly any units outside the Eastern District, or specifically, any units in Virginia. To attempt on the eve of conclusion of discovery

Hon. Vincent Cattagio Page Two

in a priority case to suddenly ring in locations never before alleged despite Judge Neahen's order seven months ago to name locations, is improper and unfair.

To expedite this matter, and even though plaintiff has already deposed 13 of our officers, employees, maintenance men, etc. - and even though the new seven depositions sought include those of former employees, and those whose statements could not legally bind us - we are willing to and hereby agree to all seven depositions; and to have them completed before September 1, 1974. As to the records, even though the new demands happen to include a series of records we already produced and others which are not relevant - again to expedite, we hereby agree to the production of all requested records - also before September 1, 1974.

The only item with which we are completely unwilling to comply is the production of records and information about some units in Virginia and elsewhere in the country outside the Eastern District, for the grounds previously stated. document this in detail: The complaint was filed October 15, We moved to dismiss or to make more definite and certain on the grounds it told us nothing. On January 25, 1974, Judge Heahen heard argument. The minutes containing his comments and rulings are attached to this letter as "A" for Your Honor's convenience. We particularly refer Your Honor to pages 25 -28, wherein Judge Heahen indicates that "location of buildings" must be specified (p.27) and pointed out the defendant's difficulty in meeting these charges because of the number of units involved "in New York" (p. 28). The Government's furnishing of locations and details pursuant to these directions of Judge Neahen came on February 28, 1974, and are also attached to this letter (as "C") along with our demand ("B"). At no point in the ten pages is a single location outside the Eastern District mentioned - and now, only days before conclusion of discovery, they seek for the first time to ring in units far away from this District, which would result in considerable delay and prejudice to the defendants in this priority case.

We agree to all seven new depositions, and to produce all requested records for all locations set forth in the Government's response to Judge Neahen's order. We ask Your Honor to exclude the attempt to expand this case to never before cited

Hon. Vincent Cattagio Page Three

buildings in other areas of the country.

Respectfully yours,

Roy M. Cohn

RMC:sb

cc: Donna Goldstein

Civil Rights Division

Donald Trump

ADDRESS REPLY TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
AND REFER TO
INITIALS AND NUMBER

JDP:HAB:sm File No. 730959

### United States Department of Justice

#### UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FEDERAL BUILDING BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11201

> FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE August 20, 1974 U. S. DISTRICE COURT E.D. N.Y.

> > SEP 5 1974

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Magistrate, U. S. District Court Eastern District of New York U. S. Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

TIME A.M..... P.M.....

United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 JSP:DFG

D/J Ref.: 175-52-28

Dear Magistrate Catoggio:

On August 13, 1974, the plaintiff in the above styled lawsuit noticed a Request for Production of Documents under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This records inspection was to commence at apartment buildings owned by the defendants in Norfolk, Virginia, on August 29th in accordance with the discovery deadline which you directed at the August 8th meeting in your office.

I have been informed by Mr. Cohn that he intends to communicate to you by letter defendants' objections to any production of documents dealing with apartments outside of New York City. We believe that the complaint and related case law show that plaintiff is entitled to such discovery. Therefore, it is respectfully requested that a decision on this issue not be made until plaintiff submits a brief supporting its position.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Very truly yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN
Attorney, Housing Section

48

39 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

(212) 472-1400

THOMAS A. BOLAN COUNSEL

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN

LORIN DUCKMAN

U.S. D. STRICK CO. ST. ED. N.Y. \* SEP 5 1974

May 16, 1944 A.M.

Miss Donna Goldstein United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Miss Goldstein:

Enclosed please find a copy of defendants' answers to plaintiff's interrogatories. It is my understanding from speaking with Miss Goldweber that you are taking her place on this case since she has left to work in New York.

As you will note from our answers, most of the information requested by the Government in the interrogatories already has been supplied in the five examinations before trial which you already have completed. We could not make specific reference to page numbers due to the fact that the transcripts have not been completed. will note that there are three questions requiring detailed information from records, which Stuart Hyman has been compiling and hopes to complete next week. We will supply you with this information as soon as Mr. Hyman completes same.

Very truly yours,

SEM/ew

Scott E. Manley

Hon. Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201



#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN CLERK'S OFFICE
J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	☆ CP 11 1974 ★
Plaintiff,	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
v.  FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,  Defendants.	) ) ) )	PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' INTERROGATORIES

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney hereby supplements its Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories. Plaintiff states that, while these Answers include all information presently available to it, some additional investigation based on records made available by defendants and on information recently furnished by the Urban League is continuing as expeditiously as possible. The Answers will be further supplemented as soon as such information has been secured and assembled.

### Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 1 and 2

The following information constitutes evidence that defendants through their agents or employees have made apartments unavailable on account of race in the following ways:

- 1. The following information constitutes evidence of a discriminatory policy engaged in by the defendants in their operation of buildings outside of the New York area.
  - (a) On May 21, 1974, Mr. Ellis W. James (white)

    Head of Tidewater Fair Housing at 1802 N. Lakeland,

    Norfolk, Virginia, provided a Departmental representative

    with the following account:

In or about July 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph

Jones (black) informed James that they had been

denied an apartment at the Oakdale Apartments in

Norfolk. In early July, 1971, James and his wife

went with Mrs. Jones to the complex. Mrs. Jones

went into the office alone and spoke with the

manager, Mrs. Morgan, about renting an apartment

which had been advertised in the morning newspaper.

Morgan stated that no apartments were available

and indicated that an apartment might become

available on August 3, 1971. Morgan indicated that

Jones could submit an application if she so chose.

James and his wife immediately went into the office and spoke with Morgan about renting an apartment. Morgan stated that an apartment would be available in about a week and that they could rent the apartment immediately. In response to a question about the racial composition of the complex, Morgan stated that there was one black officer residing in the complex.

(b) In June 1973, Mr. Richard Foard (black) furnished the Norfolk office of the FBI with the following information of alleged discrimination:

Foard, who was assigned to the Naval Force
Station in Norfolk, stated that in mid June, 1973,
he went to the Ocean Air Apartments in Norfolk to
apply for a two-bedroom apartment. Foard stated
that he decided to apply there after learning from
Mr. Eugene Sorel, a white male, that he had just
obtained an apartment at Ocean Air for a reasonable
price. At the rental office, Foard was advised
to return in July or August and submit an application
at that time. Foard was also told that he would
have to return at that time to see the model apartment.

- 2. The New York Urban League furnished plaintiff with information about several tests conducted by the League to determine the racial practice at various buildings operated by defendants. Most of the tests indicate that racial discrimination is practiced at the respective buildings at which the tests were conducted. In the interest of fairness, we summarize all of the "tests" so that interested parties may draw their own conclusions.
  - (a) Belcrest Hall 166-05 Highland Hall Jamaica

Ms. Stephanie Bush, a black employee of the Urban League, went to the Belcrest on July 12, 1974, to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment. Mr. H. Neher, the superintendent,

advised Bush that a one-bedroom rented at \$280.00 and would not be available until October. Neher suggested that Bush contact Kraham Realty Co. \*/ which would find her an apartment.

Ms. Susan Bernstein, a white employee of the Urban League, applied for an apartment at the Belcrest a short time after Bush left the building. Bernstein, was shown an apartment, told that the apartment rented for \$250.00, and that the apartment would be available on September 1.

(b) Saxony Hall 87-15 165 Street Queens, New York

On July 12, 1974, Ms. Bush went to Saxony
Hall to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment. Bush spoke with Supt. Kurt Marscheider about
renting an apartment and was advised by him that
none were available and that he did not know
when one would become available.

<sup>\*/</sup> Kraham Realty Co., is presently the subject of a complaint brought by the New York City Commission on Human Rights alleging difference in treatment of home seekers based on race, and the "steering" of home seekers to different areas based on race.

Ms. Bernstein went to Saxony Hall a short time after Bush left the building and spoke with Marscheider about renting a one-bedroom apartment. Bernstein was shown a one-bedroom apartment, given a business card and told to call back in a week, at which time Marscheider would know when an apartment would be available.

(c) Clyde Hall 87-06 166 Street Queens, New York

On July 24, 1974, Ms. Bush went to

Clyde Hall to inquire about renting a onebedroom apartment. Bush spoke with a

woman who stated she was the superintendent.

The woman advised her that there were no

vacancies and none would be available for

six months.

Ms. Bernstein went to Clyde Hall a short time after Bush left the building. Bernstein spoke with a woman, who stated that she was the superintendent, and was advised by her that only a studio apartment was immediately available. The woman advised Bernstein that a one-bedroom apartment would be available as soon as the estate of the recently deceased tenant of that apartment had been settled and the apartment had been painted. She stated, however, that the other "empties" in her building would have to be filled first. The woman added that because

- 5 -

there were so many "empties" in her building, that the apartment rentals were being handled by another Trump agent in the Trump building across the street, but that the same apartment could be rented from her at a less expensive price.

(d) Edgerton Hall 178-10 Wexford Terrace Queens, New York

On July 9, 1974, Ms. Bush went to Edgerton Hall to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that was advertised in the New York Times. Bush spoke to a doorman who said that the superintendent was on vacation and that there were no vacancies. The doorman gave her the name of the superintendent so that she could periodically check on vacancies. following morning, at about 9:30 a.m., Bush returned and the same doorman as she met on the preceding day advised her that the superintendent was out. Bush returned that afternoon at about 2:30 p.m., at which time she met the superintendent. The superintendent informed her that he had just rented a onebedroom apartment and that another one would not be available until the middle of August. The superintendent stated that he had a vacant

- 6 -

two-bedroom apartment. Ms. Bush was not shown an apartment.

Ms. Bernstein went to Edgerton Hall on the morning of July 9, 1974 and spoke with a doorman. The doorman advised her that the superintendent was out for the day, but that there was a vacant one-bedroom apartment. Ms. Bernstein returned the following day at about 2:00 p.m. and met the superintendent identified as Mr. Weber. Weber advised her that he had a one-bedroom, studio, and a four-room apartment available. Bernstein was shown a one-bedroom apartment and was told that the apartment would be available for August 1 at \$250 per month.

(e) Winston Hall 178-60 Wexford Terrace Queens, New York

On July 9, 1974, Ms. Bush went to Winston Hall to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that had been advertised in the <u>New York Times</u>. Bush spoke to the superintendent, Mr. Volz, who told her that a one-bedroom apartment had been rented on Saturday, July 6, 1974, and that there were no other vacancies.

Ms. Bernstein went to Winston Hall a short time after Bush departed to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment. A man who identified himself as the superintendent stated that he had just completed showing an available one-bedroom apartment to a woman and suggested that a studio apartment was also immediately available at \$195-200 per month. The superintendent then showed the studio apartment to her.

(f) The Highlander 164-20 Highland Avenue Queens, New York

On July 12, 1974, Ms. Bush went to the Highlander to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that had been advertised in the New York Times. At the building, Bush met a maintenance man who told her that he thought a studio apartment was vacant. Bush then met the superintendent and asked for a studio or one-bedroom apartment. She was told that a 4 1/2 room apartment was available at \$390 per month, but that there were no vacancies in a studio or one-bedroom and that none was likely to become available until January or February.

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Ms. Bernstein went to the Highlander shortly after Ms. Bush left the building. Bernstein spoke to the superintendent and was told that there was only a 4 1/2 room apartment available at \$370 per month. Bernstein was told that there were no vacancies at the present time, but that vacancies usually occur in September.

(g) Sussex Hall 166-05 Highland Avenue Queens, New York

On July 12, 1974, Ms. Bush went to Sussex
Hall to inquire about renting a one-bedroom
apartment. Bush spoke with the superintendent,
Mr. Pajumae, who advised her that only a junior
3-room apartment was available at \$210 per month.
Pajumae advised Bush that she could fill out an
application and that she would be advised in about
one week as to whether her application had been
approved.

Ms. Bernstein went to the Sussex shortly after Bush had left the building. Bush asked to rent a one-bedroom apartment and Mr. Pajumae advised her that a one-bedroom was available at \$260 per month.

(h) Coronet Hall 172-70 Highland Avenue Queens, New York

On July 9, 1974, Ms. Bush went to the Coronet to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that had been advertised in the <u>New York Times</u>. Bush spoke to the superintendent who advised her that a studio was presently vacant and that a one-bedroom renting at \$270 per month would be available on August 1.

Ms. Bernstein went to the Coronet shortly after Bush left the building. Bernstein was advised that a studio apartment was presently vacant and that a one-bedroom would be available shortly.

(i) Wexford Hall 86-75 Midland Parkway Queens, New York

On July 12, 1974, Ms. Bush went to Wexford
Hall to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that was advertised in the New York Times.
Bush spoke with the superintendent who advised
her that he had available for rent a 3-room
apartment at \$250 per month and a 3 1/2-room
apartment at \$270 per month. Both apartments
were shown to Bush.

Ms. Bernstein went to Wexford Hall a short time after Bush left the building. The superintendent advised her that he had available for rent a 3-room apartment at \$250 per month and a 3 1/2 room apartment for \$270 per month.

Bernstein was shown both apartments.

(j) Wilshire Hall 182-30 Wexford Terrace Queens, New York

On July 12, 1974, after first dealing with a non-rental employee who indicated that discrimination against non-white applicants is or has been practiced at the Wilshire by the superintendent (who takes applications in the rental agent's absence) Ms. Bush spoke with Mr. Joseph Consalro, the rental agent, to discuss the possibility of renting a one-bedroom apartment at the Wilshire. Mr. Consalro advised Bush that he had a 1-bedroom apartment available for \$295.00. A New York Times advertisement indicated that the apartment rented at \$275 per month, but Consalro explained that the one-bedroom advertised in the newspaper was on the first floor and had already been rented.

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Ms. Bernstein went to the Wilshire on
July 12, 1974 and spoke with Mr. Consalro
about renting a one-bedroom apartment. Consalro
advised her that he had a one-bedroom apartment
available for \$295 per month.

(k) The Essex 143-11 Barclay Avenue Queens, New York

On July 24, 1974, Ms. Bush went to the Essex to inquire about a one-bedroom apartment that was advertised in the New York Times. Bush spoke with a non-rental employee who advised her that there were vacancies, but that the superintendent was not on the premises. Bush returned later that day and spoke to another non-rental employee who advised her that the superintendent was still out. employee told her that discrimination is practiced at the Essex through misrepresentations to blacks that no apartments are available. Bush returned on August 2, 1974 at about 3:00 p.m. and spoke to a woman identified as Ann. The woman advised Bush that there was a vacancy, but that she would have to return on another day between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to speak with the renting agent, Mr. Graham.

On August 2, 1974, shortly after Ms. Bush departed from the Essex, Ms. Bernstein went to the Essex and spoke with a woman residing in the Moltzen apartment. The woman advised her that there was a vacant one-bedroom apartment, but that she would have to return on another day between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to speak with the renting agent, Mr. Graham.

3. Mr. Peter Connan, a former employee of defendants, was superintendent in late 1972 and early 1973 at the Westminster Apartments, then a virtually all-white building, after the death of his father, the previous superintendent. He advised that the Trump office staff, including Minerva Gilbert, wanted to know the race of the applicants whose applications were submitted to the central office, and that this information was provided. On one occasion he overheard Mrs. Gilbert tell the superintendent of another building, identity unknown, that he should have told a black applicant that there were no vacancies, instead of forwarding his application. Mr. Connan advised that his father, while superintendent, kept a sham lease and check to be shown to black applicants. One black was admitted to residency only after he had been falsely told that no apartment was available and shown the sham lease, and only after the actual existence of a vacancy was demonstrated by the offer of an apartment

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to the black applicant's white friend. Connan submitted at least three applications of blacks to the Trump office, but defendants did not rent to them.

- 4. The defendants have, throughout this proceeding, made false, misleading and reckless statements, including:
  - (a) The affidavits filed in connection with their counterclaim; as outlined in plaintiff's memorandum response thereto;
  - (b) The affidavits filed in connection with the spurious attack on the integrity of one of the counsel for plaintiff; and
  - (c) Statements relating to the supposed nonexistence of records.
  - (d) Disruptive tactics during discovery which have been previously outlined to the Court in plaintiff's report thereon.

Plaintiff proposes to adduce evidence of the foregoing to show consciousness of guilt and guilt on the part of defendant's.

5. On August 20, 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Laitman, tenants at 3901 Nostrand Avenue who had recently vacated their apartment, wrote a letter to Mr. Trump at the offices of Trump Management Company charging that they had been denied the right to sublet their apartment because the prospective subleasee was black. A copy of this letter is appended hereto as Attachment A.

Donna Goldstein

, Attorney

Department of Justice Washington, D.C.

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### AFFIDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON	)	
	)	SS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	)	

- I, Donna Goldstein, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- I am informed of the facts of this case. The foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4 of September, 1974.

Valeue Prather
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: January 31, 1977

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 5, 1974, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories were placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to counsel for the defendants:

Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

ump Waragement agency in West 2 St. rosklyn. N.Y. 11223 Utn Mr. Drump

esile.

re: Kenneth Laitman 3901 Noctrand ave."A-3G" Brooklyn, N.Y. 11235 August 20, 1973

er Mr. Trump:

We wish to assist to you to correct the unconscionable actions of as ripricintative mics marraygo.

This marraygo had sent us a little stating that we had to sign with lace elective 6-1-73 for our apartment or felse we would be evicted. We another to be to but rather wanted to pay trump Marraygo insected the within so medical to pay trump Marraygo insected that we is a prince or size face woton. We therefore, under diverse, signed a new lease within a month after each lease signing we wished to proceed (300) Nestrand Que, ig. Q. a. o. t. 3G.) but were advised by Mis Marraygo and we would have to pay 55 a month's rent to be released from the lease. We cannot afford to do this.

At withing Trump Management to suffer a lost by our vacating said up. I'm a Marraygo and were found a prospection of the trusting to take is over due lease or welling to sign a number to marraygo and were told "you're at the marraygo and were told "you're the marraygo and were told "you're the marraygo and were told "now he the marraygo and were told "now he the marraygo and were told "now he the marraygo and able to rent the apartment were protected to a prospective traint who is ready, welling and able to rent the apartment " prospective traint who is ready, welling and able to rent the apartment of the process of the order of the partment of the process of the partment of the process of the partment of the apartment were rented and to be face will be a partment were rented to a Negro marraygo that if the apartment were rented to a Negro marraygo that if the apartment were rented to a Negro marraygo that if the apartment were rented to a Negro process of the partment to the briefly to be likewice.

a michien of ours, whi sail Mr shomas (who is Migro) in our apartment in plains to Miss marrays that if the apartment were reuted to a Negrowould break her lease and encourage others in the building toclo likewise.
is Marrayse immediately telephoned us that if Mrs. Fremon (who is ucsion) of apt. 60 withing to take over our apartment then we would be eased from the lease at no charge. Mrs. Fremon, however, decided not take the apartment. I believe Miss Marrayso refused to reut the apt.

Mr. Thomas because he is Negro. Racial prejudice should not be tilested is used or against the miss marrayson.

We believe that Miss Marrayzo is acting in an unconscionable swell and prejudicial manner. We cannot afford to pay for an aparting it we are not joing to use and feel it is not right that your organization wise to accept another tenant (which we found at our expense) and tently demand \$500 + 1 mo rent, when if the tinent were accepted then your carriestion would face no loss or have any claims for damages against us. It is have vacated the apartment and wish it to be known that it is visible for rental. We appeal to you on the basis of the foregoing, to visible for rental. We appeal to you on the basis of the foregoing, to visible for mental. We appeal to you on the basis of the foregoing, to visible from the lease at no cost to us. Please reply as soon as

Sincerely,

Kenneth + Ruth Laitman

10 Miriam Richman

125 Ocean Parkway

B'thyn, N. Y.

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

FILED EASTERN DISTRICT OF IN CLERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y NEW YORK SEP 24 1974 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 Plaintiff, ) APPLICATION OF THE UNITED v. STATES THAT DEFENDANTS' FRED C. TRUMP, ET AL., MOTION FOR SANCTIONS BE HEARD, DENIED WITH PREJUDICE Defendants. AND STRICKEN AFTER HEARING

SIRS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff, United States of America, will move this Court, before the Honorable Edward R. Neaher, District Judge at the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York in Courtroom 9, on the 21st day of October, 1974 at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an Order denying with prejudice defendants' motion for sanctions, filed on July 26, 1974, on the grounds that the matters contained therein are unsupported by fact and are sham and false.

The grounds for this Application are set forth with particularity in plaintiff's supporting memorandum and in the attached affidavit of Frank E. Schwelb. Plaintiff further prays for such other further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank & Schuelle

JAMES PORTER, Chief HENRY A. BRACHTL, Attorney United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District Civil Division FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney
Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
ν.	) )
FRED C. TRUMP, ET AL.,	) <u>AFFIDAVIT</u> )
Defendants.	) )
WASHINGTON ) ss	
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )	

FRANK E. SCHWELB, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, and in supervisory charge of the above-styled litigation on behalf of the United States. I make this affidavit in support of our request that an early hearing be had on defendants' motion for sanctions against the United States and Ms. Donna Goldstein, that after a hearing an Order be entered denying said motion, that the motion and supporting affidavits be stricken, and that the Court impose such sanctions as may be appropriate for any abuse of its processes.
- 2. On or about July 26, 1974, defendants filed with this Court a Notice of Motion praying that Donna Goldstein, one of plaintiff's counsel in this action, be adjudged in

contempt of this Court for alleged coercion and threats against prospective witnesses, and that the United States be ordered to cease and desist from such alleged unlawful conduct. The Notice of Motion was purportedly supported by the affidavits of Carol R. Falcone and Thomas Miranda, former employees of defendants, and by the signed but unsworn statements of two former employees, Paul and Paula Ziselman. Also attached to the motion is an affidavit by defense counsel, in which he purports to describe a number of events at which, to the best of my knowledge, he was not present, and which did not occur in the manner described by him.

3. On or about August 5, 1974, plaintiff filed a response, together with affidavits, denying each and every

- 3. On or about August 5, 1974, plaintiff filed a response, together with affidavits, denying each and every allegation of misconduct and requesting expedited discovery and an early hearing on the motion.
- 4. On August 8, 1974, this Court directed that expedited discovery be conducted in preparation for a hearing to resolve defendants' charges. This Court also directed that Magistrate Catoggio supervise the taking of certain discovery depositions.
- 5. On August 8, 1974, in accordance with the Court's direction, counsel met informally with Magistrate Catoggio for the purpose of scheduling the taking of the proposed depositions. At that meeting, defense counsel withdrew his

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request for a hearing on his motion but refused to withdraw the motion and the attached affidavits in which, among other things, Ms. Goldstein is accused of unprofessional conduct. As a result of this action, the charges against Ms. Goldstein remain on file, subject to being revived at any time at defense counsel's caprice.

- 6. Subsequently, plaintiff noticed the taking of depositions of Mr. Miranda and Ms. Falcone for August 28, 1974.

  In view of the serious nature of the charges against Ms. Goldstein, and my conviction that they are completely false, I had planned to take the depositions of her principal accusers personally.

  Without notice to plaintiff, defense counsel produced Mr. Miranda for deposition two days ahead of schedule. I was not in New York on August 26, since more routine depositions had been scheduled for that day and were scheduled to be taken by younger attorneys assigned to this case. As a result, the deposition of Mr. Miranda was taken outside my presence. I did take the deposition of Ms. Falcone on August 28, 1974.
- 7. For reasons set forth in our attached memorandum, I am satisfied that the allegations against Ms. Goldstein are false, and that they were filed, at least, with reckless disregard of the facts, which facts were readily available to defense counsel. I have full confidence in the integrity and professionalism of Ms. Goldstein and of the propriety of her conduct in this case.

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- 8. I believe that defense counsel's action in declining to withdraw these charges leaves them unfairly hanging over Ms. Goldstein's head, as a possible permanent cloud on her professional reputation. In addition, I believe that the continued pendency of such charges can only have the effect of making it more difficult for Ms. Goldstein to carry out her professional responsibilities in connection with this case. Accordingly, the charges should either be withdrawn, with prejudice, or evaluated by this Court based on the evidence. Even though a hearing on this matter would necessarily be unpleasant for Ms. Goldstein, since she has in my view done nothing to warrant any challenge to her integrity, it is preferable to the prospect of allowing charges I believe to be false and scurrilous to hang over her professional career indefinitely.
- 9. For reasons set forth in our memorandum I believe that defendants have used disingenuous tactics in this case to a degree which warrants a strong adverse inference against them on the merits of the case. Accordingly, and in order to facilitate Ms. Goldstein's participation in the trial, we request that this matter be scheduled for hearing in advance of the trial of the main case.

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10. No previous application has been made for the relief here requested.

Sworn to before me this 20th day of September

May Commission Expires August 14, 1977

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IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y

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TIME 131 ........

UNITED S	TATES DIS	STRI	CT	COURT
EASTERN	DISTRICT	OF	NEW	YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

P.M.....

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

-against-

No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

DAVID G. TRAGER
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
Attorney for Plaintiff
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney
Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
(Of Counsel)



## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED	STATES (	OF AMERICA,	) \
		Plaintiff,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
	v.		<i>)</i>
			) MEMORANDUM OF UNITED STATES IN
FRED C.	TRUMP,	et al.,	) SUPPORT OF ITS APPLICATION TO
			) DENY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
		Defendants.	) CONTEMPT WITH PREJUDICE, FOR AN
			) EARLY HEARING, AND TO STRIKE

On July 26, 1974, defendants filed with this Court a "Notice of Motion" seeking an adjudication of contempt against Donna F.

Goldstein, a Department of Justice attorney assigned to this litigation, and a "cease and desist" order against the United States.

In affidavits filed with Defendant's Notice of Motion, including that of defense counsel Roy M. Cohn, Ms. Goldstein was alleged to have threatened prospective witnesses and to have attempted by other improper means to influence their testimony in the forthcoming trial of this case. Ms. Goldstein and other representatives of the United States were also accused of conducting themselves in an unprofessional manner while in the process of attempting to conduct a records inspection at the offices of the defendants. The United States filed a response, together with affidavits by three of plaintiff's counsel, denying each and every allegation of improper conduct as false and

scurrilous and requested expedited discovery and an early hearing on the issue. On August 8, 1974, this Court granted plaintiff's request for expedited discovery in connection with this issue and directed that Magistrate Catoggio supervise the taking of the scheduled depositions.

Subsequent to the hearing on August 8, 1974, Magistrate Catoggio met with attorneys for both parties for the purpose of scheduling the proposed discovery. At that meeting, defendants withdrew their request for a hearing on the contempt charges, but refused to withdraw the underlying pleadings, which contain the allegations of misconduct by Ms. Goldstein.

Even though defendants' pleadings lie dormant in the file, plaintiff believes that the charges contained therein continue to hang over Ms. Goldstein. They can be resurrected at any time at defense counsel's caprice, and leave a shadow over her reputation which will remain there until removed by adjudication or withdrawal with prejudice. The accusations also interfere, practically as well as psychologically, with plaintiff's preparation of the case and impose unwarranted burdens on Ms. Goldstein's ability to participate fully and effectively at the forthcoming trial. Plaintiff has accordingly taken discovery depositions of Ms. Goldstein's principal accusers and now requests that this Court schedule a hearing on the

merits of defendants' motion and at the conclusion of that hearing deny defendants' motions as sham and false. Plaintiff asks that this matter be resolved promptly, and in advance of trial. If it is established, as we believe it will be, that the allegations of misconduct are false and were filed with reckless and malicious disregard of the truth, then that fact is admissible against defendants on the merits as an indication of defendants' consciousness that their case, if truthfully presented, is weak. See pp. 17-18, infra.

## DISCUSSION

#### I. THE FACTS

A. Counsel for Plaintiff Did Not Threaten or Harass Prospective Witnesses

The two persons who have made serious allegations of unprofessional conduct against Ms. Goldstein are Mr. Thomas Miranda
and Ms. Carol Falcone,\*/ both former employees of defendants.

<sup>\*/</sup> Two other persons, Mr. & Mrs. Paul Ziselman, submitted affidavits, but neither of the affidavits in our opinion contained allegations of unprofessional misconduct against Ms. Goldstein. We do wish, however, to preserve our right to call them to testify at any hearing on this matter if we believe that such action is necessary to resolve this controversy.

They allege in separate affidavits that Ms. Goldstein threatened and harassed them in an effort to induce them to testify against their former employer, Trump Management Co. While neither has yet been subjected to cross-examination by plaintiff, the testimony that they have given on deposition, combined with other evidence already in the record, seriously discredits their allegations.

Nor are the witnesses the only persons at fault. While defense counsel saw fit to file his own affidavit attesting to the truth of the allegations made against Ms. Goldstein by Mr. Miranda and Ms. Falcone, each of these witnesses testified on depositions that counsel never met, spoke, or otherwise communicated with him or her until the day of their depositions. The filing of such inflammatory charges by counsel against another attorney without any inquiry into their truth or falsity is, at least, unusual.

### (1) Ms. Carol Falcone

In her affidavit of July 19, 1974, $^{*/}$  Ms. Falcone charged that Ms. Goldstein had engaged in unprofessional conduct in a number of

<sup>\*/</sup> Although the affidavit bears a date of July 19, 1974, Ms. Falcone swore that she, in fact, wrote it several days later. She also swore that every word in it was her own, and that it was written without assistance in spite of some striking similarities in language to earlier submissions on behalf of defendants.

significant ways. In the deposition that followed, however, Ms. Falcone withdrew or substantially modified many of the allegations that she had previously leveled at Ms. Goldstein. While even the "softened" accusations will be shown to be false, and while a full airing of Ms. Falcone's charges must await the hearing and adversary cross-examination (which we carefully avoided on deposition), a comparison of her affidavit and deposition.\*/
is instructive at this juncture to enable the Court to make a preliminary appraisal of Ms. Falcone's testimony.

1. Affidavit - 'Ms. Goldstein harassed and accused me of lying and withholding information and then threatened that I would be held for perjury and thrown into jail."

Deposition - Ms. Falcone testified that

Ms. Goldstein never directly accused her of

lying nor did she, in fact, threaten to have

her thrown into jail. Ms. Falcone did testify

that Ms. Goldstein asked her whether she knew

what the penalty for perjury was, and that

Ms. Falcone construed this question, in the

<sup>\*/</sup> Counsel have not yet been furnished with copies of the depositions, but we believe that the transcripts thereof will fully support our references here.

context in which it was asked, as an accusation of perjury and a threat to be sent to jail.

Ms. Goldstein will testify that the subject of perjury was never mentioned.

Ms. Falcone also testified that the interview ended amicably. Even if Ms. Goldstein had mentioned the penalties for perjury - and she did not - the filing of an affidavit that Ms. Goldstein threatened Ms. Falcone with imprisonment, when the affiant will testify to no more than she did, is at least reckless disregard of the truth.

2. Affidavit -"[Ms. Goldstein] accused me of not legitimately owning my own business and stated that the money I used for its purchase was illegally obtained, which it was not."

<u>Deposition</u> - Ms. Falcone acknowledged that

Ms. Goldstein never accused her of obtaining funds

for her business in an illegal manner. She stated

that Ms. Goldstein remarked during the interview

about the fact that Ms. Falcone owned her own establishment even though she was young and had apparently earned

low wages from Trump. Ms. Falcone inferred from this,

and from nothing else, that she was being charged with

having illegally obtained money to finance her business.

3. Affidavit - "I was interviewed by a Ms. Donna Goldstein, attorney for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department and by another attorney on the morning of July 19, 1974, at my place of business in connection with the Civil Rights suit against my former employer, Trump Management." She also referred later in the affidavit to her interrogators in the plural.

<u>Deposition</u> - Ms. Falcone testified that only

Ms. Goldstein interviewed her about the suit

and that no other attorney was present. Ms.

Falcone did say that another attorney had called

her several days beforehand for the purpose

of arranging an interview.

The foregoing description of some of the discrepancies in Ms. Falcone's testimony, given under oath\*/ on two separate occasions, is not intended to be exhaustive or necessarily dispositive of the matter. We believe, however, that this discussion does shed light on the insubstantial basis for the serious charges made against Ms. Goldstein. At the hearing on our motion, we expect to establish that none of the accusations directed at Ms. Goldstein are true and that the entire affidavit should be stricken as sham

<sup>\*/</sup> On deposition, Ms. Falcone was unwilling to answer, clearly and unambiguously, whether or not she knew she was under oath when she signed the affidavit.

and false. We will also ask that the appropriate inferences be drawn against defendants for the use of such tactics.

### (2) Mr. Thomas Miranda

The principal accusation of misconduct made by Mr. Miranda against Ms. Goldstein is contained in his affidavit in which he states the following:

"[Goldstein] stated that if I did not cooperate with her and in effect 'lie' in order to help her in her ambitions and winning her case, 'I will be thrown into jail.'"

On deposition, Mr. Miranda reaffirmed this allegation. He acknowledged that his dealings with Ms. Goldstein were friendly, but he described her as "tough" on the job.

In this litigation, both parties have at different times sought to rely on Miranda's ability to tell the truth and it is necessary to explain Miranda's role in this litigation in order to assess the validity of his recent charges against Ms. Goldstein.

About one year ago, attorney Elyse Goldweber, who was then employed by the Department of Justice and assigned to this case, interviewed Mr. Miranda as part of plaintiff's preparation of this litigation. The nature and substance of that interview are described in an affidavit submitted by Ms. Goldweber in connection with these

proceedings. According to Ms. Goldweber, Mr. Miranda provided information to the effect that defendants engaged in racially discriminatory practices. He also indicated that he was deeply concerned that he might be physically harmed by the defendants if they became aware that he had furnished damaging information to the Department of Justice. Subsequent to that interview, plaintiff, as part of its obligations under the rules of discovery, furnished defendants, in response to their interrogatories, with the information provided by Mr. Miranda including his identity. Mr. Miranda was notified by letter that this had been done. A copy of that letter is attached to Ms. Goldweber's affidavit.

During July of this year, Ms. Goldstein reinterviewed Mr. Miranda, since he was considered to be an important witness in this litigation and had not been contacted in several months. During that interview, Mr. Miranda, while expressing apprehension about becoming a witness in this action, provided additional information about defendants' discriminatory practices. A few days later, however, Mr. Miranda reversed direction and executed an affidavit effectively retracting the statements he had previously furnished to the two government attorneys, and accusing Ms. Goldstein of improper conduct.

In his recent deposition, Mr. Miranda flatly denied that he had furnished to plaintiff any information unfavorable to defendants'

position in this litigation despite affidavits to the contrary by Ms. Goldweber and Ms. Goldstein. In this connection it is noteworthy that defense counsel does not challenge Ms. Goldweber's veracity. Mr. Cohn's affidavit states that "At all times that she was in charge of the said investigation, Miss Goldweber pursued her duties with diligence, but observed legal and ethical strictures."

The positions taken by Mr. Miranda and the two government counsel are, of course, irreconcilable. Obviously, if Mr. Miranda initially told Ms. Goldweber about racially discriminatory practices engaged in by the defendants, then the statements in his affidavit and deposition are false, and Ms. Goldstein did not make alleged threats designed to induce false testimony. The determination of whether Mr. Miranda made these statements turns largely on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.

In view of the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, relating to the signing of pleadings, one would ordinarily assume that defense counsel had reason to believe that Mr. Miranda was telling the truth and that counsel for the United States were lying. As previously stated, however, defense counsel never interviewed Mr. Miranda, and had never met him until August 26, 1974, more than a month after the affidavit was filed.

The only information which defense counsel had as to Mr. Miranda's veracity was the following excerpt from the deposition of defendant Fred Trump, at which counsel was present:

- Q. Do you have any knowledge of instructions that were given to any of your managers to attach a piece of paper in order to flag the main office that the prospective tenant was a black person?
- A. That is <u>such a lie</u>, and by our friend, Mr. Miranda, who has been lying to us since we hired him, has taken home money, but hasn't produced . . . (Fred Trump Dep. p. 37)

B. Counsel for Plaintiff did not Engage
In Unprofessional Conduct During a
Records Inspection

In his affidavit of July 29, 1974, defense counsel asserts that

On or about June 12, 1974, Miss Goldstein

by-passing counsel, literally descended

upon the defendants with representatives of

the Civil Rights Division and Student Interns

demanding entry into the offices of Mr. Donald

Trump, officer of the defendants' corporation,

and production of defendants' records. (emphasis

added) \*/

His affidavit further asserts that Ms. Goldstein and her colleagues ignored requests to contact the offices of defense counsel and that defendants were unsuccessful in getting plaintiff's representatives to leave their offices until defendants contacted the United States Attorney for the Eastern District.

<sup>\*/</sup> The affidavit also refers to a letter addressed to Assistant United States Attorney Henry Brachtl from Mr. Scott Manley, cocounsel for defendants, which accuses plaintiff's representatives of "descending upon the Trump offices with five storm troopers...banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine."

These allegations against Ms. Goldstein, as well as against other representatives of plaintiff, in fact, bear virtually no resemblance to what actually took place on the morning of June 12th or the events leading up to that morning. The fact that neither counsel for defendants was present at the offices of defendants or accessible by telephone at the time when plaintiff's counsel arrived to inspect records may, in large part, explain the inaccuracies of the charges, but it does not excuse them.

Even though plaintiff has previously described in its report of the United States to the Court on the Status of Discovery its position on these allegations, we take the opportunity again to set forth briefly, together with supporting documentary proof, the actual sequence of the events involving the proposed records inspection of June 12th.

On May 6, 1974, plaintiff served and filed a Rule 34

Request for Production of Documents on defense counsel Roy

Cohn. (See letter of May 6, 1974, addressed to defense counsel and signed by Ms. Goldweber, attached as Appendix A). Another copy of the request was mailed to defense counsel Scott Manley by Ms. Goldweber pursuant to his telephone request on May 15, 1974.

A third copy of the request was sent to Mr. Manley on May 28, 1974, following a telephone conversation between him and Ms. Goldstein

in which Mr. Manley stated that he knew nothing about the proposed inspection. (See letter of May 28, 1974, addressed to Mr. Manley and signed by Ms. Goldstein, attached as Appendix B.) Ms. Goldstein, in the course of two additional telephone conversations between May 28 and June 3, reminded Mr. Manley that plaintiff was planning to inspect records on June 12 at defendants' offices. At no time during these conversations did Mr. Manley express any objection to the inspection or indicate that the records would not be made available at the designated time and place. Moreover, defendants filed no objection to the records inspection, and did not suggest any alternative site or date, or any limitation on what plaintiff would be permitted to inspect.

Plaintiff's representatives arrived at the offices of defendants on June 12th at the designated hour for inspection and were met by a group of Trump employees who expressed surprise at plaintiff's visit. Initially, Mr. Stuart Hyman, controller of Trump Management, met solely with Mr. Henry Brachtl, Assistant United States Attorney. Ten to fifteen minutes later, Mr. Hyman met with the other representatives of plaintiff, including attorneys Norman P. Goldberg and Ms. Goldstein, and informed them that he was unaware of the scheduled records inspection and that no records could be produced until he contacted defense counsel.

- 14 -

Ms. Goldstein attempted, without success, to reach Mr. Manley by telephone and left a message for him to contact her at the United States Attorney's office. Plaintiff's representatives then left the Trump offices and returned to the United States Attorney's office.

About one hour later, Mr. Manley telephoned Ms. Goldstein at the office of the United States Attorney to inform her for the first time that he had objection to the inspection. Mr. Manley stated that these objections had previously been made to plaintiff whereupon Ms. Goldstein responded that no such objection had been transmitted and that, if defendants would not permit the inspection to proceed, plaintiff would file an appropriate motion. After some negotiations, defendants agreed to allow the inspection to begin on June 14, 1974, at the offices of defense counsel.

It is apparent even from this brief discussion, and the attached documentation, that plaintiff did not bypass defense counsel in its efforts to inspect defendants' records pursuant to a properly noticed request. Moreover, contrary to the affidavit and letter of defense counsel, there was no banging on doors, overreaching or other improper conduct by any of plaintiff's representatives. No calls were made to the United States Attorney's office by defendants or their counsel complaining about the conduct of representatives of the plaintiff.

We are prepared to call at the hearing on this matter each of the representatives of plaintiff who has some knowledge of these events in order to refute defendants' charges.

#### II. THE LAW

While defendants' motion may simply be denied on the grounds that there are insubstantial facts to support it, there is additional authority under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the striking of pleadings which are found to be sham and false. Rule 11 states:

The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or it is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.

That Rule is to be construed as imposing an <u>affirmative</u> obligation on the attorney filing the documents that he has in good faith made the determination that there is good ground to support the facts contained in the pleadings. <u>Freeman</u> v. <u>Kirby</u>, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The evidence suggests that this obligation was not fulfilled. Counsel who disregard this Rule

Benefit of Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety, 25 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). The sanctions provided in the Rule provide not only for the striking of a pleading found to be sham and false but also for such disciplinary or other action as may be appropriate.

\* \* \* \*

If the Court finds, after hearing, that defendants' allegations of unprofessional conduct against plaintiff's cousel are sham and false, plaintiff will ask not only that this Court strike those pleadings containing such allegations but that it draw appropriate unfavorable inferences against defendants at the time of the presentation of their cases on the merits. To quote Professor Wigmore

[A] party's <u>falsehood</u> or <u>other</u> <u>fraud</u> in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and <u>all similar conduct</u>, is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth or merit. The

inference thus does not apply itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause. Wigmore on Evidence, §278 (3rd Ed. 1940) \*/

That principle set forth, in <u>Wilson</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 162

U.S. 613, 620 (1886), has been consistently followed by federal courts. See e.g. <u>Holt</u> v. <u>United States</u> 272 F.2d (9th Cir. 1959)

Andrews v. <u>United States</u>, 57 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946). Accordingly, if the Court concludes that defendants made spurious claims against plaintiff's counsel which disrupted plaintiff's preparation of its case and misled the Court, as well, we submit that the propriety of drawing an inference as to the weakness of the defendants' case would be particularly appropriate.

#### CONCLUSION

Fore the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that this matter be set down for hearing in advance of the trial,

<sup>\*/</sup> This episode is merely the most striking example of conduct by the defense of the kind condemned by Wigmore, and not the first. In that connection, plaintiff invites the Court's attention to our Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn, filed on January 7, 1974, and to the Report of the United States to the Court on the Status of Discovery, filed on August 25,1974.

that the defendants' motion be dismissed with prejudice as sham and false, and that appropriate sanctions be ordered as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Fronk E. Schwell

JAMES PORTER, Chief
HENRY A. BRACHTL, Attorney
United States Attorney's
Office for the Eastern
District
Civil Division

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. T. 5-6-74

EMY 6 1974

JSP:FES:ESG:cmk DJ 175-52-28

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Roy:

Please find enclosed two copies of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents.

Sincerely,

J. STAMLEY FOTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

cc: Records
Chrono
Goldweber
Trial File
Hold

By:

Attorney

Bousing Section

T. 5/28/74 JSP:EG:mlp DJ:175-52-28

MAY 28 1974

Scott Manley, Esq. Same, Bacon, Belan & Manley 39 Fast 68th Screet New York, New York 10021

> Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et.al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Mr. Manley:

In response to our telephone conversation of May 28, 1974, please find enclosed a copy of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, scheduled to commence on June 12, 1974. Also, please note the attached proposed schedule for continuing depositions of the agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc. Formal notice will be forthcoming. These depositions had been previously acheduled for April 18 - April 22, 1974.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon to confirm the attached discovery schedule.

Sincerely,

J. STAMLEY POTTINGER Assistant Attorney Coneral Civil Rights Division

Hy:

Chrono

Ms. Goldsteine

Trial File

Henry Brachtl

DONNA COLDSTEIN Actorney Housing Section IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
LASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	Nov G \ 1974 ★
Plaintiff, )	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529
v. )	SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	
Defendants. )	

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney hereby supplements its Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories.

# Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 1 and 2

- 1. The following information constitutes evidence that defendants through their agents or employees have made apartments unavailable on account of race in the following ways:
  - a. Mr. Carlos Zeller, 512 Harbor Drive,
    Andulusia, Pa., a former employee of defendants,
    was superintendent at the Highlander in 1973.
    Mr. Zeller stated that he attached a coded piece
    of paper to those applications submitted by blacks
    in order to inform the central office that the
    applicant was black. Mr. Zeller also advised that
    various superintendents in Queens used a "phony
    lease" as a device to enable them to refuse renting
    apartments. In addition, Mr. Zeller stated that

generally he did not count a wife's income in judging whether a couple was financially qualified to rent an apartment. h. Mrs. Ruth Sarver, 164-20 Highland Ave., Queens, was hired by Mr. Fred Trump to assist Mr. Carlos Zeller, the former superintendent, in the renting of apartments at Highlander Hall and did so for approximately three months in 1973. Sarver stated that on one occasion she was informed by Zeller that Trump Hanagement tries not to rent to black persons, and that the reason two single black males, whose application she submitted, were rejected for tenancy was on account of their race. Mrs. Sarver also advised that a racial code was used in the application process to inform the central office which applications were submitted by black persons. c. Mr. Jack Fogler, 2850 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, New York, a former employed of defendants, was a doorman at Ocean Terrace Apts. in 1970 and 1971. Mr. Fogler advised that Superintendent Guido Lara had instructed him that whenever Lara was away from the building at the time that a black inquired about renting an apartment, Fogler was to advise the black inquirer that the rental rate was substantially more than the

amount ordinarily charged so as to discourage the

black inquirer. White inquirers who inquired at a time when Lara was absent were told to return at a time when Lara would be present. d. Mr. Ronald Dunn, a black tenant residing at 41-10 Bowne St., Flushing, stated that Mr. Thomas Miranda, a Sormer superintendent, related to him the following information during his employment by Trump Management: (1) On on occasion, Miranda forwarded an application and check submitted by a black prospective tenant to the central office of the defendants. An agent of the defendants indicated that the application had been rejected and directed Miranda to return the check. Miranda initially refused to follow that order. Ultimately the black applicant was denied an apartment and according to Miranda the reason for the rejection was the race of the applicant. (2) Miranda related to Mr. Punn that agents of the central office did not want him to rest to an Indian who had submitted an application, but eventually decided - 3 -

against refusing to rent the apartment.

The decision to accept the applicant,
according to Miranda, rested on the fact
that the Indian applicant had United
Nations connections and the Management
Company believed that the rejection might
cause an unnecessary confrontation.

- (3) Miranda indicated that a black who had been accepted for tenancy in the Rendall Hall Apartments had been accepted because the Trump agents believed that the applicant was associated with a local fair housing organization.
- (4) Miranda also related that he was reluctant to disclose to the Trump Management that he was Puerto Rican. Miranda indicated that he preferred to state that he was South American since he believed that the defendants did not want Puerto Ricans living or working in the building.
- e. Robert Heusel, 1300 Richmond Ave., Staten Island, was formerly employed by defendants in 1973 as a superintendent at Lawrence Towers. Housel advised that Sophic Fredwald instructed him to send black applicants directly to the central office to apply.

with respect to white applicants, Heusel was authorized to accept applications and deliver them to the central office for processing. Heusel also stated that when he delivered applications to the central office he was asked the race of the applicant. In addition, Heusel advised that a rental agent assigned to rent apartments at Lawrence Towers applied more strigent standards in determining the eligibility of black applicants than white applicants.

According to Heusel, a wife's income was not counted in evaluating whether or not a couple's income was sufficient to meet the financial standards for renting an apertment.

f. Donald Herman, Oriental Boulevard,

Brooklyn, was a former rental agent employed by

defendants in 1973. Herman indicated that at the

beginning of his employment he asked M. Harazzo

whether or not Trump Management rented to blacks.

According to Mr. Herman, Ms. Marrazzo responded

that some blacks do live in Trump buildings but

that Trump Management believes that Jewish tenants

are the best tenants. Herman also stated that the

superintendent of the building in which he worked,

Frank Finnegan, gave him the impression, through

·\* L.

words and statements, that he should not rent to blacks. Herman also has some recollection that a code was used as a means to identify those applications which had been submitted by black persons.

g. Allan A. Gross, 12 Seaside Ave., Staten

Island, was formerly employed as a rental agent and maintenance manager by the defendants in 1973 at Tysens Park Apartments. Gross related that on at least two occasions he heard Irving Eskenazi, a high-level manager of the defendants, instruct rental agents at the Tysens buildings to discourage black applicants from renting apartments. Gross also stated that a code was used within the effice to designate which applicants were black or other-wise "undesirable."

h. Fir. James Gordon White, 46 West 45th
Street, New York, New York, a former employee of
defendants, was a rental agent at Tysens Park
Apartments in 1973. According to Mr. White, Mr. Fred
Trump instructed him not to rent to black persons.
Additionally, Mr. Trump told him that he wished to
decrease the number of black tenants already residing
at Tyseus Park by encouraging current black tenants
to locate housing elsewhere. White states that
a code was placed on rental applications.

White also recalls that during his employment he accepted an application for tenancy from a black couple which he gave to another rental clerk, Frances (last name not recalled), for forwarding to the main office. White states that Frances expressed concern about submitting the application because the applicants were black, and believes that Frances used a code to indicate the race of the applicant.

i. Aldopho Gomez, 377 South 4th St., Brooklyn, was formerly employed by the defendants as a doorman and porter at the Briarwyck and Highlander. Gomez stated that as a doorman he was instructed by former superintendent Carlos Zeller to inform blacks who inquired about rentals that there were no vacant apartments even though there were such vacancies available for rent. Gomez also stated that while he was employed at the Briarwyck there were at least two occasions when he informed black prospects that apartments were available. According to Gomez, these applicants proceeded to an office to speak to a rental agent identified as Harry (last name unknown.) Gomez stated that a few minutes later these applicants left the rental office and indicated that they had been told that there were no vacant apartments,

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j. Eduardo Galdames, 445 W. 4° St., New York, New York, formerly employed by defendants as a doorman at the Briarwyck Apartments. Hr. Galdames states that he was told by Mrs. Theresa Schefflie, a former rental agent, that an apartment at Briarwyck had been rented to black women at a substantially higher rent than is required of whites, and that Trump Management did not wish to rent to black persons.

k. Mr. and Mrs. Ricky Helms, 1403 New York Avenue, Erooklyn, New York.

Co or about September 26, 1974, Mr. Helms, telephoned the rental office of Beachhaven Apartments, 2611 West 2nd St., Brooklyn, New York, to inquire about renting a two-bedroom apartment. He was told by an unidentified Semale that a two-bedroom apartment was available, and that the rental rate for 2 indrooms was \$235 and up. Mr. and Mrs. Melms arrived at the restal office on West 2nd Street approximately forty-five minutes later and spoke to a mental age of who identified immedias Troing Liebouitz. Mr. Liebouitz told then that there were no smallable two-bedroom apartments, and that the last one hall been restal about one hour marlier. When the Melms asied about the mental price, Mr. Liebouitz responded that two bedrooms rest for approximately \$225 and sp.

On or about October 3, 1974 at approximately 11:30 a.m. a tester for the Open Mousing Center of the New York Urban League, Mr. Michael Scott, went to the Beachhaven Apartments and was shown two available two-bedroom apartments by Mr. Liebowitz, renting for \$255 and \$260. At approximately 12:00 p.m., of the same day, Mrs. Helms telephoned Mr. Liebowitz, identified herself, and inquired about available two-bedroom apartments. Mr. Liebowitz responded that there were still none available.

1. Ms. Maxine Brown, 182-30 Wexford Torrace, Jamaica, New York.

on or about December 1963, after noticing a rental sign for the still unfinished Wilshire Apartments, Ms. Brown spoke to the rental agent and filled out an application for a one-bodroom apartment. The agent told her that she would be contacted.

Approximately one month later, after having heard nothing, she called the Wilshire rental office and was told that one-bedroom apartments were available.

When she arrived shortly later, she was told that nothing was available. Ms. Brown then filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission. Shortly thereafter Ms. Brown received a letter from Trump Management offering her an apartment at the

**--** () --

Wilshire. When she contacted the defendants she was told that the apartment was not yet ready.

After approximately one week, a white tester from the New York Urban League was told that apartments were available for immediate occupancy. A black tester was subsequently told that apartments were not yet available for occupancy. Ms. Brown's complaint proceeded to a hearing before the New York Commission and Ms. Brown secured her present apartment at the Wilshire in June 1964.

2. Pursuant to the agreement made by counsel of the United States in open court on October 24, 1974, we submit the following list of names which represents those persons who were contacted in connection with the investigation and preparation of this action:

Miriam Abrams

Casper Aloi

Cosmo Aloi

Shirley Ames

Corinthia Anderson

Lola Anderson

Carmen Baceret

Jose R. Barros

Peter Baybak

Victor Baybak

Susan Bernstein

Beverly Best

Vikentije Besu

Luiz Betencourt

Kalman Biczo

Theodore Bogart

Harriette Bolling

Carl Bonekoskey

Rene Bouchard

Gerard Breitner

Donald Brofman

Mae F. Brown

Maxine Brown

William V. Buffa

Mr. & Mrs. Ronald Bunn

Stephanie Bush

Joseph Calcaterra

Doreen Cameron

Alfred Cardilli

Regis Cardillo

Martin Celnick

Lawrence Ceraula

Michael Cheng

Andrew Cirelli

Ruth Clarke

William Clay

William Cloonan

Nafi Coker

Peter Connan

Ismail Dahbali

Henrietta Davis

Marie Davis

Glen G. Day

Oscar G. Deagustini

John DeMark

Edward Dier

Charles Duryea

John Egeland

Rufus Ensley

Selma Epstein

Janice Evans

Carol Falcone

Diane Falcone

Victor Falcone

Theresa Farina

Skender Fici

Elizabeth DiFiore

Max Fischer

Richard Foard

Jack Fogler

Marva Forde

Linda K. Friedman

Anita Furman

Edwardo Galdames

Mary Gallager

Annette Gandy

Edgar Gelar

Rhoda Glasser

L. Goldberg

Monique Golden

Dina Goldfarb

Morris Goldfarb

Adolfo Gomez

Benny Gonzales

James Gordon

Patrick Dennis Green

Max Greenbaum

Hyla Greenberg

Frank W. Greene

Allan Gross

Mabel Gruber

Josephine Gugliotta

Ernestine Guzman

Virginia Hallem

Lucy Hanna

Herbert Heller

Mr. & Mrs. Ricky Helms

Donald Herman

Robert Heusel

Sara Heyman

Mr. & Mrs. Alfred Hoyt

Ann Hurley

Stuart Hyman

Clara Jacobs

Gustav Jaeckh

Carolina Kanguat Jivi

George Sim Johnston

Charles Jonap

Ellis W. Jones

Margaret Jones

Rose M. Jones

Nettie Kerstein

Harry Kreitzer

Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Laitman

Guido Lara

Henry Lawson

Adelfa Leal

Joan Legeno

Anthony F. Licari

Ray LiMani

Nicholas Luttendodt

Dora Mabunda

John Mare

Charles W. Martin

Mary Massa

Gary M. McCaskill

Peter Menza

Youn Minn

Thomas Miranda

Charles Mitchell

Geraldine Mitchell

Esther Monasch

Lillian Morales

Robert Morrison

John Mosby

Sheila Moskowitz

Alan Newman

Gertrude Olin

Wilma Parker

Robert L. Patterson

Yolanda Perez

Julius Reinheimer

Thomas Randazzo

Joseph Reed

Frank Regina

Julius Reinheimer

Gertrude Robinson

Walter Rohr

Chauncey Roles

Abraham Rosenberg

Robert Rosenblaum

Emma Rossinsky

Albert Rossland

Andrew Rossner

Muriel Salzman

Louis Sarnell

Ruth Sarver

Dominic Scaglione

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Schefflin

Helen Schnitman

Marcia Schwartz

Charles Sedita

Louis Sforza

Martin Shaechter

Sarah Shah

Pearl Shaw

Muriel Silberberg

Otis Simpson

Gloria V. Sloley

Herb Smith

Phyllis Spiro

Frank Stern

Jeanette Strauss

Simone Taha

Meilech Teitelbaum

Matthew Tosti

Anthony Tringo

L. Warkol

Olga Wusits

J. Hugh Watkins

Edward Watson

Arlene Weiler

James Gordon White

Robert H. White

Bill Wiedmann

Pauline M. Williams

Helen Wrenne

Abraham Wybinow

Stephen Zaffarano

Mr. and Mrs. Paula Ziselman

Respectfully submitted,

Frank E. Schwelb Norman P. Goldberg Donna F. Goldstein

Attorneys,

Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

## AFFIDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

- I, Donna Goldstein, heing duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and our of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Fred C.</u>

  <u>Trump, et al.</u>, Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. I am informed of the facts of this case. The foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /ob of November 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: Ace. 14,1977

## CLUTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I berby certify that on Movember 4, 1974, copies
of the foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to
Defendants' Interrogatories were placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to counsel for the defendants:

Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Same, Dacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number

JSP:FES:NG:car DJ 175-51-28 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

\* NOV 6, 1974 \*

SEP 171974

Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plana East Brooklyn, New York 11201

Ro: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

On September 11, 1974, we received a copy of a letter sent by Mr. Roy Cohn to Magistrate Catoggio in which he states that he has requested that the above-captioned suit be placed on the trial calendar. As our responding letter to Magistrate Catoggio (a copy of which is enclosed) indicates, we believe there are important matters remaining outstanding which need to be settled before this case is set for trial.

For example, defendants have made objections to plaintiff's August 13th Request for Production of Documents. The parties are now awaiting a determination by Magistrate Catoggio as to the permissibility of this requested discovery. Moreover, we intend, in the very near future, to file a motion to Strike defendants' July 26th Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavits which seek disciplinary action against plaintiff's counsel for alleged misconduct. As you may recall, on August 8, 1974, after the hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, the parties met with Judge Catoggio. At that time the defendants decided to withdraw their contempt motion from the calendar, but refused to agree to a full withdrawal with prejudice.



Plaintiff believes that allowing this motion to remain in its present state of limbo only serves to further choud the issues in this lawsuit. It additionally unduly prejudices the reputation of one of plaintiff's counsel with charges which we are prepared to prove are totally without foundation.

The United States wants an early and expeditious trial in this case in keeping with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 3613. In fact, this lawsuit could have already been tried had it not been for the continued delays and dilatory tactics occasioned by the defendants and their counsel. However, we do not believe that with these outstanding issues still unresolved, this case is now ready to be set for trial. Therefore, we respectfully urge that this case not be placed on the trial calendar until the resolution of these open matters.

Respectfully yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By: Monar i Coldlerg

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney Housing Section

cc: The Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Roy M. Gohn, Esquire JSP:FES:DFG:car DJ 175-52-28 IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio
Magistrate, United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

★ NOV6, 1974 ★

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Catoggio:

We have just received a copy of Mr. Roy Cohn's September 5, 1974, letter to you in which he contends that our response to defendants' objections to plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents in the above-captioned case was so untimely as to render the issue "academic." While we hesitate to burden you with additional correspondence on this matter, we believe the letter raises issues requiring a short response.

On August 20, after being informed by the United States Attorney's office that Mr. Cohn had objected by letter to our request to inspect records in Norfolk, Virginia, we delivered a letter to you which advised that we intended to respond fully to these objections. You may recall that on September 3, I advised your Honor by telephone that I was on that date mailing, by special delivery, plaintiff's response. During that conversation, it was my impression that the matter remained open for determination.

Despite Mr. Cohn's assertion that the issue is now "academic," we believe that Plaintiff's outstanding Request for Production of Documents, noticed on August 13, 1974, remains active and survives the September first discovery



deadline. Indeed, if plaintiff's September third response is deemed to be untimely because it comes after the discovery deadline, defendants would succeed in defeating what would otherwise be permissible discovery by making informal objections at the eleventh hour.

Mr. Cohn also indicates that he has asked Judge Neaher to fix an early trial date. We have, as yet, received no notice from the defendants, either formal or informal, that they have requested that this case be put on the trial calendar. However, we will be contacting Judge Neaher to advise him that we believe there are certain matters remaining outstanding in this lawsuit which need to be settled before this action is set for trial. These include our request to inspect records in Norfolk, Virginia, and a forthcoming motion which we intend to file to have defendants' July 26 notice of Motion and supporting Affidavits, which seek to have plaintiff's counsel held in contempt of court, stricken from the record.

Respectfully yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

DONNA F. COLDSTEIN Attorney Housing Section

cc: Honorable Edward R. Neaher Roy M. Cohn, Esquire

## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number JSP:FAS:DFG:car DJ 175-52-28

SEP 131974

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio
Magistrate, United States District Court
Lastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTINGT COURT E.D. N.Y.

NOV6, 1974 ★

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Catoggio:

We have just received a copy of Mr. Roy Cchn's September 5, 1974, letter to you in which he contends that our response to defendants' objections to plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents in the above-captioned case was so untimely as to render the issue "academic." While we hesitate to burden you with additional correspondence on this matter, we believe the letter raises issues requiring a short response.

On August 20, after being informed by the United States Attorney's office that Mr. Cohn had objected by letter to our request to inspect records in Norfolk, Virginia, we delivered a letter to you which advised that we intended to respond fully to these objections. You may recall that on September 3, I advised your Honor by telephone that I was on that date mailing, by special delivery, plaintiff's response. During that conversation, it was my impression that the matter remained open for determination.

Despite Mr. Cohn's assertion that the issue is now "academic," we believe that Plaintiff's outstanding Request for Production of Documents, noticed on August 13, 1974, remains active and survives the September first discovery



deadline. Indeed, if plaintiff's September third response is deemed to be untimely because it comes after the discovery deadline, defendants would succeed in defeating what would otherwise be permissible discovery by making informal objections at the eleventh hour.

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Respectfully yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Givil Rights Division

By:

DONNA F. COLDSTEIN

Attorney Housing Section

cc: Honorable Edward R. Neaher Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

(212) 472-1400

THOMAS A. BOLAN COLINSEL

ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN

September 5, 1974

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN

LORIN DUCKMAN

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Magistrate, United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

IN CLERK'S OFFICE J. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y. \* NON 6, 1974 \*

United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Catoggio:

On August 14, 1974 Your Honor fixed September 1, 1974 for the completion of all discovery in the above entitled matter. The Government noticed a bunch of depositions in addition to the 13 they had already taken, and requested a volume of new records pertaining to the buildings involved.

We promptly advised that we would object to none of the depositions and would supply all of the records. The only exception, which we set forth in a letter to Your Honor dated August 20, 1974, was our objection to the attempt to ring in some buildings in Norfolk, Virginia which were never mentioned during its pendency until 10 days before the conclusion of discovery. We received no objection to our letter of August 20, 1974, stating that we would supply all of the witnesses and records requested except for the extention to the Norfolk buildings, and assumed that that ended the matter. We went ahead and completed the depositions and produced the records.

The date for conclusion of discovery passed on September 1, 1974. Now, on September 5, 1974, I received in the morning mail a reply to our letter of two and a half weeks ago (August 20, 1974), raising the Norfolk issue again.



Page Two June 21, 1974

Instead of holding this conference on June 27, 1974 at 4:30 P. M. we are scheduling it for August 2, 1974 at 4:30 P. M. Should you wish a time earlier than that day we will accompdate you.

Very truly yours,

VINCENT A. CATOGGIO United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York

# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number

JSP:FES:DFG:car DJ 175-52-28 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

SEP 3 1974

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

\* NOV6, 1974 \*

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Magistrate, United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Catoggio:

This is in response to Mr. Cohn's letter to you dated August 20, 1974, in which he objected to plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents from apartment buildings owned by the defendants in Norfolk, Virginia. Since he proceeded informally by letter, we are doing the same, rather than filing a formal motion.

Mr. Cohn's objection appears to be based essentially on two grounds: relevancy and timeliness. Specifically he contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to any discovery with respect to apartment buildings in Norfolk, Virginia, because the United States made no allegations of discrimination in Norfolk either in its Complaint or in its Answers to Interrogatories. He further argues that the request is untimely because it comes on "the eve of conclusion of discovery." We believe that such documents are properly discoverable and that the issue of lack of timeliness has been inequitably raised, since any lateness was directly created by defendants' continuous postponements and delays during discovery.

Before directly dealing with defendants' specific objections, we respond to defendants' repeated contention that plaintiff should have had its evidence before bringing this lawsuit,

rather than relying on discovery. As plaintiff's answers to interrogatories and its forthcoming supplemented answers will indicate, the United States has a substantial amount of evidence, quite independent of discovery, indicating discriminatory housing practices. Before filing a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. the Attorney General must have "reasonable cause" to believe that the defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. If defendants believe that such reasonable cause does not exist, the appropriate remedy would have been a motion for summary judgment which would have tested the credibility of their oft-repeated generalizations. Defendants having failed so to move, each party is entitled to discovery, both to discover additional evidence and to prepare to meet its adversary's case. Considering that the Trumps control in excess of 12,000 units, our discovery has been modest in comparison to what occurs, for example, in the typical antitrust case.

To support the allegation that the United States is not entitled to information with respect to buildings outside of New York City, defendants represent that Judge Neaher found plaintiff's Complaint too general. In fact, on January 25, 1974, Judge Neaher denied defendants' motion for a more definite statement and directed the defendants to seek its specifications through interrogatories. It is also alleged that plaintiff has heretofore made no mention of buildings outside New York. This too is incorrect and we respectfully direct your Honor's attention to paragraph 3 of the Complaint which states that the defendants own and operate apartment buildings in "New York City and elsewhere" (emphasis added) and to page 29 of the Deposition of Donald Trump, where plaintiff attempted to obtain information about these very buildings now in dispute. Mr. Cohn at that time objected to the pursuit of the issue, based on his "reading" of the Complaint contrary to its terms.

Even if our attempt to inspect Norfolk records were a "fishing expedition," that would not be controlling, for "no longer may the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507

(1947). In any event, this is no fishing expedition. Our forthcoming supplemental answers to interrogatories will disclose alleged discrimination at Trump's Norfolk properties.

We will not burden your Honor with citations for the incontestable proposition that the discovery rules are to be liberally applied, and that discovery extends not only to matters that are admissible in evidence but also to those that may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Complaint alleges that defendants have engaged in a "pattern and practice of discrimination." If defendants were to introduce evidence, for example, that their Norfolk operation is fully integrated, that it affirmatively advertises to attract blacks into a white area, etc., that evidence would surely be receivable. For that reason alone, plaintiff is entitled to discovery to prepare for it.

Conversely, if plaintiff's discovery in fact discloses discriminatory practices at apartments outside New York City, that evidence would be admissible toward proving such a "pattern or practice." In the debates on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Senator Humphrey remarked that:

"there would be a pattern or practice if, for example, . . . a chain of motels or restaurants practiced racial discrimination throughout all, or a significant part of its system. 110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (June 18, 1967).

Defendants' assertion that discovery may not be secured outside the parameters of the specific discriminatory incidents listed in our answers to interrogatories, prepared before discovery began is inconsistent with the very purposes of discovery, for the Rules are designed to enable the parties to discover all pertinent facts. This is particularly true in Civil Rights cases, in which "statistics tell much and courts listen," United States v. Youritan Construction Corp., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Calif. 1973) and cases cited, and the overall statistical picture is therefore critical. In Burns v. Thiokal

Chemical Corp., 483 F. 2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), a suit brought under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., a statute almost identical in respects here pertinent to the Fair Housing Act, the district court had limited plaintiff's discovery to only those employment records relating directly to the specific incidents of discrimination which had precipitated the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that this limitation was an abuse of the district court's discretion. The court allowed full discovery of records relating to the employment of all of the defendants' employees, stating:

Our wide experience with cases involving racial discrimination in education, employment, and other segments of society have led us to rely heavily in Title VII cases on the empirical data which show an employer's <u>overall pattern of conduct</u> in determining whether he has discriminated against particular individuals or a class as a whole. (Emphasis added), 483 F. 2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973).

If a defendants' overall practices are relevant in a suit on behalf of an individual plaintiff, they are even more relevant in a pattern and practice case, in which admissibility is very broad. Evidence of a pattern and practice can go back "many many years." Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F. 2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. den. 371 U.S. 952 (1962). Moreover, if the United States proves its allegations, it will be entitled to broad injunctive relief. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently held that injunctive relief may be available as to all of defendants' operations upon a showing of discrimination only at some of Brennan v. Fields, 488 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973). them. If the other complexes are relevant to relief, it is surely imperative that sufficient facts be discovered to ensure that the relief fit the operation.

We would like to briefly address ourselves to defendants' ironic claim that plaintiff's request is untimely. First, the request came on the date specified by your Honor. Second, without burdening your Honor with the long list of cancellations and delays occasioned by defense counsel during discovery, we earnestly request that you consider our prior submissions on this question particularly pp. 4-6 of plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sanctions, and our recent Status Report on discovery. These passages show that the experience encountered by you at the original hearing on discovery, when defense counsel showed up several hours late, was no aberration. because of the delays here described, and our attempt to secure discovery in an orderly and logical pattern, that we have only now requested records inspection as to complexes outside New York City. In the Status Report we address ourselves to defendants' failure to answer several of the United States' interrogatories even after two motions to compel. If these interrogatories had been answered, some of the information we are now seeking would be unnecessary. At the January 25 hearing, Judge Neaher stated that if the defendants were to find the United States' interrogatories burdensome, "you will then be faced with the Government's demand for production; the right to inspect and copy your records." (Tr. p. 38).

The United States has attempted to meet the discovery deadline which you set at the August 8 meeting in your office by moving swiftly to apprise the defendants of the remaining discovery we wished to secure. We think the defendants must now accept their share of the responsibility for this Request coming on the "eve of conclusion of discovery." The United States therefore respectfully requests that defendants be required to produce the requested documents.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By: Nonna Goldstein DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney Housing Section

cc: Mr. Roy Cohn
Attorney for the Defendants

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT U.S. DISTRICT COURT A.
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NOV 7 1974
3	TIME A.M
4	P.I.1
5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
6	-against- : 73-C-1529
7	FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,
8	Defendants. :
9	X
10	United States Courthouse
11	Brooklyn, New York
12	October 24, 1974
13	
14	Before:
15	HONORABLE EDWARD R. NEAHER, U.S.D.J.
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21	DANIEL D. SIMON OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
22	DANIEL D. SIMON OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
23	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
24	Kon

## Appearances:

DAVID G. TRAGER, ESQ.
United States Attorney

for the Eastern District of New York

BY: FRANK E. SCHWELB, ESQ.

-and-

NORMAN GOLDBERG, ESQ.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

ROY M. COHN, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant MR. SCHWELB: May I make a few opening remarks,

MR. COHN: Before he makes his opening remarks, we are ready to go forward, however, there are three witnesses we hope to call that couldn't be here today, but I would like the conclusion of this morning's hearing to ask your Honor to give us another date.

But we are ready, your Honor.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, in relation to that, as you know, we asked Mr. Cohn to answer some interrogatories. And he gave a representation here in open Court that these would be the witnesses.

I -- He has not answered the interrogatories further nor would he tell me on the telephone on Friday or Thursday who the witnesses are he cares to call.

MR. COHN: It is very simple. The witnesses whose affidavits we have attached to these very papers.

MR. SCHWELB: The Zisselmans?

MR. COHN: There are two we propose to call.

And the third one is a man named Dan Bronfman.

MR. SCHWELB: Just a few opening remarks, your
Honor, as you know, this matter arose when rather casually
and matter of factly my colleage, Mr.Cohn, filed some
affidavits which accused my colleagues in the Civil
Rights Division, Mr. Brachtel, of staging a gestapo

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raid on the Trump office and bypassing counsel. He claimed that Miss Dona Goldstein, a young and promising attorney, had engaged in criminal and unethical conduct which included threats to witnesses about perjuring themselves, and wire tapping, or talking to people, and that we wiretapped the Trump offices and we knew from wiretaps that they were lying and all kinds of terrible things.

And unlike the defense counsel we do not treat this as a minor matter, but with the greatest of seriousness.

We determined to lay out the facts before the Court in an evidenciary hearing so that the Court could make up its own mindaas to whether these charges had any merit to them.

Your Honor will recall that we immediately propounded interrogatories and the Court signed an order to show cause to get an immediate response to those interrogatories.

We also took depositions of a couple of the proposed witnesses. And then we went before Magistrate Catoggio -- and I don't know if your Honor has been informed about this -- and Magistrate Catoggio suggested to Mr. Cohn that he withdraw this entire thing. And Mr. Cohn said he wouldn't withdraw it. He would just

drop it from the calendar. But that would leave the charges hanging over Miss Goldstein indefinitely. That is not acceptable to us or not acceptable to me as Miss Goldstein's supervisor.

I do not want one of our attorneys to be so unfairly treated. I do not want a cloud over her head in her professional life -- for the remainder of her life without being heard.

So now therefore I ask for an evidenciary hearing and want to have it today.

Now, with respect to the storm trooper raid business which Mr.Cohn had in his affidavit and the letter from his colleague, Mr. Manley, I think we can establish by the testimony of Miss Goldstein and Mr. Brachtel, and by documentary proof, that this affidavit about something at which neither Mr. Cohn or Mr. Manley was present, that that didn't happen like anything that was represented there and we will be able to show as a matter of fact, to use Judge Wisdom's phrase, that that count about storm troopers and gestapo raids recalls the eery atmosphere of never-never land.

And with respect to the allegation against Miss Goldstein personally, the discovery and the depositions of these two witnesses disclose a number of gross contrasts and extraordinary circumstances.

Mrs. Falcone in her affidavit says that two attorneys intimidated her in her affidavit, abused her, and on her deposition she said it was only one, Miss Goldstein. A lot of conclusions were based on inferences.

In her affidavit, for example, she said that Miss Goldstein accused her of dating Mr. Trump --

MR. COHN: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt but is this summation? If it is an evidenciary hearing why don't we hear what the witnesses say without having Mr. Schwelb, before they say it, tell your Honor what it is --

MR. SCHWELB: I am outlining my proof, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, he says he is outlining his proof. Of course I have read the affidavit already submitted which I assume you are summing up?

MR. SCHWELB: All right, your Honor, I will shorten it.

Now, with respect to Mr. Miranda I just wanted to state that he testified on deposition that he ran from Mr. Trump and said he didn't want -- that is Donald Trump -- to be involved with his lousy case, and that the proof -- much of his testimony was to the effect that what he didn't like about Miss Goldstein was that she was trying to compel him to be involved in a case he

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didn't want to be involved with.

Now, both of these witnesses said pleasant goodbyes. Mrs. Falcone it will be shown had -- I am sorry -- Miss Goldstein had coffee and cake with him at the conclusion of these terrible intimidations that she performed.

And I think it will be shown that that is not the kind of conduct -- the kind of reaction you have to somebody who is saying this kind of thing. That wasn't all we discovered.

Now, your Honor, we have become accustomed in this case to events and circumstances which have occasionally made me rub my eyes in astonishment that they are happening.

For example we had a hundred million dollar counterclaim filed by defense counsel in this case --

MR. COHN: Excuse me. Your Honor, does this bear on the contempt motion before your Honor today?

THE COURT: I do not think it really has a direct bearing. I will give you an opportunity, Mr. Schwelb, if you feel it is necessary, to sum up in these matters at the end of the case.

MR. SCHWELB: All right.

THE COURT: Now, before we go any further I realize that you have some witnesses available here and

are ready to put them on.

Is it still your desire, Mr. Cohn, to pursue this matter on a litigated basis or are you open to the suggestion made by the magistrate or have you considered the position that you should completely withdraw these charges?

MR. COHN: The magistrate never suggested that we completely withdraw your Honor. I think what we all felt, including Mr. Schwelb, before he had fifth thoughts on this, is that what we would do is put the motion over until after trial, and then I thought it was indicated that probably as these pre-trial things have a way of doing, when the actual battle takes place and that the trial is over, they usually get worked out and disappear. In other words, we were not going to press -- it is our motion -- and we were not going to press our motion at all at this point.

And Judge Catoggio resolved it by saying he would request that it be marked off the calendar, and that he felt that that would be the way to dispose of it and to get on to the facts on the trial of the case.

That is still our position. We are perfectly willing to have the motion marked off the calendar without prejudice to renew it at a future time which of course would not prejudice the rights of either party.

THE COURT: Well, that is not the way Mr.

Schwelb sees it. And I must say that there is some good reason evidently because the charges were to have this young attorney held in contempt, and from what appeared on the basis of the affidavits would perhaps be a rather igregious conduct.

So it is not quite as simple as letting it hang over as a cloud or a sort of Damacles over thehead of someone. And under the circumstances I think we will have to go forward.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, I might say that the motion is made in complete good faith. As a matter of fact facts supportive of it become increasing in volume rather than diminishing.

We are perfectly ready and prepared to go forward on the motion on an evidenciary hearing.

MR. SCHWELB: Let me just say that in conclusion of what I wanted to say here your Honor is that the depositions disclosed that Mr. Cohn had never met Mrs. Falcone until her deposition was taken.

THE COURT: I am aware of those facts.

MR. SCHWELB: And that Mr. Trump -- the only thing that they could have known about Mr. Miranda was that Mr. Trump, Sr., testified that he was a liar. And he was interviewed for five to ten minutes by Don Trump

and not at all by Mr. Cohn. That is essentially what I have your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, all right, why don't you call your first witness.

MR. SCHWELB: I think it is Mr. Cohn's motion your Honor.

MR. COHN: I have no answer to make. I would rather have the witnesses speak for themselves. All I would do, and I know the Court has read the motion papers. The substance of the motion is that a serious charge was made in the complaint in this case and interrogatories directed by your Honor to make those charges specific as to date and location were furnished I believe, in January or February of 1974.

At sometime thereafter Miss Goldstein came into the case. And from then on it took a new turn in which tactics of investigation and conduct toward witnesses were pursued which constitute an abuse of the process of this Court.

First witness we would call is Miss Goldstein.

DONA GOLDSTEIN, called as a witness having been
first duly sworn by the Deputy Clerk testified as follows:

DEPUTY CLERK: What is your full name?

THE WITNESS: Dona Goldstein.

MR. SCHWELB: I think it is understood that he

1			Goldstein-direct 11
2		is cal	ling her as an adverse witness.
3			THE COURT: I suppose it would be adverse to
4		the mo	tion obviously.
5	DIRECT	EXAMIN	ATION
6	BY MR.	COHN:	
7		Ö	Miss Goldstein where are you employed?
8		A	Department of Justice, Washington.
9		Q	In what particular section of the Justice Depart-
10	ment?		
11		A	I am employed in the Housing Section of the Civil
12	Rights	Divisio	on.
13		Q	For how long a period of time have you been em-
14	ployed	in the	Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division?
15		A	This December will be two years.
16		Ω	So thatwould make it December, 1972, is that
17	right?		
18		A	Correct.
19		Õ	And did there come a time when you were assigned
20	a case	involvi	ing the Trump Management Company?
21		A	Yes.
22		Q	When were you assigned to the Trump case?
23		<b>A</b> .	May, 1974.
R2 fls <sub>24</sub>			(Continued on next page.)

1		Goldstein-direct 12				
2	Q	Before that time had the work that the sub-				
3	stance of the	work you were assigned to do been handled by				
4	another lady :	named Elyse Goldweber?				
5	А	That is correct.				
6	Q	In effect you took over for Miss Goldweber, is				
7	that right?					
8	A	Yes.				
9	Ö	May of 1974?				
10	A	Mr. Goldberg and myself took over.				
11	Q	You and Mr. Goldberg?				
12	A	Yes.				
13	Ō	All right, had you had any connection with the				
14	Trump case before that?					
15	A	No direct connection. No official connection at				
16	all, but because I worked in the same office that Miss Gold-					
17	weber worked	in I was aware of the case.				
18	Ω	Had you discussed it with Miss Goldweber from				
19	time to time?					
20	A	Yes.				
21	Q	You had a general idea of what it was about?				
.22	A	A general idea.				
23	Q	But would it be fair to say you were not into				

the specifics very much?

That is correct.

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Q After you were assigned to the case in May of 1974 did you familiarize yourself with the legal file in the case?

A Yes.

And did you discover that a complaint was filed by the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division charging the Trumps with practicing discrimination -- practicing discrimination with respect to units in Brooklyn and Queens?

A I was familiar with the case prior to that. I knew the complaint and I knew the specifics of the complaint.

Q You knew a complaint had been filed about October 1973?

A Yes.

O Did there come a time when you learned that

Judge Neaher had directed the Government, the Housing Section

of the Civil Rights Division, to answer certain interrogatories

propounded by the defendants?

A Yes.

Q And those interrogatories -- called for the specification of various items of that charge including when, where, and what location, under what circumstances it was alleged by the Government that these discriminatory acts took place?

Are you familiar with that?

A I was familiar with the interrogatories propounded by the defendant, yes.

Q Were you familiar with the answers to the interrogatories filed pursuant to the Court's order by the Civil
Rights Section?

A Yes.

When did you become familiar withthe interrogatories and the answers thereto? Prior to May, 1974, or thereafter?

A I believe I read them prior to May and of course when I became personally involved in the case I read them again.

Q Is it fair to say that your understanding was that the interrogatories propounded and the answers given were for the purpose of putting the defendants on notice as to that which they were being charged in this complaint?

I am sorry, but could you restate that.

MR. COHN: Would you read the question please?

(Record read.)

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I object to the form of the question for the following reason: I think that the trouble that the witness may be having is is he asking her are these the final answers, the only thing that we would refer to in the case until the end of the

case, or was this proof that we had available at that If he would phrase his question to identify which of those two alternatives he is referring to it would not be objectionable.

MR. COHN: Of course that anticipates my next few questions.

#### BY MR. COHN:

Ö But did you have difficulty in understanding the question?

Yes I did. Also, Mr. Cohn, I didn't answer those interrogatories.

> Q When you took over the case --MR. COHN: Withdrawn.

Your recollection is that you had read both the interrogatories and the answers thereto before you took over the case?

Yes.

And after the case was assigned to you in May, Q 1974, you looked at them again, is that right?

> Α Yes.

Well, what was your understanding as to the 0 purpose of interrogatories and the responses thereto?

My understanding of the purpose of the interrogatories, as in any case, is to -- the interrogatories asked for

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the specific acts of discrimination that occurred which were known to the plaintiff at the time the interrogatories were answered. And I believe that is the purpose and effect of the interrogatories.

And following the filing of the interrogatories certain depositions took place, is that correct?

A That is correct.

And during what period of time did those depositions --

MR. COHN: Withdrawn.

Q Those depositions were all taken by your office, weren't they? In other words, the defendants noticed no depositions. The depositions were noticed by the Civil Rights Division of various officers of the defendant and various employees, and a considerable number were taken over a period of time. Can you give us the period of time over which these depositions were taken?

A Well, Mr. Cohn, I believe that some depositions were taking prior to my becoming involved in the case. I can't tell you the exact period of time that these were taken. I was present and took some depositions I believe during June and July.

All right, let's take that. You were present at some depositions that were taken during June and July, is that

right?

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Yes. Α

Miss Goldstein, as a result of an examination 0 of the alleged incidents -- by the way, were there about twelve incidents of discrimination set forth in the answers to interrogatories? Does that seem about right?

That may be correct. Frankly I haven't read the answers recently so that I am not that familiar with the exact number at the moment. If I could look at it I can tell you.

> MR. SCHWELB: I wonder if I may interpose an objection as to form. By "incidents of discrimination" does he mean it is an admission of an extra judicial admission of discriminatory policy, or what does he mean?

MR. COHN: I mean numbers put on by the Civil Rights Section 1 through 12 citing specific instances under your Honor's direction of what they claim to be acts as of discrimination over a fourteen year period in the Trump office.

THE WITNESS: I do not believe that that is how the interrogatories were answered.

MR. COHN: The answers that you submitted (indicating).

BY MR. COHN:

Now, Miss Goldstein, did there come a time after you reviewed the answers to the interrogatories with these instances of discrimination, and I suggest to you we will find in a minute they were twelve over a fourteen-year period in some fourteen thousand apartment units, when you examined them and when you listened to the testimony at the depositions you concluded that there was no case?

Is that a fact?

A That is not a fact, Mr. Cohn. That is not anything near it.

Did you conclude that an entirely new investigation was called for concerning not events charged inthe complaint but events that were taking place months after both the complaint was filed and his Honor's direction that we be given specifics of the charges that were made?

A No, Mr. Cohn, I think you are misconstruing our conduct --

Q Please, Miss Goldstein.

MR. SCHWELB: Will you allow her to answer.

MR. COHN: I think the answer was no.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, could Mr. Cohn be instructed to allow this witness to answer his very probing questions.

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THE COURT: Well, what is the state of the record, Mr. Simon, the last two questions and answers. (Record read.)

THE COURT: All right, that is the answer.

BY MR. COHN:

Miss Goldstein, didn't you initiate a new investigation of the Trumps?

> Α No.

Sometime following May, 1974?

No, what we did --

MR. COHN: No, ma'am, your lawyer will have his chance to get up if he feels I haven't covered it adequately.

But if I say did you initiate a new investigation and if you tell me the answer is no I accept that.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, excuse me, but I think that she wanted to explain her answer and has the right to do so. I would appreciate Mr. Cohn being instructed not to interrupt her in the middle of answers.

THE COURT: Well, I suppose that since Miss Goldstein is in the role of an adversary witness, Mr. Cohn is entitled to conduct his direct examination as in the nature of a cross-examination.

Now, so far we really have a statement from Miss

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Goldstein that she did not conclude that there was no case. Right?

And as I understand it this last answer was no she didn't conduct or consider that a new investigation was necessary. Is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Well, what I understand Mr. Cohn's question to be was did I initiate an altogether new investigation. My answer was no. And I was going to explain that but he didn't give me a chance. BY MR. COHN:

0 Well, let me draw upon your words now that I have them.

Did you conclude that in the answers furnished to the interrogatories propounded by order of this Court a number of the alleged twelve instances of discrimination were invalid and mistaken onthe part of your Section?

Did I conclude that a number of instances were I had understood one incident to be part of a invalid? complex -- I understood one of the instances to be part of an apartment complex that they no longer owned.

> Q Do you mean that there was a mistake?

MR. SCHWELB: I'm trying to be helpful here but there is one problem. Now one doesn't ordinarily examine an attorney about his work product. And that is what

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the examiner is doing. I understand she is an adversary witness but at some point we have to have an end and I suggest that that is now.

MR. COHN: I think if Mr. Schwelb did not talk so much, your Honor, with great respect, we would have an end.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohn, I would have to say I am perplexed.

MR. COHN: May I explain your Honor? May I make an offer of proof?

THE COURT: I didn't mind your eliciting from her her connection with the case, original familiarity with the case, but it seems to me that we are now going into what I certainly regard as strictly lawyer's matters with respect to the conduct of litigation.

They do not seem to me to have any relevance to the issues framed by your motion.

MR. COHN: Well, your Honor, in the nature of an offer of proof, whatever your Honor might wish, the I am going -- and if counsel bears with me I do not think it will take long to get where I am going, is this, there came a time when the Civil Rights Section found that these twelve instances they supplied in the answers to interrogatories were out the window, that

there was no case, and that in certain cases they actu-

ally found wrong buildings which the Trumps didn't even

own, and at that point Miss Goldstein set upon a course

of conduct of using undercover agents, intimidating

and scandalous.

witnesses, and trying to build an entirely new case not involving these specifics. And that in the course of that committed the acts which are set forth with specificity in this contempt motion.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I move to strike subject if he is not able to prove it. I move to strike

THE COURT: Well, of course I merely view it as a lawyer's argument, you understand, statements made to the Court, you know, in an attempt to explain something.

that as not proper remarks, as inflamatory and improper

I thought that this case was all about certain charges of specific conduct in connection with either the taking of depositions or preparation for the taking of depositions, or examination of records. I certainly didn't think that we were going into anything that had pertained to the merits of the case.

I thought that was to be reserved for a future date when we would get down to the merits of the case.

R3 fls

What we are really considering here are the merits of the charges made against this witness. And I understand your desire to probe into motivation and so forth. I think until we know what the real facts are with respect to what did or did not take place, the incidents which formed the basis for your motion, we are going to get nowhere because I am lost right now.

MR. COHN: All right, your Honor.

(Continued on next page.)

THE COURT: I understood this to be in the nature of a collateral hearing on some charges of misconduct.

MR. COHN: No problem in that at all. If your Honor looks up paragraphs one and six of my affidavit in support of this motion I think it spells out just what the allegations are.

Your Honor, in using the term motivation, of course that is exactly what I am getting at. There came a time when they felt this original complaint was out the window and embarked on a series of totally improper tactics in the guise of a pre-trial period which was set forth with some specificity -- examples are set forth in the papers supporting this motion before your Honor. And I would be very glad to turn to specifics right now.

THE COURT: Well, I would have to have a considerable demonstration that that was the case. My recollection of the events here is that that occurred within the regular framework of the progress of the litigation that had begun.

Now whether that litigation has merit or not is something to be determined. It may be thatyou would be making all the statements to the Court at some point, I don't know, when we have a full exposition of what the

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BY MR. COHN:

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facts are with respect to the allegations of the complaint. What we are concerned with here, as I see it. are allegations made against the witnesses. And that is something quite collateral, to my way of thinking, and I would like to get down to some proof on that score.

Now, I don't know exactly what your further plan is with respect to Miss Goldstein but it would certainly seem to me that we ought to get down to some of these specifics that you said in your affidavit in paragraph --

MR. COHN: Paragraph one and six in my affidavit, your Honor, state in general terms our complaint concerning the manner in which Miss Goldstein has been conducting this investigation which we say is violative of the rights of the defendants, of the perspective witnesses, and is totally improper pre-trial procedure.

And I will turn to specifics right this minute your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Do you know somebody named Stephanie Bush? 0

Yes, I do. Α

Did you send Stephanie Bush in as an undercover Q.

1	Goldstein-direct 26
2	agent into Trump buildings in July of 1974
3	A No.
4	$\Omega$ in other words two months agc.
5	Λ No, I did not.
6	Q Did you discover that Stephanie Bush had been
7	sent into Trump buildings as an undercover agent concealing
8	her identity in July, 1974?
9	MR. SCHWELB: I object to the term "undercover
10	agent." If you want to know about Miss Bush she is
11	a tester for the Fair Housing Group.
12	$\Omega$ Do you know a tester for the Fair Housing Group
13	by the name of Stephanie Bush?
14	A Yes.
15	Q When did you meet Miss Bush?
16	A I believe it was in August of 1974.
17	O Does she work for the Urban League?
18	A Yes, she does.
19	THE COURT: Am I mistaken? I believe that this
20	occurred after the events which form thebasis for your
21	motion.
22	MR. COHN: Oh, no, I think it came before.
23	THE COURT: It came before?
24	MR. COHN: Oh yes. Specifically your Honor, I

think that Miss Bush, according to my information, was

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contacted at the Urban League by the Civil Rights . Section, according to my information, in June of 1974. That Miss Bush set about on her testing campaign there at the beginning of July, 1974.

In fact it was one of the factors motivating the bringing of this motion.

MR. SCHWELB: If your Honor please, there is not one word about Miss Bush in Mr. Cohn's motion. propounded interrogatories with respect to that and he didnt mention it and I move to preclude that.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, I do not think it is precludable. I think there is enough in the general allegations where I was not required to set forth the name of every witness to whom this has been done or every tactic which Miss Goldstein has done.

Now, with reference to a motion to preclude that Mr. Schwelb says -- I don't knwo what the remedy on a motion to preclude is -- if it is surprise I should have told him today, I do not think it is. But if he says it is I am perfectly willing to pass on to something else and give him an opportunity to do whatever he sees fit.

MR. SCHWELB: Interrogatories call for all the information that had to do with Miss Goldstein's conduct.

He didn't list that. Miss Bush will probably be called as a witness at the trial a month from now and you will be able to determine in full detail what the results of the testing by a black and white tester were from Trump buildings, and they weren't very favorable to Mr. Trump.

MR. COHN: You see, your Honor, that gets down to the basics here. Are we trying this case based upon a complaint here on your Honor's direction that we be advised of the specifics or are we trying it on Miss Goldstein's fashioning of a completely new investigation covering not the events charged inthe complaint but covering events that allegedly occurred right while the pre-trial on the original complaint was taking place.

extremely serious in this matter. But after we have been given specificity and told what to meet and go out and start doing it are and are actually in depositional process, to have undercover or testing agents, or however they want to denominate them, sent around day after day to Trump buildings trying to trap somebody into saying and doing something which can have no relevancy to the original charges in the complaint and the specificity your Honor directed we were entitled to have, I

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think it is totally improper as a tactic and covered by the purport of this motion by paragraphs one and six of my affidavit, and that it is totally improper -- that it constitutes totally improper conduct on the part of a Government attorney in the middle of a pre-trial and an existing complaint when specifics have been given and a framework of issues drawn under a Court order, and they are subjecting the defendants to undercover agents going in and out of their buildings, lying as to who they are and where they are from --

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I appreciate Mr. Cohn's low key presentation. But our answer to interrogatories were amended to disclose the additional testimony.

It has nothing to do with the charges.

THE COURT: Perhaps I owe you an apology for asking a question which has provoked so much debate. I started off by saying wasn't this a recollection of something happening in August after the motion and now I find this motion was dated July 26, 1974.

MR. COHN: Yes.

THE COURT: So it did happen after.

MR. COHN: No, she just said it. I am going to prove it happened weeks before this motion.

THE COURT: Well, her answer, as I understand it,

it this way -- I think that would be the key witnesses that we should be concentrating on here. I don't know what other witnesses Mr. Cohn may have. But unless these pertain to events that occurred prior to making this motion I will rule it all irrelevant.

MR. COHN: I have your Honor's ruling.

#### DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. COHN: (CONTINUING)

Miss Goldstein to your knowledge did an under-cover -- did a tester named Stephanie Bush go around to Trump buildings on July 9, 1974, some weeks prior to the making of this motion.

MR. SCHWELB: Objection as to relevancy your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, do you know or do you not know?

A I am aware that a testing was conducted by the New York Urban League and that that testing was conducted in early July, and that the information about that testing was provided to my office, to the Department, I believe sometime after the events occurred.

Ω When do you say you first learned of this Stephanie Bush going around to the Trump buildings in this capacity?

A Do you want an exact date? I don't have an exact

MR. SCHWELB: He is misquoting the testimony.

MR. COHN: I will withdraw the question.

I met Betty Hoeber then, yes.

Who is Betty Hoeber?

Did you meet Miss Bush's superiors in June?

I don't know what her title is, but Betty Hoeber

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is the director of the Open Housing Center which is an arm of the New York Urban League.

Q Did you discuss with Betty Hoeber the sending of agents around to Trump buildings?

A Did I discuss with her? Miss Hoeber stated that she might send some testers.

The Urban League had provided us with some information and their clients were a number of the people we have listed inour interrogatories.

Miss Hoeber was interested in the case and indicated that she might do some more testing. They weren't agents of ours in any way.

Q Did you ask Mrs. Hoeber to have the testing?
Can you answer that yes or no?

A I don't believe I asked Miss Hoeber to do the testing.

THE COURT: I was just about to ask you is it far to say that some of the information involved in the allegations of the complaint were predicated on information supplied by the New York Urban League? Is that so?

THE WITNESS: In the original complaint?

THE COURT: Well, I realize you were not in the case originally. But did you learn that at any time

that the Urban League group had supplied information which --

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. COHN:

Now, who initiated the meeting with Mrs. Hoeber in June, you or Mrs. Hoeber?

A I don't recall.

It's part of my job we meet with representatives of fair housing groups on a regular basis.

In fact I believe I met with Mrs. Hoeber not for the purpose of discussing Trump, but to discuss another project that she was doing -- that the Open Housing Center was doing in New York, about a conference they were planning on having, I believe -- it may not have been that conference -- but at another project, and it was during my meeting with her, I believe, we talked about it possibly.

Did you tell Miss Hoeber inwords or in substance that your Section pursuant to an order of the Court had already furnished answers to interrogatories setting forth the acts which you claim were committed in this case, and that the case was as of June, 1974, in the depositional, pre-trial stage?

A I don't know whether the depositional stage is any different than the normal discovery stage of litigation.

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Q I will take it any way you want.	
A I don't recall whether I specifically told Miss	
Hoeber that we had answered interrogatories. It is possible	
that I stated that we provided the first answers to inter-	
rogatories were provided before I became involved in this	
case, and she may have known, Miss Hoeber, I have no idea.	
I have no recollection of whether or not I said	
anything. I may have mentioned the answers to interrogatorie	s
I have no recollection of it.	
(Continued on next page.)	

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Q Did you ask Miss Hober to keep quiet the fact that you had knowledge of her sending this undercover agent around in July of 1974?

A Are you talking about the tester?

Q Yes.

A Did I ask Miss Hober to keep quiet?

Q The fact that she and you had discussed the sending of this agent around?

A I may have indicated to Miss Hober that I was not asking her to do this.

Did you say in words or substance to Miss Hober it might not be the right time at this point to be sending agents around to the truck buildings because we have already presented our case, but if you do it on your own, that is your business and I would be very happy to receive any information that you can give us?

A I don't believe that would be a correct statement of anything that I would have said to Miss Hober.

Q Well, I don't want what you would have said. I want your recollection of what you did say.

A I didn't say to Miss Hober that we have already presented our case and it wouldn't be appropriate for me to -- because we presented our case it wouldn't be appropriate for me to do the testing. What I may very well have said

to Miss Hober is that I would not initiate any testing. That if the Urban League wished -- They had indicated that they had a plan on testing and I said I wasn't going to initiate any testing and get the Department of Justice involved in any testing.

And having said that, did you receive information from Miss Hober from time to time thereafter, specifically in and about the middle of July concerning the reports of this lady who was marching around the truck buildings?

MR. SCHWELB: I object to the characterization.

MR. COHN: I will withdraw the words "marching around".

Q (continuing) who was presenting herself at various buildings involved in this case?

A Yes, I did. I received information from the Open Housing Center. And I would like to --

Q Is there any difference between the Open Housing Center and the Urban League?

A It is an arm of the Urban League.

Q An arm of the Urban League? It is a private organization; is that correct?

A I have no idea. I guess it may be.

Now, just one last question on this point:

I used the word undercover agent, and you corrected me and used the word tester.

Let me ask you this:

To your knowledge, when this lady, Stephanie
Bush, went to these Trump buildings at the beginning of July,
1974 and thereafter, did she identify herself as coming from
the Urban League?

A I don't believe that she did.

And in fact, the impression -- would you agree

-- the impression -- would you agree with me that the last

thing she wanted superintendents to know was that she came

from the Urban League?

MR. SCHWELB: It calls for a conclusion of somebody else and a mental operation. But I think we all know what testers are for.

THE COURT: Well, I think so. I do not see how this witness can invade somebody else's state of mind. All right.

One Trump employee that she was connected with the Urban League based upon any reports that you have received from Miss Bush whenever you met her, or from Mrs. Hober, whenever you met her, or from anyone else connected with the open housing or Urban League?

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MR. SCHWELB: Now, your Honor, this calls for a hearsay answer. Furthermore, we will stipulate and we will concede and we will be happy to tell Mr. Cohn that when testers go to test a building, they don't identify themselves as testers because if they did, the test wouldn't work and it wouldn't give a representative example of the conduct they are trying to determine, and in this case did determine.

Q Well, before --

MR. COHN: Strike that.

At the time you had this conversation with Miss Hober, in which this testing was discussed in June of 1974, did you consult with any of your superiors in the Justice Department as to the propriety of this?

MR. SCHWELB: Objection. Work product.

THE COURT: I do not think it has relevance to what we are trying to determine here.

Now, during this same period of time, namely following your entry into this case in May of 1974 until July 26th, 1974, which I would fix under his Honor's ruling as the perameter of this motion, certainly, did you have occasion to make up a list of former Trump employees whose names were not set forth in the information supplied to us in February, 1974 in answer to our interrogatories?

A I am afraid I am confused by the question.

Q Are you really? Maybe I can restate it if you are confused.

At the time of your entry into the case, there had already been furnished to the defendants interrogatories containing specific incidents and the names of witnesses.

Do you recall that?

A Are you talking about the original answers to interrogatories?

- Q I am talking about answers to interrogatories.
- A Right.
- O You are clear about that?
- A Yes.

Q After you came into the case, which was some months later, did you make up a list of former employees of the Trump organization which were not mentioned?

MR. SCHWELB: This is some more work product.

I wish you would get to the incidents that she spoke

of --

MR. COHN: I have no interest in their work product. I am getting right to the incident.

Q Did you make up such a list?

THE COURT: I will allow that question.

A We conducted a records inspection in June of

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1974. At that records inspection we did make a list of Trump employees, present and former, from payroll records that were produced pursuant to notice of records inspection.

- Q About when was this?
- A In June, 1974.
- Q Did you turn this list over to the FBI?
- A Did I turn that list over to the FBI? No, I did not.
- Q Did you turn the information from that list over to the FBI?
- A Pursuant to information I received from that list I requested, as in the normal course of our conducting litigation investigation, I asked -- made this request that the FBI conduct certain interviews.

People we request to be interviewed, some of those names were furnished from the list that we secured from the records inspection.

- Q Now, would it be fair to say that the FBI agents conducted these interviews under your direction?

  Were you the person in charge of the Justice Department?
  - A No, not really.
  - Q Under whose direction did they conduct it?
- A I may have -- some of them -- there have been -- there is a lot of paperwork involved. My name may be on it.

Mr. Goldberg's name may be on it. All our requests are reviewed and finally sent out by Mr. Schwelb or two of his deputies.

Q Did you request the FBI to contact a lady Carol Falcone?

- A I believe I did, yes.
- Q Do you have any doubt about that?
- A number of requests were sent out.
- Q A number of anything might have happened. All
  I want to know is, as you are sitting in that witness chair
  were you the one who told the FBI to interview Carol Falcone?

A I advised Mr. Goldberg. I believe we both -I don't know which one she was on. One of us did.

Q Were you aware of the fact that sometime before the FBI appeared, if the evidence is so going to show, at Miss Falcone's home at 10 o'clock at night, you were the one who told the FBI to go?

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, first of all I object to that entire tone which is unnecessary, and, second, the question is so confusing that I would object to the form.

MR. COHN: I will be glad to withdraw it.

Q Could you tell us simply, did you tell the

FBI to go to interview Carol Falcone or did you have knowledge that any of your colleagues told the FBI to go to interview Carol Falcone?

A Either myself or my colleagues requested that the FBI conduct an investigation or to interview certain former employees, and Miss Falcone was one of them, Mr. Cohn.

THE COURT: I think that has been answered.

MR. COHN: The answer is yes.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, will he stop testifying, please? The presence of the witness is highly
superfluous if he tells us what the answer is.

MR. COHN: If I could get straightforward answers, your Honor --

THE COURT: I think the answer was straightforward, Mr. Cohn.

Q Now, did you tell the FBI that you wanted to talk to Miss Falcone?

A What I believe I said was that after I had interviewed Miss Falcone I contacted the FBI, or Mr. Goldberg contacted the FBI to inform them that we had already contacted Miss Falcone and it would be unnecessary for them to do so.

Q Do you want to give me the chronology of this?

Is it, as I understand from your last answer, that you told

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the FBI not to get to Miss Falcone? That you, independently of the FBI, tried to reach Miss Falcone? That you reached her first and then called the FBI and said, we have located her, or whatever it might be, and it is not necessary for you to do anything? Is that a fair statement?

- A I object to the phrase, "get to."
- Q Other than the phrase, "get to"? Reach?

  Locate? Find?

A We requested the FBI to interview Miss Falcone.

I interviewed Miss Falcone. I then contacted the FBI to

tell them that I had interviewed her and that it was

unnecessary to contact her as well.

Q Before you interviewed Miss Falcone, did it come to your attention that FBI agents had gone to her home and at hours after 9 o'clock at night?

A Absolutely not.

Q When did you first hear about this, if you did?

A At the deposition of Miss Falcone, with reference to this hearing -- prior to this hearing.

Q That was the first you knew that her mother, her uncle, had been visited by FBI agents at hours --

A Absolutely.

MR. SCHWELB: Excuse me. It calls for

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innumerable hearsay answers and I want to object to it.

THE COURT: Well, I think we are straying again.

So the FBI went there and what?

- Q So the FBI went there. You say it didn't come to your attention until the deposition?
- A That she had been visited at 10 o'clock at night by any FBI agents, that is correct. Or at any time at night, that is right.
  - Q Did you give to the FBI any ground rules -MR. COHN: I withdraw that.
- Q Did you have any reason to believe Miss Falcone was anything other than a former Trump employee? That she was involved in anything herself?
  - A No, the only information --
  - Q That's an answer.

Did you give the FBI general instructions on what hours these witnesses should be approached?

- A I didn't give them instructions.
- Q You do not ever outline the perameters of investigation?
- A I outline the questions to be asked, information to be received. The FBI is a very professional organization and it never came to my attention that they

ever conducted themselves unprofessionally.

And certainly it is not my business to give instructions to the FBI. That is generally done elsewhere, as I understand it.

- Q Well the fact is you are saying you didn't, in this case?
  - A I merely sent out a request through our office.
- Q With whom were you dealing in the FBI, involving Miss Falcone, specifically?
- A Are you asking me who the special agent of the FBI was?
- Q Yes. Would this refresh your memory? You said you contacted somebody to say you had located Miss Falcone.
- A I don't recall whether I personally made the contact or whether Mr. Goldberg made the contact.
- Q And do you recall who was contacted in the FBI?
- A We had been working together on it. I know who in New York had been conducting the investigation and who may have been contacted, And Mr. Schwelb -- if he has no objection, I will mention it.

MR. SCHWELB: No, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Terrence Cox.

THE COURT: He is a special agent?

THE WITNESS: A special agent in charge of this case, yes, sir.

THE COURT: In New York?

THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct.

THE COURT: He was doing it or in charge of it, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: From what I understand, that would be correct. I don't have much contact with the FBI.

- Well, did you have much contact with Miss Falcone?
  - I interviewed Miss Falcone. Α
  - On how many occasions?
  - One occasion. Α
    - How long did the interview last? Q
  - About a half an hour to 45 minutes. Α (continued next page.)

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1		Goldstein-direct 48
2	Q	About 30 to 45 minutes?
3	A	About that.
4	Q	Where did that take place?
5	A	In her place of business, the Hero Hut.
6	Q	That is a place where they sell hero sandwiches,
7	I would assum	ne.
8	A	Right.
9	Ó	About what time of the day was it?
10	A	I believe I arrives at approximately quarter to
11	twelve.	
12	Q	Was the lunch business in progress while you
13	were there?	
14	А	There was some. It was not very crowded.
15	Q	What time do you say you left there?
16	A	I would think at the latest about 12:30.
17	Q	Did you have occasion to discuss the perjury
18	laws with Mis	s Falcone?
19	А	No.
20	Q	Did you tell Miss Falcone in words or in
21	substance tha	t
22		MR. COHN: I withdraw that question.
23	Q	Did you question Miss Falcone concerning her
24	work for the	Trump organization in prior years?
25	A	Yes.

Q After she described her duties did you suggest to her that she wasn't telling the full truth concerning that?

A I believe at one point in one specific question

I asked Miss Falcone to refresh her recollection, on a

specific point that I found it hard to believe, and would

she refresh her recollection.

- Q When you use the words that you found it hard to believe, did you tell her that there are perjury laws which say you can go to jail for up to five years?
  - A Absolutely not.
  - Q You deny that categorically?
  - A Totally.
- Q Now, did you ask questions dealing with Miss Falcone's personal life?
- A No. I asked her if she was married -- her age, her occupation. I may have asked her whether she was married. that would be the personal questions I would have asked her.
- Q Did you ask her if she dated Donald Trump when she worked for the Trump Organization?
  - A Absolutely not.
- Q Did you ask her where she could have gotten the money to open the Hero Hut?
  - A I hate to be repetitious, but no.

Q I don't think it is repetitious. I think it is the first time I asked that question.

Did you tell Miss Falcone in words or in substance that there were records of phone calls that took place at the Trump office and therefore you knew what she was telling you was not true?

A No, Mr. Cohn. That would never have crossed my mind.

- Q Now, do you know somebody named Mr. Miranda?
- A Yes.
- Q By the way, I don't think I asked you to fix the date of your interview with Miss Falcone.
- A I believe it was Friday, August -- was it the 19th? I believe it was Friday, August 19th.
  - Q No, it was not August, was it?
- A Was it July? Wait, I'm a little confused on that.
  - Q I know it was July.
- A Then it was July 19th. Then it was Friday, July 19th. My dates are wrong.
- Q Now, did you have occasion to interview a man named Thomas Miranda?
  - A Yes.
  - Q Had you previously asked the FBI to locate

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2 Mr. Miranda for you?

> We knew where Mr. Miranda was. We had No. already spoken to him.

- Did you call him? 0
- Yes, I telephoned Mr. Miranda. Α
- Where did you telephone him? Q
- I telephoned him at his home. Where was I? Α
- Where was he when you telephoned? 0
- At his home. Α
- Can you remember when this was? Q

It was most -- I believe it was Tuesday of the Α same week of July 19th. So it would be July 16th perhaps.

About what time of the day did you phone the Q home?

> Midday. Α

Did you have knowledge about where he was Q working then?

> Α Yes.

Where was he working then? 0

Well, he was a superintendent of the apartment Α building that he lived in. This phone number, his telephone, would be his working and home number from what I believe it to be.

> Now, was a meeting between you and Mr. Miranda Q

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1		Goldstein-direct	52
3	set up? A Q	Yes. Did you go to his home?	
4	A	Yes, I did.	
5	Q	Anybody else present?	
6	A	His wife.	
7	Q	How long were you there?	
8	A	About two hours.	,
9	Ω	You were there about two hours?	
10	A	Correct.	
11	Q	Did you ask for another interview after	you left?
12	A	No.	
13	Q	Did you say in words or in substance to	,
14	Mr. Miranda t	hat you did not feel he was giving you	the
15	whole story?		
16	A	No, Mr. Miranda No, I did not. Mr.	Miranda
17	was at first	reluctant to speak with me. He never ga	ave me
18	a different	story. He told me he didn't want at first	t to
19	discuss the	matter. But I never indicated to him the	at I
20	felt he was	giving me a story that was incorrect or	
21	incomplete.		
22	Q	Did you tell him that you didn't have	to

discuss the matter?

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I indicated -- Mr. Miranda -- he told me he didn't want to become involved in this lawsuit. That he  $\mathbf{2}$ 

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was frightened.

Did you at that point advise him of his rights and tell him he didn't have to talk to you?

Mr. Miranda was, from what I understood, a friendly witness --

> MR. COHN: First I would like you to answer this question.

> > THE WITNESS: May I finish?

MR. COHN: I don't mind you finishing subject to his Honor's instruction. Will you answer my question? Yes. THE COURT:

Did I give Mr. Miranda his rights? No, I Α didn't. He, as I said, was considered to be a friendly witness. He had provided information to us.

After the man you thought to be a friendly witness had said that he didn't wish to talk to you, did you advise him of his rights not to talk to you?

> MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, just a minor objection, but the implication in that question is that Mr. Miranda was being charged with a crime and he I did not want this question to be understood as being he was entitled to some Miranda warning.

> > THE COURT: Just because his name was Miranda.

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MR. SCHWELB: I missed that. I am sorry.

I'm not asking you for your mental processes. 0 I'm asking if you had told Mr. Miranda that you do not have to talk to me now if you dn't wish.

> No. Α

How much longer after he told you he didn't Q wish to did you remain there?

I remained there for a few hours. Mr. Miranda Α talked to me and told me why he did not want to get to talk to me.

> Did you help jog his memory --Q

MR. COHN: I withdraw that question. Did you help bring about a change in his position by telling him he could go to jail?

No. Α

Did you use the word jail in talking to 0 Mr. Miranda?

> No. Α

Did you make any threat to Mr. Miranda? 0

Α No.

Did you tell him there were bigger people Q in the Department of Justice that he was going to have to deal with?

> Α No.

Mr. Schwelbe back his Ziesselman statements.

55

Do you know two people named Paul and Paula Q Ziesselman?

> Α Yes.

Did you interview them?

Yes. Α

When?

I believe I interviewed them after I interviewed Α Mr. Miranda later in the afternoon of the same day. It was during that week. Sometime during the middle of that week.

Where did you interview them?

At their home. Α

Was that in Valley Stream?

I believe it is on Long Island and I think it Α was Valley Stream. I would have to see their address in the phone book.

Did you state at or about the conclusion of the 0 interview that you were not satisfied with Mr. Ziesselman's statement to you?

> Α No.

Did you tell him that unless he was able to furnish more information that you were going to send the FBI

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agents back to them?

No, what I said to Mr. Ziesselman was that I had requested, as I had to Miss Falcone, that the FBI contact them and interview them. And that now that I had contacted them, that I would try to get in touch with the FBI to let them know that I had seen them so that the FBI wouldn't come to see them. If by chance, I said to them, I miss the FBI and they came, not to be concerned or frightened. They were coming pursuant to a request from me for the same kind of interview that I had already conducted.

That was the context in which you referred to the FBI?

> That is correct. Α

You didn't say it in what we might call a Q threatening context?

> No. Α

And the Ziesselmans, if they so interpreted that, your testimony would be mistaken?

> Α Yes.

Did you know a man named Mr. Herbert Heller/

Do I know a Mr. Heller? No, I believe he is Α a former employee that the Bureau did contact.

Did you make a phone call to Mr. Heller at midnight at a summer resort at which he was vacationing?

1	Goldstein-direct 57
2	A What?
3	Q Did you make a phone call?
4	A No.
5	Q Did anyone else to your knowledge?
6	A I have no knowledge of such phone call.
7	Q Is this the first you heard of such a suggestion?
8	A Yes, absolutely.
9	Q Did you ask the FBI to locate Mr. Heller for you?
10	A I believe Mr. Heller's name was on it was on
11	one of the FBI requests that we sent out, yes, although I
12	don't think it was on the one that I prepared because I don't
13	have any recollection of it.
14	Q Did the FBI ever report back to you that they
- 15	had called Mr. Heller at five minutes after midnight?
16	MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, first of all, this is
17	outside the scope of the affidavit, and, secondly, I
18	have no idea what time he is talking about.
19	THE COURT: Is this pre-motion or after motion?
20	THE WITNESS: I have no idea.
21	Q When did you ask the FBI to contact Mr. Heller?
22	A I don't know that I have
23	MR. SCHWELB: There is something before the
24	Court, your Honor, I object to that as outside the
25	scope of the motion. Further I think your Honor has

ruled that if it happened afterwards it is irrelevant.

MR. COHN: I would like to find out when it happened.

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

Q When to your best recollection, as the person in charge of this case, did you ask the FBI to locate Mr. Herbert Heller?

A I am trying to explain the operation -- of the FBI operation -- I don't know.

Q In the dim past I too have a knowledge of FBI requests. But can you tell me your best recollection as you sit on the witness stand now as to when you asked the FBI to contact Mr. Herbert Heller.

A Well --

MR. SCHWELB: If you know.

A (Continuing) I don't know. I don't think
Mr. Heller was on the list that I prepared. I don't know
which FBI list his name was included in. It may have been
in June. It may have been in March. It may have been in
August. It might have been in September. I have no idea.

Q Do you know a man names Mr. John Brofman?

A Yes.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, this is outside the scope of the four witnesses that he talked about that

we asked in the interrogatories about. I very particularly wanted to know all the charges against this young lady that he had. He said that is all he had. I don't think he can go and meander around the world, although if he does he does.

THE COURT: Well, now, is this something you believe is antecedent to your motion?

MR. COHN: I will have to ask her. It is no secret. I can state it in the form of a statement or an offer of proof. What I have is on the basis of phone calls made by people who were called either by Miss Goldstein, or associates, or FBI agents, called or visited --

THE COURT: I would say if they were called by the FBI this wouldn't be helpful here. This witness couldn't possibly tell. She is not vicariously responsible for anything the FBI does in my judgment.

MR. COHN: Except for this, your HOnor, I would suggest that the person -- that as your Honor well knows better than any of us in this courtroom -- the FBI is an investigative arm. It is not the Department of Justice and it operates under programs given to it-

THE COURT: Well, it happens to be part of the Department of Justice.

MR. COHN: Of course.

THE COURT: Although for many years its director didn't recognize that.

MR. COHN: At various times, It's my part thank goodness, but your Honor, whatever it might be, the fact is we are going to raise the question here after your Honor hears the testimony from the witnesses as to whether there is any obligation on the part of the person in charge of the case to see that certain standards, particularly during the discovery period, and dealing with employees and former employees of the defendant, whether certain standards of ethicality and decency are not to be observed in the course of such an investigation.

MR. SCHWELB: We will stipulate that we asked the FBI to contact these people. If he wasnts to charge some FBI agent with contempt or whatever else he wants to charge them with, I suggest he name them and we will propound interrogatories and identify him and let the FBI agent be here and not put it on Miss Goldstein.

THE COURT: Well, I also assume again if these people were in the employe of your client -- I have the impression that they were former employees.

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes.

MR. SCHWELB: We don't interview their managing agent without counsel present, your Honor.

THE COURT: So of course, as an old-timer like yourself, you are well aware that the Department of Justice judicially makes use of the FBI in investigation of civil cases. It is not all criminal investigation work, although the popular notion is the G-man as a crime buster. They are trained investigators and the only investigators that the Department has.

And they do precisely such tasks as this.

MR. COHN: And the Urban League.

THE COURT: Well, it is the Attorney General's responsibility to bring cases when he feels or that he has information that should be brought forth and also under our statute they call on the FBI for aid in the necessary trial preparation. So, as I say, I do not think these FBI requests are helpful here.

Now, so far as this Don Brofman, do you know him?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. I interviewed
Mr. Brofman a few weeks ago.

MR. SCHWELB: It was after the motion.

THE WITNESS: After the motion. I didn't

1		Balistreri-direct 64	
2	A	Yes, it is.	
3	Ď	Is tehre any secret about it?	
4	А	No.	
5	Q	Now, did there come a time	
6		MR. COHN: I will withdraw that question.	
7		Did you work for the Trumps at any time?	
8	A	Yes, I did. I worked for three and a half years	•
9	Q	What was the general nature of your duties?	
10	A	I was a clerk.	
11	Q	Now, did there come a time when you met a lawyer	
12	named Donna G	oldstein?	
13	<b>A</b>	Yes, I did.	
14	Q	You saw her here in Court this morning?	
15	A	Yes.	
16	Q	Before you met Donna Goldstein did it come to	
17	your attention	on that somebody from somewhere wanted to see you	}
18	A	Yes.	
19	Q	What happened?	
20	A	They came to my home looking for me.	
21	Q	What time?	
22	A	About 9:00 o'clock. And I wasn't there.	
23	Q	Nine o'clock when?	
24	A	In the evening.	
25	Q	Who was that?	

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, is this based on something somebody told her or her own knowledge? If it is not her own knowledge I would object.

Q Was this something discussed between you and Miss Goldstein when you met Miss Goldstein?

A Yes. When she came to my store I told her there were FBI agents looking for me at my home. And I told her I didn't know exactly whether there was two or one. I said there was two or one. And someone came at 10:30 at night. They said they were from the FBI, speaking to my uncle.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, is this based on what her uncle told her or what she knows?

Q I am interested in what you told Miss Goldstein when you first met her.

THE COURT: I will permit the witness to testify what she told Miss Goldstein for a limited purpose with respect to state of mind.

MR. SCHWELB: The testimony that she is telling Miss Goldstein rather than what she told --

THE COURT: I am not accepting it as a part of the truth thereof. Do you understand?

MR. SCHWELB: Yes sir.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead. Is it

## Mrs. Balistreri?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q In any event I think you just answered us that you told Miss Goldstein that FBI agents had been at your house and seen your uncle at 10:30 at night?

- A Right.
- Q On how many occasions?
- A Twice.

Q Did you say anything to Miss Goldstein on how you could be located?

A I told her they should have just called my store.

Two gentlemen also went to my store and they spoke to my husband. My husband said that it just happened she is not here but she is here every day.

MR. SCHWELB: Is this something you related to Miss Goldstein or is that something that you related to the outside world?

THE WITNESS: He said to Miss Goldstein.

- Q You said to Miss Goldstein?
- A I told her how many people had been looking for me.

THE COURT: Well, did you understand that an FBI man came to your store? Is that what you are saying?

THE WITNESS: No, two gentlemen. My husband didn't tell me who they were. He said two gentlemen came looking for you.

THE COURT: You told this to Miss Goldstein?
THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q And I think you said that I am right here practically every day?

A I told her, I said, I am here every day. They keep saying they are looking for me; they are looking for me. I am here.

She said, "Well, that's why I came to speak to you."

Q How long did she stay?

A She came about 20 after 11:00 and she left about 5 or 10 to 2:00, somewhere around there.

The only reason I remember the time is it was lunch hour in the Hero shop and that is our busy time.

- Q Was she there more than a half-hour?
- A Definitely it was more than half an hour.
- Q Your recollection is it was around from a little before 12:00 to around 2:00 o'clock?
  - A Yes, before 12:00.
- Q Now, did she ask you any questions about your duties with the Trump Organization?

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years.

A Yes, she did. She asked me what my duties were there. How long I worked. Who my friends were.

Q All right, let me stop you there. When she asked you about how long you worked for the Trump Organization did she ask you to describe your duties?

A Yes, she asked me to describe my duties and I said -- I described them for her.

Q Briefly what did you describe?

A I said I typed, I filed, I did clerical work.

She said in three and a half years that is all you did?

I said that's all I did.

She said I worked in other offices and during three and a half years I knew more than that.

I said well, I am sorry, I just didn't know more than that. That is all I did there. That was about it.

Q Was the word perjury used at any point during the interview?

A Yes. She said to me -- she said when I said this to her -- she said remember, do you know what the charge is for perjury.

So I said no, I didn't know.

She said you know, she said, it is one to five

I said oh, that's nice. You know, I didn't

know what she was trying to bring out. I said I am telling you what I did there. And that was the end of it.

- Q What you told her was the truth?
- A That was the truth. That's what I did.
- Q Now, you are quite clear about her talking about perjury being one to five years?
  - A Yes.
- Now, did she ask you any personal questions in relation to your employment by Trump?
  - A Yes. She said to me how old are you.

    I said I am 28.

    She said do you own this place?

I said yes, I own this place.

She said a young girl like you?

Then I said to her, Miss Goldstein, I said, I am 28, yes. I worked since I am 17 years old. I have saved every penny that I made and that is how I own this place.

If you think in any way that I got the money from, you know, Trump or anything, if that is what you are trying to say?

She said, no, I just wanted to know how a girl could own a place like this.

Then she asked me about my friends, who my friends were.

 ${ t Q}$  I want you to go into all the questions that

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she asked you about different friends of yours. But I do want to ask you did she ask you about any personal relationship you had with Donald Trump?

A Yes. She said were you single when you worked there?

I said yes, I wasn't married.

She said do you know Donald Trump?

I said yes, I worked for him.

She said did you ever go out with him?

I said no, I did not.

Did he ever ask you out?

I said no, he did not.

MR. COHN: Nothing further.

MR. SCHWELB: Can I have about a two-minute recess?

THE COURT: Let's have a ten-minute recess.

MR. COHN: What's your pleasure about time today, your Honor?

THE COURT: As far as there are witnesses to go, except what I will do is I will probably have to adjust the lunch hour because I have a matter on at 2:00 o'clock. That will probably take a half-hour. It's a juvenile hearing.

MR. COHN: That would help me.

could say that you just signed it, is that right?

MR. COHN: Your Honor, if it is just preliminary

I don't mind. But if it is going to be on something

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to talk about the deposition I would prefer to have 24 him say were you asked this question and did you give 25

this answer.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, in writing your affidavit, Miss Falcone, did you try to be fair?

A Yes.

You tried not to exaggerate?

A I didn't exaggerate. You know, I wrote down what she had said to me and what I said.

Now, I believe that you stated in your affidavit that "...I was interviewed by Miss Donna Goldstein, attorney for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department and by another attorney on the morning of July 19, 1974 at my place of business in connection with the civil rights suit against my former employer, Trump Management."

Now, were you interviewed on that occasion by Miss Goldstein and another attorney?

A No, just Miss Goldstein.

MR. SCHWELB: Thank you.

Q And now later on in your affidavit you said,

"...that in fact made me feel I was a criminal being held on
a criminal charge..." Was that only Miss Goldstein?

A Miss Goldstein was the only one that questioned me.

I meant when I said it that because they came

#### Balistreri-cross

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looking for me at such odd hours and that they, you know, as they were all trying to reach me when I was right there at my place. That is what I meant by it.

Is it your testimony that somebody other than Q Miss Goldstein tried to make you feel like a criminal?

No one treated my unfairly except I felt that Α she did.

- The others all were nice to you, were they? 0
- Very nice. Α
- And they treated you fairly?
- Polite and fairly. Α
- I think you testified today that Miss Goldstein came at about a little before 12:00 o'clock and left at about 2:00?

Yes. Α

In your affidavit you testified that she was there three and a half hours.

Approximately three, three and a half hours.

Well, in your affidavit it says, "...which lasted approximately three and a half hours." That isn't right, is it?

Yes, it is right. It is approximately three Α hours and maybe ten minutes, or three hours and seven minutes.

> Three hours and ten minutes? Q

A About that. From about a quarter after 11:00 until about a quarter after 2:00 or ten to 2:00. Around that time.

Now, in your affidavit you stated that "...she accused me of dating Donald Trump in front of my husband..."

Actually did she ask you, according to you, whether you dated Donald Trump, is that right?

A Well, if someone said to you do you date

Donald Trump I guess that is accused.

Q You guess that is accused. And is that what you mean?

- A I assume that is what she meant.
- Q That is your assumption.
- A It is my assumption.

MR. SCHWELB: Thank you.

Now, Miss Goldstein asked you a number of questions, did she not, about the racial composition of different buildings?

A Yes.

Q She asked you how many blacks and how many whites there were in each of them?

A She said what do you think the denominations were. How many do you think were black and how many do you think were white. And I said I didn't know.

GR fls

Q And you inferred from those questions, did you not, that she was accusing you or Trump of discrimination?

A Well, if you had asked me a question like that I would assume that you meant that did we have as many blacks as whites. And I said I didn't know how many of which, you know, were in the building.

(Continued next page.)

1 1 Balistreri - cross - Schwelb  $^{2}$ CROSS-EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. SCHWELB (Cont'd): 4 And you took from that that she -- she was ac-5 cusing you of lying about that? 6 MR. COHN: What? 7 THE WITNESS: Excuse me? 8 MR. COHN: I don't understand. You took from 9 that she was accusing you of lying? 10 MR. SCHWELB: About the racial composition of 11 the building. 12 Did she ask you a lot of questions about it? 13 THE COURT: Do you understand the question? 14 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. Do you want to know 15 what she said about how many blacks and how many whites? 16 MR. SCHWELB: I'll withdraw the question. 17 It was poorly phrased. 18 Now, at the conclusion of your discussion with 19 Miss Goldstein -- strike that, please. 20 At the beginning of your discussion, you had 21a very friendly conversation, didn't you? 22 Α Yes. I was polite to her. 23 She was polite to you? Q 24 Α Yes. 25

GR/rp 2amrl

1	2 Balistreri - cross - Schwelb
2	Q And you offered her a cup of coffee?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And she had it?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And you discussed manicures, I think?
7	A She was discussing manicures. She was looking
8	at her nails and said, "I just had a manicure."
9	Q And you said you couldn't in your line of
10	business?
11	A Yes.
12	Q That was the tone of conversation?
13	A At the beginning.
14	Q When you left, you said, "Goodbye"?
15	A I said, "Goodbye."
16	Q And she said "Goodbye"?
17	A Yes. She was in my place and I wouldn't be
18	rude to her.
19	MR. SCHWELB: I have no further questions of
20	this witness, your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Any redirect?
22	MR. COHEN: May I have just a second?
23	
24	(Continued on next page.)
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1	3 Balistreri - redirect
2	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
3	BY MR. COHN:
4	Q Just one. Did Miss Goldstein say anything to
5	you on the subject of the Government having information
6	about what went on in the Trump organization from
7	MR. SCHWELB: Objection, your Honor. Beyond
8	the scope of the direct.
9	MR. COHN: I think it probably is. I was
10	wondering if I could have your Honor's permission
11	to ask it as an omitted question. I suppose possibly
12	Mr
13	THE COURT: We will see. I'll give you an
14	opportunity for some recross.
15	MR. SCHWELB: All right.
16	THE COURT: Go ahead. I'll let you ask the
17	question.
18	BY MR. COHN:
19	Q Did Miss Goldstein say anything to you about
20	any information about how the Government knew what was
21	going on in the Trump organization?
22	A Yes. She said to me, she said, "You told me
23	that you answered the phone, did you?"
24	I said, "Yes, I answered the phone."
25	She said, "Did you notice when you answered the

1 Balistreri - redirect phone if anyone that was on the phone was Negro?" 2 3 I said, "I really didn't know the difference in the voices." I said, "Why?" 4 She said, "Because you know," she said, "There 5 are tapes," she said, "And we can prove that every 6 incident when a Negro would call, in the background 7 you would say, 'Shoo, shoo,' or 'Hang up on them.'" 8 I said, "I never did that. I never even heard 9 of it." And that's what she said about the tapes. 10 11 I said, "Are you saying that I did this on the tapes?" 12 She said, "Well, you did answer the phone." 13 14 I said, "I didn't always answer the phones." 15 She said, "Do you know of anyone who did this?" 16 I said, "I do not know anything of this. What you're trying to bring out to me?" 17 MR. COHN: I have nothing further. 18 MR. SCHWELB: I don't think any cross on that 19 20 particular allegation is necessary, your Honor. 21 MR. COHN: Well, you --22THE COURT: You may step down. 23 MR. COHN: All right. 24 (Witness excused.) 25 MR. COHN: Mr. Miranda, with your Honor's

1	5	Miranda- direct
2	permiss	sion.
3	THOMAS	MIRANDA, called as a witness
4	having	been first duly sworn by the Clerk of the Court
5	testifi	ed as follows:
6	DIRECT EXAMINA	ATION
7	BY MR. COHN:	
8	Q	Mr. Miranda, do you know Donna Goldstein?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	You saw her here in Court this morning?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	did there come a time when she came to your
13	home?	
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	July of 1974?
16	A	That's right.
17	Q	About how long was she there?
18	A	About one hour and a half, two hours.
19	Q	And when she came in, did you have any discus-
20	sion with her	about on the subject matter of whether you
21	wanted to talk	to her or not?
22	A	Never. She didn't mention that to me.
23	Q	Did you tell her you did not want to be involved
24	in this?	
25	A	I told her I don't want to be involved in this.

1	6 Miranda - direct
2	Q Did she tell you at any time that you did not
3	have to answer her questions?
4	A Never.
5	Q Now, did she ask you questions about discrimin
6	tion in any of the Trump buildings?
7	A She asked questions of discrimination, yes.
8	Q And did she say anything to you about whether
9	or not she was satisfied with your answers?
10	A In the beginning she was not satisfied with
11	my answer, that's right.
12	Q What did she say to you?
13	A Well, she told me that she threatened me
14	with the question of higher authority or jail or whatever it
15	is.
16	MR. SCHWELB: I don't understand the witness,
17	your Honor.
18	MR. COHN: May the answer be read, your Honor?
19	MR. SCHWELB: Can he go more slowly?
20	THE COURT: Let's hear it. Read it back.
21	(Question read.)
22	BY MR. COHN:
23	Q That was in connection with which answers,
24	Mr. Miranda?
25	A In connection with the question I refused to
- 1	1

1	7 Miranda - direct
2	be cooperative in relation with this case. I don't want to
3	be involved.
4	Q Did she press you to say that there had been
5	discrimination at the Trump buildings?
6	A Well, precisely that discrimination Trump
7	building, yes.
8	Q What did you tell her?
9	A No.
0	Q After you had told her there was not, did she
1	keep pushing you on it?
12	A Yes.
13	Q About what point of the interview was the term
14	"jail" used by her?
15	A Well, put it this way. Maybe in the beginning
16	of the conversation that we have.
۱7	Q By the way, you yourself are Puerto Rican; is
18	that correct?
19	A I am Puerto Rican.
20	Q How long did you work for the Trumps?
21	A Two years.
22	MR. COHN: I have nothing further, your Honor.
23	CROSS-EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. SCHWELB:
25	Q Mr. Miranda, you filed an affidavit in this

1	8	Miranda - cross
2	case earlier,	did you not?
3	A	If I file an affidavit in this case?
4	Q. Q.	Yes.
5	A	To whom?
6	Q	You signed a paper which is an affidavit?
7	A	I signed a paper when?
8	Q	And that affidavit was written in legal terms,
9	wasn't it?	
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	You don't understand the legal terms very well;
12	is that right	?
13	A	That's right.
14	Q	Youwere given a chance to make changes but you
15	ddn't know ho	w to make changes on a document in legal terms;
16	is that right	?
17	A	I don't think so. I don't think that they ever
18	mentioned tha	t to me. I saw the affidavit was in good terms
19	and good 1	ooked all right and I signed it.
20	Q	You didn't write it, did you?
21	A	No.
22	Q	Who write it?
23	A	Somebody in the office.
24	Q	What office was that?
25	A	Trump office.

1	9 Miranda - cross
2	Q Thank you.
3	Now, when did you first meet Mr. Cohn?
4	A Mr. Cohn?
5	Q This gentleman here, Mr. Roy Cohn.
6	A Mr. Roy Cohn? I met him over here when I
7	came first for a hearing in the lobby.
8	Q For the deposition; is that right?
9	A Deposition. Whatever you call.
10	Q So you had not met him when you signed your
11	affidavit, had you?
12	A No.
13	Q Now, did you know that as a result of your af-
14	fidavit, Miss Goldstein could get in ver serious trouble?
15	MR. COHN: Your Honor, I object to that.
16	Did he know with respect to his affidavit
17	Miss Goldstein could get into serious trouble?
18	I don't think that's a proper question.
19	THE COURT: I think that objection is well take
20	MR. SCHWELB: If I understand the ground for
21	the objection, your Honor, I could
22	THE COURT: You might inquire whether anyone
23	explained to him why the affidavit was being asked
24	sought, etc.
25	Q Did anybody explain to you why the affidavit

1	10 Miranda - cross	
2	was being taken?	
3	A If anybody well, is quite difficult to answe	r
4	that question.	
5	Q Did anybody explain it to you?	
6	A The result of the the affidavit?	
7	Q Did anybody explain to you	
8	A No.	
9	Q what would be done with the affidavit?	
10	A No.	
11	Q Now, I think this did you go to Mr. Trump's	
12	office after Miss Goldstein came to see you?	
13	A I don't remember if it was the same day or the	
14	following day.	
15	Q Sometime after?	
16	A Yes.	
17	Q You told Mr. Trump, didn't you, you that	
18	Miss Goldstein had interviewed you about this case and it was	
19	his case and not your case?	T-VALUE
20	A I	
21	Q You didn't want to be involved in his lousy case	ė:
22	A That's true.	
23	Q Now, he's a very busy man, is he not?	
24	A Mr. Trump, yes.	
25	Q So he spent only about five or ten minutes with	

	1	11 MITANUA - CIOSS
	2	you; is that right?
	3	A 15 or 20 minutes, more or less.
	4	Q Didn't you testify that it was five or 10 minutes?
	5	A Five, 10 minutes. I don't follow the time.
	6	Q A short time?
	7	A A short time.
	8	Q Now, do you think your affidavit is a fair
	9	summary of everything that happened between you and
	10	Miss Goldstein?
	11	A In this particular case I was looking for protec-
	12	tion.
	13	
IC fols.	14	(Continued on next page.)
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# Miranda - cross/Schwelb

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. SCHWELB: (Cont.)

Q What kind of protection?

A You see, I'm a minority. I have been harassed many, many times in this city. And I need protection when they mention the question of -- in other words, higher authority or somebody else, I was a little scared.

Q Let me just ask you whether you put in your affidavit -- you gave a fair picture of everything that happened at your house that day?

A If I put a fair picture of everything that happened in my house?

Q Right.

Between you and Miss Goldstein.

A It's very difficult. In the first place because I didn't have it for me to -- right at the moment, the second, because it happens a long time ago.

Q All right.

Mr. Miranda, isn't it true that Miss Goldstein called you --

THECOURT: Hold it just a minute. I know the purpose of this was to give him an opportunity to read it.

MR. SCHWELB: I'm sorry, your Honor. I was

authority or something like that.

1	3 Miranda - cross/Schwelb		
2	Q The words were higher authority?		
3	A Yes. Somebody higher in the Department of		
4	Justice.		
5	Q Let me just ask you first, isn't it true that		
6	youtestified and isn't it true that you think she is a nice		
7	girl?		
8	A A nice girl.		
9	Q She wasn't rude to you in her words?		
10	A A nice girl. Doing her job.		
11	Q Her job was to interview you about the Trump		
12	A Yes.		
13	Q The agency?		
14	A Yes.		
15	Q At the end of her doing her job, she asked		
16	you you had coffee and donuts with her, did you not?		
17	A Yes, if I remember.		
18	Q You had a very friendly discussion about Puerto		
19	Rico and the problems of Puerto Ricans, didn't you?		
20	A Yes.		
21	Q And at the end of it you said good bye and she said		
22	good bye and everything was very friendly?		
23	A Of course.		
24	Q As a matter of fact, you she is welcome		
25	to come to your house again, isn't she?		

1	10	Minanda anara (Gabara) b
2	10	Miranda - cross/Schwelb
3	Q	You didn't tell her that?
	A	No.
4	ର	Did you tell that to Miss Goldstein?
5	A	No.
6	Q	Did you ever tell anybody or tell any of the
7	Justice Depart	ment people that about an incident of
8	possible discr	imination with any black family?
9	A	No.
10	Q	Did you ever tell anybody that you had been
11	told that the	management preferred Jews?
12	A	No.
13	Q	Did you tell them that they wanted to keep your
14	place white?	
15	A	No.
16	Q	You didn't tell any of those people any of
17	those things?	
18	A	Any of those things.
19		Now, I think you testified that the affidavit
20	Q	
21		somebody else?
22	A	Yes.
23	ବ	And Miss Goldstein is welcome in your house
	at any time?	
24	A	Yes.
25		

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### Miranda - cross/Schwelb

MR. SCHWELB: Thank you. No further questions.

THE WITNESS: All right.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

### BY MR. COHN:

Q About what point of the interview was the word "jail" used by Miss Goldstein, do you remember?

A Quite difficult but I think -- I believe it was in the beginning of the conversation.

Q Sometime before you telephoned your son to ask what you should do?

A Before, before.

MR. COHN: I have nothing further, your Honor.

MR. SCHWELB: I have nothing further, your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

You may step down, Mr. Miranda.

MR. COHN: May I have just a second, please, your Honor. Your Honor, that's all we have with the exception of the testimony of Cecilmans who we could not get today.

I will not call Mr. Browman in view of Miss -subject to confirmation of Miss Goldstein's statement
that that incident took place after the date of our
motion. That's it. Then we will rest. Subject to

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# Miranda - cross/Schwelb

the --

MR. SCHWELB: Could I have about a three-minute conference with Mr. Cohn?

We may be able to resolve this sand unclog the calendar.

THE COURT: Yes, certainly.

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MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I might say that no excuse has been furnished by defendant for not producing his witnesses.

MR. COHN: I'll give a good excuse.

Mr. Schwelb has sent marshals around and I know your Honor's patience gets a little tried with all of this because it is not in the direct issue here.

Miss Falcone had the pleasure of three different sets of marshals going around at hours up to 12:20 in the morning, serving three subpoenas, two of them with incorrect dates, one of them which she had to change in longhand calling for her to be here on October 29th, next week, instead of today, when I had told -- said, and she had explained she was available on a phone call to be over in this courtroom whenever her testimony was desired.

MR. SCHWELB: This has something to do with the Zisselman's?

MR. COHN: Yes. As far as the Zisselman's are concerned, I tried to treat them with as much courtesy as I could. When your Honor had a calendar problem, I had a calendar problem, and the Court of Appeals, the date had to be changed. I contacted the Zisselman's who had switched around their programs and could not come today.

I said to them, "If I subpoena you, could I get you?" They said "Now that you have told us that, you cannot get us with a subpoena. We just can't be there. We can come on a few days' notice."

Mr. Schwelb has made a proposal I might be able to agree to.

We have these affidavits of the Zisselman's.

He apparently suggesting that we take -- I thought the first affidavits and stipulate that they would so testify. Now I think he's having second thoughts and only wants one of the affidavits, and not the other.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor --

MR. COHN: If his offer is both, I accept it. In order to expedite and conclude this hearing, I would stipulate that if the Zisselman's were here, their testimony would be in accordance with these affidavits.

MR. SCHWELB: Let me take a couple of minutes on that, your Honor. I never offered him anything. I suggested that might be a possibility, to save some time. That's all.

Let me study it right now and we'll determine it.
THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I will stipulate as to Mr. Cohn's proposal, that Mr. and Mrs. Zisselman will testify in accordance with their affidavits. They

3 1 weren't affidavits. They were signed statements. 2 MR. COHN: Should I have them marked now, your 3 Honor? Or read them in or have them marked? 4 THE COURT: You can have them marked as your 5 exhibits, if you wish. 6 MR. COHN: Thank you. 7 Paul and Paula Zisselman. 8 THE CLERK: That's Paul Zisselman marked defen-9 dant's Exhibit A in evidence. 10 (So marked.) 11 THE CLERK: The other one is Paula Zisselman 12 marked Defandant's Exhibit B in evidence. 13 (So marked.) 14 MR. COHN: We rest, your Honor. 15 MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, I move at this time 16 to dismiss the contempt proceedings against Miss Goldstein and against the United States, the proceedings 17 for an order against the United States, on the grounds 18 that the defendant didn't make anything approaching the 19 kind of proof required, if the Court considers the 20 21 credible evidence heard. 22 THE COURT: All right. May I see that? They 23 haven't been marked yet? 24 THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, Mr. Cohn,

I think it's -- it's an abuse of power on the part of the Government and I think it's violative of the rights of a defendant, first of all, when there is a case in progress, a case containing a serious charge, a charge which the defendant stoutly resists.

When there has been an order of the Court which further expands the complaint and clarifies the issue by putting the defendants on notice, what they are to meet, when it's a priority case for trial and after those stages, when the Government -- when with the knowledge and I would submit the collaboration of the Government, the Urban League or any other agency, is permitted to and does send in a -- and furnish information to the Government periods outside the time in the complaint or the particulars filed an undercover tester around the Trump buildings, with a lot of attendant circumstances that is improper conduct on the part of a prosecutor.

I would ask your Honor's leave on that to submit a little law. IT won't take me very long because I've been through that issue in another forum on differing circumstances recently.

The second phase of the motion, your Honor, is this. As is apparent from the testimony before you, this did not come -- we probably haven't scratched the

who sends the boys out to do the job. I think that supervision and control should certainly extend to telling them to call witnesses within -- this is a civil rights case and these former employees are not being charged with murder 1 and I think that there is certainly ground rules of courtesy and hours which not telling them not to go around to homes at 10:00, 11:00, 12:00 at night, which -- I just think that the better housekeeping job can be done by the --

MR. SCHWELB: Is he entitled to make references in this closing argument to things completely outside the record, that in my judgement are not true and have nothing to do with his original motion and didn't happen in relation to anything he complained about?

MR. COHN: Your Honor --

MR. SCHWELB: I object.

(Continued on next page.)

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GRrp 2amr4&5 MR. COHN: What is not in the record?

MR. SCHWELB: About what these FBI agents went in the middle of the night.

THE COURT: I would have to agree with Mr. Schwelb, that outside of a request by his office -- section, to the FBI to conduct such a request. I find no evidence in the record that anything of the nature of Gestapo tactics was permitted by the FBI in doing the tasks assigned to them.

I consider that an extraordinary charge to make about an agency which, in my view, has always acted in respect even of criminal, with the utmost politeness and respect for the rules and laws of this country.

MR. COHN: Let me say this, Judge Neaher.

As far as the FBI is concerned, nobody has been a better friend of the FBI than I have. I agree with you completely. I have written that publicly, magazines, books, newspaper articles, and I think they consider me such.

But I will say this to your Honor. I think it is way out of line, in a civil rights' case, for agents to be at potential witnesses' homes.

THE COURT: Well, I will have to take judicial notice of the fact that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation is precisely that. It investigates not only the ivolations of the laws of the United States but it acts as the investigating arm of the Department of Justice in purely civil matters. And this is the first time it has ever been brought to my attention that anyone has charged an FBI agent or agents in a civil matter with some kind of conduct that could be described as storm trooper or Gestapotype conduct.

MR. COHN: Your Honor.

THE COURT: I have found no evidence in the record to sustain such a charge and I think the charge is utterly without foundation.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, we're going from A to B here. The charge in this contempt proceeding is not against the FBI.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. COHN: I have never brought a charge against the FBI in my life. I have personal reasons why I haven't and I never would. My relationship is much too close.

THE COURT: There is no evidence in this record.

MR. COHN: Fine.

THE COURT: Other than the making of a request in regular course to the FBI, giving names of persons

the department wishes to have interviewed in connection with a particular matter.

MR. COHN: Okay.

THE COURT: The FBI is supposed to be well trained, professional, and the assumption or presumption would be that based upon their own schedule of assignments and work to be done, they went out, perhaps late in the evening, because their agents are oftentimes required to work late in the evening in order to get matters performed, oftentimes because people aren't even approachable during the daytime hours. No one at home and so forth. However, whatever the time, as I say, there is nothing here that in my judgment would warrant any contempt or other action by this Court on the basis of the proof shown here.

It is perfectly obvious that some former employees were approached, were interviewed or attempted to be interviewed. Presumably for one reason or another, they did not turn out to be willing witnesses, which is understable in some certain situations such as one of this kind. But I hardly find it a basis for critisizing the actions of the plaintiff's attorneys.

I feel that nothing here would amount to any

reason why this Court should condemn them or punish them or censure them for what was done here. And that is my ruling in this matter, and I therefore grant the Government's motion to strike this application from the record.

MR. COHN: All right.

Your Honor, may I have two points?

THE COURT: In toto.

MR. COHN: May I have two points on that?

I'd like it -- I'd like the point clarified concerning
the FBI. That that allegation was not made.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohn, you and I don't have to argue.

MR. COHN: Okay.

THE COURT: It is unnecessary, I assure you.

MR. COHN: Okay. Fine.

THE COURT: Now, what I am interested in is, the progress of this case, I remember referring it to the Magistrate for purposes of discovery specification.

Is this going along or --

MR. COHN: The Magistrate ruled that at that time that all discovery would terminate by September 1, 1974.

He commented in making the ruling, he though there had been -- a priority case under the statute and he thought there had probably been too much

discovery already.

There had been 13 depositions taken at that time. He gave the Government -- we took no depositions. We engaged in no discovery.

He gave the Government a period of weeks to schedule more and gave them some ground rules about the facts of not calling a lot of ex-employees who didn't -- couldn't understand the law behind the defendants. He was more interested in what would be admissible in a Courtroom and all of that.

After having set the ground rules, the Government then noticed another bunch of depositions, I think six or seven or eight, something in that number. All of those except one witness who was excused by the Government, sick or something, were produced by us, exactly as noticed by the Government, and we now have some, I believe, 20 depositions, all of which have been completed and the -- and were completed prior to the cut-off date of September 1st.

In addition thereto, Judge Catoggio ordered certain records to be turned over. We had turned some over once before and we turned them over again, plus additional records and all of that was completed by September 1, 1974.

The only item that could conceivably be regarded

New York or elsewhere?

MR. SCHWELB: Almost all of the New York, I think.

> MISS GOLDSTEIN: Yes.

MR. COHN: I'm going to ask your Honor for two rulings here. I heard what your Honor said about the contempt motion. I might respectfully disagree, which I guess is my prerogative and I know. your Honor has the ball when it comes to making a decision.

Be it a civil case, and let's assume a civil case is even more than a criminal case, I have never seen anything like this in a discovery period. don't think I should be met with phone calls every day about undercover agents going around to the buildings while I'm trying to get this case ready.

MR. SCHWELB: I object to that for the leighteenth time, your Honor.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, they didn't -- they didn't prepare this case before they filed the complaint. They're doing it now and I'm paying for it.

What I'm interested in is responding to your Honor's inquiry. Are we going to trial November 25th? How much longer are we going to get hit by them with new areas, new things, not mentioned in the complaint

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and not mentioned in the interrogatories, based upon which we have or have not taken our discovery, based upon which 20 depositions and carloads of records have been turned over?

When is there going to be -- when Judge Catoggio ruled that the end came, September 1, 1974, I do not understand why in October, 1974, this -- your Honor having set a trial date, it is a statute requirement in a priority case, why we're still talking about these things.

MR. SCHWELB: Can I answer why we are, your Honor?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHWELB: I think your Honor will recall that we had considerable difficulty in discovery.

Discovery was to be over by September the 1st. That was a ruling that Mr. Catoggio -- Magistrate Catoggio made.

Part of that discovery was to look at their records which got us the names of their former employees. We asked for them late in -- the fall of 1973. We never got them.

Now, finally, we've gotten them. For that reason I think that your Honor would agree with us that it is our responsibility to interview them, to

determine what facts they have. And we've interviewed them.

As soon as we get information we supplement our answers to interrogatories. It is our responsibility to do it.

Mr. Cohn is talking about this case being in a hurry, and we're delaying it, is something that boggles the mind.

If you recall the fate of the interrogatories, the fact that they didn't answer them, they didn't object to them. Then after they did answer them, they answered them about a page and a half.

I come -- I've come up here any number of time to be met with a proposition that depositions can't be held. Mr. Cohn is in Cohn against Cohn, Jones against Jones, or whatever it is he's in. He's the only attorney who can represent them.

With due respect, we want to move as quickly as possible and we've asked to move as quickly as possible, but we do discovery and get names, we have a right to interview them and use them so the Court can have the entire truth. And that's what we're trying to do.

With the new information, I believe that we have an excellent case when we started with admission

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of discriminatory policy, with incidents about seven or eight definite buildings and with statements by their agents how they don't want to rent to blacks, we had some former employee proof.

Now, as a result of discovery which often happens, we've got a great deal more. We want to give it to your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand that you want to prepare your case thoroughly but I think Mr. Cohn has a point about there having to be some cut-off date, when he can feel confident that the matter has come to an end. as far as trial preparation is concerned. You understand?

MR. SCHWELB: Yes, your Honor. I think he's entitled to that.

THE COURT: It's very unsettling to believe that you're dealing with a case that is shaped like this, only to find that it is now grown to something like this (indicating).

MR. SCHWELB: You see --

THE COURT: At the last minute.

MR. SCHWELB: Your Honor, with respect, that date, as to when the cut-off must come, must bear some relation to when we were given our rights of discovery.

We've moved with considerable dispatch in looking at his records.

THE COURT: The whole purpose of referring it to the Magistrate, though, was to make sure that all these matters could be ironed out and I had the impression from what you said a little while ago that these had been.

Did I misunderstand?

MR. SCHWELB: I think -- I didn't realize we were in conflict except I advised your Honor, because I think I have a responsibility, too.

We have additional interviews and we want to amend our answers to interrogatories.

THE COURT: They are not deposition matters?

MR. SCHWELB: We don't want to take their

depositions. In other words, we've interviewed a

number of people. A number of those people have

additional evidence to what we had before.

We want to -- we have not yet disclosed that to Mr. Cohn because we only just recently got it and the reason we just got it is because we had an investigation by the FBI based on the records he gave us, I think, in August. I may be wrong.

THE COURT: August of '74?

MR. SCHWELB: Yes. And I may be wrong about

the date. I'm not positive. But in any event, it takes a certain amount of time for them to interview these people and we're move -- I give your Honor my word that we're moving with the utmost dispatch on it.

MR. COHN: Maybe I could clarify this.

Our position simply is going to be this.

We're trying this case based on the allegations of the complaint, as clarified by the answers to the interrogatories filed in answer to your Honor's direction.

I am going to object just as strenuously
as Mr. Schwelb did when I tried to get over and your
Honor upheld him over July 26th on this contempt
motion this morning, to anything that comes after the
dates charged in the complaint in this case.

In other words, the complaint in this case does not charge what Miss Busch from the Urban League says someone indicated to her about a current situation in July, 1974.

The complaint in this case charges up to

October, 1973, and that's what I am prepared to meet,

based upon the specifics, all of which relate to

events prior to the date of the filing of the complaint.

So I am going to object at the trial to the admission

complaint which is all we are called upon --what we 2 are called upon to meet in this case. 3 I think what Mr. Schwelb is saying to your 4 5 Honor is this. He wants to file supplemental interro-6 gatories. Answers to interrogatories. 7 MR. SCHWELB: MR. COHN: Answers to interrogatories, to 8 expand what he says he now has. So that when the day 9 of the trial comes, he will try to offer those in 10 11 evidence. 12 I don't care if he does that, if he wants to 13 serve me with any supplemental anything, without 14 delaying the trial and without taking more depositions. 15 God bless him, let him do it. 16 THE COURT: Are more depositions contemplated? 17 MR. SCHWELB: Not by us. 18 MR. COHN: No objection to that at all. 19 At the trial I will reserve my right to object 20 to the offering of any proof. 21 THE COURT: I would suggest in that case 22 that both of you pay some attention to inform the Court 23 on legal authority with respect to that. 24 MR. SCHWELB: We will do that. 25 THE COURT: Ordinarily I would view this as

of anything that goes beyond the charge made in this

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any equity type action, where the complaint would speak as of the time and injunction was to be granted, if one were to be. That's not a pre-judgement.

I am simply saying that --

MR. COHN: Of course not.

THE COURT: It isn't like the normal situation where you're dealing with the legal rights and relations growing out of something that occurred in the past, a breach of contract or that sort of thing.

This is a -- well, I suppose it's in a certain sense civil enforcement of a statute type ligitation, where the claim is pattern of discrimination, and I suppose to the extent that the Government proves it, whether it be by evidence which was developed after the complaint was filed or evidence which they had in their possession before it was filed, they're talking about, of course, a past pattern of discrimination.

But what they consider an existing pasttern of discrimination which is why they're asking or will ask I'm sure for a form of injunctive relief.

So I suggest therefore that you have that in mind if your going to make a point of it at the trial so that I'll have the benefit of your --

MR. COHN: Thank you. I would have very much in mind the fact that there is nothing about a civil

rights case that a -- raises it to some kind of position over ordinary litigation and litigants to the point that -- that I have to meet evidence up until a date months after the filing of a complaint and evidence of which I have not been advised and given the opportunity to meet.

I think -- and I understand your Honor wants law on that. I hope we will be able to furnish it.

Maybe I'm wrong. I find out every day I'm wrong on things.

THE COURT: As I said, I prefer not to delay the trial of this case. If we have to suspend the trial to give you an opportunity to interview some of these people, we may have to do that. I don't know.

MR. COHN: Could I ask your Honor -- through
your Honor's good offices now, when does Mr. Schwelb
intend to give me his -- the final statement he talked
about?

MR. SCHWELB: We certainly -- your Honor,
we'll certainly give them a substantial one this coming
week. I'd like to consult with my operating counsel
here as to whether the thing is over.

I believe that the FBI investigation is either over or almost over. We have a substantial number that we got in -- last four or five days, that we

1	21	THE COURT: Well, I think I'll let it stand.
2		MR. COHN: The final word? I don't dispute
3		anything that
4		THE COURT: The Government never has to pay
5		costs so I even things up by denying them costs
6		now and then.
7		MR. SCHWELB: I thought this particular motion
8		had a particular characteristic but I abide by your
9		Honor's ruling.
10		MR. COHN: Your Honor asked us for law. We
11		will furnish it to you.
12		In response to Mr. Schwelb's last statement,
13		I think a charge of violation of the civil rights
14		laws is seriously when the people against whom it
15		is made do not violate the civil rights law and
16		that's why it is interesting in this case that it is
17		the defendant who has been asking for the priority
18		trial date, not the Government.
19		We are ready to meet it and no matter what
20		Mr. Schwelb wants to file next week, we're not going
21		to ask for a minute's delay in this trial.
22	£.	THE COURT: All right.
23		MR. SCHWELB: Thank you.
24		MR. COHN: Thank you. November 25th, that will
25		be this Courtroom?

\* \* \* \*

THE COURT: November 25th is still the date.


# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	NOV 1 4 1974
Plaintiff,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529
v.	)
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	) SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES
Defendants.	)

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney hereby supplements its Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories.

# Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 1 and 2

- 1. The following information constitutes evidence that defendants through their agents or employees have made apartments unavailable on account of race in the following ways:
  - (a) Mr. Kalman Biczo, 588 West End Avenue, New York, N. Y. a former employee of defendants, was superintendent at Laurence Gardens in 1971. Biczo states that at or about the time a black tenant was being evicted, the superindent at the Trump apartment building opposite Laurence Gardens, believed to be Laurence Towers, whose



name was Frank (last name unrecalled), advised him that he would be better off not renting to blacks, indicating that when you rent to blacks you run into trouble. A short time later, Biczo was relieved of rental responsibilities at Laurence Gardens and these responsibilities were assigned to Frank.

(b) Mr. and Mrs. Harold Zimmerman (current address unknown). Mr. and Mrs. Zimmerman who are caucasion are former tenants at Kendall Hall Apartments. The Zimmerman's moved from Kendall Hall early 1970. At or about the time they were planning to move from Kendall Hall, Mrs. Spitrey who was the wife of the Superintendent and who served as a rental agent, told the Zimmermans not to inform their neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Walarsky, that they were moving, since the Walarsky's had black friends who were interested in renting at the apartment house.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELB NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys, Housing Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

#### AFFIDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON	)	
	)	SS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	)	

- I, Donna Goldstein, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section,
  Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice,
  and one of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v.

  Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. I am informed of the facts of this case. The foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this // of November 1974.

NOTARY PURITC

My Commission expires:

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 11, 1974, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories were placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to counsel for the defendants:

> Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> > DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953)

(212) 472 - 1400

Thomas A. Bolan

COUNSEL

ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL

HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN

November 16, 1974 Course D. N.Y

NOV 1 9 1974 TIME A.M.....

P.M. 1529

Hon. Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Court House Foley Square New York, New York 10007

Dear Judge Neaher:

When we last appeared before Your Honor, it was brought to Your Honor's attention that the case now bore stamped resemblance to the original allegation contained in the complaint and to their specification by the Civil Rights Section's responses last January, 1974, amplifying the complaint by listing the specific locations and incidents already called upon to me at the trial. Extensive depositions of the people involved in the listed incidents and others in the Trump management were taken - all by the government, none by us, as we were anxious to expedite this trial. Discovery was terminated by Magistrate Cattagio on September 1, 1974, and we moved the case for trial by communicating with Your Honor's chambers.

However, thereafter, the government served a whole new set of amended or additional answers to the ten month old answers to interrogatories. From these it appeared that right during the taking of discovery, the government was going around trying to bolster its case by the use, among other techniques, of undercover tester agents of the Urban League, in an attempt to entrap (albeit substantially unsuccessfully) certain employees of the defendants.

This new slew of answers to interrogatories and alleged incidents obviously produced an entirely new list of alleged incidents, some within a few weeks of the September set of new answers to interrogatories. Nevertheless, we persisted in our attempt to have this case disposed of promptly.



Caxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

Hon. Edward R. Neaher November 16, 1974 Page Two

When we appeared before Your Honor in October, we were told, for the first time, that the government intended to file still another set of answers to the January, 1974 interrogatories, containing still additional incidents. We advised the Court that without a cut-off date it would be impossible to have the prompt trial to which we are all entitled, and to have substantial justice done with an opportunity on our part to meet allegations - which we thought governed the period to the date of the filing of the complaint - in a monitoring current spy network operating around our units.

It was then and there represented to Your Honor that a final set of new answers would be submitted the next week. They were not. Some time after the promised date there was submitted an entirely new list of answers containing previously uncharged and unspecified alleged incidents.

This letter was supposed to end here, but after I started preparing it, and on yesterday, November 15, 1974, we received still another new set of allegations and specifications.

In view of this amazing conduct on the part of the government, we now have no choice but to reluctantly request Your Honor to adjourn the trial date of November 25, 1974, which was fixed at our instance and opposed by the government, and to ask for the re-opening of discovery so that we may examine witnesses involved in incidents of which we have been notified since the date discovery was ordered concluded - September 1, 1974. We also request that Your Honor formally fix the November 15, 1974 additional allegations by the government as the final cut-off date prior to trial for the filing of such new allegations, so the period between now and whatever the trial date Your Honor sees fit to fix after November 25, 1974, may be used for the preparation of a case of which we have been notified, and can be prepared to meet.

If Your Honor feels a conference is required as a result of this letter, we are, of course, available at your convenience.

Respectfully,/

Noy M. Cohn

sb

cc: Mr. Frank Schwelb

CIS:HAB:gp F. 730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

 $G \subset D_{k}^{(2)}(\mathbb{R}^{2},\mathbb{Q}) \setminus \mathbb{Q}(k) \longrightarrow Y(k)$  $-x^{2/3}$  NOV 2 0 1974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

TIMPLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES

-against-

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned, submits the following supplementary answer to defendants' interrogatories.

1. On or about June 14, 1972, George Sim Johnston, 131 E. 69th Street, New York, N.Y., an employee of The Urban League, conferred with Mr. Louis Sarnell, a rental agent employed by the defendants at the Shorehaven comples. Sarnell informed Johnston that the neighborhood was safe, in part, because there were no blacks in the immediate area or words to that effect. Sarnell also indicated that "people who make trouble" implying blacks, were kept in a specific area in the community and that at Shorehaven, Johnston would be safe from those persons.

2. On or about July 31, 1972, Godfrey Jacobs, 2401 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y., a black tester from the Urban League spoke to Mr. Abe Rosenberg, a rental agent of the defendants at the Beachaven complex to inquire about renting a one-bedroom apartment that was advertised in the New York Times on or about July 24, 1972. Jacobs was told that nothing was available. A few minutes later George Sim Johnston, white, inquired about renting a one-bedroom apartment and was shown the apartment and informed that he could rent it.

Dated: Brooklyn, N.Y. November 20, 1974

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney

Department of Justice

man G Coliber

Washington, D.C.

# VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK	)	
	)	ss.
COUNTY OF KINGS	)	

- I, Norman P. Goldberg, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. I am informed of the facts of this case. The foregoing Plaintiff's Supplementary Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

Sworn to before me this 20th day of November 1974

(Velyn Jommer) EVELYN SOMMER Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-4502158
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 19 7 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEC 3 1974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	)
v. FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	) ) ) ) SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER
Defendants.	) TO DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES )

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney hereby submits the following supplemental answer to defendants' interrogatories. In addition, plaintiff submits a correction to an answer previously submitted.

#### Supplemental Answer

Mr. Saul Blate, 49 Nixon Court, Brooklyn, New York, is a white tenant currently residing in the defendants' Beachaven Complex. Sometime in late 1970, Mr. Blate went to the defendants' Beachaven rental office to inquire about moving to a larger apartment. While at the office, the rental agent, name unknown, observed through a window some black people walking near the office. The agent stated to Blate that "we" do not want to rent to blacks or words to that effect. The agent then proceeded to pull the window shade down indicating to Blate that he wanted to give the appearance that the office was closed.

#### Corrected Answer

Reference is made to Item 1(i) contained in Plaintiff's Supplemental Answer served on November 4, 1974. The portion of the Answer referring to a discriminatory statement made by Carlos Zeller to Adolpho Gomez should be changed as follows:

According to Gomez, Zeller informed Gomez that Trump Management did not want to rent to blacks. Zeller further advised Gomez that when blacks inquired about renting apartments Zeller informed them that there were no vacancies in order to implement the defendants' discriminatory policy.

Respectfully submitted,

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

#### AFFIDAVIT

CITY OF WASHINGTON	)	
	)	SS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	)	

- I, Norman P. Goldberg, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- I am informed of the facts of this case. foregoing Plaintiff's Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Interrogatories is true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this of November, 1974.

My Commission expires: January 31,1977

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November (1974, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Interrogatories were placed in the United States mail, postage, prepaid, addressed to counsel for the defendants:

Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 CIS:HAB:gp F. 730959

> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

- - - - - - x

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:00 A.M. on the 12th day of December, 1974 at the Office of the United States Attorney, 225 Cadman Plaza East, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action will take the deposition of Adolpho Gomez, as a witness, upon oral examination, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a Notary Public, or before some other officer authorized by law to take depositions. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine. A Spanish interpreter will be present.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York December 4, 1974

Yours, etc.

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Kacher

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

By:

Assistant U.S. Attorney 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 (212) 596-3563

TO:

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 East 68th Street New York, N.Y. 10021

IN T	THE UNITED  EASTERN	STATES DISTRICT OF	CICT COURT	FOR THE SECTION COURTED. N	
TES C	OF AMERICA,	)		TIME A.M	

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

P.M...

Plaintiff,

OCIVIL ACTION

NO. 73 CIV 1529

V.

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Defendants.

INTERROGATORIES

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, by its undersigned attorney hereby submits the following supplemental answer to defendants' interrogatories.

#### Supplemental Answer

On or about August 17, 1972, Mr. Godfrey Jacobs, a black male who is associated with the Open Housing Center, went to the Trump apartment complex located 3323 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn, to inquire about renting a studio or one-bedroom apartment, which had been advertised in the <a href="New York Times">New York Times</a> on that day. Mr. Jacobs was informed by the rental agent that neither was available for rent.

Mr. George Sim Johnston, III, a white male associated with the Open Housing Center, went into the rental office of

120 H/19/24

(65)

3323 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn, a few minutes after Jacobs departed in order to inquire about renting a studio or onebedroom apartment. Johnston was informed that the apartments were available for rent.

Respectfully submitted,

DONNA GOLDSTEIN Attorney Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

#### **AFFIDAVIT**

CITY OF WASHINGTON	)
	) ss
DISTRICT OF COLUMBI	A )

- I, Donna Goldstein, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney in the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, and one of the counsel for plaintiff in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Fred C</u>.

  <u>Trump</u>, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529.
- 2. I am intormed of the facts of this case. The foregoing Plaintiff's Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Interrogatories is true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN
Attorney, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  $17^{th}$  day of December, 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: 648 Commission Expires June 14, 1977

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 17, 1974, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Interrogatories were placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to counsel for the defendants:

Mr. Roy M. Cohn, Esq.
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan
& Manley
39 E. 68th Street
New York, New York 19021

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

### United States department of justice



WARRINGTON, D.C. MERS

Address Forth to the Models to March 1 March 1

FEB 181975

The Honorable Edward R. Neaher U.S. District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Gadman Plaza E. Brooklyn, New York 10023

E.S. DISTRICT COUNT ELECTRIC

FEB 21: 1975

Re: U.S. v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73C1529

EME AM.....

Dear Judge Neaher:

I am writing to request an early conference with the Court so that a consent decree, which has been agreed upon in principle, can be entered as soon as possible.

As the Court is aware, the parties have agreed to a settlement of the above-styled action on the terms contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, executed on January 20, 1975 and submitted to the Court on January 21, 1975, and the proposed consent decree which is attached thereto, which may be modified only as described in the memorandum. The memorandum provides that the parties shall seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any disagreements as to meaning, and that all provisions not in dispute as to meaning shall be contained in their entirety in the final consent decree.

Because of the delays previously encountered in this action, including the postponement of two trial dates, and the requirement for expedition contained in 42 U.S.C. §3614, the



(66)

Memorandum of Understanding contains a timetable for final execution of the decree. Under the terms of the memorandum, if no final decree has been executed by February 14, 1975, "the parties shall then seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any dispute arising solely out of disagreement as to the meaning of any proposed change referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding."

Shortly after the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding, Plaintiff forwarded to defense counsel a proposed consent decree containing the provisions previously agreed upon. Several attempts to contact Mr. Cohn, both before and after the Pebruary 14 deadline, have gone unanswered, and, no decree has therefore been executed. Accordingly, we are writing to request that a meeting with the Court be scheduled in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding, so that the settlement can be made final and the consent decree promptly entered. Thank you for your consideration.

## Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

Frank E. Schwell

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief Housing Section



#### United States Department of Justice

WASHINGTON, D.C. MCM

Address Reply to the
Elicides Indianosid
out Refer in Indian and Number

JSP:FES:DG:sas DJ 175-52-20 FEB 181975

The Honorable Edward R. Neaher U.S. District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza E. Brooklyn, New York 10023

> Re: U.S. v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73C1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

I am writing to request an early conference with the Court so that a consent decree, which has been agreed upon in principle, can be entered as soon as possible.

As the Court is aware, the parties have agreed to a settlement of the above-styled action on the terms contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, executed on January 20, 1975 and submitted to the Court on January 21, 1975, and the proposed consent decree which is attached thereto, which may be modified only as described in the memorandum. The memorandum provides that the parties shall seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any disagreements as to meaning, and that all provisions not in dispute as to meaning shall be contained in their entirety in the final consent decree.

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Shortly after the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding, Plaintiff forwarded to defense counsel a proposed consent decree containing the provisions previously agreed upon. Several attempts to contact Mr. Cohn, both before and after the Pebruary 14 deadline, have gone unanswered, and, no decree has therefore been executed. Accordingly, we are writing to request that a meeting with the Court be scheduled in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding, so that the settlement can be made final and the consent decree promptly entered. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

Bv:

Frank E. Schwell

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief Housing Section

### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CLERK

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

U. S. COURT HOUSE

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11201

February 20, 1975

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, N.Y. 10021

Encl.

cc: Frank E. Schwelb, Esq. U.S. Attorney - E.D.M.7.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -against-73 C 1529 FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENTS, INC., U.S. District Country Defendants. -----x FEB 2 1010 TIME 1 M .....

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Pursuant to a letter from plaintiff's counsel dated February 18, 1975, requesting the scheduling of a meeting with the court in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, dated January 20, 1975, and filed with the court in the above-captioned action, and good cause appearing therefor, it is

ORDERED that counsel for the parties appear in chambers, Room 252, at 10:00 a.m. on March 5, 1975, for the purposes as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Edward R. Healer

P.13.....

Dated: Brooklyn, New York February 20, 1975

# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAY 8 1975

Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number JSP:FES:dcr
DJ 175-52-11

U. S. DISTRICT COURT

TIME A.M.....

P.M....

Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East New York, New York 11201

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.,

C.A. No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

We are writing to you to respond to your law clerk's inquiry about the status of this case and to request the assistance of the Court once again to implement a settlement of the above-styled lawsuit, previously agreed to by the parties. Despite painstaking and time-consuming efforts by my colleagues and myself to complete the settlement through telephone conversations with Mr. Cohn and lengthy conferences with his clients, we have been unable to reach a final resolution of this matter.

As the Court is aware, on January 20, 1975, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding, attached hereto as Appendix A, incorporating a proposed Consent Order and specifically outlining the terms of a settlement. That Memorandum is on file with the Court. It was only because of the execution of this document, and the representation contained therein that the lawsuit had been settled, that the plaintiff agreed to the adjournment of the second trial date of January 27, 1975. In fact, in the Memorandum the parties agreed to the entry of the Consent Order on or before February 24, 1975. In addition, the Memorandum provides (starting on the bottom of page 3):



If no final consent has been executed by February 14, 1975, the parties shall so inform the Court. The parties shall then seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any disputes arising solely out of disagreement as to the meaning of any proposed change referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding. All other provisions in the attached Consent Decree and those not in dispute as to meaning in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be contained in their entirety in the final Consent Decree.

On February 4, 1975, a copy of a proposed Consent Order (attached hereto as Appendix B) based on the settlement outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding was forwarded to Mr. Roy Cohn, defendants' counsel. We were unable to contact Mr. Cohn to agree on the terms of a settlement, and we wrote to this Court on February 18, 1975, seeking a conference. The Court scheduled a conference for March 5, 1975, which was later cancelled by reason of the Court's illness.

Thereafter, Mr. Cohn forwarded to this office a proposed Consent Order which omitted many of the major provisions of the settlement terms agreed to in the January 20th Memorandum. (A copy of this proposal is attached hereto as Appendix C.) On March 14, we wrote Mr. Cohn a letter, a copy of which is attached as Appendix D, indicating that we believed the terms of the settlement had been fixed by the Memorandum of Understanding filed in this Court and that we therefore found the defendants' proposal completely unacceptable. On April 15, 1975, after we had again encountered substantial difficulties in finding anyone with whom to deal, defendant Fred C. Trump, and his colleague Mr. Irving Eskanazi came to Washington to meet with counsel for plaintiff, \*/ without their counsel but with his consent, to

<sup>\*/</sup> This meeting took place only after Mr. Cohn twice cancelled scheduled conference calls between him, defendant Donald Trump, and counsel for the United States which were supposed to resolve the controversy once and for all. Subsequently, Mr. Cohn advised counsel that defendant Donald Trump would come to Washington to negotiate, but his father and Mr. Eskanazi came instead.

discuss the terms of the final Consent Order. Despite our often stated position that we had negotiated in good faith the terms of a settlement which we considered binding on the parties by the signed Memorandum of Understanding, all three counsel for plaintiff spent half a day with Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi, and Ms. Goldstein spent the remainder of the day with Mr. Eskanazi, working out what we understood to be a final settlement. It was the understanding of all concerned that Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi were negotiating for all defendants. A meeting was arranged for April 23 to take place in New York for the purpose of executing the settlement and on April 19, 1975, a last proposed Consent Order which set forth the precise understanding between Ms. Goldstein and Mr. Eskanazi, was sent to Mr. Cohn. A copy of that document is attached hereto as Appendix E.

On April 22, Mr. Cohn informed us by telephone that he now wished to make new changes in the terms of the settlement. These proposed changes were represented to us as being "minor", and, despite some misgivings, a meeting was scheduled in New York for May 2, 1975 for the purpose of working out these minor changes and executing a final consent decree for presentation to this Court. On May 2, 1975 Ms. Goldstein met with Mr. Fred Trump and Mr. Irving Eskanazi at the law offices of defendants' counsel. Mr. Cohn was again not present. Defendants proposed several new changes, and several were conditionally agreed to by plaintiff even though they were inconsistent with the Memorandum of Understanding. Defendants also made new proposals, however, which in our judgment would have changed the character of the settlement and seriously impaired the effectiveness of the Decree, and to which we were unable to agree.

Specifically defendants now propose to delete provisions, previously agreed to, dealing with the inclusion of fair housing statements in advertising [see III A(3) p. 8 of Appendix B (the

Proposed Consent Order pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding) and Section IV A(3) p. 8 of Appendix E (the Proposed Consent Order drafted pursuant to the April 15 meeting)], and with affirmative steps to ensure equal employment opportunity (see III C p. 11 of Appendix B \*/ and IV C p. 10 of Appendix E). In the Memorandum of Understanding agreed to on January 20, 1975, (Appendix A) and in the settlement negotiated with Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi (Appendix E), the Injunction, including the affirmative provisions, applied to all of defendants' properties in New York City. \*\*/ The reporting provisions (part V, p. 15 Appendix B, and part VI, p. 17, Appendix E) were to apply to fifteen properties. \*\*\*/ Defendants now propose, contrary to the explicit provisions of prior agreements, that the affirmative provisions of the Decree (see part III of Appendix B and part IV of Appendix E) apply only to those properties listed in the reporting provisions. This proposal is inconsistent with what has been previously settled and makes the decree far less effective in ensuring the full enjoyment of equal housing opportunity. While we have, at defendants' request, agreed to a number of changes in the January 20th Memorandum of Understanding, even though defense counsel had then represented it to be a final settlement, we cannot agree to the three most recent proposals. Defendants apparently take the position that without these new alterations, all three at odds with what they have previously signed, they will not execute a consent decree as they have previously committed themselves to doing.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{*}{}$  At the May 2 meeting, plaintiff conditionally agreed to delete III C(1) of the decree.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Brennan v. Fields, 488 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1974) for the propriety of relief at complexes other than those at which the alleged discrimination occurred. In Fields, nationwide relief was granted, whereas here, we negotiated affirmative provisions applicable only to New York, and not affecting defendants' properties in New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> Reduced to fourteen at subsequent meetings.

\* . . . . .

In light of the foregoing, we are now requesting the Court's assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding quoted at the beginning of this letter. We believe that we have exhausted all reasonable avenues towards securing a final consent decree short of requesting the assistance of the Court. The United States agreed to a second postponement of the trial in this case, which is required by statute to be expedited, 42 U.S.C. §3614, solely on the representation that the terms of a Consent Order has been agreed to by the defendants. Now, nearly four months later, it appears that the defendants do not consider themselves to be bound by prior agreements, including the Memorandum of Understanding filed in this Court.

The January 20th agreement specifically states that all provisions not in dispute as to meaning "shall be contained in their entirety in the final Consent Decree." Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Court exercise the authority contemplated by the Memorandum of Understanding, and

- (1) resolve the three issues separating the parties by evaluating the present positions of the parties as against the Memorandum of Understanding; and
- (2) enter an Order pursuant to that Memorandum of Understanding, either by issuing a document in the form of Appendix "E" as the Court's Order, or by entering an Order based on the Memorandum of Understanding and the initial proposed Consent Order attached thereto (Appendices A and B).

We are, of course, ready to meet with the Court and with defense counsel at the Court's convenience to resolve this matter, and we hope that this litigation can be completed without further delay. In view of the constant attempts by defendants to renegotiate what has already been settled, and in view of defense counsel's consistent unavailability, we do not think

that further negotiations without the assistance of the Court would be any more productive than the many dozens of attorney-hours already spent. Once a settlement in substance has been reached between counsel which provides for resolution by the Court of any difficulties in completing the settlement, then we believe that the parties are required to utilize the machinery for resolution by the Court of disputes as to the meaning of the Understanding, and are not free to disregard prior commitments.

In the event that the Court should think it inappropriate to require the defendants to comply with their prior agreements, then we must reluctantly request that the case be scheduled for trial at an early date. In this connection, the Memorandum of Understanding includes a list of witnesses for each side, and only four witnesses - the two Trumps, Althea Gibson, and one NAACP representative - are eligible to testify for defendants. Accordingly, substantially all of plaintiff's case will be uncontradicted. Since the case was, for all practical purposes, settled once, it would seem to be an unnecessary expenditure of time and resources to go to trial. Nevertheless, if the defendants are not to be bound to their prior bargains, we will be ready to proceed.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

Frank E. Ahwell

Bv:

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief

Housing Section

cc: Mr. Roy M. Cohn Mr. Henry Brachtl

. . . . . .

M'FILMED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

MAY 1 9 1975

Plaintiff,

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

\* IN A LINKE

#### ORDER

The court having received correspondence from counsel in the above-captioned case concerning the Memorandum of Understanding and Proposed Consent Order filed therein, and it appearing that a conference with the court concerning the progress of settlement of the action is necessary, such a conference is hereby scheduled for 3:00 p.m., Wednesday, June 4, 1975, in Courtroom No. 2.

SO ORDERED.

Raward R. Wlaher U. S. D. J.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York May 19, 1975



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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

		EASTERN	DISTRICT	OF	NEW	YORK	U. S	IM CLEE	KS OFFICE COURT E.D.	N.Y
UNITED	STATES O	F AMERICA	. )				27	<b>≸</b> JUN	41.	$\triangle$
			, j		CIV	IL AC	TIC	ON NO.		
		Plaintiff	,		73	C 152	9		<b> </b>	
			)					P.M		
			)							
	v.		<b>,</b>		MEM	OP A NTO	1TM	TN CIID	ው የጀብር	
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,		et al.,	) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT ) OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST ) TO ENFORCE A SETTLE-						QUEST	
	D	efendants	. )			T AGR			LE-	

On January 20, 1975, counsel for the parties in this lawsuit executed a "Memorandum of Understanding" containing the provisions for settlement of the case. The Memorandum was intended as a settlement agreement and contains such language as: "Plaintiff agrees to a continuance solely on the basis of the representation that this case is settled in principle along the lines stated herein." (Emphasis added) Para. 1, p. 1. Because defendants' counsel, Mr. Roy Cohn, was about to leave the country for a matter of weeks, the Memorandum was signed, but the formality of executing a final Decree was postponed until mid-February, 1975. No final Decree has been executed, and plaintiff now seeks to have the settlement enforced.

It is well established that a settlement agreement entered into voluntarily "cannot be repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced by the Court." <u>Cummins Diesel</u>

Michigan, Inc. v. The Falcon, 305 F. 2d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 1962); see also All States Investors, Inc. v. The Bankers

Bond Co., 343 F. 2d 618 (6th Cir. 1965) cert. denied, 382

U.S. 830 (1965); Kelly v. Greer, 365 F. 2d 669 (3rd Cir. 1966); CA ANON Venezolana de Navagaceon v. Harris, 374 F. 2d 33 (5th Cir. 1967).

The January 20th Memorandum contemplates the later execution of a Consent Decree. However, the memorandum clearly and specifically outlines all provisions to be contained in the final Decree. The anticipation of a subsequent document in no way affects the binding nature of the Memorandum as a final settlement. Even an oral agreement to compromise a lawsuit and to later enter into an accord may be a valid contract although not reduced to writing. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F. 2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1969), <u>Kelly</u> v. <u>Greer</u>, <u>supra</u>. In cases where there is only an oral agreement, the crucial question to determine whether a binding contract exists is "whether or not the parties intended to be bound and regarded the contemplated written agreement as a memorial of a prior contract or whether they intended only to be bound upon the execution of a written, signed contract." Pyle v. Wolf, 354 F. Supp. 346, 352 (D. Ore. 1972). No such question exists here. Memorandum contemplates that the final decree shall contain all the provisions contained in the memorandum and that the only matters left open were to be disputes as to the meaning of language and not as to material portions of the settlement.

Since the final decree was intended to simply "memorialize" the prior agreement, the agreement can stand alone as a settlement of this lawsuit.

Subsequent to the execution of this Memorandum, defendants indicated concern about various provisions of the settlement, and plaintiff agreed to numerous changes in order to effectuate a final Decree. However, defendants have continued to seek changes in substantive provisions claiming that these provisions were beyond the scope of what the Court would Order. While plaintiff believes that each provision of the settlement represents appropriate relief in a case of this kind, once a settlement is agreed to by the parties, it is irrelevant to consider what a court would order after a trial on the merits. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in J. Kahn and Co. v. Clark, 178 F. 2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1949):

Where the parties, acting in good faith, settle a controversy, the courts will enforce the compromise without regard to what the result might, or would have been, had the parties chosen to litigate rather than settle.

\* \* \*

An agreement of the parties settling a disputed liability is as conclusive of their rights as a judgment would be if it had been litigated instead of compromised.

In view of Mr. Cohn's intended absence immediately after the signing of the Memorandum, it was impossible to draft and execute a Final Decree at that time, and a provision

was inserted providing for the Court to resolve any disagreement as to the meaning of the language of the The parties had not then consulted the Court memorandum. as to its readiness to resolve any such disagreement as to the meaning of the language, and, accordingly, a provision was added specifying that if such disputes could not be resolved\*/ the parties will proceed to trial and will be bound to the witness lists incorporated Should the court be unable to resolve in the Memorandum. the differences between the parties as to the meaning of the Memorandum of Understanding - and we believe that the Court can easily do so - then the plaintiff is prepared to proceed to trial pursuant to the last provision in the signed Memorandum.

<sup>\*/</sup> In view of the very limited character of the questions left open for resolution, all dealing with meaning of language rather than substance the possibility was recognized by all parties to be extremely remote.

# CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Memorandum of Understanding should be enforced and a decree entered in accordance therewith.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELB

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 4, 1975, copies of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Request to Enforce a Settlement Agreement were hand delivered to counsel for the defendants at the following address:

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E 68th Street New York, New York 10021

DONNA F. GOVDSTEIN Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Copy

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )	
)	CIVIL ACTION NO.
Plaintiff, )	73 C 1529
<b>)</b>	
v. )	
j	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,	OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
)	TO ENFORCE A SETTLE-
Defendants. )	MENT AGREEMENT
)	

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Since the final decree was intended to simply "memorialize" the prior agreement, the agreement can stand alone as a settlement of this lawsuit.

Subsequent to the execution of this Memorandum, defendants indicated concern about various provisions of the settlement, and plaintiff agreed to numerous changes in order to effectuate a final Decree. However, defendants have continued to seek changes in substantive provisions claiming that these provisions were beyond the scope of what the Court would Order. While plaintiff believes that each provision of the settlement represents appropriate relief in a case of this kind, once a settlement is agreed to by the parties, it is irrelevant to consider what a court would order after a trial on the merits. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in J. Kahn and Co. v. Clark, 178 F. 2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1949):

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\* \* \*

An agreement of the parties settling a disputed liability is as conclusive of their rights as a judgment would be if it had been litigated instead of compromised.

In view of Mr. Cohn's intended absence immediately after the signing of the Memorandum, it was impossible to draft and execute a Final Decree at that time, and a provision

was inserted providing for the Court to resolve any disagreement as to the meaning of the language of the memorandum. The parties had not then consulted the Court as to its readiness to resolve any such disagreement as to the meaning of the language, and, accordingly, a provision was added specifying that if such disputes could not be resolved\*/ the parties will proceed to trial and will be bound to the witness lists incorporated in the Memorandum. Should the court be unable to resolve the differences between the parties as to the meaning of the Memorandum of Understanding - and we believe that the Court can easily do so - then the plaintiff is prepared to proceed to trial pursuant to the last provision in the signed Memorandum.

<sup>\*/</sup> In view of the very limited character of the questions left open for resolution, all dealing with meaning of language rather than substance the possibility was recognized by all parties to be extremely remote.

# CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Memorandum of Understanding should be enforced and a decree entered in accordance therewith.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELB NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys, Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June #, 1975, copies of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Request to Enforce a Settlement Agreement were hand delivered to counsel for the defendants at the following address:

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E 68th Street New York, New York 10021

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN
Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

CIS: HAB: iq F.#730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

🛨 JUN 1 0 1975 🖈

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

TIME A.M.

P.M.....ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,

-against-

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Upon the application of the United States and the affidavits filed in support thereof, and good cause having been shown, it is hereby

ORDERED that the defendants herein show cause before this Court, in Courtroom 2 of the United States Court House on June 10th, at 10 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why

- (1) a permanent injunction should not be entered herein pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding submitted to the Court herein on January 20, 1975, and the subsequent commitment by defense counsel;
- (2) assessing costs against defendants and their counsel in an appropriate amount for unnecessary time and expenditure incurred by counsel for plaintiff herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service upon counsel for defendants shall be made by delivering this order and apers attached that their office no later than June 6, 1975, at 3.00 P.M. and that this shall constitute good and sufficient service.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of June 1975

United States District Judge

CIS: HAB: gp F. 730959

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

-against-

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The United States of America, plaintiff, respectfully moves this Court for an Order requiring defendants to show cause, if any there be, why

- (1) a permanent injunction should not be entered pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding heretofore submitted to the Court on January 20, 1975, and the subsequent commitment by defense counsel;
- (2) why costs should not be assessed against the defendants and their counsel, see 28 U.S.C. §1927, in an appropriate amount for unnecessary time and expense incurred by counsel for plaintiff herein.

Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as the interests of justice may require.

The application is based on the affidavits of DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN and FRANK E. SCHWELB and the attachment thereto. The legal basis therefor is set forth in the plaintiff's memorandum herein filed on June 4, 1975.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELB NORMAN GOLDBERG DONNA F GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys

U.S. Department of Justice

CIS:HAB:gp F. 730959

> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----X UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

> > Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

-against-

AFFIDAVIT

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.
----X
STATE OF NEW YORK )

COUNTY OF KINGS

says:

FRANK E. SCHWELB, being duly sworn, deposes and

l. I am the Chief of the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, and in supervisory charge of this litigation on behalf of the United States.

) ss.:

- 2. I am familiar with Ms. Goldstein's affidavit of this date and its contents are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. The contents of my letter of May 8, 1975 to the Court attached to her affidavit are also true.
- 3. At about 5:35 p.m., after I had waited in Mr. Cohn's office since about 4:15 p.m. (the revised time for our appointment) I asked his secretary to contact him, for me, which she did. I advised him that the decree was satisfactory to Mr. Eskenazi. Mr. Cohn related that he was in a conference with about eleven people on another matter that he could not leave the conference at that time, that he was going to Bermuda for the weekend and would be back on Monday; that we could not get the consent decree signed this week; and that I should leave it at his office; and he would get it signed "next week" after showing it to his clients. He then said he could talk no longer and hung up.
- 4. My colleagues and I have been attempting to implement the Memorandum of Understanding for about five months, but our attempts have been frustrated by our com-

plete inability to get the elusive Mr. Cohn into a room for the very short time needed to complete the job. on these experiences, some of which are set forth in my letter to the Court dated May 8, 1975, I have reluctantly concluded that this matter cannot be expeditiously resolved without the assistance of the Court. I have reached this conclusion because prior "settlements" have been agreed upon with defendants, and submitted to them for their signature, but in each case defendants and their counsel have asked for "one more conference" or have made some request, which has always resulted in additional delay but has never produced the promised final decree. constant variations and changes have taken up an inordinate amount of my own time, which is spread "pretty thin" anyway since it is my responsibility to supervise all fair housing litigation for the United States throughout the country, and even more of Ms. Goldstein's time and Mr. Goldberg's time. These delays - the most extraordinary in my seventeen years at the bar - have occurred throughout this case despite Magistrate Catoggio's clear warning to defendants, on the record, that counsel's conduct must be governed by 42 U.S.C. §3614, which requires that cases of this kind be "in every way expedited."

5. In view of the foregoing, we ask that this
Court tolerate no further delaying tactics of any kind;
that our application for an Order To Show Cause be granted,
and that this Court promptly enter an Order which implements
the settlement previously negotiated and signed by the
parties and set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding
of January 20, 1975.

Frank E. Schwell FRANK E. SCHWELB

Sworn to before me this

6th day of June 1975

EVELYN SOMMER
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-4502158
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT

- against - : Civil Action No. 73 C 15

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - x

STATE OF NEW YORK )
: ss.:
COUNTY OF KINGS )

I, DONNA GOLDSTEIN, being duly sworn do hereby depose
and say:

- 1. I am an attorney for the United States Department of Justice, and one of counsel for plaintiff in <u>United</u>
  States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.
- 2. On June 20, 1975, Norman Goldberg, another of plaintiff's counsel, and I negotiated the settlement of this action by executing a Memorandum of Understanding with defendants' counsel Roy Cohn. The memorandum outlined the provisions to be contained in the final decree which was to be executed by February 24, 1975.
- 3. Subsequent to the execution of the agreement, and despite numerous efforts by counsel for plaintiff, we have not been able to meet with counsel for defendants to sign a final decree. The details of some of these efforts, over a period of five months, to implement the agreement are set forth in the May 8, 1975 letter of Mr. Frank Schwelb, which is attached hereto.
- 4. By an Order dated May 19, 1975 this Court scheduled a conference on this matter for June 4, 1975 at 3:00 P.M. At approximately 10:00 a.m., while I was filing a legal memorandum in this action, I was approached by

Mr. Roy M. Cohn, counsel for the defendants, who was in the company of defendants Fred Trump and Mr. Donald Trump and Mr. Irving Eskanazi, an agent of the defendants who had previously participated in the settlement negotiations.

Mr. Cohn informed me that he had understood the conference to be at 10:00 a.m., and that he would not be available at 3:00 P.M. as the Court had directed. Accordingly, this fact was made known to the Court while it was engaged in the trial of a criminal matter. During conversations with Mr. Cohn prior to being heard by the Court, he and I again reached agreement on the terms of a final Decree, and the Court was so advised. Mr. Cohn requested that I have a Decree typed in final form and we agreed to meet at his office at 4:00 P.M. the next day, June 5, 1975, at which time the Decree would be executed.

- 5. My colleague, Mr. Frank Schwelb, who is the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, had arranged to come to New York in time for the 3:00 P.M. conference and for the principal purpose of completing the resolution of this lawsuit.
- 6. On June 5, 1975 Mr. Schwelb and I arrived at Mr. Cohn's offices at the agreed time (earlier changed to 4:15 P.M.). Mr. Cohn, however, did not appear. At approximately 5:35 P.M. Mr. Schwelb, through Mr. Cohn's secretary, contacted Mr. Cohn, who apparently was in conference elsewhere. This conversation is described in Mr. Schwelb's accompanying affidavit.
- 7. At approximately 5:40 P.M. I telephoned Judge Neaher's law clerk Mr. David Brown and advised him of what had occurred.

Mr. Schwelb, Mr. Eskanazi and I left Mr. Cohn's offices at approximately 5:45 P.M.

DONNA GOLDSTEIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of June, 1975.

ully Sommer

EVELYN SOMMER
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-4502158
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 19

JSP:YES:der DJ 175-52-11

> Honorable Edward R. Nesher United States District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East New York, New York 11201

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., C.A. No. 73 C 1529

# Dear Judge Neaher:

We are writing to you to respond to your law clerk's inquiry about the status of this case and to request the assistance of the Court once again to implement a settlement of the above-styled lawsuit, previously agreed to by the parties. Despite painstaking and time-consuming efforts by my colleagues and myself to complete the settlement through telephone conversations with Mr. Cohn and lengthy conferences with his clients, we have been unable to reach a final resolution of this matter.

As the Court is aware, on January 20, 1975, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding, attached hereto as /ppendix A, incorporating a proposed Consent Order and specifically outlining the terms of a settlement. That Memorandum is on file with the Court. It was only because of the execution of this document, and the representation contained ther in that the lawsuit had been settled, that the plaintiff agreed to the adjournment of the second trial date of January 27, 1975. In fact, in the Memorandum the parties agreed to the entry of the Consent Order on or pefore F bruary 24, 1975. In addition, the Memorandum provides (starting on the bottom of page 3):

cc: Records
Chrono
Schwelb
Goldstein
Goldberg
Trial File

If no final consent has been executed by February 14, 1975, the parties shall so inform the Court. The parties shall then seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any disputes arising solely out of disagreement as to the mesning of any proposed change referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding. All other provisions in the attached Consent Decree and those not in dispute as to mesning in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be contained in their entirety in the final Consent Decree.

On February 4, 1975, a copy of a proposed Consent Order (attached hereto as Appendix B) based on the settlement outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding was forwarded to Mr. Roy Cohn, defendants' counsel. We were unable to contact Mr. Cohn to agree on the terms of a settlement, and we wrote to this Court on February 18, 1975, seeking a conference. The Court scheduled a conference for March 5, 1975, which was later cancelled by reason of the Court's illness.

Thereafter, Mr. Cohn forwarded to this office a proposed Consent Order which omitted many of the major provisions of the settlement terms agreed to in the January 20th Memorandum. (A copy of this proposal is attached hereto as Appendix C.) On March 14, we wrote Mr. Cohn a letter, a copy of which is attached as Appendix D, indicating that we believed the terms of the settlement had been fixed by the Memorandum of Understanding filled in this Court and that we therefore found the defendants proposal completely unacceptable. On April 15, 1975, after we had again encountered substantial difficulties in finding anyone with whom to deal, defendant Fred C. Trump, and his colleague Mr. Irving Eskanszi came to We hington to meet with counsel for plaintiff, \*/ without their counsel but with his consent, to

<sup>\*/</sup> This meeting took place only after Mr. Cohn twice cancelled scheduled conference calls between him, defendant bonald Trump, and counsel for the United States which were supposed to resolve the controversy once and for all. Subsequently, Mr. Cohn advised counsel that defendant Donald Trump would come to Washington to negotiate, but his father and Mr. E kanazi cama instead.

discuss the terms of the final Consent Order. Despite our often stated position that we had negotisted in good faith the terms of a settlement which we considered binding on the parties by the signed M morandum of Understanding, all three counsel for plaintiff spent half a day with Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi, and Ms. Goldstein spent the remainder of the day with Mr. Eskanazi, working out what we understood to be a final settlement. It was the understanding of all concerned that Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi were negotiating for all defendents. A meeting was arranged for April 23 to take place in New York for the purpose of executing the settlement and on April 19, 1975, a last proposed Concent Order which set forth the precise understanding between Ms. Goldstein and Mr. Eskanazi, was sent to Mr. Cohn. A copy of that document is attached hereto as Appendix E.

On April 22, Mr. Cohn informed us by telephone that he now wished to make new changes in the terms of the settlement. These proposed changes were represented to us as being "minor", and, despite some misgivings, a meeting was scheduled in New York for May 2, 1975 for the purpose of working out these minor changes and executing a final consent decree for presentation to this Court. On May 2, 1975 Ms. Goldstein met with Mr. Fred Trump and Mr. Irving Eskenazi at the law offices of defendants' counsel. Mr. Cohn was again—not present. Defendants proposed several new changes, and several were conditionally agreed to by plaintiff even though they were inconsistent with the Memorandum of Understanding. Defendants also made new proposals, however, which in our judgment would have changed the character of the settlement and seriously impaired the effectiveness of the Decree, and to which we were unable to agree.

Specifically defendants now propose to delete provisions, previously agreed to, dealing with the inclusion of fair housing statements in advertising [see III A(3) p. 8 of Appendix B (the

Proposed Consent Order pursuant to the M morendum of Understanding) and Section IV A(3) p. 8 of Appendix E (the Proposed Consent Order drafted nursuant to the April 15 meeting)], and with affirmative steps to an ure equal amployment opportunity (see III C p. 11 of Appendix E \*/ and IV C p. 10 of Appendix E). In the Memorandum of Understanding agreed to on January 20, 1975, (App. noix A) and in the settlement negotiated with Mr. Trump and Mr. Eskanazi (Appendix E), the Injunction, including the affirmative provisions, applied to all of defendants' properties in New York City. \*\*/ The reporting provision: (part V, p. 15 Appendix B. and part VI, p. 17, Appendix E) were to apply to fifteen properties. \*\*\*/ Defendants now propose, contrary to the explicit provisions of prior agreements, that the affirmative provi ions of the Decree (see part III of Appendix B and part IV of Appendix E) apply only to those properties listed in the reporting provisions. This proposal is inconsistent with what has been proviously cettled and makes the decree far less effective in ensuring the full enjoyment of equal housing opportunity. While we have, at defindants' request, agreed to a number of changes in the January 10th Momorandum of Understanding, ev n though defense counsal had then represented it to be a final settlement, we cannot agree to the three most recent proposals. Defendants apparently take the position that without these now alterations, all three at odds with what they have previously signed, they will not execute a consent decree as they have previously committed themselves to doing.

<sup>\*/</sup> At the May 2 meeting, plaintiff conditionally agreed to delete III C(1) of the decree.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Bronnen v. Fields, 488 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1974) for the propriety of relief at complexes other than those at which the alleged discrimination occurred. In Fields, nationwide relief was granted, whereas here, we negotiated artifecting defendants applicable only to New York, and not affecting defendants properties in New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> Reduced to fourteen at subsequent meetings.

In light of the for going, we are now requesting the Court's assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding quoted at the beginning of this letter. We believe that we have exhausted all reasonable avenues towards securing a final consent decree short of requesting the assistance of the Court. The United States agreed to a second postponement of the trial in this case, which is required by statute to be expedited, 42 U.S.C. §3614, solely on the representation that the terms of a Consent Order has been agreed to by the defendants. Now, nearly four months later, it appears that the defendants do not consider themselves to be bound by prior agreements, including the Memorandum of Understanding filed in this Court.

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- (1) resolve the three issues deparating the parties by evaluating the present positions of the parties as against the Memorandum of Understanding; and
- (2) enter an Order pursuant to that Memorandum of Understanding, either by iscuing a document in the form of Appendix 'E" as the Court's Order, or by entering an Order based on the Memorandum of Understanding and the initial proposed Consent Order attached thereto (Appendices A and B).

We are, of course, ready to meet with the Court and with defense counsel at the Court's convenience to resolve this matter, and we hope that this litigation can be completed without further delay. In view of the constant attempts by defindants to renegotiate what has already been settled, and in view of defense counsel's consistent unavailability, we do not think

that further negotiations without the assistance of the Court would be any more productive than the many dozens of attorney-hours already spent. Once a settlement in substance has been reached between counsel which provides for resolution by the Court of any difficulties in completing the settlement, then we believe that the parties are required to utilize the machinery for resolution by the Court of disputes as to the meaning of the Understanding, and are not free to disregard prior commitments.

In the event that the Court should think it inappropriate to require the defendants to comply with their prior agreements, then we must a luctantly request that the case be scheduled for trial at an early date. In this connection, the Memorandum of Understanding includes a list of witnesses for each side, and only four witnesses - the two Trumps, Althoughton, and one MAPCP representative - are eligible to testify for defendants. Accordingly, substantially all of plaintiff's case will be uncontradicted. Since the case was, for all practical purposes, settl d once, it would seem to be an unnecessary expenditure of time and a cources to go to trial. Nevertheless, if the defendants are not to be bound to their prior bargains, we will be ready to proceed.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief Housing Section

ce: Mr. Roy M. Cohn Mr. Henry Brachtl UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

\_\_\_\_X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT

- against -

: Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

 $\frac{\alpha_i}{\beta} = \frac{2^{j}}{\lambda_i}$ 

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants. :

STATE OF NEW YORK )
) SS.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

ROY M. COHN, being duly sworn deposes and says:

- l. Agreement has been reached on the substance of all provisions in the consent decree, and the minor language modifications will be made later today.
- 2. These constant applications to the Court by the Civil Rights Section are assuming the aspects of paranoia. Without boring the Court with a minute by minute recital, Mr. Eskenazi met with Miss Goldstein and Mr. Schwelb at the appointed time at my office, and solved the very few remaining problems. I did not get out of court at the <a href="DeGiarde">DeGiarde</a> habeas corpus proceeding before Judge Grumet until late afternoon, and had to stop at another legal conference on the way uptown. I called in and was told by Mr. Eskenazi that things were worked out except for the actual signatures, and I was not needed.
- 3. I asked to have a copy left for me and my clients and suggested it be signed this week. Mr. Schwelb came on the phone in hysterics and kept repeating the same thing, which was that everything was agreed upon and when could it be signed. I told him this week after I had reviewed the final draft with my clients. I arrived at the office and found that Mr. Schwelb had left, which was fine. Mr. Schwelb fails to state in his affidavit



that he returned to my office about an hour after he had left, came into my office, to which I had returned, had a brief exchange of pleasantries, said nothing about any dissatisfaction in the signing of the papers this week, and then left.

- 4. The business about costs is absolutely ridiculous. We have gone so far to appease Mr. Schwelb that Mr. Fred Trump and Mr. Eskanizi themselves went to Washington to work out the language for the decree rather than inconvenience Mr. Schwelb and Miss Goldstein by having them come to New York.
- 5. It is respectfully submitted that a date convenient to the Court be fixed for the signing of the decree by the parties, and the acceptance thereof by the Court.

ROY M. COHN

Sworn to this 9th day of June, 1975

Unn Luce hand

ANN TURCHIANO
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-4235040
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1977



CIS:HAB:ec UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
F. # EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y

JUN 1 0 1975

TIME A.M....

P.M....

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CONSENT ORDER

- against -

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

X M'FILMED

This action was instituted by the United States of America on October 15, 1973, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601  $\underline{\text{et}}$   $\underline{\text{seq}}$ .

The claim of the United States is that the defendants have failed and neglected to exercise their affirmative and nondelegable duty under the Fair Housing Act to assure compliance by their subordinates, with the result that equal housing opportunity has been denied to substantial numbers of persons and that defendant's subordinates have failed to carry out their obligations under the Act.

Defendants vigorously deny said allegations.

Accordingly, without adjudication of the merit and without any admission as to the existence or absence of liability, and in order to resolve this matter without further protracted litigation, the parties hereto are prepared to resolve this case by the entry of a Consent Decree.

It is expressly understood and agreed that the execution of this Agreement by Trump Management, Inc., is in no way an admission by it of a violation of the prohibition against discrimination as set forth in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or any other applicable statute, rule or regulation.

Irrespective of the merits of the complaint, however, the principal officers of defendant Trump Management, Inc., are prepared to affirmatively assume and carry out the responsibility for assuring that their employees will comply with the Act and will promote equal opportunity. Accordingly, the parties are prepared to resolve this case by the entry of the following Consent Order.

I.

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that in consideration of their affirmative assumption of responsibility contained in part III herein, the complaint against Fred C. Trump and Donald J. Trump is dismissed against them in their personal capacity, with prejudice, as to all allegations contained therein, and predating this Order.

II.

### INJUNCTION

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant, its officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

# GENERAL INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS 1. Refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 3. Making, printing, or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or published, any notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make such preference, limitation or discrimination. 4. Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available. Influencing the residential choice of any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 6. Coercing, threatening, or interfering with, or attempting to coerce, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to assist others to secure equal housing opportunity. - 3 -

7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act. In this connection, defendants shall not, in determining the income qualification for rental of any person, family, or other group of persons, fail or refuse to fully count a woman's total income, including salary, wages, alimony, support payments or other income from whatever source received.

III

ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PRINCIPALS OF TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC., AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Trump Management Inc., controls many thousands of rental units in the New York area and elsewhere, and its activities therefore have a major impact on housing opportunities. The company therefore occupies a position of leadership in the real estate community and can, by its example, influence the activities not only of its own agents and employees but also of many others. The Fair Housing Act prohibits conduct which is discriminatory in its effect, regardless of motivation, and violations of the Act can result from thoughtlessness and lack of information, as well as from deliberate discrimination.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc., shall forthwith (1) thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis with all of the obligations of the defendant under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended and as judicially interpreted; under state and municipal civil rights laws; under pertinent Regulations and Guidelines of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other appropriate agencies; and under this Order; Take steps to assure that their principal assistants and officers similarly familiarize themselves with their obligations; and (3) Personally undertake to assure that the training program set forth herein is successfully carried out. B. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, the Defendant by its principal officers, shall conduct and complete an educational program for all employees with rental or employment responsibilities, who have contact with prospective tenants, provide information to the public about rental, or accept or process applications for rentals, or who are engaged in any manner in the employment process, to inform them of the provisions of this Decree, and their duties under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Such program shall include: - 5 -

(1) Furnishing to each such agent and employee a letter summarizing the terms of this Decree and of the Fair Housing Act as it applies to the employee. (2) Informing each such agent and employee, in person or by general meeting, of the provisions of this Decree and of duties of the Company and its agents and employees under the various applicable Fair Housing Acts. Each such agent and employee shall be advised that his failure to comply with the provisions of this Decree shall subject him to dismissal or other disciplinary action, and to sanctions for disobedience of this Order. (3) Securing a signed statement from each such agent that he has read the letter mentioned above and received the instructions described in the preceding paragraph and forwarding a copy of each such signed statement to plaintiff. Each new agent and employee shall be instructed in accordance with the procedures set out above and shall be required to sign a statement to the effect that he has been so instructed and will comply with such instructions within ten (10) days following the initial date of employment. Copies of all signed statements will be furnished to plaintiff upon execution. - 6 -

### AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM

It is further ORDERED that the defendant shall forthwith \*/
and for a period of two (2) years following the entry of this
Order take the following steps to adopt and implement an
affirmative program aimed at ensuring compliance with the Fair
Housing Act of 1968:

- A. Notification to the Community of Defendant's Nondiscriminatory Policy
- Notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, in writing, with copies to counsel for plaintiff that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin, as here matter provided. Included in such letter shall be a full synopsis of the rental standards and procedures outlined in Part V, below, and a general statement of present and anticipated vacancies in Trump apartment buildings in the New York Metropolitan area. parties shall agree on the text of an appropriate letter prior to its mailing. Subsequently, defendant shall mail to the Open Housing Center a copy of its weekly Central Listing of vacancies described infra in Part V of this decree. This mailing shall be done on the day the list is made. The Open Housing Center may, at its own discretion, forward copies of the abovementioned letter and weekly list of vacancies to any and all organizations with an interest in promoting equal housing opportunities.

<sup>\*/</sup> The defendant's obligations to implement each provision of this Order for affirmative action shall begin ten (10) days following the entry of this Order, unless otherwise specified herein.

2. Post and maintain fair housing signs in a form aproved by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) \*/ in all offices of the defendant where there is rental activity or public contact.

3. Implement an advertising program aimed at informing the nonwhite community of defendant's nondiscriminatory rental policy. The defendant shall

| for New York City apartment | for New

papers, telephone directories, radio, television and other media, and on all billboards, signs, pamphlets, brochures, and other promotional literature the words "Equal Housing Opportunity" and the fair housing logo. These words and the logo shall be prominently placed and easily legible. \*\*\*/ In addition, all advertising placed by the Company or its agents shall conform to the practices recommended in the Department of Housing and Urban Development advertising guidelines, as published in 37 Fed. Reg., pp. 6700-02, on April 1, 1972. A copy of these guidelines is attached as Appendix "B" to this Order.

<sup>\*/</sup> See the pertinent HUD regulation, 37 F.R. 3429 (a copy attached hereto as Appendix A).

This subsection dealing with newspaper advertising shall only apply to newspaper ads of eight (8) lines of print or more. Defendant shall continue its present advertising policies, and shall not change its present practices with respect to the size and type of advertising by shortening or by otherwise changing its policy of placing display ads to avoid the requirement of including the equal opportunity statement.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> In radio and television advertising, the words "equal housing opportunities" shall be used and shall be easily audible.

WW.

(b) Insert in a newspaper of general Ruculation, such as the new york Times, one Sunday in every month, an advertisement at least 3 inches in length advertising available apartments in particular sections of New York City, Chartments advertised pursuant to this sextorn shall be selected on a rotating basis so that each apartment building 15 so advertised at least once yearly. This ad shall contain at its foot, in grominant capital letters, the words "Equal Housing Opportunity"

Allocate a reasonable proportion of its advertising budget to advertising in media directed primarily to the black and Puerto Rican communities. The parties have agreed that the placement of monthly 15 line display advertisements, one in the black and one in the Puerto Rican press, \*/ together with the allocation of 10% of defendant's radio advertising budget to black-oriented and Spanish language stations, shall meet the requirements of this provision. All advertisements of Trump buildings in minority media shall advertise a full cross-section of Trump buildings with vacancies, and shall not stress or give undue emphasis to buildings with substantial minority occupancy. \*\*/

4. Provide written notification to each firm, association company, corporation, or other person or organization engaged by defendant to act as referral agency, apartment locating service, credit checking company, or management company that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Each such notification shall also advise the recipient of defendant's objective standards and procedures for rental.

**-** 9 -

<sup>\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{**}{\text{with}}$  If the listed apartments do not include all Trump buildings with vacancies, the buildings listed shall be rotated with each ad so that the same apartment buildings are not continuously or disproportionately advertised under this subsection.

### B. Program of Providing Listings for Minority Apartment Seekers

For two years after the entry of this Order, defendant shall notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10003, of every fifth available apartment in each apartment building owned and/or managed by the defendant which has a black tenancy of less than ten percent,\*/ at least three days prior to placing that apartment on the open market.\*\*/ During this three-day period, the Open Housing Center shall have the opportunity to refer qualified applicants to the defendant for the purpose of renting the apartment. All applicants referred by the Open Housing Center shall provide the defendant or its representative with an appropriate identification which will serve to advise the defendants that such applicant has been referred by the Open Housing Center pursuant to this subsection. After three days if no qualified applicant referred by the Center has filed an application seeking to rent the apartment, the apartment may be placed on the open market to be rented in defendant's normal business custom without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. \*\*\*/

### C. Affirmative Employment Program

The defendant shall recruit, hire, assign, promote and transfer employees and agents without regard to race, color,

<sup>\*/</sup> The requirements of this provision need not be followed for apartment buildings which presently have or in the future reach a black occupancy rate of 10%. For these apartment buildings, apartments shall continue to be rented without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The three-day period shall begin when notification has been completed and the Open Housing Center has received, either in person, by telephone, or by mail, the listings. For purposes of this Decree, rental on the open market shall mean rental to any person not referred by the Open Housing Center.

\*\*\*/ This provision shall not apply to Trump Village.

religion, sex or national origin and will endeavor to place blacks and other nonwhite persons in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified arise.

Pursuant to this program, the defendant shall take the following steps:

1. Display an equal employment opportunity poster \*/ in a prominent place clearly visible to prospective agents, employees, and applicants for employment in each office of the defendant where applications for employment are taken.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}/$  This poster shall be in the form, size and prominence approved by the United States Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

2. Notify in writing, each labor union representing any part of defendant's work force of the terms of Part IV(C) of this Decree and that prospective employees are to be referred without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

In recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees, the defendant shall not require that nonwhite persons recruited or hired possess qualifications for any job or position more exacting than those which were in effect with respect to white employees before the institution of this action.

V

### IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVE RENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

In order to assure nondiscriminatory selection and assignment of tenants and to assure equal opportunity in housing at each building owned or managed by Trump Management, Inc., defendant agrees that the following standards and procedures shall be uniformly applied at all of its properties in determining whether or not to rent to an applicant. \*/

### A. Standards

### 1. Income

One week's gross income from all sources  $\underline{**}/$  must be at least equal to one month's rent, except in the following circumstances:

(a) The applicant(s) have outstanding automobile payments, or other fixed debt in excess of \$50.00 a month, with a remaining debt period in excess of four (4) months, or

<sup>\*/</sup> The following standards shall not be applicable to Tysens Park which is subject to other federal regulations imposed by §221(d) of the National Housing Act.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This shall include alimony, child support, public assistance payments, or guarantor's assurances on behalf of public assistance recipients, wife's income, part-time employment, pensions, etc.

(b) The family composition is in excess of three (3) persons.

In either circumstance (a) or (b) above, one week's <u>net</u> income must be at least equal to one month's rent.

If an applicant does not meet the foregoing income standards, he or she may still qualify for rental if:

- (a) He or she secures a guarantor who can verify funds sufficient to meet the financial obligations of the guarantors fixed monthly payments for his or her residence, as well as the applicant's rental, based on the defendant's income standards.
- (b) If the applicant is willing to post three (3) months security deposit or will supply six (6) months rent in advance.
- (c) If a tenant switches from one Trump building to another Trump building and if that tenant has met his obligations to Trump Management, Inc., in the past.

### 2. Occupancy

Not more than two (2) persons in a one-bedroom apartment. Not more than four (4) persons, two (2) adults

and two (2) children of the same sex,\*/ in a two-bedroom

for a two-bedroom apartment, defendant shall, in a

apartment. to occupancy.

apartment.

### B. Procedures \*\*/

### 1. Application Procedure

<sup>\*/</sup> Except that children under ten years of age may be of different sexes.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> These procedures are substantially based on defendant's past practices, as described during discovery.

a. Applications for tenancy will be received at the apartment building or complex where the tenant is applying for an apartment. Applications shall be received by Superintendents or rental agents authorized by the defendant to accept applications, and instructed in the requirements of this Order and of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.

3601 et seq. Applications shall be accepted from all persons wishing to apply and the superintendent or agent shall make no subjective judgment on the acceptability of a prospective tenant, unless said prospective tenant is:

- (i) visibly and objectively drunkand disorderly;
- (ii) visibly and objectively under the influence of drugs;
- (iii)abusive towards the superintendent
  or rental agent;

or there is,

(iv) a visible and objective indication that the applicant will not maintain his or her apartment with sufficient care and cleanliness so as not to intrude on the rights of other tenants. In order to satisfy this criteria, defendant or its agents shall contact the applicant's former landlord to ascertain the manner in which he or she had maintained the rented premises. In no event shall the subjective impression by a superintendent of the manner of dress or style of grooming disqualify an applicant. This subsection shall apply solely to cleanliness criteria.

b. The superintendent or rental agent shall review the application for completeness and shall require a security deposit of one month's rent and a W2 form (or reasonable substitute therefor) from all applicants. The agents shall then submit the deposit, W2 form and application, for review and determination to one of the defendant's two main offices. No superintendent or rental agent shall have the authority to make a determination on the acceptability for tenancy of an applicant except as outlined in B(1)(a) (i-iv) above.

- c. Applications shall be reviewed and a determination of acceptability shall be made by the Section Managers employed in the defenant's main offices.
- d. If conducted, a uniform credit check and/or employment check shall be conducted with respect to each applicant. The standards of acceptability based on credit and employment shall be uniformly applied without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- e. Each applicant shall be informed wherever possible within ten (10) business days whether or not he or she has been accepted for tenancy. If an application can not be processed within ten (10) days, defendant shall notify the applicant of the reason therefor, but in no event shall an applicant not be informed of the disposition of his application beyond twenty (20) days from the time he or she applied. If rejected, the applicant shall be informed of the reason for rejection, and of the specific objective standard he or she has failed to meet. \*/

<sup>\*/</sup> Applicants who have not been accepted for tenancy pursuant to V(B)(a) above need not be informed of the reasons for the defendant's decision not to accept his or her application. However, defendants shall still note the reason for non-acceptance in its records and its reports to plaintiff pursuant to Sections VI and VII herein.

### 2. <u>Providing Rental Information to Apartment</u> Seekers

- Defendant shall maintain at its central offices at 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, a Central Listing, to be compiled on a weekly basis, of each currently vacant or available apartment in the New York area, and of each apartment expected to be vacant or available in the New York area within the next thirty days. This list shall include the type of apartment, the number of rooms, the monthly rent, and the date of availability and shall be shown to all persons inquiring about available apartments. Defendant shall also maintain at each of its buildings a similar list of the apartments vacant at that building by type of apartment available and a notification that complete lists of all available apartments in the New York area are available for inspection at defendant's main offices located at 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.
- b. Apartments which are available for rental and listed on the apartment availability list (2(a) above) shall be shown to all interested inquirers by an authorized agent of the defendant.
- c. Inquirers shall be uniformly informed of the qualifications for rental, including the income, security deposit and W2 form requirements.

d. No waiting list\*/ will be maintained at any of the defendant's offices or apartment buildings nor shall there be any preference for persons referred by present tenants.

Rental will be on a first-come, first-served basis when apartments are available for rental.

VI

### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is further ORDERED that three (3) months after the entry of this Decree, and thereafter three (3) times per year for two years the defendant shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the plaintiff a report containing the following information for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed by the defendant:

- 1. Argyle Hall
- 2. Westminster Hall
- 3. Fontainebleau Apartments
- 4. Lawrence Gardens and Lawrence Towers
- 5. Sea Isle Apartments
- 6. Bachaven Apartments
- 7. Shorehaven Apartments
- 8. Belcrest Apartments
- 9. Highlander Hall
- 10. Saxony Hall
- 11. Clyde Hall
- 12. Edgerton Apartments
- 13. Winston Hall
- 14. Sussex Hall

<sup>\*/</sup> Since this is defendant's present practice and it is nondiscriminatory, plaintiff interposes no objection thereto.

From Village Shall be excepted from this provision prohibiting the use of a waiting list.

- 17 -

a. The number of persons, by race\*/ (as visually observable) making inquiry in person about the availability of terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding reporting period and the number by race, that:

- 1. made inquiry;
- 2. were offered an application;
- 3. filled out an application;
- 4. submitted an applicant with deposit;
- 5. were accepted for occupancy;
- were rejected;
- withdrew applications;
- had applications pending at the end of the reporting period.

This report may be forwarded to plaintiff on a form similar to the sample form attached hereto as Appendix C.

- b. A report reflecting the applications for tenancy submitted during the preceding reporting period, including the following information for each person submitting an application:
  - name, address, business and home telephone number, and race;
  - date of application;
  - whether a deposit was received;
  - 4. date notified of acceptance or rejection;
  - 5. weekly income of applicant and monthly rent of apartment sought;

<sup>\*/</sup> For purposes of this Decree, all notations of race shall be as visually observable.

if accepted, apartment chosen;

- 7. if rejected, reason therefor;
- name of person or persons who decided to accept or reject the application;
- if neither accepted nor rejected, status or disposition of application.

This report may be forwarded to plaintiff on a form similar to the sample form attached hereto as Appendix D. For each rejected nonwhite applicant, the report shall include a detailed statement of the reason(s) for rejection and supporting information.

- c. A list of vacancies during the preceding quarter, including the date the apartment was placed on the market \*/ and the date each apartment was rented or otherwise committed for rental.
- d. Reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include the current statistics with respect to the race of tenants in each apartment building owned or managed by the defendant, and an account of the steps taken during the preceding reporting period to implement the program outlined in Sections I and II above, including:
  - Copies of all letters sent to apartment locators and credit checking companies, Fair Housing groups, and labor unions pursuant to Parts III and IV of this Decree.

<sup>\*/</sup> Including where appropriate, the date the Open Housing Center was contacted concerning the apartment's availability in accordance with Part III above.

2. Representative copies of all newspaper advertisements placed in the Amsterdam News and El Diario pursuant to this Order and the date of each advertisement.

3. The name, race, position and office assignment of each rental agent, superintendent and main office employee employed as of the date of the entry of this Order, an assurance that the educational program required by Part II has been conducted, and copies of all signed statements obtained in accordance with Part II of this Decree. If any rental agent refuses to sign such a statement the defendants shall include a full statement of all pertinent circumstances and of any action taken by them in relation thereto.

VII

### RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall, for two years following the entry of this Decree, make and preserve the following records for all apartment buildings owned or managed by them:

1. The name, address, telephone number and date and time of contact of each person inquiring in person about the availability or terms of rental of an apartment therein, \*/ and the size of apartment sought, if known.

<sup>\*/</sup> This may be accomplished by maintaining a guest register at each apartment building owned by the defendants.

2. A detailed record of all action taken on each application and the reasons for such action, including all steps taken by the defendant in ascertaining the acceptability for tenancy of the applicant and the name of the employee who took such steps or who approved or rejected the application.

3. All records which are the source of, or contain any of the information pertinent to defendant's obligations under this Order. Representatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the defendant at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendant from the inspection of such records.

### VIII

It is further ORDERED that for a period extending two years from the entry of this Decree, the defendant shall, at least twenty (20) days prior to the event, report to counsel for the plaintiff:

- 1. Any new ownership or management interests in residential property, acquired by the defendant.
- 2. The divestment through transfer or sale, of any ownership or management interests in residential property.

IX

It is further ORDERED that for a period of two years after the entry of this Decree the defendant shall advise counsel for plaintiff, in writing, of all complaints, \*/ from

<sup>\*/</sup> For purposes of this Decree, "complaints" shall mean any information which comes to the attention of the defendant or its officers from whatever source received, which indicates a possible denial of equal housing opportunities under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq., or a potential violation of this Decree.

whatever source, received by the defendant regarding equal opportunity in housing at properties owned and/or managed by Trump Management, Inc. In addition, plaintiff shall, for a period of two years after the entry of this Decree, notify the defendant of all complaints received by the plaintiff.

Except where the plaintiff determines that there exists a need for emergency relief threatening the effectiveness of this Decree, the plaintiff shall afford the defendant fifteen (15) days from the date notice of such a complaint is received to investigate the complaint and provide plaintiff with an explanation of the information contained in the complaint. If the complaint is determined to be valid by either party, plaintiff shall recommend what steps it believes to be necessary to correct the conditions leading to the complaint, and shall afford the defendants an additional seven (7) days to effectuate appropriate steps to remedy the conditions leading to the complaint and to overcome any continuing effects of the alleged discriminatory actions before applying to the court for a motion to compel compliance with this Decree, or any other additional judicial relief.

X

Each party shall bear its own costs.

The Court shall retain jursidiction of this action for all purposes.

ORDERED this 10 day of June

EDWARD& NEAHER

United States District Judge

The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this Order:

For the Defendants:

ROY M. COHN

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

39 E. 68th Street New York, New York

For the Plaintiff:

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

normant you elberg NORMAN P. GOLDBERG

Attorney, Housing Séction Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

HENRY BRACHTL

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Eastern District of New York

DAVID & TRAGER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

37 F.R. 3429 Feb. 16, 1972

## Rules and Regulations

# Title 24—HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Chapter I—Office of Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Department of Housing and Urban Development

> SUBCHAPTER A-FAIR HOUSING [Docket No. R-72-165]

### PART 110-FAIR HOUSING POSTER

The purpose of this regulation is to require the display of a fair housing poster by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and to prescribe the content of this poster.

Notice of a proposed amendment to Title 24 to include a new Part 72 was published in the Federal Register on August 4, 1971 (36 F.R. 14336). (Under the reorganization of Title 24 published in the Federal Register on December 22, 1971 (36 F.R. 24402), the fair housing poster will become new Part 110.) Comments were received from approximately 20 interested persons and organizations and consideration has been given to each comment.

Some comments with respect to proposed § 72.10 criticized the coverage of the proposed regulation as too broad, while other comments objected that the coverage is too narrow, and various suggestions were made for changes in coverage. Comments were directed not only to what dwellings should be included but also to the stage at which the requirement should take effect and the persons to whom it should apply. In response to the comments, § 72.10(a) (now § 110.10 (a) and (b)) has been revised to clarify the extent of coverage, to broaden coverage to the extent appropriate and to eliminate unnecessary burdens where the requirement can appropriately be narrowed or eliminated. Under § 110.10 (a) and (b), display of the prescribed poster at a single-family dwelling is not required unless the dwelling is being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings; however if a real estate

broker or agent is handling the sale or rental, he must display the poster at any place of business where the dwelling is being offered for sale or rental. With respect to all other dwellings covered by the Act, the poster must be displayed at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for sale or rental; in addition, the poster must be displayed at the dwelling, except that in the case of a singlefamily dwelling being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, e.g., a subdivision, the poster may be displayed at model homes instead of at each of the individual dwellings. Finally, in the case of dwellings other than a single-family dwelling not being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, the poster must be displayed from the beginning of construction through the end of the sale or rental process.

Several comments suggested revisions in the language of the poster described in proposed § 72.25. Such suggestions included rewriting the poster in terms of the individual's rights rather than the Act's prohibitions, adding additional prohibitions contained in the Act, emphasizing the nature of penalties for failure to post, and listing the HUD area office instead of the regional office as a location to which to send complaints. The new § 110.25 adopts the suggestion with regard to the area offices in that the poster will provide for insertion of the address of the regional or area office as appropriate. It has been decided that instead of lengthening the content of the poster by adding additional prohibitions, the poster should be made shorter and easier to understand by briefly highlighting the major prohibitions. In addition, the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype and slogan have been inserted at the top of the poster.

A comment by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) recommended exempting from this regulation any person subject to a regulation of the FHLBB requiring that person to post a poster substantially similar in content to the poster described in HUD's regulation. A similar comment was made by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to entities subject to supervision by any of the four Federal financial regulatory agencies. The Department will authorize a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Federal financial regulatory agency to utilize a poster prescribed in a regulation by such agency, and approved by the Department, instead of the poster prescribed by HUD. However, all of the other requirements of Part 110 will remain fully applicable regardless of whatever sanctions the regulatory agency prescribes for failure to comply with its regulation. This provision is set forth in § 110.25(b). The requirement, set forth in § 110.10(c), that financial institutions post and maintain a fair housing poster will not be effective until May 1, 1972, in order to allow time for the Federal financial regulatory agencies to issue appropriate regulations.

Proposed § 72.30 stated that a failure to display the poster as required would be

deemed a discriminatory housing practice, i.e., an act unlawful under sections 804, 805, and 806 of title VIII, and prima facie evidence of a violation of these sections, as applicable. There were comments favoring this provision and a comment stating that such a provision was beyond the Department's authority on the ground that title VIII prescribes the specific acts of discrimination which are unlawful. There was also a comment recommending that failure to comply should subject a person to suspension from eligibility for FHA insurance.

The Department believes that it has the authority to require a fair housing poster, and that proposed § 72.30 does not prescribe a new violation not provided for in title VIII. Rather, the section provides an appropriate evidentiary mechanism for assisting in the determination of whether a violation of title VIII has occurred. For purposes of clarity, the provision has been combined with proposed § 72.35—complaints—into a new ga § 110.30—Effect of failure to display by poster—and the combined text shortened. Under § 110.30, when a person at claiming to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice files a com- or plaint pursuant to Part 105-Fair Hous- of ing, a failure to display the required poster shall be deemed prima facie evidence of such practice.

The comment with respect to application of additional sanctions is rejected, its since such sanctions as well as others are provided in the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations published January 5, 1972 (37 F.R. 75), for failure to make the posting required at FHA project sites by § 200.620(f) of that regulation. Although Part 110 is applicable to some persons who are not covered by the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing regulations, the Department considers that the insertion in Part 110 of the sanctions proposed in the comment is not appropriate.

Accordingly, a new Part 110 is added to Title 24 to read as follows:

### Subpart A-Purpose and Definitions

Sec. 110.1

110.1 Purpose.

110.5 Definitions.

### Subpart B-Requirements for Display of Posters

110.10 Persons subject.

110.15 Location of posters.

110.20 Availability of posters.

110.25 Description of posters.

### Subpart C-Enforcement

110.30 Effect of failure to display poster.

AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 110 are issued under section 7(d) of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3535(d)).

### Subpart A—Purpose and Definitions § 110.1 Purpose.

The regulations set forth in this part contain the procedures established by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development with respect to the display of a fair housing poster by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604-3606.

plementary advertising campaign that is directed at other groups, or the use by a de-veloper of racially mixed models to advertise one of the developments and not others.

C. Policy and practices guidelines. The following guidelines are offered as suggested methods of assuring equal opportunity in

real estate advertising:

- 1. Guidelines for use of logotype, statement, or slogan. All advertising of residential real estate for sale or rent can contain an Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement or slogan as a means of educating the homeseeking public that the property is available to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin. Table 1 (see appendix) indicates suggested sizes for the use of the logotype. In all space advertis-ing which is less than 4 column inches of a page in size, the Equal Housing Opportunity slogan should be used. The advertisement may be grouped with other advertisements under a caption which states that the housing is available to all without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. Alternatively, 3-5 percent of the advertisement copy may be devoted to a statement of the equal housing opportunity policy of the owner or agent. Table 2 (see appendix) contains copies of the suggested Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement and slogan.
- 2. Guidelines for use of human models. Human models in photographs, drawings, or other graphic techniques may be used to indicate racial inclusiveness. If models are used in display advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as reasonably representing both majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area, Models if used, should indicate to the general public that the housing is open to all without re-gard to race, color, religion, or national origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one such group.

- 3. Guidelines for notification of Housing Policy. (a) Employees. All publishers of advertisements, advertising agencies, and firms engaged in the sale or rental of real estate should provide a printed copy of their nondiscriminatory policy to each employee and officer.
- (b) Clients. All publishers of advertisements and advertising agencies should post a copy of their nondiscrimination policy in a conspicuous place wherever persons come to place advertising and should have copies available for all firms and persons using their advertising services.
- (c) Publisher's notice. All publishers are encouraged to publish at the beginning of the real estate advertising section a notice such as that appearing in Table 3 (see

Effective date. This statement of policy shall be effective May 1, 1972.

> SAMUEL J. SIMMONS, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity.

#### APPENDIX

The following three tables may serve as a guide for the use of the Equal Housing Op-portunity logotype, statement, slogan, and publisher's notice for display advertising:

#### TABLE I

A simple formula can guide the real estate advertiser in using the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan. If other logotypes are used in the advertisement, then the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype should be of a size equal to the largest of the other logotypes; if no other logotypes are used, then the following guidelines can be used. In all instances, the type should be bold display face and no smaller than 8 points.

	Size of
Approximate size of	Logotype
advertisement	in inches
½ page or larger	- 2 x 2.
1/8 page up to 1/2 page 4 column inches to 1/8 page	- 1 X 1. - ½ X ½
Less than 4 column inches	- (¹).

<sup>1</sup> Do not use.

TABLE II .- ILLUSTRATIONS OF LOGOTYPE. STATEMENT, AND SLOGAN

Equal Housing Opportunity logotype.



### EQUAL HOUSING

Equal Housing Opportunity statement: We are pledged to the letter and spirit of U.S. policy for the achievement of equal housing opportunity throughout the Nation. We encourage and support an affirmative advertising and marketing program in which there are no barriers to obtaining housing because of race, color, religion or national origin.

Equal Housing Opportunity slogan: "Equal Housing Opportunity."

TABLE III-ILLUSTRATION OF PUBLISHER'S NOTICE

Publisher's notice:

All real estate advertised in this newspaper is subject to the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 which makes it illegal to advertise "any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national

origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.'

This newspaper will not knowingly accept any advertising for real estate which is in violation of the law. Our readers are hereby informed that all dwellings advertised in this newspaper are available on an equal opportunity basis.

[FR Doc.72-4983 Filed 3-31-72;8:45 am]

37 F.R. 6700 4/1/72

# DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Office of Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity

[Docket No. R-72-108]

### ADVERTISING GUIDELINES FOR FAIR HOUSING

### Notice of Statement of Policy

In order to facilitate and promote compliance with the requirements of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and particularly section 804(c) thereof (42 U.S.C. 3601, 3604(c)) regarding notices, statements or advertisements, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has prepared guidelines to indicate graphic and written references that are appropriate for the preparation, publication, and general use of advertising matter with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling as defined by the Act.

Notice of a proposed statement of policy was published in the Federal Register on May 21, 1971 (36 F.R. 9266). Comments were received from 26 interested

persons and organizations and consideration has been given to each comment.

Several comments observed that the proposed policy statement was at times unnecessarily limited to the field of newspaper advertising. In response to the comments, the policy statement has been revised in several places to clarify that the guidelines apply to advertisements in all media, including, e.g., television and radio, as well as to advertising agencies and other persons who use advertising.

Several organizations suggested additional catchwords connoting a discriminatory effect for inclusion in section A-3. That section has been expanded to include several additional terms which may have a discriminatory effect when used in a discriminatory context.

In response to other comments, section A-6 has been revised to clarify how directional references could be employed in a discriminatory context with an ethnically, as well as a radially, discriminatory effect. Also, section A-7 has been added relating specifically to designation of religious, ethnic or radial facilities to identify an area or neighborhood.

A number of comments indicated that human models or Equal Opportunity advertisements can and have been used selectively to promote the development of racially exclusive communities. A new section C-4 has been added in order to meet this specific problem. The previous human models section has been clarified by revision and reorganization in the new section C, in light of comments which indicated confusion or uncertainty surrounding the use of human models.

In response to publishers' comments, Table I has been simplified and references to minimum type sizes limited to a recommendation that the type should be bold display face and no smaller than eight points.

A number of organizations suggested the inclusion of a publisher's notice to appear with real estate advertising. A suggested notice has been included as Table III, in lieu of the provision in the proposed guidelines for direct notification to all firms or persons using the advertising services of a publisher. This provision was removed in light of objections that such notification would be unworkable or would impose great hardship since a large volume of real estate advertising is placed by a great number of persons on a nonrecurring basis.

Finally, a number of minor editorial or organizational changes have been made in order to clarify or simplify the

advertising guidelines.

Several organizations suggested that the guidelines make specific reference to the roles of other enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice and local agencies. These comments suggested that the guidelines specify that they do not alter or affect conciliation agreements or court orders obtained by these agencies, as well as by the Department. Such a disclaimer appears to be unnecessary, since there is nothing in the guidelines to indicate an intent to

alter or affect agreements or orders obtained by the Department and other agencies.

This document is issued pursuant to section 7(d), Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 3535(d).

The statement of Policy reads as follows:

Publication Guidelines for Compliance With Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968

### POLICY STATEMENT

Section 804(c) of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(c), makes it unlawful to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling (any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereof of any such building, structure, or portion thereof) that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.

These advertising guidelines are being issued for the purpose of assisting all advertising media, advertising agencies, and all other persons who use advertising to make, print, or publish or cause to be made, printed, or published any classified or display advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling by the owner or his agent, in compliance with the requirements of title

Conformance with these guidelines will be considered in evaluating compliance with title VIII in connection with investigations by the Assistant Secretary of advertising practices and policies under the title.

A. The use of words, phrases, sentences

A. The use of words, phrases, sentences and visual aids which have a discriminatory effect. The following words, phrases, symbols, and forms typify those most often used in residential real estate advertising to convey either overt or tacit discriminatory intent. Their use should therefore be avoided in order to eliminate their discriminatory effect. In considering a complaint under title VIII, the Assistant Secretary will normally consider the use of these and comparable words, phrases, symbols, and forms to indicate possible violation of the title and to establish a need for seeking resolution of the complaint, if it is apparent from the context of the usage that discrimination within the meaning of the Title is likely to result.

1. Words descriptive of dwelling, landlord, and tenant. White private home, Col-

ored home, Jewish home.

2. Words indicative of race, color, religion, or national origin. Negro, Hispano, Mexican, Indian, Oriental, Black, White, WASP, Hebrew, Irish, Italian, European, etc.

3. Catch words. Restricted, ghetto, disadvantaged. Also, words such as private, integrated, traditional, "board approval" or "membership approved" if used in a discriminatory context.

4. Symbols or logotypes. Symbols or logotypes which imply or suggest race, color, religion, or national origin.

5. Colloquialisms. Locally accepted words or phrases which imply or suggest race, color, religion, or national origin.

6. Directions to the real estate for sale or rent (use of maps or written instructions). References to real estate location made in terms of racially or ethnically significant landmarks such as an existing Black de-

velopment (signal to Blacks) or an existing development known for its exclusion of minorities (signal to Whites). Specific directions given from a racially or ethnically significant area.

7. Area (location) description. Use of religious, ethnic, or racial facilities to describe an area, neighborhood, or location.

B. Selective use of advertising media or content with discriminatory effect. The selective use of advertising in various media and with respect to various housing developments or sites can lead to discriminatory results and may indicate a violation of title VIII.

1. Selective geographic impact. Such selective use may involve the strategic placement of billboards, brochure advertisements distributed within a limited geographic area by hand or in the mail, or advertising in particular geographic coverage editions of major metropolitan newspapers, or in local newspapers which are mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular segment of the community, or in displays or announcements only in selected sales offices.

2. Selective use of equal opportunity slogan or logo. Such selective use may involve using the equal opportunity slogan or logo in advertising reaching some geographic areas, but not others, or with respect to some properties but not others.

3. Selective use of human models. Such selective advertising may also involve the use of human models primarily in media that cater to one racial or ethnic segment of the population that is not balanced by a com-

#### § 110.5 Definitions.

(a) "Department" means the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

(b) "Discriminatory housing practice" means an act that is unlawful under section 804, 805, or 806 of title VIII.

(c) "Dwelling" means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.

(d) "Family" includes a single individ-

ual.

(e) "Person" includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, jointstock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and fiduciaries.
(f) "Secretary" means the Secretary

of Housing and Urban Development.

(g) "Fair housing poster" means the poster prescribed by the Secretary for display by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

(h) "The Act" means title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601

et seq.
(i) "Person in the business of selling defined in section 803(c) of the Act.

### Subpart E—Requirements for Display of Posters

### § 110.10 Persons subject.

(a) Except to the extent that paragraph (b) of this section applies, all persons subject to section 804 of the Act, Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster as follows:

(1) With respect to a single-family dwelling (not being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings) offered for sale or rental through a real estate broker, agent, salesman, or person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, such person shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for sale or rental.

(2) With respect to all other dwellings

covered by the Act:

(i) A fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for

sale or rental, and

(ii) A fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained at the dwelling, except that with respect to a singlefamily dwelling being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, the fair housing poster may be posted and maintained at the model dwellings instead of at each of the individual dwellings.

(3) With respect to those dwellings to which subparagraph (2) of this paragraph applies, the fair housing poster must be posted at the beginning of construction and maintained throughout the period of construction and sale or rental.

(b) This part shall not require posting and maintaining a fair housing poster:

(i) On vacant land, or

(ii) At any single-family dwelling, unless such dwelling

(a) Is being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings in which circumstances a fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained as specified in paragraph (a) (2) (ii) of this section, or

(b) Is being offered for sale or rental through a real estate broker, agent, salesman, or person in the business of selling or renting dwellings in which circumstances a fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained as specified in paragraph (a) (1) of this section,

(c) All persons subject to section 805 of the Act, Discrimination in the Financing of Housing, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at all their places of business which participate in the financing of housing.

(d) All persons subject to section 806 of the Act, Discrimination in the Provision of Brokerage Services, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at all their places of business.

### § 110.15 Location of posters.

All fair housing posters shall be prominently displayed so as to be readily apparent to all persons seeking housing accommodations or financial assistance or brokerage services in connection therewith as contemplated by sections 804-806 of the Act.

### § 110.20 Availability of posters.

All persons subject to this part may obtain fair housing posters from the Department's regional and area offices. A facsimile may be used if the poster and the lettering are equivalent in size and legibility to the poster available from the Department.

#### § 110.25 Description of posters.

(a) The fair housing poster shall be 11 inches by 14 inches and shall bear the following legend:



We Do Business in Accordance With the Federal Fair Housing Law

(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) IT IS ILLEGAL

TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY PERSON BECAUSE OF RACE.

COLOR, RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN

- In the sale or rental of housing or residential lots.
- In advertising the sale or rental of hous-

In the financing of housing.

• In the provision of real estate brokerage services.

Blockbusting is also illegal.

Anyone who feels he has been discriminated against should send a complaint to:

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Washington, D.C. 20410

**HUD** Region or

#### [Area Office stamp]

(b) The Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity may grant a waiver permitting the substitution of a poster prescribed by a Federal financial regulatory agency for the fair housing poster described in paragraph (a) of this section. While such waiver remains in effect, compliance with the posting requirements of such regulatory agency shall be deemed compliance with the posting requirements of this part. Such waiver shall not affect the applicability of all other provisions of this part.

#### Subpart C-Enforcement

#### § 110.30 Effect of failure to display poster.

Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice may file a complaint with the Secretary pursuant to Part 105 of this chapter. A failure to display the fair housing poster as required by this part shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a discriminatory housing practice.

Effective date. This part shall be effective February 25, 1972, except for § 110.10(c) which shall be effective May 1, 1972.

> SAMUEL J. SIMMONS, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity.

[FR Doc.72 2262 Filed 2-15-72;8:45 am]

# APPENDIX C

### TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.

			DATE:
RE:	Renta]	l Analysis Report	
	THE	BREAKDOWN OF PERSONS BY RACE MAKING ABOUT THE TERMS AND AVAILABILITY O	•
	FOR	THE PERIOD OFTO	
		AT	APARTMENTS

	WHITE	BLACK	SPANISH	OTHER	TOTAL
MADE INQUIRY					
WERE OFFERED AN APPLICATION					
FILLED OUT AN APPLICATION					
SUBMITTED DEPOSIT WITH APPLICATION					
APPLICATIONS WITHDRAWN BEFORE PROCESSING					
APPLICATION ACCEPTED					
APPLICATIONS WITHDRAWN AFTER PROCESSING					
APPLICATIONS REJECTED					
APPLICATIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD					

### APPENDIX D

# APPLICATIONS FOR TENANCY AT APARTMENTS

JAME* DDRESS, RACE	HOME & BUSINESS PHONES	DATE OF INQUIRY	DATE OF APPLICA- TION	APPLI- CANT'S WEEKLY INCOME	SIZE, TYPE OF APT. DESIRED (Brs., Fur-nished)	MONTHLY RENTAL RATE	DESIRED DATE OF OCCUPANCY	DEPOSIT REC'D AND DATE	AND DATE	IF ACCEPTED, DATE NOTIFIED	NAME OF EMPLOYEE ACTING ON APPLICATION
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If two or more single persons are applying for one apartment, please so indicate.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	)	CIVIL ACTIONS DISTRICT COURTED. NO. 73 C 1520	V.Y
	)	UCT 29 1975	
v.	)		
TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant.	) ) )	TIME A MP.MP.MP.MP.M	
Defendant.	_ś	M'FILMED	Ī

On the application of the plaintiff, the United States of America, and after conference with the Court on September 24, 1975, it is hereby ordered that Part V(A)(2) of the Consent Order in this action filed on June 10, 1975, is hereby amended as follows:

### (a) Occupancy

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Not more than two (2) persons in a onebedroom apartment. For a two-bedroom apartment defendant shall, in a uniform manner, adhere to its past practices with respect to occupancy.

No applicant shall be denied tenancy solely on the grounds that he or she has children.

Shocklyn, New York

ORDERED this 28 That of Other

EDWARD R. NEAHER

United States District Judge

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  U.S. DESTRICT COURT
2	FASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	<b>x</b> MOV 6 1973
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
5	- against - : 73 C 1529
6	FRED C. TRUMP, et al.,
7	Defendants. :
8	x
9	U. S. Court House
10	Brooklyn, New York
11	June 10, 1975 10:00 A. M.
12	
13	Before:
14	HON. EDWARD R. NEAHER,
15	U. S. D. J.
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	BURTON SULZER
<b>2</b> 3	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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pearar	ices:
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DAVID G. TRAGER, ESQ., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

By: HENRY BRACHTL, ESQ., and MS. DONNA GOLDSTEIN, Assistant U.S. Attorneys

ROY COHN, ESQ., Attorney for Defendant

### Also Present:

A p

FRED TRUMP DONALD TRUMP IRVING ESKANAZI, ESQ.

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THE CLERK: Civil hearing, United States versus Fred Trump, et al.

THE COURT: I must say, Mr. Cohn, that this case seems to be plagued with unnecessary problems, and I think the time has come when we have to bite the bullet.

MR. COHN: We have everybody in court, your Honor. Would you like to hear from them one by one?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COHN: With his Honor's permission, Fred, could you tell Judge Neaher -- you have the final document that was proposed at the end of last week, you have read that, and I believe you have a couple of general observations that you would like personally to give to Judge Neaher in view of the fact the Government brought on this application this morning, rather than giving us the opportunity to go over this -- your Honor, if we could --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: If I may, I have to object, your Honor, to the tenor of this.

THE COURT: I don't think this procedure is in order. If Mr. Trump wants to say something to the Court, he can take the stand and be sworn and give his statement under oath.

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That would be fine, your Honor. MR. COHN:

THE COURT: But this is a government motion and I assume the Government wants to be heard.

I will give Mr. Trump -- I will give you an opportunity of course to be heard. No one is going to go away from here feeling he hasn't been heard. But as I say, my own knowledge of the history of this case leaves me in a state of puzzlement because I understood from all the papers that had heretofore been submitted that there had been a memorandum of understanding that had been executed by all the parties, and -- that is so, isn't it?

MR. COHN: The memorandum of understanding, your Honor, was not a 20-page decree. It recited some principles and then provided in the event it could not be reduced to decretal form that was satisfactory to both sides, we then were back where we were.

We have gotten the opposite direction, we have gotten to the point where we are like 99.99 per cent finished, and I think unfortunately it is just a question of a little bit of lack of patience such as last Thursday which stops us from getting there 100 per cent.

We have a document which is very close to a final

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document. It is an important thing to everybody concerned, and it is not the kind of thing you can just shove down somebody's throat.

They have come very, very close -- all that we are apart on at this point is minor language problems that if I could have gone over this with Fred Trump and Donald Trump in these couple of days we probably would have solved those as well as we have solved everything else.

But this motion has precipitated into here and we are very glad to have this forum because everybody is here -- I have nothing to add on the motion.

I submitted an affidavit explaining our position on it, and I assume your Honor does not want either side to repeat what we have already said in our papers. So we are ready. We have everybody here and if we can solve those final few problems we have got a decree.

THE COURT: You say you submitted an affidavit?

MR. COHN: Yes, your Honor, yesterday.

THE COURT: I don't recall seeing it.

MR. COHN: It was sent out to the clerk's office yesterday afternoon.

THE COURT: You say in this affidavit that a date convenient to the Court be fixed for the signing of the decree by the parties and the acceptance thereof

by the Court, which seems to suggest to me that the decree is now in form to be signed.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, frankly, it was not in form to be signed -- there are some minor language changes, which are very minor; for example, one point which Mr. Fred Trump is going to make to your Honor, which I think the Government inserted inadvertently, would have required children of opposite sex to occupy a small bedroom after they had passed an age that would be permissible from any standpoint, and a couple of little things like that.

If we had been able to work these things out after we reviewed it --

THE COURT: May I have a copy of the decree.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: The most recent decree, your

Honor?

MR. F. TRUMP: Off the record, Judge, we can sign this this morning. You call the shots, we change them, initial it and sign it. We want to get through with this.

THE COURT: I am sure the Government does, too.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: If I may take a few minutes of
your time, your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me hear from the young lady and perhaps that will expedite matters.

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MS. GOLDSTEIN: We have --

THE COURT: I have read your application. I understand your feelings in the matter.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Our concern is as happened many times before that a recitation of the facts that have come heretofore in this case is often not as we have understood them, and only so that the Court may have what we would think would be a better understanding of what has happened in this case, I would state that the memorandum of understanding clearly set out the provisions to be contained in the decree.

We believe what was left open was simply to memorialize --

THE COURT: Was a copy of that, by the way, submitted in the papers?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I have an additional copy, if you would like to see it.

THE COURT: You have a copy?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Attached to the memorandum is the consent decree initially submitted by the plaintiffs. The memorandum makes certain revisions in the consent decree and states that all other provisions are to be contained in their entirety in the final decree.

Very little, if anything, is left open in the memorandum of understanding, and essentially the next

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decree was to memorialize the settlement, all the terms of which had been agreed upon.

THE COURT: This document?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That is about the fifth one.

THE COURT: You are familiar with this one?

MR. COHN: That is --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That was submitted last week.

MR. COHN: That was submitted by the Government on Thursday, your Honor, after the conference we had in this courtroom on Tuesday. That is the final.

THE COURT: Which left me with the impression that everything had been settled, based on your statement --

MR. COHN: I think it was --

THE COURT: -- and Miss Goldstein's.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Mr. Cohn represents that minor things have always been left open, and they are merely minor revisions that we are talking about.

Since the signing of the memorandum, not minor revisions but defendants have attempted to renegotiate in toto large portions of the consent decree, entire provisions which have been agreed to in the first memorandum.

Initially, the United States, while hesitant -- and I believe the correspondence between the parties in

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this matter will bear that out -- very hesitant to renegotiate, in order to proceed to execution we have changed various portions.

We have been brought to the well so many times in this last five months that promises now that we are about to be able to drink the final drink leaves me a little skeptical, and that is why we are here today, to ask the Court's assistance for close supervision so that if the Court will not today enter this decree summarily, then for close supervision so that it may become a reality in the near future.

THE COURT: I am going to assure you you are going to have my undivided attention to the accomplishment of this decree.

What I would like to get down to is this, as I understand it we have here this memorandum of understanding, which I do recognize is to some extent a statement of principles, although I suppose certain specific provisions are made --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Specific provisions are contained, because it essentially adopts the attached consent decree.

THE COURT: All right. But now we have something which presumably is final or so close to the edge
that --

1 MR. F. TRUMP: One hour, Judge, we will be out of here.  $\mathbf{2}$ THE COURT: What are we talking about? 3 MR. COHN: In other words, you want to address 4 yourself to the final document that they produced on 5 Thursday? 6 7 THE COURT: I want to address myself to the final document to find out what point of difference there is. 8 MR. COHN: Do you want Mr. Fred Trump to testify? 9 THE COURT: Let me see for a moment. We will 10 hold that. Maybe we can accomplish this more quickly 11 than I had thought. 12 Has anyone got a marked copy of this consent 13 order? 14 MR. COHN: We have a memorandum, your Honor, with 15 the language changes we would want. 16 THE COURT: Have you seen that? 17 MS. GOLDSTEIN: We have not seen that. 18 was not --19 THE COURT: Give one to Ms. Goldstein and one to **2**0 me and maybe one to Mr. Brachtl. 21 Are you going to be a participant here? 22 MR. BRACHTL: Yes, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: It might be useful. 24 Let's turn to page 7-A, item one. 25

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MR. COHN: That, your Honor, on page 7-A-1 would refer to -- under A, the third line, "Apartments owned or managed," and it would say "Apartments owned or managed..." -- I suppose it would say "New York City properties owned or managed by the defendant, exclusive of Tysen's Park and Trump Village."

The reason for that is, of course, Trump Village is a Mitchel-Llama project, and I think -- Tysen's is a federal project and I think we are all agreed that the same effect is accomplished with reference to them without requiring additional record keeping and things like that.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We have excluded Tysen's and Trump Village from particular provisions which would affect their obligations under the federal statutes that they were constructed under, such as tenancy requirements, objective criteria for accepting tenants and things like that.

These provisions they are talking about are simply provisions to notify the community of vacancies, and I see no reason why two particular projects, while federally funded and state project, should not be included in the provisions that notify the community as to vacancies.

These were, previous to coming in today -- all

these had been agreed upon on numerous occasions.

THE COURT: May I inquire, is Tysen's Park and Trump Village managed by Trump?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Owned and managed.

MR. COHN: Yes. These are the two buildings, your Honor, one is under state supervision under the Mitchel-Llama Act; Tysen's is already under federal supervision.

I think we had all agreed that it was unnecessary to have them in this.

Now, apparently what Miss Goldstein --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: One project does have a racial composition, which is virtually white and would be an important project to include under the decree.

We might go through these. I don't want to hold up settlement on minor points, you know, but you renegotiate and renegotiate so many times.

MR. FRED TRUMP: Why don't you exclude them, Donna. We are giving you a lot of buildings. It's burdensome so far as the money is concerned, also.

MR. COHN: Mr. Fred Trump wanted to tell your Honor, on 23 points which the Government made here, we have given almost totally, and some of them are very much against everyone's better judgment, in an attempt to get this done.

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Mr. Trump himself and Mr. Eskanazi, an attorney who has been very constructive working with us, have gone to Washington rather than have the folks come up here to try and hammer this thing out.

THE COURT: Miss Goldstein, is there anything about the status of those two, Tysen's Park and Trump Village, which would insure that the availability of nondiscriminatory housing message would come through other agencies or anything of that sort?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: There presently is not. There are no requirements that I am aware of and no civil rights enforcement by the state and federal government with respect to the operation of these kinds of projects.

We are talking about two very different kinds of projects. Tysen's Park is in Staten Island and while not large it does have a significant minority population, as we understand it.

MR. F. TRUMP: Over 30 per cent.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I had understood it to be approximately eight or ten per cent. But unlike what we have alleged to exist at other Trump properties.

Trump Village, however, is very representative of what we allege to be the reputation of the Trump properties in the community, and of the racial composition of the Trump properties. It is an exclusively

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or almost exclusively white project. It is a very desirable project.

We have agreed to exclude it from certain provisions which would be offensive to the regulations that it was set up under. They have to give certain preferences in tenant selections to veterans and other groups because it is a state Mitchel-Llama project, and they have accepted in the decree provisions that would interfere with that; however, it is a very desirable project.

THE COURT: Would there be created some false impression about their availability in the light of the exceptions you have later agreed to?

In other words, if, on the one hand, you say -I realize this is simply to notify the Open Housing
Center that these are available to all qualified persons,
and so forth --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: No, your Honor, I don't think that would open.

THE COURT: That somebody would then go to Tysen's Park or Trump Village and say "We have been told something" and then --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That would simply place these people in the same position that thousands of New Yorkers are in.

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Trump Village does have a waiting list.

MR. ESKANAZI: My name is Irving Eskanazi, your Honor. This would probably clear up the matter.

As far as Trump Village is concerned, there has not been, for a good number of years, any advertising whatsoever because there is an extensive waiting list which is supervised by the State Department, as far as when the people first entered their names — they are kept in the proper order, et cetera.

Therefore, listing vacancies with Open Housing would not accomplish anything but merely give the people who inquired at Open Housing the opportunity of joining the waiting list.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Then all that we would be doing is, the decree requires only to provide vacancies that exist.

Excepting Trump Village under the circumstances that have just been discussed would really serve no purpose. If there is no vacancy then they shall not be included. Advertising requires them, that when they do advertise vacancies they advertise in a certain manner. To include it blanketly from the decree would give a message to all those that read it that Trump Village does not subscribe to the same equal opportunity requirements as the rest of the Trump properties, and

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that is misleading.

MR. COHN: We are not talking to Judge Neaher's point, which seems to be very cogent.

You have agreed to exclude these two from what would be meaningful provisions of the decree that would apply to other buildings because we all recognize that it is under state and federal regulation already.

Having excluded them, if you stick them in back at another point and have these notices sent to Open Housing, it will in effect mislead --

THE COURT: What would be a specimen of one of these special provisions respecting these two?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Footnote 3 on page 10.

There is a provision in the decree whereby for buildings with insignificant numbers of black and Spanish tenants that a certain -- the Open Housing Center shall be given a three-day jump to fill an apartment. Because Trump Village has to give preference to certain tenants and does have a long waiting list, we have excluded it from that provision.

We have excluded Tysen's Park on page -
THE COURT: Let me ask this, where does it say
they are excluded?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Third footnote. This provision shall not apply to Trump Village. On page 12, footnote

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one, the part where it goes through the objective rental criterion standards for determining the eligibility of tenants.

Footnote one excludes Tysen's Park because it is subject to other federal regulations with respect to tenant eligibility. Those are specific exclusions.

We did not wish to make a blanket exclusion that would appear to the public to be taking large projects outside of the requirements of the equal housing — the equal housing opportunity requirements that the defendants were agreeing to.

I don't see how it serves any function on properties that --

MR. COHN: If we are dealing with a cosmetic problem, how about this: Instead of mentioning them by name, saying apartments owned or managed by the defendant, parentheses, with the exceptions noted in the footnotes on page 10 and page 12. If they are worried about --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Someone who is going to read it is going to read it wrong.

MR. COHN: What prospective person wants to go and rent an apartment for \$175 a month and is going to come and read a 30-page consent decree?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We don't want to be unreasonable

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your Honor, but --

MR. F. TRUMP: We have discussed this for days and days.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We want a decree to be entered and we don't to be unreasonable. I suppose that partly one of the reasons that I have retained the position I have today is that provisions have been -- we have spent days upon days renegotiating this decree and each time we sit down new provisions need to be changed.

THE COURT: Suppose, if one can be very neutral,

I understand your point and I think there is merit to
the Government's point here.

Suppose one were simply to say, without regard to race, color, as hereinafter provided. You don't mention -- you understand?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I am not following you.

THE COURT: That apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin, as hereinafter provided.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The only problem is the defendants are under an injunction, a general injunction that all their properties, regardless of the type of properties they are, and whether they are excluded from affirmative provisions -- they are under a general injunction to make

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apartments available to all qualified persons.

THE COURT: I did not say they were not. I just said that they are available as hereinafter provided.

Do you understand?

Then whatever the difference is with respect to Trump or Tysen's will be governed by the more particular provisions hereinafter provided, if that makes the difference.

Do you understand?

MR. COHN: It seems like a perfect solution.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: It appears to me that putting that in would make it appear that Trump Village and Tysen's were not included in the general injunctive provisions which require them to make it available to all -- I may not understand you, but it seems to be a little misleading in terms of --

THE COURT: Well, in 10, what do you say, you say under 3 --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We don't --

THE COURT: You say this provision, which is the triple asterisk, shall not apply to Trump Village, but which provision do you mean?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The entire provision B that requires them to hold a property off the market for three days. But not the provision that requires them to --

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THE COURT: All right. So my point is, as hereinafter provided simply means that if someone goes to
Tysen's Village then you turn not to the first sentence,
which is the general blanket cosmetic approach, which
I am attempting to preserve for you, and at the same
time to satisfy these gentlemen that they are not in
some way losing the benefit of whatever is provided
more specifically in 10 and 12. I don't want to overbear you on that. I am simply a mediator here attempting
to satisfy both sides because personally I do think it
is important that you should not say on page 7 that
except for Trump Village and Tysen's Park everything
else is available.

I am simply saying all are available as hereinafter provided.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand my point?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That's fine.

MR. COHN: On the same page --

THE COURT: Where would we put that?

MR. COHN: After the words "national origin."

THE COURT: "...are available as hereinafter provided to all qualified persons, or are available to all as hereinafter..." --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Without regard to race, color,

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religion or national origin, as hereinafter provided.

THE COURT: May I mark this copy?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, you may, your Honor.

THE COURT: The mechanical details should wait.

I know they are a problem but I am trying to say to
you it might be that the Government, having recognized
the special exceptions will apply, it may be realized
also in some difference in treatment with respect to
record keeping -- I would expect that to be so, I don't
know, and that is what we are talking about here. Do
you understand?

MR. F. TRUMP: We were thinking they would be excluded because they are under restrictive -- highly restricted now. We don't pick the people.

THE COURT: I don't think either from your standpoint, and certainly not from the Government's, that it would look well for you to be attempting to, let us say -- I don't know much about Tysen's Park, but Trump Village, being a large and prominent --

MR. F. TRUMP: How many units in Trump Village,
Donna? They are co-ops. We have nothing to do with
3,000 families.

THE COURT: It is partly co-op?

MR. F. TRUMP: Three thousand were co-op and 880 are rental.

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THE COURT: It is all Trump Village?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: 880 apartments are a significant number of apartments to New Yorkers.

MR. F. TRUMP: On those two buildings, forget about it, the State takes care of everything. select --

MR. COHN: What Judge Neaher is saying, nobody is disagreeing with any of that, we are saying by calling special attention to them there in the opening sentence instead of on pages 10 and 12, where the exceptions are noted, you might be creating --

The details -- if you are interested THE COURT: in conserving expenditure of funds, which is understandable, if that is a major point here, I don't believe the Government would be unreasonable when you are not called upon to deal with the vast majority of housing that is involved here.

MR. COHN: If they are, I assume you are going to retain jurisdiction at the foot of the decree and we will come to you?

THE COURT: If any difficulties come up we will try to iron them out.

MR. COHN: The next point, we agreed to forward the statement of vacancies to the Open Housing Center. That was all right. We agreed to that after a lot of

discussion.

Then they go ahead and put in language saying the Open Housing Center, having received it, may at its own discretion forward copies of the above-mentioned letter and weekly list of vacancies to any and all persons or organizations with an interest in promoting equal housing opportunities.

What permeates the whole decree is a limitation as to numbers of groups, of do-good groups which are to be involved in this process, because we all agree, without impugning their motives in any way, it leads to an enormous volume of confusion, of extra work for superintendents, the office in processing applications, and we have selected the Open Housing Center, the Urban League, we have agreed to advertise not in every paper but in certain selected papers, on a sort of rigid basis, which both sides have agreed to.

We don't mind notifying Open Housing, but if there is an indiscriminate right to flood every organization with copies of lists of our vacancies, it is just going to not accomplish anything but a total amount of confusion.

First of all, really chaos, and by the time they get our -- our experience has been, as I understand, because we have done some of this before, by the time

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they get through distributing it has all become obsolete anyway: Places are rented, and the superintendents, the clerical help go crazy.

So we want some kind of a break on however this is to flood forward once we comply with the provision they want, which is to notify the Open Housing Center, and not have something in here which says at its own discretion forward copies to any and all persons and organizations with an interest in promoting equal housing opportunities.

I think that is what that is about.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Just to put this in perspective and get a little history of that paragraph, our initial memorandum of understanding stated that there would be approximately three or four groups to which this information would be sent.

After the decree had been entered, and when Mr. Eskanazi and Mr. Trump, in April or May, I don't remember when, came down to finish off the consent decree, and I spent the entire day with Mr. Eskanazi, it was agreed by Mr. Eskanazi, and I believe this was his suggestion, that rather than have the paper work of sending them constantly to four groups, why not send them to Open Housing Center and let them distribute it.

So at his suggestion, and to eliminate the need to

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send them to more than one group, this was put in.

If the defendants wish to go back to three specific groups to send this to, we will be more than happy to make the provision. This has gone through much negotiation since then and this has not been brought up as a sticky-wit, so I am a little confused at this late stage of the game to have them now want to change it.

THE COURT: You are concerned because of the gradual broadcast of these vacancies, if they are, and the lapse in time, that you will be flooded with people coming to the apartments which are no longer available; is that right?

MR. COHN: That is one concern.

The second concern is this: We think the notification to the Open Housing Center does it. They see the people directly. That accomplishes it and why do we have to have a proliferation now to give a bow to three other or five other or ten other -- the Open Housing Center, this is its function.

THE COURT: In addition to the Open Housing, what would have been the other groups you had in mind, what would they add to it?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We were -- there are a number of fair housing groups in the area, in the metropolitan

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area: The Human Rights Commission is a possible source.

Various other groups have housing -- we never sat down and worked out the specific groups. There are other groups similar to the Open Housing Center. Open Housing Center is one operation, has one small office and a very limited staff.

If the Open Housing Center initially, because they don't have the resources to have the impact on the community to distribute this literature, does --

THE COURT: Are there not certain advertising provisions that do also come into play?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can understand your position here but, on the other hand, as a practical matter, I can also understand that if these things are dispatched over the city it will generate a lot of activity for the management dealing with people who get there long after the apartment has been rented.

I can see what it really means is a long flow of inquiry, mail and so forth, which may not really accomplish the Government's purpose. It may even indeed cause people to expend monies to travel to these places and everything else, all in vain.

On the other hand, isn't it enough to, with the other advertising provisions and so forth, to eliminate

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this sort of broadcast --

Is this a standard provision, by the way, or was this tailored --

> MS. GOLDSTEIN: Notification to groups? THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: There are two kinds of notification in here: One is absolutely standard; the other one is done frequently, depending on the size of the operation, the nature of the volume and the need in the community, but it is done frequently. It is not uniform. One of them which notifies the community of the general equal housing opportunities pursuant to this decree, and the terms of the decree, is fairly uniform; otherwise the impact of the decree would significantly be less.

THE COURT: This distribution by the Housing --MS. GOLDSTEIN: The term of list of vacancies, this is done in a significant portion of our decrees, but not necessarily in all the decrees.

MR. COHN: Unfortunately, your Honor, the ones I have seen do not have them, which is a problem that I encountered. Your Honor put his finger right on it.

There are pages of subsequent provisions requiring detailed listings, advertising in El Dario, Amsterdam News, so on and so forth.

This is more or less general language at the beginning and they selected the Open Housing Center THE COURT: Let me ask you, though, as a practical I have an idea --THE COURT: Once the Open Housing Center gets this information, what is to stop them from dispersing MR. COHN: I don't know what is to stop them, but I don't want to encourage them. MS. GOLDSTEIN: That's okay if we take it out. The Open Housing Center can operate at its own discre-MR. COHN: Your Honor, how about the --THE COURT: Remember that one. You won that one. They can use their own discretion,

she said, which is the same as what is in there. We want

THE COURT: What is coming out?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The last sentence, "The Open Housing Center may at its own discretion..."

> THE COURT: That's out.

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MR. F. TRUMP: Thank you, Judge.

MR. COHN: The next page -- I don't think there

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minority people living in Tysen's, but even if we take Miss Goldstein's figure and she said ten per cent, one of the -- it happens to be a little higher, but one of the distinctions in the agreement is even if we list with Open Housing, they want us to list and hold for three days --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Only properties with less than ten per cent minority.

MR. ESKANAZI: This one meets the criteria.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: It will not be included in that provision because it does have a significant population

MR. COHN: They want to know how do we say that it is not included because of that.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That is a different provision.

MR. COHN: How do we in this provision -- I think they are viewing this from a standpoint -- they have to be careful because if somebody is generous as you or I -- there might be future problems here as to what that means. I think they want to make sure --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Why should Tysen's be excluded?

MR. COHN: Because you have just said Tysen's
is in fact excluded now because Tysen's has over the
minority percentage, which results in the exclusion.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Tysen's is, by operation of the provision, excluded from provision B on page 10. I made

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no statement with respect to its inclusion or exclusion from the advertising provisions on page 8.

Our understanding was that all properties, all advertising when done would fall within certain regulations prescribed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

MR. COHN: Suppose Tysen had 70 per cent blacks, minority, okay, but they had a vacancy. Under your reading of this, would the advertising --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Under the advertising provision which follows the HUD Guidelines, all advertising, if done -- we are not requiring you to advertise if you have no vacancies, we have not telling you which building to advertise, we are requiring that you follow the advertising procedures you use now and that all advertising, simple three-word statement, "equal housing opportunities," be included, as required by the HUD guidelines.

THE COURT: I am having a problem understanding your problem here, I must say, on this one.

In other words, as I understand it, if you do advertise either generally or with respect to any particular building, your advertising has to comply with this. But that as I understand it without relationship to the question -- for instance, is it

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likely that you would be advertising for Tysen's, for instance?

MR. ESKANAZI: Yes. I think the point is, your Honor, that the premise of this whole hearing supposedly, the whole case is based on the fact that the Government is looking to achieve integration in areas where it does not exist.

Now, in Tysen's Park it does exist. It is recognized and admitted by Miss Goldstein. It is also a unique project in that it is the only one we own that is supervised by the Federal Government.

MR. COHN: That is the footnote on page 12.

MR. D. TRUMP: This advertising, while it's, you know -- I imagine it's necessary from the Government's standpoint, is a very expensive thing for us. It is really onerous. Each sentence we put in is going to cost us a lot of money over the period we are supposed to do it.

Tysen's Park, where Miss Goldstein does admit
there live a large percentage of minorities, while she
uses the figure ten per cent, I can attest to the fact
that it is maybe in excess of thirty per cent. I don't
see why we have to go through the expense of adding
these lines to every newspaper where we advertise in
the New York Times, the Staten Island Press, or the

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different papers, because, quite honestly, it is very expensive.

MR. F. TRUMP: I have the New York Times today. There are 2,100 ads. We have about ten ads in here, or eight ads.

We would have to, after signing this decree, put "equal housing opportunity" underneath each of our ten ads. They are only small ads, like one-inch, twelve lines, ten lines, eight lines, but we would have ten and we would have to put in this ten different places, the 2,100 -- there isn't one other advertiser in the New York Times who does that. I think it is discriminatory against us; it is expensive and it makes us appear foolish and we will be the laughing stock of the real estate industry.

I think that should be left out altogether.

THE COURT: These ads, what do they look like?

MR. F. TRUMP: "Equal housing opportunity."

MR. COHN: Mr. Trump has now gone on to the next point, which requires on ads of more than eight lines of action print that "equal housing opportunity" be displayed.

He is telling your Honor that this is a discriminatory provision because if you go through the whole paper you won't find one other builder or developer who is

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required to do that.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, the HUD advertising guidelines, given significant weight by a number of courts in these cases, by practically all courts in these cases, require the use of "equal housing opportunity" and in certain circumstances what is called the equal housing opportunity logos, which is for display ads which the defendants do not use.

Papers throughout the country -- if you pick up the Washington Post, if you pick up almost any large city newspaper, the use of "equal housing opportunity" is a frequent occurrence.

MR. D. TRUMP: Not for an eight-line ad.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: An eight-line ad is not considered in the industry as a small ad.

MR. F. TRUMP: We were not convicted. We would win this case if we fought it.

THE COURT: Don't be too sure of that.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: An eight-line ad is not considered a small ad.

In fact, an eight-line ad is considered a significant size ad. We generally do it in three or more lines, but agreed to increase it to eight lines for the defendants.

The Washington Post, the Boston papers, the

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Philadelphia papers, this would not appear at all unusual.

What the defendants are saying, since no other apartment owners follow the guidelines, we should not be obliged to.

Perhaps what they are speaking to is need for greater enforcement by the Civil Rights Division, something that the Civil Rights Division, since it came into this case -- we are very concerned about the fact that the classified advertising in New York City in no case includes this.

However, this is a situation where we have alleged that the defendants discriminate, have even engaged in a pattern in practice of continual discrimination against blacks in New York City; that they have developed a discriminatory image in the city.

We have never entered into in a case of this kind a consent decree without requirements that the HUD guidelines be followed and the defendants have agreed to this on a number of occasions.

The first memorandum of understand contained this. The second one -- we have never, and at all times have made it very clear to them that this was an integral part of the decree.

Now, at the more than eleventh hour we again are

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renegotiating what we have indicated was one of the more significant parts of the decree.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, you say in addition to all advertising placed, and so forth, that it shall conform to the practices recommended in the HUD advertising guidelines.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That would be with respect to when a logo would have to be used.

THE HUD guideline states that all ads should have equal housing opportunities. We have limited it to eight. With respect to the use of a logo, which the HUD guidelines talks about in terms of display ads which are generally known as ads that are bordered and set off, and then the logo consists of the outline of a house with an equal sign, and it is known in the community as equal housing opportunity logo.

With respect to that we just said, in addition, that is additional to the eight-line requirement all other ads will just conform to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

MR. F. TRUMP: We don't have any display ads.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Fine. We are not requiring you to use them.

MR. F. TRUMP: We are the only ones in the New York Times that would have that. I think that is

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terrible and it certainly is discriminatory.

MR. ESKANAZI: To give you an idea of lineage, the publishing business, they classify fourteen lines as equal to an inch, so when we speak of eight lines, we are saying any ad that would be just over a half inch in size or more, which would be requiring that. So if we advertise fourteen buildings, we would have that fourteen times.

MR. D. TRUMP: That means fourteen lines, and it is very expensive.

MR. COHN: The plain fact, and this is probably everything looking down our list of problems, this is
probably the problem because the others are very, very
small. This is a basic one because it is awfully hard
to say to people when you pick up the newspapers and
go through two thousand ads a day -- we have been doing
it for over three months now since this provision was
proposed and we have yet to find one -- why them?

Because they are cooperating here and taking a consent decree, why should they be singled out for treatment that is harsher and which would put them in a completely unique position, cost them a great deal of money, accomplish next to nothing as a practical result, and just make them the guinea pigs in a way that I can't tell clients it's not discriminatory

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when they have read probably a total of 300,000 ads and have yet to find one which does what they are being asked to do here.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I have not done a survey the defendants claim they have done, but I have --

MR. F. TRUMP: Two thousand ads.

THE COURT: I have to take a quick look at the --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I have participated, going on three years, in these decrees, and we have never entered into one that does not contain this.

They are not in the same position that the other property owners in that newspaper are in that they have been charged with a serious violation of the Civil Rights Act, which they have agreed to settle by consent.

MR. F. TRUMP: There is never an ad in. We have checked it for three months and there is not one.

MR. D. TRUMP: We haven't found one in any other paper in New York.

MR. COHN: Looking at all this language, as I say, this is the last big problem, and if you look down the list, there just isn't anything, but this is an awfully basic one.

If these people, who, as Mr. Trump keeps pointing out, there wasn't a trial, and a consent decree is in the spirit of just that, and I think they have gone so

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is the most important.

We have tried to take a composite here and do something in every regard. If we advertise in the Amsterdam News and El Dario we hardly are advertising something that is in a discriminatory fashion.

We are yielding to the Government here and putting in ads in minority papers themselves.

On top of that, to make us the only people in the history of New York City, when we have gone over 300,000 ads and have yet to see this on the part of any other builder or developer, it just seems grossly unfair and discriminatory.

MR. BRACHTL: Your Honor, it appears to me from the citation to the HUD regulations that the date of those regulations postdates the Lefrak decree, which is regarded a significant decree in this area, which may explain that difference with respect to that decree.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: We have been following these guidelines.

MR. BRACHTL: It seems to me that when the purpose of this decree is to assure affirmative action, that advertising really is at the heart of the decree.

THE COURT: I can understand that.

The only thing that bothers me a little bit was

I never thought of advertising in the sense of the tiny

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far, as you go through this decree, the notifications, the lists of vacancies, it is --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Advertising is the most significant thing they do. They advertise. They do a great deal of advertising. Their average ad is approximately fourteen or fifteen lines, as has been represented to me.

This is the most effective way to reach the public.

A person who is looking for an apartment in New York

goes to the newspapers. Open Housing Center can do

just so much. They have limited clientele and very,

very limited resources. We are not dealing with a large

operation.

As I say, there has been not one decree entered in a Title 8 suit by my office that has -- brought by my office -- that has not contained provision following the HUD guidelines and requiring the use of equal opportunity --

MR. F. TRUMP: Lefrak does not do it.

MR. COHN: It just isn't there. Nobody has this.

Judge, every point we talk about, about notification, Miss Goldstein says this is the most important. When we leave this she is going to tell us that the Open Housing Center is the most important. Then El Dario and the Amsterdam News and the minority press

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ads saying that a particular apartment or two or three is available. I have always thought of advertising, indeed, it might be said to be something like this, for instance, a long blurb about a whole building advertising availability, generally.

Even on this page, Starrett City, where we know from passing it by on the Parkway that it is a huge complex, unquestionably with many apartments available --

MR. F. TRUMP: That is very important to us, that equal housing, and there is one thing after that --

THE COURT: Let me say this, I think I can see where in multiplying these tiny ads with these extra lines it could conceivably be a very expensive item.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The defendants' ads are not tiny.

A 14-line ad is not considered tiny in the industry, your

Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know whether they are all --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The ads that I have seen of the --

MR. F. TRUMP: One-inch is fourteen lines.

MR. D. TRUMP: It is a very small ad.

THE COURT: They get fourteen lines in one inch?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, perhaps we could work out a rotating proportion, that is, every other ad, to cut the expense in half.

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MR. D. TRUMP: Will you pay for the expense, Donna?

MR. BRACHTL: We have heard much about the expense, and I was wondering what the number of ads is that exceeds eight lines, what the total advertising budget is and what the cost is of inserting these three words in each ad.

MR. COHN: We can tell you something about that right now, but I want to say that it almost seems that by insisting on this you defeat your own purpose.

If I picked up a newspaper and was looking for an apartment, if I were in a minority group and I saw ten ads or eight ads out of over two thousand which said "equal housing opportunity," or something, and not one other did, I would almost assume that the others all do not have equal housing opportunity and I was confined to these eight or ten.

That is the last impression they want to create because their point is that everybody is bound by this.

MR. BRACHTL: We will take the risk.

MR. COHN: If a minority person is looking and sees eight or ten have this logo and 1990 don't, it is almost going to seem that the others do not observe the law insofar as this is concerned.

If you read this, Judge Neaher, in line with the

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other provisions of this decree where you had the advertising equally in minority newspapers, the furnishing of lists to the Urban League, the record-keeping system, the constant notification system to add to all of that the fact that in every relatively small ad they have got to be the one person in the history of the City of New York to do this in the form of a consent decree seems grossly unfair.

MR. BRACHTL: Mr. Cohn, you have digressed from my question. Now if you would respond to the inquiry about the --

MR. COHN: I don't think you were here -- cost of the ad? When we talked about the lineage, you were not here. I think that Donna is familiar with that.

There are, I suppose, more than most people, we do run some larger ads. This logo would not be in at all. It would be in some. That's the way it would be.

MR. BRACHTL: Expense was put forth as the primary objection, and I am curious about the expense.

MR. F. TRUMP: We would be the laughing stock of the industry if we were the only ones that had --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I don't think the defendants are in a position to say they will be the laughing stock of the industry.

THE COURT: You might be commended.

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MS. GOLDSTEIN: New York City is a little behind other cities in the use of advertising. I don't believe this will continue for very long.

You won't find too many other cities in situations like this. You pick up the Washington Post and it is a common occurrence. It is not -- the other defendants have not been subject to a suit under Title 8.

The HUD guidelines are very explicit and it is -this provision is considered to be the most effective,
and one of the very most important in a consent decree
of this kind.

To say that they are going to be the laughing stock I think is simply not the question here before the Court.

MR. COHN: Are these other ads all in compliance with HUD regulations which don't have the logo?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Apparently not.

MR. COHN: Apparently there is a custom and usage which has been recognized on the point of every builder and developer.

Your Honor pointed to Starrett, which is a good example. It is not done and the Government has never asked them to do that.

In a decree here and in a period of over three years since this regulation was specifically promulgated,

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which they say, and I read it a little differently, supports this, nothing has been done with reference to the others.

So we are now asked to have this and it is -
MS. GOLDSTEIN: We are negotiating the resolution
of a claim, Mr. Cohn, a claim by the United States of
a continuing practice over a long period of time of
racial discrimination which has caused most Trump property in New York to be virtually all white.

MR. F. TRUMP: We deny that.

MR. D. TRUMP: You should even be allowed to say that.

THE COURT: How long did you have in mind that this requirement would endure?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Two years.

MR. ESKANAZI: If we refer ourselves to the HUD guidelines, there is language in there, and I think the spirit of the HUD guidelines is such where they want to avoid what Donna is asking us to do. They mention in language they don't want advertising made where you single out a particular group.

I think if two thousand ads in the <u>Times</u> don't say anything, in twelve of ours it will say "equal opportunity," we are more or less putting up a red flag saying we will take minority groups -- the others

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may not, but we will.

The HUD guidelines specifically --

MR. BRACHTL: That is to be applauded.

THE COURT: Not necessarily. That is the whole problem with schools and everything else.

MR. ESKANAZI: It can be overdone.

MR. BRACHTL: I gather, however, at least the expense claim is no longer put forth.

THE COURT: You probably ought to grab the applicants that read the New York Times.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: What Mr. Eskanazi brings up about the HUD guidelines, it is the practice of the defendants to take certain properties and only use them there.

You find large developers which operate properties which have a sufficient black population and some with almost white, the slogan and the logo may be run only in his properties in which he is trying to appeal to minority groups; that is a term of art in the industry and it is called stealing, and that is what the HUD guidelines are aimed at.

THE COURT: Is there any way, looking over at the next provision with respect to the black and Puerto Rican communities monthly 15-line display ads, is it possible to solve this by having them place at some periodic interval a larger ad for Trump buildings, or

what have you, in which this would appear?

This might even get Starrett to do it, figuring this is a good --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Trump owns a significant portion of Starrett.

MR. D. TRUMP: We are limited partners in that, really nothing to do with it.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: It can be perhaps handled by increasing the number of ads and the size of ads in the black and Puerto Rican press, or --

THE COURT: I was thinking that in addition to the black and Puerto Rican -- of course, it says in media directed primarily toward --

MR. F. TRUMP: Anyway, to leave those ads out is really repulsive. The New York Times is the greatest minority newspaper, and to --

MR. D. TRUMP: Anybody looking for an apartment in New York is going to pick up the New York Times, whether black or Puerto Rican.

THE COURT: Would you object to the requirement that on, say, whatever this is, a monthly basis for the next two years you insert some kind of large general ad which included this equal housing opportunity and fair housing logo?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: I have another alternative, your

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Honor.

How about having them, as we do with the other provisions, advertise equal housing opportunities for properties with say a black percentage occupancy, percentage of less than 15 per cent?

MR. COHN: We might have an answer.

THE COURT: Is it possible to do that?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: They have to keep records, in any They will have the records available -event.

THE COURT: What I am trying to say is, here we seem to be concerned with the development of individual apartments that come on the market and an ad goes in, a little ad.

MR. F. TRUMP: It is one in that building, two in this building, nothing big.

THE COURT: All I am saying, actually I am not altogether sure that I would ever construe this requirement as fitting within the confines of something an inch high, honestly I wouldn't. Perhaps I don't live in Washington. I have daughters there and I go there and I see the Washington Post a couple of times a year. The next time I go there I am going down to look and see if they are there.

It is obvious that nobody else here will have it in, but I think there is something to be said, the

defendant is in a lawsuit, claims have been made, in 1 requiring them to place some kind of advertising in a 2 paper such as this or in the Sunday Real Estate, maybe 3 in the Sunday papers. 4 MR. COHN: Would this solve it? This whole 5 decree is cast around quarterly reporting. Suppose we 6 take a large ad quarterly --7 MS. GOLDSTEIN: That is three times a year, your 8 Honor. 9 MR. ESKANAZI: Two inches, three inches, four 10 inches, and rotate so each time we throw an ad like 11 that it would be a different building, so eventually 12 we would reach all our buildings. 13 THE COURT: Three times a year is not very much. 14 MR. ESKANAZI: Four times a year. 15 MR. COHN: Let's say every ad over five inches 16 or six inches. 17 MR. D. TRUMP: We have many ads over five inches, 18 I would say. 19 MS. GOLDSTEIN: May I make one additional point, 20 your Honor? I know we are stretching your patience 21 considerably. 22 THE COURT: I am an exceedingly patient man. 23 I am really interested in trying to work out something 24 here which I think is going to be realistic and not 25

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just because it is acceptable to the defendant. I really shrink at the thought that this statement would appear in those tiny little ads.

Remember landlords in this city have many burdens, there is no question about that, and that is one of the big problems about this city. What I am trying to say is I really think there ought to be at least a monthly ad here of some sort.

I was thinking -- I don't know whether you do
this or not, something that would be visible to the eye,
three or four-inch ad, or whatever it is. I don't know
whether you do that.

MR. F. TRUMP: You want one a month, Judge? We will put three or four buildings together and say it once a month.

MR. COHN: Judge, we will do that.

THE COURT: Can't we insure that the buildings rotate? I don't know whether it is possible --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: How many buildings are we choosing, one building to be advertised?

MR. ESKANAZI: I think it should be up to us, as many as we see fit: two, three, four.

THE COURT: Subject to your surveillance, wouldn't it be? If you have a complaint about it you make the complaint. In other words, the idea is that it will,

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the advertising will apply to all their buildings, I take it, and to comply with the spirit of this I think all of them at one time or another in a revolving way should turn up in these ads.

MR. D. TRUMP: Could we do this, once a month we will take a certain number, not just a big blank ad that says "Trump Equal Housing," but once a month if we take it on a rotating basis, you have twelve months, and if we could take three or four buildings, put them together and then at the bottom of that, we will take three or four Queens buildings, three or four different Brooklyn buildings, and over the period of twelve months we have covered all of our buildings, and then some, and probably we will go over some two or three times.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Can they be a display advertisement --

MR. D. TRUMP: They are expensive. Nobody uses that.

MR. ESKANAZI: This is a misunderstanding as to the terminology or definition of display, because I think you will see that in the next point when they talk about El Dario or Amsterdam News, where they speak of 15-line display ads, they are talking about something of one inch.

I think the Government speaks in terms of display

ad as merely signifying a black line around the ad.

MR. D. TRUMP: If we can do that I think it would be satisfactory.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Can we agree to a size?

MR. COHN: Three inches?

MR. ESKANAZI: Three inches or more.

THE COURT: We will say at least three inches.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: What Mr. Brachtl and I have been considering is the significant decrease in the number of properties and impact that this provision would incur, decrease in terms of frequency, impact, number of properties that it will cover as opposed to the provision that the defendants signed, agreed to solely on the consideration of putting off a trial date and that would have been part and parcel of each subsequent agreement.

The defendants have agreed to this provision.

They now come into court and say to your Honor it is unreasonable. I think even considering the equities, the defendants had reached a settlement agreement and this provision was included. It is not an unreasonable provision.

I wonder whether there could be this compromise, however, from going to every-day ad to one add once a month, which would only cover a small percentage of

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their buildings.

MR. BRACHTL: Perhaps a flat percentage, perhaps 50 per cent; in other words, all offerings considered as a unit, the offer of one apartment in one newspaper on one day. If 50 per cent of those offerings are units included with the logo -- not the logo, but the recitation of "equal housing opportunities," then -- otherwise what we are describing here is a reduction from daily coverage to twelve times a year, once a month; and, further, to reduce from what appeared to be a fair number of ads each day to just three or four once a month, which means that we will have a reduction in the coverage or the exposure in this advertising program down to about one per cent.

THE COURT: Don't you think you get more visibility with a larger ad? That certainly attracts my attention.

The first time I glance at the paper I look at the large ads.

MR. BRACHTL: In whatever manner the defendants would wish to connect the recitation, the equal housing opportunity recitation with specific ads, would be up to them, but the requirement would be that 50 per cent of these advertising units, that is one apartment being offered on one day, would have to be associated either

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in a block or individually with this recitation.

If they wish to block all of their ads together, if they wish to diminish their advertising from seven days a week to one day a week, whatever their advertising is, 50 per cent of the units offered, considering a unit, as I say, the offer of an apartment on a day, would have to be associated with either in a block or separately with this recitation of "equal housing opportunities," unless they cut their advertising costs any way they wish to.

MR. D. TRUMP: We have to pay for that extra line.

MR. F. TRUMP: Then we are the only ones in there.

MR. D. TRUMP: You can't really block them together anyway in most cases because in most cases if you notice it is in the specific borough and location, such as Luna Park, let's say, Forest Hills, they are all in different locations.

If we own ten buildings in Brooklyn, they are going to be four or five inches apart, or maybe twelve inches apart, in an entirely different column; in the Luna Park section, the Brighton Beach section.

MR. BRACHTL: If that is true, then there will be difficulty conforming to your program.

THE COURT: The difficulty in consolidating in one ad would be in a particular section at a time; that is

Brooklyn one time, Queens, whatever.

MR. D. TRUMP: We are willing to do that.

MR. BRACHTL: That means about once a year Brooklyn, for example, would have three or four apartments advertised with the equal opportunities.

MR. COHN: How does this read, with reference to advertising for New York City buildings, the words "equal housing opportunity" and the fair housing logo shall appear in an ad to run once a month, of a minimum of three inches in the New York Times, and specific apartments shall be advertised and the buildings advertised shall be rotated on a sectional basis so that all Trump New York City buildings shall be covered in such ads over the course of a year at least once, one or more times?

MR. F. TRUMP: We were just talking about, not the logo, we were just talking about the line "equal opportunity."

THE COURT: You can't put a logo?

MR. F. TRUMP: That would make a display ad out of it.

MR. COHN: We are talking about the words "equal housing opportunity."

THE COURT: I don't know what the newspaper rules are.

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MS. GOLDSTEIN: I suppose every newspaper is different.

MR. F. TRUMP: If you put the logo in it is considered a display ad.

We are talking about equal housing opportunity.

We were not asked to put a logo in because that is a

larger ad.

MR. COHN: Then we would agree that the words "shall be prominently placed and easily legible," meaning the words "equal housing opportunity," shall be -- with reference to advertising for New York City buildings --

THE COURT: You would have to modify A --

MR. COHN: I was going to strike out A from the word "include" down to the fifth line, the word "literature." Then start as follows, "With reference to advertising for Trump New York City buildings," then go back, the words "equal housing opportunity," then insert, "shall appear in an ad to run once a month, of a minimum of three inches in the New York Times.

Specific apartments shall be advertised and the buildings advertised shall be rotated on a sectional basis so that all Trump New York City buildings are covered in such ads at least once in the course of a year."

Then go back, these words, "shall then be

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MR. D. TRUMP: You have the whole New York Times, what do you want?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: The defendants put their signatures to a document which included this provision.

MR. COHN: That isn't so.

MR. D. TRUMP: I never signed any document.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Mr. Cohn signed it.

MR. COHN: You always push without giving these people a chance to read what they are doing.

You want them to know what they are doing and you want them to understand it and they want you to understand it. You can't be intelligent about something you don't read.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: They enter into contracts daily.

THE COURT: My suggestion would be to eliminate the word "newspapers" in A andto have really a new B.

MR. COHN: Good idea, Judge.

THE COURT: With the thought that -- which I consider a distinct advance so far as is apparent to the Court from looking at one of the major papers, it would be looked at in terms of housing or apartment availability, and to have a larger than normal size ad appear regularly on a periodic basis characterizing Trump as an equal housing opportunity landlord or management, building management, apartment management,

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and provide what you have here somewhere in the footnote, double asterisk, to take that up and make that all part of B before you come to the next one, which I would make C, dealing with the black papers.

That might even say that under B, all advertising - I suppose you cover all the New York papers, the Times --

MR. F. TRUMP: Just the Times.

MR. COHN: That is the only one used.

THE COURT: So maybe if that is the only one --

MR. COHN: Refer to it specifically?

THE COURT: I don't know. I suppose they want to make sure that in case you change your policy, if you go to the Daily News --I don't know what else is around --

MR. COHN: Times or comparable publication.

THE COURT: I think to make B --

MR. COHN: B would read something like this --

THE COURT: It says the defendant shall, A, include in all advertising -- I would strike out the word "newspapers" so it would be in telephone directories, whatever --you have no objection to that?

MR. COHN: No.

THE COURT: Then B --

MR. COHN: That would run down to the bottom of the page?

THE COURT: Then B would be, include in all

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newspaper advertising at least once a month an ad of a certain size --

MR. COHN: Minimum of three inches.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: A monthly ad, which is twelve times a year -- we are going from 365 times a year to 12 times a year?

MR. BRACHTL: For three to four units to be selected by the defendants? Can this not be done on a weekly basis?

THE COURT: It is totally unrealistic.

MR. D. TRUMP: Will you pay for it?

THE COURT: I'm trying to give you something that people will see in large letters in a newspaper that is the major source of advertising and in which I find no other ad containing this legend.

If that is not a distinct advance for the Government, I don't know what is. If you want to litigate this case over that, then I am ready to go. You might not even win that at the end of a final decree.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I suggest that you phrase along those lines as has been indicated here that the grouping of buildings in a particular section—buildings or apartments, whatever it would be, and it would be at least a three-inch ad which I would say would be

substantial in size and in which "equal housing opportunity" might even be a two-line or three-line basis, so that you can see it.

The logo, I gather, is not possible in this newspaper --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Not unless it becomes a display advertisement.

THE COURT: I don't know what you mean by a display advertisement.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Blocked off. One of these squared-off ads.

MR. D. TRUMP: It also makes it a very expensive ad.

MR. COHN: It couldn't run in the regular real estate column.

THE COURT: I agree. That is usually done for new housing, isn't it?

MR. F. TRUMP: That's right.

THE COURT: You are not talking about new housing.

MR. BRACHTL: Might we specify that such an ad be run on the third Sunday of each month?

MR. COHN: Why not.

MR. BRACHTL: The purpose behind it is simply that the day of the ad is an important one.

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THE COURT: Make it the first Friday if you want.

MR. BRACHTL: With regard to when it is that people are preparing or at least --

MR. COHN: That might be a problem, for this reason, apparently they don't control when the vacancy arises and when they are going to place ads.

It might be on Friday once, it might be on Sunday another time. I think people who are looking for an apartment don't look once a week.

MR. F. TRUMP: The supers are not around on Sunday in the summertime.

MR. D. TRUMP: It might very well be on a Sunday, but I don't know if we should put it in specifically for Sunday.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Sunday is the biggest day for looking for housing --

THE COURT: You want to limit it to Sunday?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: If we are considering from the

Government's standpoint the greatest impact, a Sunday

advertisement is clearly a greater impact than a Wednesday advertisement.

MR. F. TRUMP: It gets lost on a Sunday because it is twice as much.

MR. D. TRUMP: Believe it or not, you have twelve pages of apartment advertising.

MR. F. TRUMP: If you want it on a Sunday, you have it.

MR. BRACHTL: May we suggest --

THE COURT: This is a Sunday paper here, I see.

MR. ESKANAZI: I think, your Honor, if you do grant the Sunday, I think it should be one Sunday a month, but not a specific Sunday, for the simple reason that it makes it hard because of vacancies, we may not have enough to throw in an ad of that size.

THE COURT: You don't care as long as it appears once on Sunday a month.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Statistically, there will be more people looking for an apartment, I believe, by the third or fourth week --

THE COURT: Maybe there is a technical problem from their standpoint.

MR. BRACHTL: Maybe we can write the decree so as to provide that the Government can provide the day. We have not having experts --

THE COURT: I don't think that is realistic.

MR. D. TRUMP: One Sunday a month, Judge.

MR. BRACHTL: Not a day for their discretion.

I am asking that it be made in our discretion.

THE COURT: I don't understand. It seems to me that it is very -- they indicate that they cannot

control the space allocations of newspapers. They can take an ad for a Sunday, I take it, and then it will go in on some Sunday in that month.

MR. ESKANAZI: No, your Honor.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: It has to be in by Thursday night of the week before.

MR. ESKANAZI: Because these people are not experts in housing, I might point out that the third or fourth Sunday would be a horrible time, and we are aware of our vacancies in the last week of the preceding month and perhaps the first or second Sunday would be the best time -- we never know.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Do your leases generally run on the first of the month?

MR. ESKANAZI: All of them do.

MR. COHN: Would this be something that you had in mind as regards to B --

THE COURT: Let's see, the defendant shall, B, shall advertise -- put it this way, advertise at least one Sunday a month.

MR. COHN: How about with reference to newspaper THE COURT: You have three there. We don't want
to change it all.

The defendant shall, A, -- and this is a mandatory direction --

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MR. COHN: A is just the way it is.

THE COURT: B will begin "shall advertise..." --

MR. COHN: The defendants shall advertise not less than once a month.

THE COURT: At least one Sunday in every month or shall -- well, or shall -- insert in a newspaper of general circulation, such as the New York Times -- how about that?

MR. ESKANAZI: Fine.

MR. COHN: Yes.

THE COURT: (Cont'g) -- newspaper of general circulation, such as the New York Times, at least one Sunday in every month, and an advertisement of at least three inches in length, advertising available apartments in a particular section --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: With a rotating provision.

THE COURT: On a rotating basis, and shall include in-- what would you say -- larger type of some kind, the words "equal housing opportunity" -- we can't say the logo, apparently.

MR. COHN: No.

MR. F. TRUMP: At the foot of the ad.

THE COURT: At the foot of the ad. All right.

MR. COHN: And shall contain at the foot of the ad the words "equal housing opportunity."

THE COURT: I don't know what kind of type you call it. It may be a sized type.

MR. COHN: In caps.

THE COURT: In at least something typed -- type size-- "equal housing opportunity."

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Are we to specify the minimum number of properties to be included in the advertising?

THE COURT: They may want to put a bigger ad in. What's wrong with that?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That's wonderful. I am talking about the minimum number of apartments to appear so that it is not one apartment.

THE COURT: If it is at least a three-inch ad, you have to -- I can't see them as a practical matter just putting one apartment in a three-inch ad. I think some discretion -- they will utilize the space. Their business economics would demand that they not throw their money away on white paper.

I am leaving it up to their good faith and your surveillance. If a problem develops we can resolve it at that time. Let's see how it works.

MR. COHN: Fortunately, we are now on page 12, paragraph two.

The second full paragraph, beginning "The recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees." That the

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defendants shall not require nonwhite persons to possess qualifications more exacting than those that were in effect with respect to whites before the institution of this action.

We are asking that that be eliminating, pointing to the fact that on page 10 we agree affirmatively to, even though this complaint in this action raises absolutely no questions about employment, this is not an employment case or an antitrust case, it is a civil rights rental case, but nevertheless we are willing, because we do it, to say — to agree to an affirmative employment program, saying that we shall hire, without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and will endeavor to place blacks and other nonwhite persons in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified arise.

We don't feel that in this apartment decree, rental decree, we should be required to put in that second paragraph on page 12, subdivision two. We don't see that it adds anything that is not already in what we have agreed to in page 10.

MR. BRACHTL: It adds quite a bit, your Honor.

It adds a requirement that employment requirements and qualifications not be raised at least with respect to nonwhite applicants for jobs; that is, not be raised

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over the standards and qualifications which were in force at the time that this action commenced.

MR. COHN: We will give it to them. I don't understand it, but we will give it to them.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Page 13.

MR. COHN: They have agreed to our request.

THE COURT: What is it on 13?

MR. COHN: That is the thing that Mr. Trump was talking about before, the children of the different sexes over ten years old.

MR. F. TRUMP: We have two-bedroom apartments, Judge. They are small and built under FHA specifications, 100 square feet, the second bedroom. We rent those to couples. In Jamaica Estates we have probably 1700 families in a dozen different buildings. Three of them have more than 15 per cent blacks, but these people, their children are married, they sold their home, they move in with us, we say carefree living and they take the second bedroom; there are no children in there, for instance, and — the Wilshire, 220 families, there are six children in the whole building out of 220 families.

We have 40 per cent two-bedroom, and they want to tell us that we must put up to two children in each bedroom. That building would have 160 children where

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our pattern is --

MR. COHN: How would you like to do it, can you tell the Judge?

MR. F. TRUMP: We want to follow the same pattern that we have. Whatever the vacating family from a two-bedroom has as far as children are concerned, we will put the same exact family in there. We don't want to have two children of opposite sex sleep in a little bedroom where the most you could get in is a double bed. You have a girl and boy ten years old. The next year they are eleven and then twelve and they are in a single bedroom. It's bad housing and we have not done it. We would be changing our pattern that we have established over twenty years.

If that could be changed to say a two-bedroom should have the same occupancy as the vacating tenant -

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Then you would be forced to rent to two children --

MR. F. TRUMP: Even Patio Gardens, which is all colored, we don't have children.

THE COURT: I'm not sure of those changes.

MR. F. TRUMP: They say two children of the opposite sex to occupy -- up to two children of the opposite sex to up to ten years of age --

THE COURT: It is really the footnote.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We have already stated that five is okay with us.

MR. F. TRUMP: We don't want the two children where there is an adult building with a beautiful lobby and carpeting in the halls.

MR. COHN: How do you want to word it exactly?

MR. F. TRUMP: A two-bedroom should have the same occupancy as the vacating tenant.

MR. COHN: The defendant shall not be required to use as a leasing standard for a vacated two-bedroom apartment anything --

MR. F. TRUMP: Any higher census than presently vacating the apartment.

MR. ESKANAZI: I have a suggestion that would make it easier. Under 2, Occupancy, not more than two persons in the one-bedroom apartment; not more than three persons in a two-bedroom apartment.

MR. F. TRUMP: That is no good.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That's fine with us.

MR. COHN: Maybe they will want to do it in a certain case.

MR. F. TRUMP: If we have six children and 200 families or 150 families, we certainly don't want one if 150 families have 60 two-bedroom, we don't want 60 children in there; they would ruin the lobby and ruin

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the building.

They'd bring ten children from around the corner and they -- it is unfair to have children in the buildings because they are adult buildings.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: You can turn these into adult buildings.

THE COURT: I don't think there is a dispute, but it is the phrasing that troubles me a little bit.

There are some laws about -- there used to be laws about restricting people with children from renting, were there not?

MR. F. TRUMP: It is unfair to the children to put them in an apartment. It is unfair where you say you can't do this --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: A lot of people have no other alternative, though.

THE COURT: I don't think the Court can sign a decree which violates local law with respect to --

MR. F. TRUMP: Would you say two children not over four years, Judge, babies, you don't put a ten-year-old boy with a ten-year-old sister.

THE COURT: I agree with everything you say.

MR. ESKANAZI: Why say two when we said they will even give you one only. Let's restrict it to one.

MR. F. TRUMP: I would like to say as the

vacating tenant had.

MR. COHN: This should not be a restriction against you, this should be the minimum you have to live up to.

If you want to make an exception they will be pleased.

THE COURT: There is nothing wrong, is there, with not more than two persons in a one-bedroom apartment?

MR. F. TRUMP: Then we would have to rent to two children if they did come around.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. You are not focusing on something. You under Occupancy, not more than two persons in a one-bedroom apartment.

MR. F. TRUMP: Fine.

THE COURT: Are these beyond two-bedroom apartments or is that your maximum?

MR. F. TRUMP: We go to two-bedroom arrangements; that is the maximum.

THE COURT: What you want to say is in twobedroom apartments --

MR. F. TRUMP: Same occupancy as the vacating tenant had.

THE COURT: Same occupancy as the two-bedroom --

MR. D. TRUMP: It says not more than. You can't rent to more than -- to solve this, make it on the bottom

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instead of ten-year-old, make it five-year-old and end up doing it that way.

MR. COHN: Make it four years old.

THE COURT: You don't seem to understand, as your son is pointing out, this is really telling you you can't rent to more than four persons in a two-bedroom apartment. You can't stuff five, six, seven, and you don't have any desire to.

MR. COHN: You shall not be required -
MR. F. TRUMP: Rent to more than two children
in a two-bedroom. We want to maintain the pattern
that has been set in the building.

MR. D. TRUMP: You can do that. You can rent to two adults.

THE COURT: It says you shall not be required to rent a two-bedroom apartment to more than four persons, including not more than two adults and including no more than two children.

MR. F. TRUMP: Now we have two persons in a two-bedroom -- in all our two bedrooms you have two persons.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: As long as the decision to accept someone without children is made on that basis rather than grounds impermissible and which violate the injunction. You have certain leeway in your

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rental decisions.

THE COURT: The problem is the ten years down in the footnote, isn't it?

MR. D. TRUMP: If you made that five I think the whole problem would be solved.

MR. ESKANAZI: Can we say in a two-bedroom apartment, we refer to the double asterisk below, and that says procedures are based on defendants' past practices described in discovery?

Mr. Trump's past practice has been to rent these apartments to people similar to the ones he has had before.

MR. COHN: How do you word that? Could we put a comma after the word "discovery" in footnote two, including the procedures are substantially based on defendants' past practices, as described during discovery, including a policy of favoring vacating census?

MR. F. TRUMP: If a couple moves out of a twobedroom you put another couple in. If a couple with two childre move out you put a couple with two children in, but not that we are bound to every two-bedroom --

MR. COHN: Including a policy --

THE COURT: Why don't we say, not more than two persons in a two-bedroom apartment -- defendant, whatever it is, defendants shall follow their customary procedures.

1	MR. F. TRUMP: As far as census is concerned.
2	MR. ESKANAZI: What he means is the numbers,
3	occupancy.
4	THE COURT: Is that something that is a term of
5	art in your business, census?
6	MR. F. TRUMP: Yes. Census per apartment.
7	MR. BRACHTL: It is somewhat ambiguous, your
8	Honor.
9	THE COURT: It is not necessary.
10	MR. ESKANAZI: It is not necessary.
11	THE COURT: For a two-bedroom apartment
12	MR. F. TRUMP: To follow past practices.
13	MS. GOLDSTEIN: These procedures are substan-
14	tially based on defendants' past practices described
15	during discovery.
16	MR. F. TRUMP: You don't need the opposite
17	section.
18	MR. ESKANAZI: We can throw out the first aster
19	isk completely.
<b>2</b> 0	MS. GOLDSTEIN: As long as you agree to five,
21	we prefer to leave that.
22	THE COURT: It is just fixing it up here. The
<b>2</b> 3	first sentence stays. The next would be for a two-
24	bedroom apartment defendant shall follow its existing
25	practice, and then maybe that could be the one foot-

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discovery were at all uniform.

The second asterisk about past practices as described during discovery talks about application pro-That was fairly uniform.

The Government's desire is not to THE COURT: stuff more people in a two-bedroom --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: As long as it is uniform and objective we don't really care.

THE COURT: You want to say for a two-bedroom apartment defendant shall adhere in a uniform manner to its past practices?

MR. F. TRUMP: It shall not exceed the vacant occupancy --

MR. ESKANAZI: If your past practice was to rent to people, you continue to rent to people.

THE COURT: I said in a uniform manner. is to be revised. Adhere to past practice.

MR. COHN: On page 17-D.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: No problem with that.

MR. COHN: We have no problem on our next point, 17-D, and no waiting list.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Added to the asterisk.

MR. COHN: At the bottom of the page, Judge Neaher, we say Trump Village shall be excepted from this provision prohibiting the use of a waiting list.

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THE COURT: Trump Village shall what?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Trump Village shall be excepted from this provision prohibiting the use of a waiting list.

MR. D. TRUMP: Can I get this straight, your
Honor? It seems a little bit difficult for me to understand. You have a waiting list. What we are saying
now is that we have no waiting list, so somebody comes
in looking for a three-bedroom apartment, a qualified
tenant comes in for three months, four months looking
for a three-bedroom apartment, a superintendent meets
the person, knows the person, likes the person, wants
to rent the person an apartment. Finally a threebedroom apartment becomes available. Somebody walks
in just by chance and theoretically then that person
would have the right --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: We understand that Trump Village has a waiting list.

MR. D. TRUMP: I am talking about our other buildings.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: That is the procedure described throughout discovery, that it is a first-come - first-served-no waiting list being maintained, and no call-backs are done, and therefore to maintain a uniform procedure --

the understanding that the signature carries with all the changes we've discussed.


I will sign that decree only when I am satisfied that those changes conform.

MR. COHN: As to a press release, we wanted no press release. They objected to that. Then we decided in view of the history of this, we suggested a joint press release. They wouldn't go for that. So there is that provision --

THE COURT: What was done with Lefrak?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Essentially, your Honor, we don't do anything about press releases. We have a public information office that takes simply the decree and writes out an informational release. We have given --

MR. COHN: They will say what they want and we will say what we want.



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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE IN CLERK'S OFFICE OF NEW YORK

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TIME A.M.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF

TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

ν.

Defendant.

The United States of America, plaintiff herein, respectfully moves this Court for an Order granting supplemental relief against the defendant Trump Management, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Trump). In support of its motion, the United States alleges:

- On October 15, 1973, the United States filed its complaint in this action, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., and prayed that the Court enter an Order enjoining the defendant from future violations of Title VIII, and directing it to take such affirmative steps as might be necessary to correct the effects of its past discriminatory practices.
- On June 10, 1975, this Court entered an Order, by consent of the parties, permanently enjoining Trump and those in privity with it from engaging in any discriminatory practices prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. The defendant was also ordered to implement an affirmative program to promote equal housing opportunity. The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc. were ordered to acquaint themselves personally and in detail with Trump's obligations under the Order and the various fair housing laws, and to assure themselves that their subordinates similarly understood their responsibilities.

3. Trump and its officers and agents have failed to comply fully with this Court's Order of June 10, 1975. Specifically, they have Made apartments unavailable to black persons on account of race; (b) Discriminated against black persons in the terms and conditions of rental of a dwelling on account of race; (c) Made statements with respect to the rental of dwellings that indicate a preference, limitation, and discrimination based on race; and (d) Represented to black persons because of race that dwellings were not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings were in fact so available; in violation of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Part II of this Court's Order. In conformity with Part IX of this Court's Order, plaintiff has notified Trump of complaints which have come to its attention and has given Trump a reasonable opportunity to correct the violations. While Trump has, in some instances, accommodated the needs of individual complainants, it has not taken adequate action to prevent future violations, and racially discriminatory conduct by Trump agents has occurred with such frequency that it has created a substantial impediment to the full enjoyment of equal opportunity. Further relief, including additional affirmative action and a substantial extension of the decree, is necessary in order to ensure nondiscrimination in the future and to correct the effects of past noncompliance. - 2 -

WHEREFORE, the United States prays that, upon a hearing, this Court order

- that the injunction in this case be extended for such period of time as may be needed to ensure the full enjoyment of equal housing opportunity;
- that additional affirmative relief be granted to ensure realistic opportunity to nonwhite citizens to rent dwellings at predominantly white buildings, including provisions such as those contained in Part IV of this Court's prior Order, as well as additional steps designed to provide a free and informed residential choice for all persons without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin;
- that individual victims of discrimination be compensated for any injury caused by unlawful conduct on the part of Trump or its agents; and
- 4. that Trump be required to continue to report to the Court and to the United States.

Plaintiff further prays for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper, including the costs and disbursements of this proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees.

David G. Trager United States Attorney

Homer C. LaRue

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Drew S. Days, III Assistant Attorney General

Frank E. Schwelb, Chief Housing and Credit Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20

Handley, Attorney Harvey Brian F. Heffernan, Attorney Housing and Credit Section Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number
DSD:HLH:mop
DJ 175-52-28

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 Re: United States v. Trump Management, Inc. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

On Monday, March 6, 1978, the United States filed a Motion for Supplemental Relief in the captioned case. This letter is intended to bring you up to date on the developments in this matter and also to attempt to arrange for a pre-hearing conference with you and opposing counsel.

As you know, the United States initially filed this lawsuit on October 15, 1973, alleging that the defendant was conducting its apartment rental business in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. After considerable delay, a Consent Order was entered on June 10, 1975, \*/ The defendant was permanently enjoined from discriminating in the rental of housing and required, among other things, to implement an affirmative program of compliance with the Fair Housing Act and report periodically, to the Court and this Department, concerning its rental operations. The affirmative provisions of this Order expired on September 10, 1977.



<sup>\*/</sup> A copy is attached for your convenience.

In our pending motion, filed March 8, we allege inadequate compliance with the order and seek extension and expansion of certain of its provisions.

We hope that the motion can be resolved by the parties without the necessity for a hearing. Should such a hearing be necessary, however, it will probably assume the proportions of a full-blown trial and occupy two days or more. Plaintiff will want to conduct a fair amount of discovery before the hearing, and we anticipate that defendant may wish to do the same.

After consulting with Mr. Homer LaRue, Assistant United States Attorney, we have concluded that an expeditious procedure would be for counsel to meet with the Court to discuss the motion and the best manner of proceeding. We understand that a tentative date of April 10, 1978 has been set for this meeting. Although this time is agreeable to us, it appears that Mr. Cohn, defense counel, will be out of the country on that date April 17, 1978, however, is agreeable to both parties.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter. If the Court believes that the matter should be handled otherwise, we will of course proceed as the Court may direct.

Sincerely,

Drew S. Days, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

Harvey L. Handley

A/ttorney

Housing and Credit Section

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN)
v.	
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANTS
Defendants.	

To Counsel for the Defendants

The following interrogatories are addressed to you pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and you are required to answer each interrogatory separately and fully, in writing, under oath, and to serve copies of your Answers on counsel for plaintiff within the time to be prescribed by the Court. The United States is applying to the Court for an Order that your time to respond be shortened to five days from the date of service.

- 1. Please state the name and address of each person known or believed by counsel for defendants, by the defendants or any of their officers, agents, or employees to have any information with respect to any alleged misconduct engaged in by Donna Goldstein, Esquire, or by any other representative of the United States in connection with the above-styled case.
- 2. With respect to each person identified in response to the preceding interrogatory, please provide the following information:

- (a) The nature of the alleged misconduct by a representative of the United States alleged by such person;
- (b) The time and date upon which such misconduct took place;
- (c) The names and addresses of all persons who witnessed or who may have information about the incident;
- (d) The means and date by which such information was brought to the attention of the defendants or their counsel; and
- (e) A full description of the alleged wrongful conduct by the representative of the United States.

JAMES PORTER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney
Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	of file (copy)
Plaintiff,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	RESPONSE OF UNITED STATES TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION OF JULY 26, 1974
Defendants.	

The United States of America, plaintiff, responding on its own behalf and on behalf of its attorney, Donna F. Goldstein, to defendants' "Notice of Motion" seeking an adjudication of contempt against said attorney and a "cease and desist" order against the United States, alleges as follows:

- 1. The United States denies each and every allegation of improper conduct by Donna F. Goldstein or by any other representative of the United States in connection with the interviews of Carol R. Falcone, Thomas Miranda, Paul Ziselman, Paula Ziselman, or any other prospective witness or other person in this case.
- 2. The United States alleges that said allegations of improper conduct, including allegations of threats and other devices to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses, are false and scurrilous, and consequently constitute an abuse of the processes of this Court.

WHEREFORE the United States prays as follows:

1. That expedited discovery be had with respect to the allegations of misconduct by the United States and its attorney;

- That depositions taken during said discovery be supervised by a master;
- 3. That a full evidentiary hearing be held before this Honorable Court on August 16, 1974, as prayed for in defendants' Notice of Motion;
- 4. That following the evidentiary hearing, the allegations of misconduct by the United States and its attorney be stricken as scandalous, in accordance with Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the motions for contempt and a cease and desist order be in all respects denied; and
- 5. That following this evidentiary hearing, this Honorable Court determine whether there has been an abuse of its processes and, if so, enter any appropriate disciplinary or other Order.

The United States further prays for such additional relief as the interests of justice may require, together with the costs and disbursements of this proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES PORTER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

JAMES P. TURNER

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney

Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff,  v.  FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,  Defendants.	) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN) ) ) )
Defendants.	

#### **AFFIDAVIT**

WASHINGTO	N		).	
			)	SS
DISTRICT	OF	COLUMBIA	)	

FRANK E. SCHWELB, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil
  Rights Division, Department of Justice and in supervisory charge
  of the above-styled litigation on behalf of the United States.

  I make this affidavit in support of our request that an Order be
  entered herein directing expedited discovery and designating
  an officer of this Court to supervise depositions with respect
  to defendants' motion to hold one of plaintiff's attorneys in
  contempt and for a cease and desist order against the United
  States.
- 2. On or about July 26, 1974, defendants filed with this Court a Notice of Motion praying that Donna Goldstein, one of plaintiff's counsel in this action, be adjudged in contempt of this Court for alleged coercion and threats against

prospective witnesses, and that the United States be ordered to cease and desist from such alleged unlawful conduct. Notice of Motion is purportedly supported by the affidavits of Carol R. Falcone and Thomas Miranda, former employees of defendants, and by the signed but unsworn statements of two former employees, Paul and Paula Ziselman. Also attached to the motion is an affidavit by Roy Cohn, one of defendants' counsel, which purports to describe a number of events at which he was not present and which did not occur in the manner described by him. The papers filed on behalf of defendant call into question the professional conduct and reputation of Donna F. Goldstein, an attorney on the staff of this Section, with whom I am well acquainted and whom I know to have an excellent reputation, both with respect to her legal ethics and in relation to her professional competence. I am satisfied that the allegations of improper conduct against her are without foundation and therefore constitute an abuse of the processes of this Court.

- 3. In view of the nature of the allegations against Ms. Goldstein, the United States requests that the matter be expeditiously handled in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614 so that the factual issues may be resolved and Ms. Goldstein's reputation cleared. We further ask that the evidentiary hearing be held on August 16, 1974 as scheduled.
- 4. In order to assure that no "surprise" witnesses be called by defendant to further attack Ms. Goldstein's reputation,

- 2 -

plaintiff has propounded brief interrogatories to defendants inquiring into the identity and prospective testimony of all witnesses to alleged misconduct by agents of the United States. Adequate preparation for the hearing will not be possible unless this information is disclosed to the United States in time to take the depositions of possible witnesses in advance of the hearing. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Roy Cohn states that defendants have attached the statements of only "some" former employees as to whom Ms. Goldstein is alleged to have acted improperly, which suggests that there are supposed to be others. Accordingly, we ask that the defendants be required to answer these interrogatories within five days, unless defendants voluntarily disclose this information to plaintiff earlier.

5. The essential thrust of defendants' allegations on this motion is that Ms. Goldstein used threats and other unfair tactics in an attempt to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses. The position of the United States is that the allegations of misconduct on Ms. Goldstein's part are false and scurrilous. In order to resolve this issue, it is essential that the testimony of all witnesses, both on deposition and at the hearing, be free of threats, undue influence, or other interference from the parties or from their counsel, and that each party's right to examine and cross-examine witnesses without interruption or disruption be fully protected.

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6. The most effective means to assure the orderly conduct of these depositions is to have them supervised by an officer of the Court. At least one of the witnesses to be deposed -- Mr. Miranda -- has expressed fear of reprisal from defendants on two separate occasions, to attorneys for plaintiff -- once to Elyse Goldweber and once to Donna Goldstein, as reflected in their respective affidavits. At a hearing on May 3, 1974, Honorable Vincent Catoggio, United States Magistrate, reprimanded counsel for defendants for failing to carry out their responsibilities relating to discovery and to expedite the action. Accordingly, the most effective means to assure the orderly conduct of these depositions is to have them supervised by an officer of this Court.

WHEREFORE I respectfully request on behalf of the United States that an Order to Show Cause be entered herein as prayed for. No previous application has been made for the relief here requested.

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Frank & Schwell

Washington, D. C. 20530

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  $\mathcal{A}$  day of August, 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires: January 31, 1977

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	<b>)</b>
Plaintiff,	) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN)
v.	· (
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,  Defendants.	· } _}
AFF	IDAVIT
WASHINGTON ) ) ss DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )	

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am an attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and one of the counsel for the United States in the above-styled action. I am a member of the bar of the State of Pennsylvania. I make this affidavit in response to defendants' motion and supporting papers which accuse me of threatening prospective witnesses and of other improper conduct in the discharge of my responsibilities in this case.
- 2. I have read the affidavits of Carol R. Falcone and Thomas Miranda and the signed statements of Paul and Paula Ziselman. While I interviewed each of these individuals to determine if they had information pertinent to this case, I did not do any of the unlawful or improper things alleged

in their statements, and, on the contrary, interviewed each in a fair and objective way to ascertain the facts. While a complete response to the statements of these individuals must await the hearing on the pending motion I think it important to immediately respond at least briefly, to the principal allegations, and I do so as follows:

- (a) I never harassed Ms. Falcone, nor did I threaten her with perjury, jail, or with anything else. I did not accuse her of any misconduct with regard to her business or money, or of dating Donald Trump, and have no information about these matters. In fact, I made no accusations at all. I did not tell Ms. Falcone that any phones were tapped, or that she was guilty, and in fact, I have no knowledge of any tapped phones and I am sure that the Civil Rights Division does not tap phones or cause them to be tapped. I did not act in a hostile manner towards her. In fact, the interview appeared to me friendly on both sides at all times.
- (b) I never harassed Mr. Miranda, and I never called upon him "to go against Trump Management" by lying. On the contrary, I asked him to tell the truth. I did not tell him that unless he cooperated he would be thrown in jail, nor did I discuss my "ambitions" or winning my case. I did not persecute him, nor did I make "unyielding" threats or any other kind. While Mr. Miranda was reluctant to relate the facts because he expressed fear that Mr. Fred Trump would destroy him, or words to that effect, he described to me some racially discriminatory housing

practices in which defendants have engaged. Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories filed in the case of <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.</u>, and sworn to by Elyse Goldweber, previous counsel for plaintiff in this suit, discloses that Mr. Miranda had also provided information about discriminatory practices before I was assigned to the case. My interview with Mr. Miranda seemed to me to be friendly on both sides.

(c) I did not threaten or intimidate Mr. Ziselman, and the contents of his affidavit suggest that there must have been a misunderstanding. Prior to my interview with Mr. Ziselman, the Department of Justice had, in accordance with our normal practice, requested the FBI to interview a number of former Trump employees. Mr. Ziselman was one of them. When I was interviewing Mr. Ziselman, I mentioned that a request had been made for the FBI to contact him, but I told him that I would try and contact the FBI in time to have the agents cancel their interview with him, since it was now unnecessary. After I had completed my interview with Mr. Ziselman, I interviewed a prospective witness for plaintiff who provided details as to a rental transaction with Mr. Ziselman which differed from Mr. Ziselman's account. Accordingly, I telephoned Mr. Ziselman and asked him if he would permit me to see him again for a short time since there were now a few more matters I wished to discuss with him. He refused my request and stated that he considered it to be harassment. I responded that

I was sorry he felt that way, since it was not intended to be harassment.

- (d) Mr. Manley's letter of June 13, 1974, and Mr. Cohn's affidavit completely distort the facts leading up to the records inspection in June 1974. Mr. Cohn was not present Trump office and has no direct information as to these events, a fact omitted from his affidavit. The facts with respect to this incident are described in detail in Appendix C to plaintiff's Report on Discovery, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
- 3. In conclusion, I wish to state that the attacks in defendants' papers on my conduct and integrity as an attorney are entirely without foundation. I hope that the matter can be disposed of at the earliest practicable date.

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Sworn to before me this 2nd day of August, 1974.

My commission expires: January 31, 1917.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	<b>&gt;</b>
Plaintiff,	<b>\( \)</b>
v. FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN) )
Defendants.	) 

#### AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEW YORK )

CQUNTY OF NEW YORK )

- I, ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER, being duly sworn do depose and say that:
- 1. I am presently employed as an examining attorney with the New York City Department of Investigation located at 111 John Street, New York, New York.
- 2. I was formerly employed as an attorney with the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. from September 19, 1972 until May 24, 1974.
- 3. While employed by the Department of Justice, I participated in the preparation and the pre-trial stage of <u>United</u>

  <u>States</u> v. <u>Fred Trump</u>, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 (EN).
- 4. Prior to the institution of the above-mentioned lawsuit, I interviewed Mr. Thomas Miranda who was formerly

employed by Trump Management, Inc. as a superintendent at Kendall Hall Apartments, 41-10 Bowne Street, Flushing, New York. The purpose of this interview was to determine what, if anything, Mr. Miranda knew about discriminatory practices on the part of Trump Management, Inc.

- 5. Mr. Miranda related to me that Mr. Hyman, Mrs. Williams & a woman called Sophie whose name he did not recall, all of Trump Management, Inc. had instructed him to attach a separate sheet of paper to all applications received from prospective black apartment seekers and that he was to write a big "C" on such attachment so as to indicate to Trump Management, Inc. that the application being considered was from a "colored" person. Furthermore, Mr. Miranda stated to me that he did this every time a black person applied for an apartment.
- 6. Mr. Miranda also stated to me during this interview that he was afraid that the Trumps would have him "knocked off", or words to that effect, because he told me about their allegedly discriminatory practices. He was reluctant to have his name disclosed.
- 7. After this interview, which was in all respects friendly, I had no further personal contact with Mr. Miranda. When it became necessary to disclose his identity, I sent a letter in the form attached hereto to him and to the other

persons who had provided information about Trump Management,
Inc. The letter was run off on an MTST machine, and while
in accordance with Justice Department practice, only one
sample copy was retained (the one addressed to Phyllis
Kirschenbaum), Justice Department records disclose that an
identical letter was sent to Mr. Miranda and fourteen others.

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of August, 1974.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires:

087:1799:199:echoer JJ 173-62-23

> es. Phyllis Tirothenbaum 1833 Gesan Barkeny Brooklyn, dew York 11223

> > Ro: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Denald Trump and Trump Menagement, Inc.

Dear Ms. Kirschenbaum:

I am sure that you remember that, during the last few months, I spoke with you about your experiences with Trumo danagement, Inc. Based on the information you and many other people gave us, the Department of Justice recently filed a lawsait in the federal court in Brooklyn alleging that Fred C. Trump, Donald Grump and Trump danagement, Inc., have violated the Fair Housing Act by engaging in racial discrimination. You may have heard about the court suit already.

In a court suit like this, the persons and the company which are charged with having broken the law have a right to find out the narros of the people whom they are charged with discriminating against. Accordingly, if the defendants so request, your name will have to be furnished to them in accordance with court rules.

It may be that the lawyers representing the Trumps will want to interview you. The main thing is that you have nothing to worry about. If you wish to talk to them, you have a right to do so. If you do not wish to talk to them, you have a right not to.

cc: Records
Chrono
Goldweber
Trial File
Kosack-Hold
Reichard-Hold

you be testify at a librouiding," where you would be ar for path and a court reporter would take down which you say. I have not a for lots at as it prisent at such a deposition, and what you say cannot be minunderated; since it is easen down by the court reporter word for word. If you would prefer to be interviewed in this way (at a deposition), do not besitate to tell that to anyledy was weets to interview you at your home or place of word.

It may be that a larger or a person representing the Trumps will want you to sign a statement. You have a right to sign one or not to sign one, as you wish. It is often advisable, however, to obtain a lawyer's help before agreeing to sign a statement, because if you do sign it, then the Trumps can use it in the court case in the event you testify later. You might be well advised to hold any statement that anyone asks you to sign in your possession for a fee days so that you can think about it and recall all the events that took place. Then, if you decide to sign it, you can at least be sure that you have had a chance to remember everything. Also, if you ever do sign a statement, make sure you get to keep a sopy for yourself.

If someone representing the Trumps does contact you, I would vary such appraciate your letting me know right away. Please call we (collect) at (202) 730-4132. If I am unavailable when you call, I will return your phone call as soon as possible. It is very important that you keep we informed about this.

Finally, let me repeat that you have nothing to werry about. You do not have to talk to anyone or sign

any statement. If you do talk to sermone or might a statement, I or ourse you will just tell the truth.

Ginceraly,

J. PERSON POSTINGUE Assistant Attorney General Field Figats Division

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By:

Attorney
Housing Section

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) ) CIVIL ACTION NO.
<b>v.</b>	) 73 C 1529 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Defendants.	) )

The United States having applied to this Court by affidavit for an Order to Show Cause, and it appearing that a hearing is scheduled before this Court on August 16, 1974 to determine motions involving alleged misconduct by one of the attorneys in this action, which alleged misconduct is denied; and it further appearing that expedited discovery is necessary and appropriate, so that this motion may be expeditiously determined in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614; and it further appearing that the nature of the respective parties' allegations justifies judicial supervision of depositions relating to the pending motion; and the Court having considered the pertinent submissions,

NOW, THEREFORE, upon the affidavit of FRANK E. SCHWELB and for good and sufficient reason,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants show cause, if any there be, in the chambers of this Court at 225 Cadman Plaza, Brooklyn, New York, on August , 1974, at M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why

- (1) defendants should not be required to answer plaintiff's interrogatories with respect to the pending motion within five days of service thereof; and
- (2) the depositions with respect to this motion should not be conducted under the supervision of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service upon counsel for defendants shall be done by no later than , and that this shall constitute good and sufficient service.

IT IS SO ORDERED this

day of August, 1974.

United States District Judge

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff,	) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
v.  FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,  Defendants.	) MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On or about July 26, 1974, defendants filed a Notice of Motion seeking an adjudication of contempt against Donna F. Goldstein, a Department of Justice attorney assigned to this case, and a "cease and desist" order against the United States. In five affidavits including that of defense counsel Roy Cohn, defendants allege that Ms. Goldstein has, among other things, threatened and sought to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses in this case. The defendants have requested a hearing on this matter on August 16, 1974.

The United States has filed a response supported by affidavits of Frank E. Schwelb, Chief of the Housing Section, Civil Rights

Division, Department of Justice, and of Ms. Goldstein denying each and every allegation of improper conduct. In preparation of the

hearing on August 16, 1974, the United States has noticed the depositions of several of the affiants who have made accusations against Ms. Goldstein, as well as of defendant Donald Trump. Brief interrogatories have also been served on counsel for the defendants to determine the pertinent details of any alleged incident of misconduct by plaintiff's attorneys. In addition, the United States has applied for an Order to Show Cause why

- (1) defendants should not be required to answer plaintiff's interrogatories with respect to the pending motion within five days of service thereof; and
- (2) the depositions should not be supervised by an officer of the Court.

### A. <u>Defendants Should Be Required to Respond to the Interrogatories</u> Within Five Days of Service.

Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vests the Court with discretion to shorten the time permitted for responding to Interrogatories. In this case, defendants have made serious accusations against the United States and, in particular, against one of its counsel, Donna F. Goldstein. They seek to bring the matter on for hearing on August 16, 1974. The United States is entitled to take the depositions of several persons who have information about these charges and to otherwise prepare for the hearing, and cannot do so unless their identities are disclosed.

Defense counsel Roy Cohn in his affidavit indicated that only some of the persons who had complained of attorney Goldstein's behavior had signed statements for submission with defendants' pleading. In order to prepare for the hearing and assure that Ms. Goldstein's rights are fully protected, plaintiff is entitled to advance knowledge of the purported case against her. Plaintiff's interrogatories are brief and can be responsively answered in a short time, and there is no reason why an immediate response cannot be forthcoming.

### B. The Depositions Should Be Supervised by an Officer of this Court.

The basic thrust of defendants' motion is that plaintiff's counsel have unduly influenced the testimony of prospective witnesses. Plaintiff contends, however, that the allegations are false and have the effect of preventing the expedited consideration of the case which the statute requires. 42 U.S.C. 3614. The affidavits of two of plaintiff's counsel -- Elyse Goldweber and Donna F. Goldstein -- disclose that at least one of the prospective deponents -- Thomas Miranda -- has on two separate occasions expressed fear of reprisal from defendants if he should testify to the discriminatory practices of which he is aware. Magistrate Cattogio has found the defendants to have been in noncompliance with discovery procedures.

With the issue herein being whether either side has used unlawful tactics vis-a-vis witnesses, it is imperative that their sworn testimony be given without interference or pressure from any source. Accordingly, the depositions should be conducted before an officer of this Court. 4 Moore's Federal Practice §28.02, p. 1915; Fisher v. Harris, 61 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); see also First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 245 F. 2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 871 (1957).

JAMES PORTER Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division JAMES P. TURNER

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

FRANK E. SCHWELB, Chief

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG, Attorney

Frank & Schwell

Housing Section

Civil Rights Division

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

#### APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

- against -

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and Trump Management, Inc.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff has forwarded to defense counsel a proposed decree which is appended hereto as Attachment A. Defense counsel has advised plaintiff's counsel that the decree is satisfactory, subject to the modifications described herein. Plaintiff agrees to a continuance solely on the basis of the representation that this case is settled in principle along the lines stated herein.

The agreed settlement is based on the proposed consent decree forwarded to defense counsel and attached hereto, subject to the following:

defendants on the grounds that a decree against Trump Management,
Inc. binds them as officers, agents, etc. under Rule 65, F.R. Civ.P.,
and that it would therefore be superfluous to retain them as named
defendants. Language of certain provisions amended accordingly.

Provisions in decree requiring assumption of responsibility by Fred
and Donald Trump remain in exfect, but may be phrased in terms of the
offices held by them without mention of their names.

- ments to persons on public assistance shall be omitted as stated.

  Under the income standards of Part IV, of the proposed decree, a footnote shall be included indicating that all income sources of any applicant, including public assistance payments, alimony, child support and wife's income shall be considered in determining the financial eligibility of any applicant.
- (c) The provision on pp. 6-7 involving wife's income to be summarized, with prefatory language eliminated, and included in general injunctive provisions in Part I of the decree as set forth in Attachment B hereto.
  - (d) Procedural history on page 2 to be eliminated.
- (e) Equal opportunity statements in advertising (P. 11) to be eliminated as to ads of five lines or less. Defendants' advertising policies presently in use shall not be changed because of this provision. Defendants shall not unreasonably substitute or change the number of ads of six lines or more or the number of display advertisements presently used.
- (f) On p. 12, language as to advertisements in minority media clarified to include one monthly ad in black press and one monthly ad in Spanish-speaking press.
- (g) On p. 12, cross-section of Trump apartments to be advertised in minority media clarified to include only buildings with vacancies.
- (h) On p. 13, 3-day period for the Open Housing Center to refer applicants clarified to commence when notification to the Center is completed. Open market to be defined to mean rental to anyone not referred by fair housing group.

- (i) Objective standards, including rental qualifications, as to all buildings and uniform procedures used to determine them, all to be based on and no more stringent than past practices, and to be prepared by defendants and negotiated with plaintiff.
- (j) On p. 17, inclusion of provision prohibiting preference for persons referred by present tenants.
- (k) Provision on p. 17 prohibiting the use of a waiting list is based on defendants' current practices. At defendants' option, a uniform waiting list procedure at all buildings may be included in the decree.
- (1) Provision shall be included allowing defendants to be notified of complaints from alleged victims of discrimination.
- (m) Under the affirmative employment provisions, reference to employees shall be clarified to include only superintendents, leasing agents, rental agents, and those in the central office who review applications for tenancy, credit references or otherwise participate in the rental process.
- (n) Provision explaining that standards for rental are subject to appropriate modication upon ruling of <u>Boyd v. Lefrak</u> now pending before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- (o) Provision dissolving affirmative provisions of the decree three years from the date of the entry of the order upon motion by the defendants with opportunity for objections by the plaintiff.

If no final consent has been executed on the proposed decree to be submitted to the Court by February 14, 1975, the parties

shall so inform the Court. The parties shall then seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any dispute arising solely out of disagreement as to the meaning of any proposed change referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding. All other provisions in the attached Consent Decree and those not in dispute as to meaning in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be contained in their entirety in the final Consent Decree.

If for any reason a Consent Decree is not agreed upon and entered by February 24, 1975 the parties shall seek a new trial date. The parties have exchanged witness lists in accordance with the Order of this Court. The plaintiff's list of witnesses is appended hereto as Attachment C. The defendants' witnesses shall be as follows:

Fred Trump

Donald Trump

Althea Gibson

A representative of the NAACP

Agreed upon this 20th day of January 1975.

For the Defendants

100 Julion

Donald Trump

Roy M. Cohn

For the Plaintiff

Donna Goldstein

Norman P. Goldberg

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
<b>v.</b>	CONSENT ORDER )
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and Trump Management, Inc.	) ) )
Defendants.	) , )

This action was instituted by the United States of America on October 15, 1973, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by refusing to rent dwellings and by otherwise making dwellings unavailable to black persons on account of race and color, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(a); by discriminating in the terms and conditions of rental of dwellings because of race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(b); by making statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation and discrimination based on race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(c); and by representing to persons on account of race and color that dwellings were not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings were in fact so available, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(c).

In December 1973, defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiff for \$100,000,000 in the nature
of defamation or malicious prosecution. The counterclaim
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter. The defendants also filed motions to dismiss
the Complaint and for a more definite statement, which
motions were denied.

On July 26, 1974, defendants filed a motion to have one of plaintiff's counsel held in contempt of court for alleged misconduct and for a protective order against the United States. On October 24, 1974, after the Court heard the evidence adduced in support thereof, the motion was denied in all respects and stricken from the record, the Court explicitly finding that there was no credible evidence of improper conduct on the part of the United States or any of its attorneys or agents.

United States is that the defendants have failed and neglected to exercise their affirmative and nondelegable duty under the Fair Housing Act to assure compliance by their subordinates, with the result that equal housing opportunity has been denied to substantial numbers of persons and that defendants' subordinates have failed to carry out their obligations under the Act. Defendants claim that the number of violations by their agents is insubstantial, and that any discrimination was not done at the direction of the individual defendants. Irrespective of the merits of the Complaint, however, the defendants Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump are now prepared

affirmatively to assume and carry out the responsibility for assuring that their employees will comply with the Act and will prote equal opportunity. Accordingly, the United Sta — is prepared to resolve this case by the entry of a — sent decree.

Ι

## INJUNCTION

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants, their officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

# GENERAL INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS

- 1. Refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 3. Making, printing or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or lished, any notice, statement or advertisement with react to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make such preference, limitation or discrimination.

- 4. Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
- 5. Influencing the residential choice of any person on account of race, color religion, sex or national origin.
- 6. Coercing, threatening, or interfering with, or attempting to coerce, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to assist others to secure equal housing opportunity.
- 7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act.

II

# · RENTAL TO PERSONS RECEIVING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

The great majority of persons on public assistance in the New York area are black or of Puerto Rican ancestry. Consequently, the blanket exclusion from tenancy of otherwise qualified persons receiving public assistance has a racially discriminatory effect, and is legally impermissible in the absence of a showing of business necessity. No business necessity exists for excluding from residence any person receiving public assistance who, through a

guarantor or otherwise, has the reasonable capacity to pay
the rent and who meets the other objective nonracial
standards set forth herein.

Affidavits filed in this action by defendants and their counsel, and press reports of certain out-of-court statements, disclose past reluctance on the part of defendants to rent to persons receiving public assistance, which reluctance has been communicated to the public through the media. The predictable effect of such communication has been to chill the exercise by persons receiving public assistance of the right to equal housing opportunity. It is now, however, the stated policy of the defendants to rent to persons receiving public assistance if they are able to meet the objective requirements which are to be nondiscriminatorily applied to all applicants for rental. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants, their officers, agents, employees and successors, and all those in active concert or participation with them or with any of them, are permanently enjoined from applying different or more stringent standards of sale or rental to any person on account of his being or having been a recipient of public assistance, and from otherwise discriminating against any such person with respect to his housing opportunities.

The parties recognize that there is pending before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defendant's appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Clark, retired in Boyd v. The Lefrak Organization, No. 71-1433, P.H.E.O.H. Rptr. para. 13,650 (E.D. N.Y. April 15, 1974). That case

involves important issues regarding the obligation of private landlord to rent to persons receiving public assistance. Whi heither party to the present action is a party to the <u>Bond</u> litigation, the ultimate decision in <u>Boyd</u> is likely to affect the controlling law with respect to this issue. Accordingly, the parties agree, and it is ORDERED that either party may apply to this Court for appropriate modification of this Order in the light of further developments in the <u>Boyd</u> litigation.

## WIFE'S INCOME

In August, 1974, 42 U.S.C. 3604 was amended to prohibit discrimination in housing based on sex as well as that based on race, color, religion or national origin. Prior to that amendment, sex discrimination was prohibited by New York law. A landlord's refusal to consider a wife's income equally with that of her husband in determining whether the family has the financial capacity to pay the rent constitutes unlawful discrimination based on sex, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604.

During the course of depositions in this action, which preceded the August, 1974 amendment to the Fair Housing Act, the individual defendants indicated a lack of certainty as to whether the wife's income was counted in determining an applicant's capacity to pay the rent, and, if it was counted at all, whether it was counted fully or partially. In order to eliminate any doubt with respect to this question, it is ORDERED that defendants, their officers, agents, employees and successors, and all those

in active concert or participation with them or with any of them, are permanently enjoined from failing or refusing to give full and equal consideration to the income of a wife in determining the rental qualifications of a married couple or the capacity of that couple to pay the rent.

# ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PRINCIPALS AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Trump Management Inc. controls many thousands of rental units in the New York area and elsewhere, and its activities therefore have a major impact on housing opportunities. The individual defendants therefore occupy a position of leadership in the real estate community and can, by their example, influence the activities not only of their own agents and employees but also of many others. The Fair Housing Act prohibits conduct which is discriminatory in its effect, regardless of motivation, and violations of the Act can result from thoughtlessness and lack of information, as well as from deliberate discrimination. The individual defendants recognize that they have both the responsibility to assure nondiscrimination by their agents and employees and a significant opportunity to promote equal housing opportunity generally in the New York area and elsewhere. They are prepared to carry out that responsibility and to take advantage of that opportunity.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

A. Defendants Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump shall forthwith

- (1) thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis with all of the obligations of the defendants under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended; under state and municipal civil rights laws; under pertinent Regulations and Guidelines of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other appropriate agencies; and under this Order;
- (2) Take steps to assure that their principal assistants and officers similarly familiarize themselves with their obligations; and
- (3) Personally undertake to assure that the training program set forth herein is successfully carried out.
- B. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, the defendants shall conduct and complete an educational program for all employees with rental or employment responsibilities, who have contact with prospective tenants, provide information to the public about rental, or accept or process applications for rentals, or who are engaged in any manner in the employment process, to inform them of the provisions of this Decree, and their duties under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Such program shall include:
  - (1) Furnishing to each such agent and employee a letter summarizing the terms of this Decree and of the Fair Housing Act as it applies to the employee.

- (2) Informing each such agent and employee, in person or by general meeting, of the provisions of this Decree and of duties of the Company and its agents and employees under the various applicable Fair Housing Acts.

  Each such agent and employee shall be advised that his failure to comply with the provisions of this Decree shall subject him to dismissal or other disciplinary action, and to sanctions for disobedience of this order.
- (c) Securing a signed statement from each such agent that he has read the letter mentioned above and received the instructions described in the preceding paragraph and forwarding a copy of each such signed statement to plaintiff.

Each new agent and employee shall be instructed in accordance with the procedures set out above and shall be required to sign a statement to the effect that he has been so instructed and will comply with such instructions within ten (10) days following the initial date of employment. Copies of all signed statements will be furnished to plaintiff upon execution.

Company Carlothan a garage

III

## AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM

It is further ORDERED that the defendants shall  $\pm$ /
forthwith take the following steps to adopt and implement

<sup>\*/</sup> The defendants' obligations to implement each provision of this Order for affirmative action shall begin ten (10) days following the entry of this Order, unless otherwise specified herein.

an affirmative program aimed at ensuring compliance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and at overcoming the effects of any previous actions by the defendants which had the purpose or effect of impairing rights secured by the Fair Housing Act:

- A. Notification to the Community of Defendants'
  Nondiscriminatory Policy
- 1. Notify the following groups in the New York
  Metropolitan Area, in writing, with copies to counsel for
  plaintiff that apartments owned or managed by the defendants are available to all qualified persons without
  regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

  Included in such letter shall be a full synopsis of the
  rental standards and procedures outlined in Part IV,
  below, and a general statement of present and anticipated
  vacancies in Trump apartment buildings in the New York
  Metropolitan Area. The parties shall agree on the text
  of an appropriate letter prior to its mailing.
  - a. (Parties to agree on identities of groups.)

b.

c.

Subsequently, defendants shall mail to each of the organizations, named above a copy of its weekly Central Listing of vacancies described <u>infra</u> in Part IV of this decree.

This mailing shall be done on the day the list is made.

2. Post and maintain fair housing signs in a form approved by the Secretary of the Department of Housing

and Urban Development  $(F(\overline{D}))$  in all offices of the defendants where there is reputal activity or public contact.

- 3. Implement an advertising program aimed at informing the nonwhite community of defendants' nondiscriminatory rental policy. The defendants shall
  - (a) Include, in all advertising, in newspapers, telephone directories, radio, television, and other media, and on all billboards, signs, pamphlets, brochures, and other promotional literature the words "Equal Housing Opportunities" and the fair housing logo. These words and the logo shall be prominently placed and \*\*/
    easily legible. In addition, all advertising placed by the Company or its agents shall conform to the practices recommended in the Department of Housing and Urban Development advertising guidelines, as published in 37 Fed Reg., pp. 6700-02, on April 1, 1972. A copy of these guidelines is attached as Appendix "B" to this Order.
  - (b) Allocate a reasonable proportion of their advertising budget to advertising in media

S 4

 $<sup>\</sup>pm$ / See the pertinent HUD regulation, 37 FR 33429 (a copy attached hereto as Appendix A).

<sup>\*\*/</sup> In radio and television advertising, the words "equal housing opportunities" shall be used and shall be easily audible.

directed primarily to the black and Puerto

Rican communities. The parties have agreed

that two monthly display advertisements in

\*/

the black or Puerto Rican press, together

with allocation of 10% of defendants' radio

advertising budget to black-oriented and

Spanish language stations, shall meet the

requirements of this provision. All advertisements of Trump buildings in minority

media shall advertise a full cross-section

of Trump buildings, and shall not stress or

give undue emphasis to buildings with sub
\*\*/

stantial minority occupany.

4. Provide written notification to each firm, association, company, corporation, or other person or organization engaged by defendants or any of them to act as referral agency, apartment locating service, credit checking company, or management company that apartments owned or managed by the defendants are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Each such notification shall also advise the recipient of defendants' objective standards and procedures for rental.

<sup>\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> If the listed apartments do not include all Trump buildings, the buildings listed shall be rotated with each ad so that the same apartment buildings are not continuously advertised under this subsection.

# B. Program of Providing Listings for Minority Apartment Seekers

For two years after the entry of this Order, or until further Order of this Court, defendants shall notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10003, of every fifth available apartment in each apartment building owned and/or managed by the defendants which has a black tenancy of less than ten percent, at least three days prior to placing that apartment on the open market.

During this three day period the Open Housing Center shall have the opportunity to refer qualified applicants to the

After three days if no qualified applicant referred by the Center has filed an application seeking to rent the apartment, the apartment may be placed on the open market to be rented in defendants' normal business custom without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

#### C. Affirmative Employment Program

The defendants shall recruit, hire, assign, promote and transfer employees and agents without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin and will endeavor to place blacks and other nonwhite persons in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified arise.

<sup>\*/</sup> The requirements of this provision need not be followed for apartment buildings which presently have or in the future reach a black occupancy rate of 10%. For these apartment buildings, apartments shall continue to be rented without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Pursuant to this program, the defendants shall take the following steps:

- 1. Place advertisements on a regular basis in a newspaper that primarily serves the black community describing the available work opportunities.
- 2. Prominently include in all advertising of available jobs the slogan "Equal Opportunity Employer."
- 3. Display an equal employment opportunity poster in a prominent place clearly visible to prospective agents, employees, and applicants for employment in each office of the defendants where applications for employment are taken.
- bers are part of defendants' work force of the terms of
  Part III (c) of this Decree and that prospective employees
  are to be referred without regard to race, color, religion,
  sex or national origin.

In recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees, the defendants shall not require that they possess qualifications for any job or position more exacting than those which were in effect with respect to white employees before the institution of this action.

ΙV

# IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVE RENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

In order to assure nondiscriminatory selection and assignment of tenants and to assure equal opportunity in

<sup>\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This poster shall be in the form, size and prominence approved by the United States Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

housing at each building owned or managed by defendants or any of them, defendants shall adopt and implement the following standards and procedures:

## A. Standards

## (1) Income

One week's gross salary from all sources must be at least equal to one month's rent.

# Occupancy

(Defendants to make a proposal based on their current standards.)

# B. Procedures

# 1. Application Procedure

a. Applications for tenancy will be received at the apartment building or complex where the tenant is applying for an apartment. Applications shall be received by Superintendents or rental agents authorized by the defendants to accept applications, and instructed in the requirements of this Order and of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Applications shall be accepted from all persons wishing to apply and the superintendent or agent shall make no subjective judgment on the acceptability of a prospective tenant.

<sup>\*/</sup> This shall include alimony, child support, welfare payments, wife's income, etc. The parties recognize that the validity of this requirement may be affected by appellate decisions in <u>Boyd</u> v. <u>Lefrak</u>, <u>supra</u>. Either party may apply for a modification or revision of this provision in the light of future developments in that case.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> These procedures are based on defendants' past practices, as described during discovery.

- b. The superintendent or rental agent shall review the application for completeness and shall require a security deposit of one month's rent and a W2 form (or reasonable substitute therefor) from all applicants. The agents shall then submit the deposit, W2 form and application, for review and determination to one of the defendants' two main offices. No superintendent or rental agent shall have the authority to make a determination on the acceptability for tenancy of an applicant.
- c. A uniform credit and employment check as described in Appendix "A" hereto shall be conducted with respect to each applicant.

- d. Applications shall be reviewed and a determination of acceptability shall be made by the Section Managers employed in the defendants' main offices.
- e. Each applicant shall be informed within five

  (5) business days whether or not he or she has been accepted for tenancy. If rejected, the applicant shall be
  informed of the reason for rejection, and of the specific
  objective standard which he has failed to meet.
  - 2. Providing Rental Information to Apartment
    Seekers
- a. Defendants shall maintain at their central offices at 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, and at Highlander Hall, Edgerton Hall, Patio Gardens and Lawrence Gardens, a Central Listers, to be compiled on a weekly basis, of each currently vacant or available apartment in the New York area, and of each apartment expected to be vacant or available in the New York area within the next thirty

days. This list, shall include the type of apartment, the number of rooms, the monthly rent, and date of availability and shall be shown to all persons inquiring about available apartments. Defendants shall also maintain at each of their buildings a similar list of the apartments vacant at that building.

- b. Apartments which are available for rental and listed on the apartment availability list (2(a) above) shall be shown to all interested inquiriers by an authorized agent of the defendants.
- c. Inquirers shall be uniformly informed of the qualifications for rental, including the income, security deposit and W2 form requirements.
  - d. No waiting list will be maintained at any of defendants' offices or apartment buildings. Rental will be on a first-come, first-served basis when apartments are available for rental.

V

#### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is further ORDERED that three (3) months after the entry of this Decree, and thereafter three (3) times per year the defendants shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the plaintiff a report containing the following information for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed by the defendants:

- 1. Argyle Hall
- 2. Westminster Hall
- 3. Fountainbleu Apartments

- 4. Lawrence Gardens and Lawrence Towers
- 5. Sea Isle Apartments
- 6. Beachhaven Apartments
- 7. Shorehaven Apartments
- 8. Belcrest Apartments
- 9. Highlander Hall
- 10. Saxony Hall '
- 11. Clyde Hall
- 12. Edgerton Apartments
- 13. Winston Hall
- 14. Sussex Hall
- 15. Oakdale Apartments
  Oceanaire Apartments
  (Norfolk, Virginia)
- a. The number of persons, by race, making inquiry in person about the availability or terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding reporting period and the number by race, that:
  - made inquiry;
  - 2. were offered an application;
  - filed out an application;

<sup>\*/</sup> As visually observable.

- 4. submitted an applicant with deposit;
- 5. were accepted for occupancy;
- 6. were rejected;
- withdrew applications;
- 8. had applications pending at the end of the reporting period.
- b. A report reflecting the applications for tenancy submitted during the preceding reporting period, including the following information for each person submitted an application:
  - 1. name, address, business and home telephone number, and race;
  - 2. date of application;
  - 3. whether a deposit was received;
  - 4. date notified of acceptance or rejection;
  - 5. weekly income of applicant and monthly rent of apartment sought;
  - 6. if accepted, apartment chosen;
  - 7. if rejected, reason therefor;
  - 8. name of person or persons who decided to accept or reject the application;
  - 9. if neither accepted nor rejected, status or disposition of application.

For each rejected nonwhite applicant, the report shall include a detailed statement of the reason(s) for rejection and supporting information.

c. A list of vacancies during the preceding quarter, including the date the apartment was placed on

the market and the date each apartment was rented or otherwise committed for rental.

- d. Reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include the current statistics with respect to the race of tenants in each apartment building owned or managed by the defendants, and an account of the steps taken during the preceding reporting period to implement the program outlined in Sections I and II above, including:
  - 1. Copies of all letters sent to apartment locators and credit checking companies, Fair Housing groups, and labor unions pursuant to Parts II and III of this Decree.
  - 2. Representative copies of all newspaper advertisements placed since the entry of this Order, the name of each newspaper in which the advertisement was placed, and the date of each advertisement.
  - 3. The name, race, position and office assignment of each rental agent, superintendent and main office employee employed as of the date of the entry of this Order, an assurance that the educational program required by Part I has been conducted, and copies of all igned statements obtained in accordance with Part I of this Decree. If any rental agent refuses to

<sup>\*/</sup> Including where appropriate, the date the Open Housing Center was contacted concerning the apartments' availability in accordance with Part II above.

sign such a statement the defendants shall include a full statement of all pertinent circumstances and of any action taken by them in relation thereto.

VI

#### RECORDKEEPING PROVISIONS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall for three years following the entry of this Decree, make and preserve the following records for all apartment buildings owned or managed by them:

- 1. The name, address, telephone number and date and time of contact of each person inquiring in person about the availability or terms of rental of an apartment \*/
  therein, the size of apartment sought, if known, and whether:
  - A. he was offered an application;
  - B. he filled out an application;
  - C. he submitted an application with deposit.
- 2. A detailed record of all action taken on each inquiry and application and the reasons for such action.
- 3. A detailed record of all steps taken by the defendants in ascertaining the acceptability for tenancy of the applicant and the name of the employee who took such steps or who approved or rejected the application.

<sup>\*/</sup> This may be accomplished by maintaing a guest register at each apartment building owned by the defendants.

4. All records which are the source of, or contain any of the information pertinent to defendants' obligations under this Order. Representatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the defendants at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendants from the inspection of such records.

#### VII

It is further ORDERED that for a period extending three years from the entry of this Decree, the defendants shall, at least twenty (20) days prior to the event, report to counsel for the plaintiff:

- 1. Any new ownership or management interests in residential property, acquired by the defendants.
- 2. The divestment through transfer or sale, of any ownership or management interests in residential property.

## VIII

Each party shall bear its own costs.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until the termination of this Order.

ORDERED THIS day of , 1975.

EDWARD NEARER
United States District Judge

The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this Order:

For the Defendants:

For the Plaintiff:

#### INJUNCTION

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants, their officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

- 1-6 see the Proposed Decree, appended as Attachment A.
- 7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act. In this connection, defendants shall not, in determining the income qualification for rental of any person, family, or other group of persons, fail or refuse to fully count a woman's total income, including salary, wages, alimony, support payments or other income from whatever source received.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 CIV 1529
v.	<b>)</b> .
FRED C. TRUMP, et al.	PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED LIST OF WITNESSES
Defendants.	)

In accordance with the Order of the Court, the United States submits the following names of persons who are expected to be called as witnesses. This list does not include the names of any rebuttal witnesses who may be called to rebut testimony by defendants' witnesses nor does it include any of defendants' officers or managing agents who may be called as adverse witnesses.

Walter Abramson, an official of the City of New York

Commission on Human Rights, or some
other agent of that agency to
authenticate, if necessary, certain
records.

Susan Bernstein
Beverly Best
Kalman Biczo
Saul Blate
Mae Brown
Maxine Brown

Ronald and Agnes Bunn
Stephanie Bush

Barbara Campbell, a <u>New York Times</u> Reporter, or

another reporter present at the

press conference at which defendants'

announced the filing of a \$100

million counterclaim.

James Chestnut

Solomon Cohen, an agent of the Division of Human
Rights, State of New York, or some
other agent of that agency to
authenticate, if necessary, certain
records.

Peter Connan

Terrence Cox

David DeReinzus

Henrietta Davis

Jack Fogler

Edwardo Galdames

Annette Gandy

Monique Golden

Elyse Goldweber

Adolpho Gomez (testified by deposition)

Allan Gross

Charles Hall

Robert Edward Harris

Lorraine Haynes

Rick and Gemma Helms

Donald Herman

Betty Hoeber

Alfred and Sheila Hoyt

Godfrey Jacobs

Pritchinella Johnson

George Sim Johnston

Phyllis Kirschenbaum

Mr. & Mrs. Kenneth Laitman

New York Times employee to verify authenticity of

certain pages of classified advertisements

(if defendants unwilling to stipulate

to authenticity of reproduction of

thosepages)

Carl Nickelson

Dorothy Orr

Paul and Hope Rudder

Muriel Salzman

Ruth Sarver

Mrs. Harry Schefflin

Michael Scott

Muriel Silberberg

Phyllis Spiro

Ralph Stein

James Gordon White

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. SCHWELE
NORMAN P. GOLDBERG
DONNA GOLDSTEIN
Attorneys, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January , 1975, copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's Proposed List of Witnesses were served on counsel for defendants by hand:

Roy M. Cohn, Esquire Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

\*

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
) PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER
)
<b>,</b>

This action was instituted by the United States of America on October 15, 1973, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by refusing to rent dwellings and by otherwise making dwellings unavailable to black persons on account of race and color, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(a); by discriminating in the terms and conditions of rental of dwellings because of race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(b); by making statements with respect to the rental of dwellings which indicate a preference, limitation and discrimination based on race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(c); and by representing to persons on account of race and color that dwellings were not available for inspection and rental when such dwellings were in fact so available, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(d).

Stripped to its essentials, the claim of the United States is that the defendant and its principal officers have failed and neglected to exercise their affirmative and nondelegable duty under the Fair Housing Act to assure compliance by certain of their subordinates, with the result that equal housing opportunity has been denied to a number of persons and that certain of defendant's subordinates have failed to carry out their obligations under the Act. Plaintiff contends that the insubstantial number of blacks presently residing in most Trump buildings supports these allegations. Defendants claim that the number of violations by their agents is insubstantial, and that any discrimination was not done at the direction of the principals of the defendant corporation. Moreover, defendant contends that plaintiff has alleged only a few incidents of discrimination over a period of fourteen years and that there are a significant number of blacks presently residing in Trump apartment buildings. Irrespective of the merits of the complaint, however, the principal officers of defendant Trump Management, Inc., are now prepared affirmatively to assume and carry out the responsibility for assuring that their employees will comply with the Act and will promote equal opportunity. Accordingly, the United States is prepared to resolve this case by the entry of a consent decree.

#### INJUNCTION

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant, its officers, agents, employees, successors and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

# GENERAL INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS

- 1. Refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 3. Making, printing, or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or published, any notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make such preference, limitation or discrimination.
- 4. Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
- 5. Influencing the residential choice of any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

- 6. Coercing, threatening, or interfering with, or attempting to coerce, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to assist others to secure equal housing opportunity.
- 7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act. In this connection, defendants shall not, in determining the income qualification for rental of any person, family, or other group of persons, fail or refuse to fully count a woman's total income, including salary, wages, alimony, support payments or other income from whatever source received.

II

ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PRINCIPALS OF TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC., AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Trump Management Inc., controls many thousands of rental units in the New York area and elsewhere, and its activities therefore have a major impact on housing opportunities. The company therefore occupies a position of leadership in the real estate community and can, by its example, influence the activities not only of its own agents and employees but also of many others. The Fair Housing Act prohibits conduct which is discriminatory in its effect, regardless of motivation, and violations of the Act can result from thoughtlessness and lack of information, as

well as from deliberate discrimination. The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc., recognize that they have both the responsibility to assure nondiscrimination by their agents and employees and a significant opportunity to promote equal housing opportunity generally in the New York area and elsewhere. They are prepared to carry out that responsibility and to take advantage of that opportunity.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

- A. The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc., presently Donald Trump and Fred C. Trump shall forthwith
  - (1) thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis with all of the obligations of the defendant under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended and as judicially interpreted; under state and municipal civil rights laws; under pertinent Regulations and Guidelines of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other appropriate agencies; and under this Order;
  - (2) Take steps to assure that their principal assistants and officers similarly familiarize themselves with their obligations; and
  - (3) Personally undertake to assure that the training program set forth herein is successfully carried out.
- B. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, the Defendant its principal officers shall conduct and

complete an educational program for all employees with rental or employment responsibilities, who have contact with prospective tenants, provide information to the public about rental, or accept or process applications for rentals, or who are engaged in any manner in the employment process, to inform them of the provisions of this Decree, and their duties under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Such program shall include:

- (1) Furnishing to each such agent and employee a letter summarizing the terms of this Decree and of the Fair Housing Act as it applies to the employee.
- (2) Informing each such agent and employee, in person or by general meeting, of the provisions of this Decree and of duties of the Company and its agents and employees under the various applicable Fair Housing Acts. Each such agent and employee shall be advised that his failure to comply with the provisions of this Decree shall subject him to dismissal or other disciplinary action, and to sanctions for disobedience of this Order.
- (3) Securing a signed statement from each such agent that he has read the letter mentioned above and received the instructions described in the preceding paragraph and forwarding a copy of each such signed statement to plaintiff.

Each new agent and employee shall be instructed in accordance with the procedures set out above and shall be required to sign a statement to the effect that he has been so instructed and will comply with such instructions within ten (10) days following the initial date of employment.

Copies of all signed statements will be furnished to plaintiff upon execution.

III

## AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM

It is further ORDERED that the defendant shall forthwith\*/
take the following steps to adopt and implement an affirmative
program aimed at ensuring compliance with the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, and at overcoming the effects of any previous actions
by the defendant which had the purpose or effect of impairing
rights secured by the Fair Housing Act:

# A. <u>Notification to the Community of Defendant's</u> <u>Nondiscriminatory Policy</u>

1. Notify the following groups in the New York Metropolitan Area, in writing, with copies to counsel for plaintiff that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Included in such letter shall be a full synopsis of the rental standards and procedures outlined in Part IV, below, and a general statement of present and anticipated vacancies in Trump apartment buildings in the New York Metropolitan area. The parties shall agree on the text of an appropriate letter prior to its mailing.

<sup>\*/</sup> The defendant's obligations to implement each provision of this Order for affirmative action shall begin ten (10) days following the entry of this Order, unless otherwise specified herein.

a. (Parties to agree on identities of groups).

b.

c.

Subsequently, defendant shall mail to each of the organizations, named above a copy of its weekly Central Listing of vacancies described <u>infra</u> in Part IV of this decree. This mailing shall be done on the day the list is made.

- 2. Post and maintain fair housing signs in a form approved by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)\*/ in all offices of the defendant where there is rental activity or public contact.
- 3. Implement an advertising program at informing the nonwhite community of defendant's nondiscriminatory rental policy. The defendant shall
  - a. Include, in all advertising,\*\*/ in newspapers, telephone directories, radio, television,
    and other media, and on all billboards, signs,
    pamphlets, brochures, and other promotional
    literature the words "Equal Housing Opportunities"
    and the fair housing logo. These words and the logo

<sup>\*/</sup> See the pertinent HUD regulation, 37 F.R. 33429 (a copy attached hereto as Appendix A).

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This subsection dealing with newspaper advertising shall only apply to newspaper ads of six (6) lines or more. Defendant shall continue its present advertising policies, and shall not change its present practices with respect to the size and type of advertising by shortening or by otherwise changing its policy of placing display ads to avoid the requirement of including the equal opportunity statement.

shall be prominently placed and easily legible.\*/
In addition, all advertising placed by the
Company or its agents shall conform to the
practices recommended in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development advertising guidelines, as published in 37 Fed. Reg., pp. 6700-02,
on April 1, 1972. A copy of these guidelines is
attached as Appendix. "B" to this Order.

- (b) Allocate a reasonable proportion of its advertising budget to advertising in media directed primarily to the black and Puerto Rican communities. The parties have agreed that two reasonably prominent monthly display advertisements, one in the black and one in the Puerto Rican press,\*\*/
  together with the allocation of 10% of defendant's radio advertising budget to black-oriented and Spanish language stations, shall meet the requirements of this provision. All advertisements of Trump buildings in minority media shall advertise a full cross-section of Trump buildings with vacancies, and shall not stress or give undue emphasis to buildings with substantial minority occupancy.\*\*\*/
- 4. Provide written notification to each firm, association, company, corporation, or other person or organization engaged by defendant to act as referral agency, apartment

<sup>\*/</sup> In radio and television advertising, the words "equal housing opportunities" shall be used and shall be easily audible.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> If the listed apartments do not include all Trump buildings with vacancies, the buildings listed shall be rotated with each ad so that the same apartment buildings are not continuously or disproportionately advertised under this subsection.

locating service, credit checking company, or management company that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Each such notification shall also advise the recipient of defendant's objective standards and procedures for rental.

# B. Program of Providing Listings for Minority Apartment Seekers

For two years after the entry of this Order, or until further Order of this Court, defendant shall notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10003, of every fifth available apartment in each apartment building owned and/or managed by the defendant which has a black tenancy of less than ten percent, \*/ at least three days prior to placing that apartment on the open market.\*\*/ During this three-day period, the Open Housing Center shall have the opportunity to refer qualified applicants to the defendant for the purpose of renting the apartment.

After three days if no qualified applicant referred by the Center has filed an application seeking to rent the apartment, the apartment may be placed on the open market to be rented in defendant's normal business custom without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

<sup>\*/</sup> The requirements of this provision need not be followed for apartment buildings which presently have or in the future reach a black occupancy rate of 10%. For these apartment buildings, apartments shall continue to be rented without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The three day period shall begin when notification has been completed and the Open Housing Center has received, either in person or by mail, the listings. For purposes of this Decree rental on the open market shall mean rental to any person not referred by the Open Housing Center.

The defendant shall recruit, hire, assign, promote and transfer employees and agents without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin and will endeavor to place blacks and other nonwhite persons in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified arise.\*/

Pursuant to this program, the defendant shall take the following steps:

- 1. Place advertisements on a regular basis in newspapers that primarily serve the black and Spanish community
  describing the available work opportunities.\*\*/
- 2. Prominently include in all advertising of available jobs the slogan "Equal Opportunity Employer."
- 3. Display an equal employment opportunity poster\*\*\*/
  in a prominent place clearly visible to prospective agents,
  employees, and applicants for employment in each office of
  the defendant where applications for employment are taken.

<sup>\*/</sup> References to employees and agents in Part III C of this Decree shall include only those persons who are presently employed as or seek to be superintendents, rental agents, leasing agents, or central office personnel who receive, review or approve applications for tenancy or otherwise participate in the rental process.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> This poster shall be in the form, size and prominence approved by the United States Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

4. Notify in writing, each labor union representing any part of defendant's work force of the terms of Part III(C) of this Decree and that prospective employees are to be referred without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

In recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees, the defendant shall not require that nonwhite persons recruited or hired possess qualifications for any job or position more exacting than those which were in effect with respect to white employees before the institution of this action.

TV

# IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVE RENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

In order to assure nondiscriminatory selection and assignment of tenants and to assure equal opportunity in housing at each building owned or managed by Trump Management, Inc., defendant shall adopt and implement the following standards and procedures. The only standards and procedures that shall be applied in determining whether or not to rent to an applicant are as follows:

### A. Standards

### 1. Income

One week's gross salary from all sources\*/ must be at least equal to one month's rent.

## 2. Occupancy

(Defendants to make a proposal based on their current standards.

<sup>\*/</sup> This shall include alimony, child support, public assistance payments, or guarantor's assurances on behalf of public assistance recipients, wife's income, etc.

# 3. Other Objective Standards

Within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Decree, defendant shall propose to plaintiff objective standards for rental, and uniform procedures for determining whether an applicant qualifies for rental, including procedures for credit and employment verification and standards for determining credit worthiness, all to be based on and no more stringent than defendant's past practices. These standards and procedures shall be negotiated with plaintiff and submitted to the Court within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order.

# B. Procedures \*/

- 1. Application Procedure
- a. Applications for tenancy will be received at the apartment building or complex where the tenant is applying for an apartment. Applications shall be received by Superintendents or rental agents authorized by the defendant to accept applications, and instructed in the requirements of this Order and of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.

  Applications shall be accepted from all persons wishing to apply and the superintendent or agent shall make no subjective judgment on the acceptability of a prospective tenant.
- b. The superintendent or rental agent shall review the application for completeness and shall require a security deposit of one month's rent and a W2 form (or reasonable substitute therefor) from all applicants. The agents shall then submit

<sup>\*/</sup> These procedures are based on defendants' past practices, as described during discovery.

the deposit, W2 form and application, for review and determination to one of the defendant's two main offices. No superintendent or rental agent shall have the authority to make a determination on the acceptability for tenancy of an applicant.

- c. Applications shall be reviewed and a determination of acceptability shall be made by the Section Managers employed in the defendant's main offices.
- d. Each applicant shall be informed within five (5) business days whether or not he or she has been accepted for tenancy. If rejected, the applicant shall be informed of the reason for rejection, and of the specific objective standard which he has failed to meet.
  - 2. Providing Rental Information to Apartment Seekers
- a. Defendant shall maintain at their central offices at 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, and at Highlander Hall, Edgerton Hall, Patio Gardens and Lawrence Gardens, a Central Listing, to be compiled on a weekly basis, of each currently vacant or available apartment in the New York area, and of each apartment expected to be vacant or available in the New York area within the next thirty days. This list, shall include the type of apartment, the number of rooms, the monthly rent, and the date of availability and shall be shown to all persons inquiring about available apartments. Defendant shall also maintain at each of its buildings a similar list of the apartments vacant at that building.

- b. Apartments which are available for rental and listed on the apartment availability list (2(a) above) shall be shown to all interested inquirers by an authorized agent of the defendant.
- c. Inquirers shall be uniformly informed of the qualifications for rental, including the income, security deposit and W2 form requirements.
- d. No waiting list\*/ will be maintained at any of the defendant's offices or apartment buildings nor shall there be any preference for persons referred by present tenants.

  Rental will be on a first-come, first-served basis when apartments are available for rental.

V

### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is further ORDERED that three (3) months after the entry of this Decree, and thereafter three (3) times per year for three years the defendant shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the plaintiff a report containing the following information for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed by the defendant:

- 1. Argyle Hall
- 2. Westminster Hall
- 3. Fontainebleau Apartments
- 4. Lawrence Gardens and Lawrence Towers
- 5. Sea Isle Apartments
- 6. Beachaven Apartments

<sup>\*/</sup> Since this is defendant's present practice and it is non-discriminatory, plaintiff interposes no objection thereto.

- 7. Shorehaven Apartments
- 8. Belcrest Apartments
- 9. Highlander Hall
- 10. Saxony Hall
- 11. Clyde Hall
- 12. Edgerton Apartments
- 13. Winston Hall
- 14. Sussex Hall
- 15. Oakdale Apartments
  Oceanaire Apartments
  (Norfolk, Virginia)
- a. The number of persons, by race,\*/ making inquiry in person about the availability of terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding reporting period and the number by race, that:
  - 1. made inquiry;
  - were offered an application;
  - filled out an application;
  - 4. submitted an applicant with deposit;
  - 5. were accepted for occupancy;
  - 6. were rejected;
  - withdrew applications;
  - had applications pending at the end of the reporting period.
- b. A report reflecting the applications for tenancy submitted during the preceding reporting period, including the following information for each person submitted an application:

<sup>\*/</sup> As visually observable.

- name, address, business and home telephone number, and race;
- 2. date of application;
- 3. whether a deposit was received;
- 4. date notified of acceptance or rejection;
- 5. weekly income of applicant and monthly rent of apartment sought;
- 6. if accepted, apartment chosen;
- 7. if rejected, reason therefor;
- 8. name of person or persons who decided to accept or reject the application;
- if neither accepted nor rejected, status
   or disposition of application.

For each rejected nonwhite applicant, the report shall include a detailed statement of the reason(s) for rejection and supporting information.

- c. A list of vacancies during the preceding quarter, including the date the apartment was placed on the market\*/
  and the date each apartment was rented or otherwise committed for rental.
- d. Reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include the current statistics with respect to the race of tenants in each apartment building owned or managed by the defendant, and an account of the steps taken during the preceding reporting period to implement the program outlined in Sections I and II above, including:

<sup>\*/</sup> Including where appropriate, the date the Open Housing Center was contacted concerning the apartment's availability in accordance with Part II above.

- 1. Copies of all letters sent to apartment locators and credit checking companies, Fair Housing groups, and labor unions pursuant to Parts II and III of this Decree.
- 2. Representative copies of all newspaper advertisements placed since the entry of this Order, the name
  of each newspaper in which the advertisement was
  placed, and the date of each advertisement.
- 3. The name, race, position and office assignment of each rental agent, superintendent and main office employee employed as of the date of the entry of this Order, an assurance that the educational program required by Part I has been conducted, and copies of all signed statements obtained in accordance with Part I of this Decree. If any rental agent refuses to sign such a statement the defendants shall include a full statement of all pertinent circumstances and of any action taken by them in relation thereto.

VI

### ... RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall for three years following the entry of this Decree, make and preserve the following records for all apartment buildings owned or managed by them:

1. The name, address, telephone number and date and time of contact of each person inquiring in person about the

availability or terms or rental or an apartment therein, ^/
the size of apartment sought, if known, and whether:

- A. he was offered an application;
- B. he filled out an application;
- C. he submitted an application with deposit.
- 2. A detailed record of all action taken on each inquiry and application and the reasons for such action.
- 3. A detailed record of all steps taken by the defendant in ascertaining the acceptability for tenancy of the applicant and the name of the employee who took such steps or who approved or rejected the application.
- 4. All records which are the source of, or contain any of the information pertinent to defendant's obligations under this Order. Representatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the defendant at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendant from the inspection of such records.

#### VII

It is further ORDERED that for a period extending three years from the entry of this Decree, the defendant shall, at least twenty (20) days prior to the event, report to counsel for the plaintiff:

- 1. Any new ownership or management interests in residential property, acquired by the defendant.
- 2. The divestment through transfer or sale, of any ownership or management interests in residential property.

<sup>\*/</sup> This may be accomplished by maintaining a guest register at each apartment building owned by the defendants.

It is further ORDERED that for a period of three years after the entry of this Decree the defendant shall advise counsel for plaintiff, in writing, of all complaints,\*/ from whatever source, received by the defendant regarding equal opportunity in housing at properties owned and/or managed by Trump Management, Inc. In addition, plaintiff shall, for a period of three years after the entry of this Decree, notify the defendant of all complaints received by the plaintiff.

Except where the plaintiff determines that there exists a need for emergency relief threatening the effectiveness of this Decree, the plaintiff shall afford the defendant fifteen (15) days from the date notice of such a complaint is received to investigate the complaint and provide plaintiff with an explanation of the information contained in the complaint. If the complaint is determined to be valid by either party, plaintiff shall recommend what steps it believes to be necessary to correct the conditions leading to the complaint, and shall afford the defendants an additional seven (7) days to effectuate appropriate steps to remedy the conditions leading to the complaint and to overcome any continuing effects of the alleged discriminatory actions before applying to the court for a motion to compel compliance with this Decree, or any other additional judicial relief.

<sup>\*/</sup> For purposes of this Decree, "complaints" shall mean any information which comes to the attention of the defendant or its officers from whatever source received, which indicates a possible denial of equal housing opportunities under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or a potential violation of this Decree.

By consent of the parties, with the understanding that this Decree is binding on the defendant corporation's principal officers, Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump, and in consideration of the affirmative assumption of responsibility by Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump contained in Part II herein, it is FURTHER ORDERED that Fred C. Trump and Donald Trump are hereby dismissed in their individual capacities as party defendants to this action.

X

Each party shall bear its own costs.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes.

ORDERED this day of

, 1975.

EDWARD NEAHER United States District Judge

The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this Order:

For the Defendants:

For the Plaintiff:

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APPENDIX C

TIN THE UNITED STATES PUSIBLE COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529

CONSENT ORDER

ν.

FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

This action was instituted by the United States of America on October 15, 1973, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.

The claim of the United States is that the defendants have failed and neglected to exercise their affirmative and non-delegable duty under the Fair Housing Act to assure compliance by their subordinates, with the result that equal housing opportunity has been denied to substantial numbers of persons and that defendant's subordinates have failed to carry out their obligation under the Act.

Defendants vigorously deny said allegations and claim that the number of violations, if any, are insubstantial, minute and "de minimis" and that if there was any discrimination, it was not done at the direction of the individual defendants or the officers of Trump Management, Inc.

Accordingly, without adjudication of the merits and without any admission as to the existence or absence of liability,
and in order to resolve this matter without further protracted
litigation, including a long, costly and time consuming trial,
the parties hereto are prepared to resolve this case by the
entry of a Consent Decree.

It is expressly understood and Agreed that the execution of this Agreement by Trump Management, Inc. is in no way an admission by it of a violation of the prohibition against discrimination as set forth in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or any other applicable statute, rule or regulation. (To the contrary, they assert that they have been in compliance with same, and that only miniscule alleged examples of discrimination in a handful of units out of over 100,000 that changed hands in 14 years establishes this.) RMC

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Complaint against Fred C. Trump and Donald J. Trump is dismissed against them in their personal capacity.

II

It is further ORDERED that Trump Management, Inc., their officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

- 1. Refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 3. Making, printing or publishing, or causing to be made, printed or published, any notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make such preference, limitation or discrimination.
- 4. Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
- 5. Influencing the residential choice of any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

- 6. Coercing, threatening, or interfering with, or attempting to coerce, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to assist others to secure equal housing opportunity.
- 7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act. In this connection, defendant shall not, in determining the income qualifications for rental of any person, family or other group of persons, fail or refuse to fully take into account a woman's total income, including salary, wages, alimony, support payments or other income from whatever source received.

#### III

# ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PRINCIPALS AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Trump Management, Inc. controls many thousands of rental units in the New York area and elsewhere, and its activities therefore have a major impact on housing opportunities. The individual defendants therefore occupy a position of leadership in the real estate community and can, by their example, influence the activities not only of their own agents and employees but also of many others. The Fair Housing Act prohibits conduct which is discriminatory in its effect, regardless of motivation, and violations of the Act can result from thoughtlessness and lack of information, as well as from deliberate discrimination.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

A. The officers of Trump Management, Inc. shall forthwith:

- (1) thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis with all of their obligations under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended; under state and municipal civil rights laws; under pertinent Regulations and Guidelines of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other appropriate agencies; and under this Order;
- (2) take steps to assure that their principal assistants and officers similarly familiarize themselves with their obligations; and
- (3) undertake to assure that the training program set forth herein is successfully carried out.
- B. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this
  Decree, the defendant shall conduct and complete an educational
  program for all employees with rental or employment responsibility, who have contact with prospective tenants, provide
  information to the public about rental, or accept or process
  applications for rentals, or who are engaged in any manner in
  the employment process, to inform them of the provisions of
  this Decree, and their duties under the Fair Housing Act of
  1968. Such program shall include:
  - (1) furnish to each such agent and employee a letter summarizing the terms of this Decree and of the Fair Housing Act as it applies to the employee;
  - person or by general meeting, of the provisions of this Decree and of ruties of the Company and its agents and employees under the various applicable Fair Housing Acts. Each such agent and employee shall be advised that his failure to comply with the provisions of this Decree shall subject him to dismissal or other disciplinary action, and to

sanctions for disobedience of this Order;

(3) securing a signed statement from each such agent that he has read the letter mentioned above and received the instructions described in the preceding paragraph and forwarding a copy of each signed statement to plaintiff.

Each new agent and employee shall be instructed in accordance with the procedures set out above and shall be required to sign a statement to the effect that he has been so instructed and will comply with such instructions within ten (10) days following the initial date of employment.

IV

## AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM

It is further ORDERED that the defendant shall forthwith take the following steps to adopt and implement an affirmative program aimed at ensuring compliance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

- A. Notification to the Community of Defendant's Nondiscriminatory Policy
- 1. Post and maintain fair housing signs in a form approved by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in all offices of the defendant where there is rental activity or public contact.
- 2. Include in all appropriate advertising the words "Equal Housing Opportunity" as to ads of fifteen lines or more. In addition, all advertising placed by the Company or its agents shall conform to the practices recommended in the Department of Housing and Urban Development advertising guidelines, as published in 37 Fed Reg., pp. 6700-02, on April 1, 1972. A copy of these guidelines is attached as Appendix "B" to this Order.

# B. Affirmative Employment Program

Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant presently has working for them a large percentage of black and minority workers. Despite this, however, the defendant will not discriminate against anyone due to race, color, religion, sex or national origin in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified arise.

Pursuant to this policy, the defendant shall take the following steps:

- 1. Display an equal opportunity employment poster in a prominent place clearly visible to prospective agents, employees and applicants for employment in each office of the defendant where applications for employment are taken.
- 2. Notify in writing each labor union whose members are part of defendant's work force of the terms of Part IV (c) of this Decree and that prospective employees are to be referred without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

In recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees, the defendant shall not require that they possess qualifications for any job or position more exacting than those which were in effect with respect to white employees before the institution of this action.

V

# IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVE RENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

In order to assure nondiscriminatory selection and assignment of tenants and to assure equal opportunity in housing at each building owned or managed by defendant or any of them, defendant shall adopt and implement the following standards and procedures:

### A. Standards

# 1. Income \*

One week's net salary from all sources must be at least equal to one month's rent unless any of the following circumstances pertain:

- a. If a guarantor is used.
- b. If additional security is used or if
   a customer is willing to pay rent in advance.
- c. If a tenant switches from one Trump building to another Trump building and if that tenant has met his obligations to Trump Management, Inc. in the past.
- d. If a prospective tenant has a bank account with a substantial balance.
- e. Individuals who furnish quality
  references from people such as bank officers,
  professionals (attorneys, architects, doctors,
  etc.) or relatives, who will guarantee their
  financial responsibility.
- f. If a particular building is experiencing rental difficulty due to economic or other conditions.
- g. If a prospective tenant (or his relatives) does business with Trump Management Inc. and will vouch for their financial stability.
- \*/ All income sources of any applicant, including wife's income, public assistance payments, alimony and child support shall be tive. In and reasonable consideration in determining the financial eligibility of any applicant to assure payment of rent when due.

# 2. Occupancy

Not more than two persons in a one bedroom apartment. Not more than four persons, two adults and two

children of the same sex, in a two bedroom apartment, etc.

### B. Procedures

### 1. Application Procedure

- a. Applications for tenancy will be received at the apartment building or management office of the complex where the tenant is applying for an apartment.

  Applications shall be received by superintendents or rental agents authorized by the defendant to accept applications, and instructed in the requirements of this Order and of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Applications shall be accepted from all persons wishing to apply and the superintendent or agent shall make no subjective judgment on the acceptability of a prospective tenant unless said prospective tenant is:
  - i. Drunk and disorderly
  - ii. Visably under the influence of drugs
  - iii. Abusive towards superintendent or rental agent.
    - iv. Blatantly shabbily dressed to a point at which other tenants living in the building would be offended.
- b. The superintendent or rental agent shall review the application for completeness and shall require the payment of one month's rent and one month's security together with a current W2 Form (or reasonable substitute therefor) from all applicants to be forwarded for review and determination to the defendant's main office.
- check shall be conducted with respect to each applicant.
- d. Applications shall be reviewed and a determination of acceptability shall be made by the Section Managers employed in the defendant's main office.

e. Each applicant shall be informed within twenty (20) business days whether or not he or she has been accepted for tenancy. If rejected, the applicant shall be informed of the reason for rejection, and of the specific objective standard which he has failed to meet.

# 2. Providing Rental Information to Apartment Seekers

- a. Defendant shall maintain at their central office at 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York a central listing to be compiled on a weekly basis, of each current vacant or available apartment in the New York area. This list shall include the type of apartment, the number of rooms, the monthly rent and date of availability. Defendant shall also maintain at each of their buildings a similar list of the apartments vacant at that building.
- b. Inquirers shall be uniformly informed of the qualifications for rental, including the income, security deposit and W2 Form requirements.

VΙ

### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is further ORDERED that three (3) months after the entry of this Decree, and thereafter three (3) time per year, the defendant shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the plaintiff a report containing the following information for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed

in the defendant:

- 1. Argyle Hall
- 2. Westminster Hall
- 3. Fontainbleau Apartments
- 4. Lawrence Gardens and Lawrence Towers
- 5. Sea Isle Apartments

- 6. Beach Haven Apartments
- 7. Shore Haven Apartments
- 8. Belcrest Apartments
- 9. Highlander Hall
- 10. Saxony Hall
- 11. Clyde Hall
- 12. Edgerton Apartments
- 13. Winston Hall
- 14. Sussex Hall
- A. If a prospective applicant, making inquiry about a rental of an apartment in one of the above mentioned developments, will fill out an application form, the following information will be asked on said application and said application will be retained by defendant during the term of this Order:
  - Name, Address, Business and Home telephone number
  - 2. Date of Application
  - 3. Whether a deposit was given
  - Weekly net income of applicant and monthly rent sought
  - 5. Apartment sought
  - 6. If rejected, reason therefor
  - 7. Name of person or persons who decided to accept or reject the application
  - 8. If neither accepted or rejected, status or disposition of application.

For each rejected nonwhite applicant, a report shall be made, on notification of a complaint, to include the defendant's reasons for rejection together with person responsible for said rejection.

#### ·VII

It is further ORDERED that whenever any future complaints arise under the provision of this Order, the Government shall furnish the name of the person who made such complaint and a brief description of the nature and substance of the complaint, including the date of the alleged incident and the building with respect to which the complaint was made. Thereafter, the defendant shall have thirty (30) days from the date notice is received of such complaint and the nature thereof, to investigate such complaint, and if the complaint is determined by defendant to be valid, to advise the Government what steps, if any, have been taken to correct the conditions leading to the complaint; or, if the complaint is determined by defendant to be invalid, to advise the Government of the basis for determining the complaint to be invalid, before the Government shall apply to this Court with any motion for an Order to Show Cause or any other motion to compel compliance with this Order.

#### VIII

It is further ORDERED that for a period extending two (2) years from the entry of this Decree, the defendant shall, at least twenty (20) days prior to the event, report to counsel for the plaintiff:

- 1. Any new ownership or management interests in residential property in the New York area acquired by the defendant.
- 2. The divestment, through transfer or sale, of any ownership or management interests in residential property in the New York area.

Two years from the date this Decree is entered, or thereafter, the defendant may move to dissolve this Order. If the United States fails to interpose any objection within thirty (30) days of the Notice of Motion, this injunction shall be dissolved and the complaint dismissed without a hearing or further Order of the Court.

X

Each party shall bear its own costs.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until the termination of this Order.

ORDERED THIS

day of

1975.

EDWARD NEAHER
United States District Judge

The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this ORDER:

For the Defendant:

For the Plaintiff:

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T. 3/14/75

JSP:FES:NPG:mp DJ 175-52-28 MAR 1 4 1975

Mr. Roy Cohn
Saxe, Bacon, Bolan
and Manley
39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Re: United States v. Trump Management et al.

Dear Roy:

I was sorry to hear of your illness and wish you a speedy recovery.

As I explained to you by telephone, we understand that this case has been settled in principle in accordance with our Memorandum of Understanding which was signed by both parties on January 20, 1975. The agreement provides, among other things, that

[t]he parties shall . . . seek the assistance of the Court to resolve any dispute arising solely out of disagreement as to the meaning of any proposed change referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding. All other provisions in the attached Consent Decree and those not in dispute as to meaning in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be contained in their entirety in the final Consent Decree.

Records
Chrono
Mr. Schwelb
Mr. Goldberg

Trial Fife

The second sentence of the quoted passage makes it crystal clear that there are to be no changes in the decree attached to the Memorandum except those specifically set forth in the Memorandum. As one who represents his clients with sufficient zeal to suit most, you will understand my unwillingness to renegotiate what we have already negotiated, or to have a negotiated settlement picked apart once the pressure of imminent trial is off.

The 'counterdraft" which you submitted to us does not appear in any way to recognize the validity of the Memorandum of Understanding and makes innumerable changes other than those specified in that Memorandum, all of which weaken the Order. Accordingly, I was somewhat reassured, hopefully with reason, by what I took to be your assurance that you did not view the Memorandum as a "gimmick" that was designed to delay the ultimate resolution of this case and that you do regard it as a valid instrument which both parties are bound to follow as closely as possible.

Accordingly, I am going along with your request to draft a new letter which sets forth the differences between your "counterdraft" and the earlier version of our agreement and indicating which of the provisions omitted from your decree are essential to a settlement. Please keep in mind that by writing this letter we are not agreeing to the reopening of any negotiations foreclosed by the Memorandum of Understanding and that we believe that the case should be settled forthwith on the terms to which we previously agreed. It is not my intention to treat an agreement previously negotiated as being a starting point for new negotiations which could only weaken it.

- 1. Provisions omitted from or substantially altered by defendants' "counterdrant" which must be re-inserted in the final decree:
  - a. Paragraph II A (1). \*/ Defendants\* notification to three fair housing groups (names to be agreed upon by the parties) of defendants' fair housing policies and subsequent weekly notification of defendants' vacancies to each group. We would be satisfied to delegate the responsibility for selecting the fair housing groups to the New York City Commission on Human Rights. Alternatively, we would be content with the selection of the following groups: (1) the New York City Open Housing Center, the South Side Community Mission (for Spanish speaking people) and any fair housing or civil rights group to which your proposed witness from the NAACP belongs.
  - b. Paragraph III A (3)(a). Inclusion of words "Equal Housing Opportunities" and fair housing logo in all types of advertising including ads of 6 lines or more. See paragraph (e) of Memorandum of Understanding for prior negotiated modification. As you know, we had originally recommended inclusion in ads of 3 lines, and the 6 lines were the compromise on which we both signed off.

<sup>\*/</sup> References to numbered paragraphs refer to those contained in Plaintiff's Proposed Consent Decree, forwarded to defendants on February 5, 1975, unless otherwise specified herein.

- c. Paragraph III A (3)(b). Advertising of housing opportunities in minority media. See paragraphs (f) and (g) of Memorandum of Understanding for prior negotiated modification of our original proposal.
- d. Paragraph III A (4). Written notification to all appropriate companies with whom defendants do business of defendants' fair housing policies.
- e. Paragraph III B. Provision of list of certain vacancies to Open Housing Center. See paragraph (h) of Memorandum of Understanding for prior negotiated modification. The text of paragraph (h) makes it quite clear that such holdings of vacancies is to be accomplished, and it is no secret to you that this affirmative relief is of particularly great importance.
- f. Paragraph III C (1). Advertising of defendants' employment opportunities in minority media.
- g. Paragraph III C (2). Inclusion of the words "Equal Opportunity Employer" in all employment advertising.
- h. Paragraph IV A (1). Income standards are to be one week's gross salary equal to one month's rent. Virtually every resident manager testified on deposition that the prior standard was gross income and not net income. Other provisions related to objective standards, Paragraph IV A 3 and paragraph (i) of the Memorandum of Understanding, set forth the principle that the standards for tenancy shall be no more stringent than those previously followed by defendants.

- 1. Footnote to Paragraph IV A (1).
  Language should be retained to assure that wife's income and other forms of income are counted and not merely given fair and reasonable consideration. See additional discussion, infra, as to requirement for counting public assistance payments.
- j. Paragraph IV B (2)(a). Maintenance at selected apartment complexes in Brooklyn and Queens of weekly listings of all vacancies at defendants' buildings.
- k. Paragraph IV (d). Rentals made available on first-come, first-served basis.
- 1. Paragraph V. Reporting obligations to run for period of three (3) years.
- m. Paragraph V (c) and (d)(1), (2) and (3). Other reporting requirements.
- n. Paragraphs VI (1) through (4). Record keeping provisions.
- o. Paragraph I. The prohibitory injunction is permanent. After three years, we have no objection to a clause enabling defendants to move for a dissolution of the affirmative relief provisions of the decree, subject to good cause objections by plaintiff.
- 2. Other changes related to settlement by consent decree:
  - a. The prefatory language of the two proposals can be combined satisfactorily. We should keep the rhetoric on behalf of everyone to a minimum.

- b. The differences between Paragraph VIII of our proposal and Paragraph VII of defendants' proposal relating to notification to either party of housing discrimination complaints are negotiable.
- c. The terms of the dismissal of Fred and Donald Trump individually should be rewarded to conform to the Memorandum of Understanding which clarifies that they are still in as officers of the corporation.
- d. As you mentioned over the telephone,

  <u>Boyd v. Lefrak was reversed</u> by the Court
  of Appeals. Plaintiffs have applied for
  a rehearing <u>en banc</u>, and expect to go to
  the Supreme Court if they lose. Accordingly,
  the footnote in our original proposal is
  still valid. In any event, your people
  testified that they counted public assistance
  payments now, and since the standards are
  not to be more stringent than before, they
  should continue to do so.

Per our agreement by telephone, we will look' forward to receiving your response within five business days. I suggest that after that we put aside four continuous hours or so of attention solely to getting the mechanics of this decree arranged, getting it typed in suitable form, and getting it signed and ready for submission to the Court. If we do not hear from you, as arranged, we will assume that settlement is not possible without seeking the assistance of Judge Neaher as provided in our Memorandum of Understanding.

All in all, I have to say I don't know whether to be impressed or surprised at the way that you are making a career of this case. Then again, I suppose you always need material for a book. I would like to think that I'll get a complimentary copy of the next one too, and good luck even if I am still with the Civil Rights Division.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

By:

FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief Housing Section

#### APPENDIX E

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
<b>v.</b>	
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	CONSENT ORDER
Defendants.	

This action was instituted by the United States of America on October 15, 1973, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.

The claim of the United States is that the defendants have failed and neglected to exercise their affirmative and nondelegable duty under the Fair Housing Act to assure compliance by their subordinates, with the result that equal housing opportunity has been denied to substantial numbers of persons and that defendant's subordinates have failed to carry out their obligations under the Act.

Defendants vigorously deny said allegations and claim that the number of violations, if any, are insubstantial, and that if there was any discrimination, it was not done at the direction of the individual defendants or the officers of Trump Management, Inc.

Accordingly, without adjudication of the merit and without any admission as to the existence or absence of liability, and in order to resolve this matter without further protracted litigation, the parties hereto are prepared to resolve this case by the entry of a Consent Decree.

It is expressly understood and agreed that the execution of this Agreement by Trump Management, Inc., is in no way an admission by it of a violation of the prohibition against discrimination as set forth in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or any other applicable statute, rule or regulation.

Irrespective of the merits of the complaint, however, the principal officers of defendant Trump Management, Inc., are prepared to affirmatively assume and carry out the responsibility for assuring that their employees will comply with the Act and will promote equal opportunity. Accordingly, the parties are prepared to resolve this case by the entry of the following Consent Order.

I.

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that in consideration of their affirmative assumption of responsibility contained in part III herein, the complaint against Fred C. Trump and Donald J. Trump is dismissed against them in their personal capacity, with prejudice, as to all allegations contained therein.

II.

#### INJUNCTION

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant, its officers, agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from:

#### GENERAL INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS

- 1. Refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying any dwelling to any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 2. Discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 3. Making, printing, or publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or published, any notice, statement or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make such preference, limitation or discrimination.
- 4. Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
- 5. Influencing the residential choice of any person on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- 6. Coercing, threatening, or interfering with, or attempting to coerce, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, or in the exercise or enjoyment of the right to assist others to secure equal housing opportunity.

7. Engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to equal housing opportunity protected by the Fair Housing Act. In this connection, defendants shall not, in determining the income qualification for rental of any person, family, or other group of persons, fail or refuse to fully count a woman's total income, including salary, wages, alimony, support payments or other income from whatever source received.

#### III

ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PRINCIPALS OF TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC., AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Trump Management Inc., controls many thousands of rental units in the New York area and elsewhere, and its activities therefore have a major impact on housing opportunities. company therefore occupies a position of leadership in the real estate community and can, by its example, influence the activities not only of its own agents and employees but also of many others. The Fair Housing Act prohibits conduct which is discriminatory in its effect, regardless of motivation, and violations of the Act can result from thoughtlessness and lack of information, as well as from deliberate discrimination. The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc., recognize that they have both the responsibility to assure nondiscrimination by their agents and employees and a significant opportunity to promote equal housing opportunity generally in the New York area and elsewhere. are prepared to carry out that responsibility and to take advantage of that opportunity.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

A. The principal officers of Trump Management, Inc., presently Donald Trump and Fred C. Trump shall forthwith

- (1) thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis with all of the obligations of the defendant under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended and as judicially interpreted; under state and municipal civil rights laws; under pertinent Regulations and Guidelines of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other appropriate agencies; and under this Order;
- (2) Take steps to assure that their principal assistants and officers similarly familiarize themselves with their obligations; and
- (3) Personally undertake to assure that the training program set forth herein is successfully carried out.
- B. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, the Defendant by its principal officers, shall conduct and complete an educational program for all employees with rental or employment responsibilities, who have contact with prospective tenants, provide information to the public about rental, or accept or process applications for rentals, or who are engaged in any manner in the employment process, to inform them of the provisions of this Decree, and their duties under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Such program shall include:

- (1) Furnishing to each such agent and employee a letter summarizing the terms of this Decree and of the Fair Housing Act as it applies to the employee.
- (2) Informing each such agent and employee, in person or by general meeting, of the provisions of this Decree and of duties of the Company and its agents and employees under the various applicable Fair Housing Acts. Each such agent and employee shall be advised that his failure to comply with the provisions of this Decree shall subject him to dismissal or other disciplinary action, and to sanctions for disobedience of this Order.
- (3) Securing a signed statement from each such agent that he has read the letter mentioned above and received the instructions described in the preceding paragraph and forwarding a copy of each such signed statement to plaintiff.

Each new agent and employee shall be instructed in accordance with the procedures set out above and shall be required to sign a statement to the effect that he has been so instructed and will comply with such instructions within ten (10) days following the initial date of employment.

Copies of all signed statements will be furnished to plaintiff upon execution.

#### AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM

It is further ORDERED that the defendant shall forthwith\*/
and for a period of two (2) years following the entry of this
Order take the following steps to adopt and implement an
affirmative program aimed at ensuring compliance with the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, and at overcoming the effects of any
previous actions by the defendant which had the purpose or effect of
impairing rights secured by the Fair Housing Act:

### A. <u>Notification to the Community of Defendant's Nondiscriminatory Policy</u>

Notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, in writing, with copies to counsel for plaintiff that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Included in such letter shall be a full synopsis of the rental standards and procedures outlined in Part V, below, and a general statement of present and anticipated vacancies in Trump apartment buildings in the New York Metropolitan area. parties shall agree on the text of an appropriate letter prior Subsequently, defendant shall mail to the Open to its mailing. Housing Center a copy of its weekly Central Listing of vacancies described infra in Part V of this decree. This mailing shall be done on the day the list is made. The Open Housing Center may, at its own discretion, forward copies of the abovementioned letter and weekly list of vacancies to any and all persons or organizations with an interest in promoting equal housing opportunities.

<sup>\*/</sup> The defendant's obligations to implement each provision of this Order for affirmative action shall begin ten (10) days following the entry of this Order, unless otherwise specified herein.

- 2. Post and maintain fair housing signs in a form approved by the Sccretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)\*/ in all offices of the defendant where there is rental activity or public contact.
- 3. Implement an advertising program aimed at informing the nonwhite community of defendant's nondiscriminatory rental policy. The defendant shall
  - a. Include, in all advertising, \*\*/ in newspapers, telephone directories, radio, television and other media, and on all billboards, signs, pamphlets, brochures, and other promotional literature the words "Equal Housing Opportunity" and the fair housing logo. These words and the logo shall be prominently placed and easily legible.\*\*\*/ In addition, all advertising placed by the Company or its agents shall conform to the practices recommended in the Department of Housing and Urban Development advertising guidelines, as published in 37 Fed. Reg., pp. 6700-02, on April 1, 1972. A copy of these guidelines is attached as Appendix "B" to this Order.

<sup>\*/</sup> See the pertinent HUD regulation, 37 F.R. 3429 (a copy attached hereto as Appendix A).

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This subsection dealing with newspaper advertising shall only apply to newspaper ads of six (6) lines or more. Defendant shall continue its present advertising policies, and shall not change its present practices with respect to the size and type of advertising by shortening or by otherwise changing its policy of placing display ads to avoid the requirement of including the equal opportunity statement.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> In radio and television advertising, the words "equal housing opportunities" shall be used and shall be easily audible.

- (b) Allocate a reasonable proportion of its advertising budget to advertising in media directed primarily to the black and Puerto Rican communities. The parties have agreed that the placement of reasonably prominent monthly display advertisements, one in the black and one in the Puerto Rican press,\*/ together with the allocation of 10% of defendant's radio advertising budget to black-oriented and Spanish language stations, shall meet the requirements of this provision. All advertisements of Trump buildings in minority media shall advertise a full cross-section of Trump buildings with vacancies, and shall not stress or give undue emphasis to buildings with substantial minority occupancy.\*\*/
- 4. Provide written notification to each firm, association company, corporation, or other person or organization engaged by defendant to act as referral agency, apartment locating service, credit checking company, or management company that apartments owned or managed by the defendant are available to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Each such notification shall also advise the recipient of defendant's objective standards and procedures for rental.

<sup>\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> If the listed apartments do not include all Trump buildings with vacancies, the buildings listed shall be rotated with each ad so that the same apartment buildings are not continuously or disproportionately advertised under this subsection.

### B. Program of Providing Listings for Minority Apartment Seekers

For two years after the entry of this Order, defendant shall notify the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10003, of every fifth available apartment in each apartment building owned and/or managed by the defendant which has a black tenancy of less than ten percent,\*/ at least three days prior to placing that apartment on the open market.\*\*/ During this three-day period, the Open Housing Center shall have the opportunity to refer qualified applicants to the defendant for the purpose of renting the apartment. All applicants referred by the Open Housing Center shall provide the defendant or its representative with an appropriate identification which will serve to advise the defendants that such applicant has been referred by the Open Housing Center pursuant to this subsection. After three days if no qualified applicant referred by the Center has filed an application seeking to rent the apartment, the apartment may be placed on the open market to be rented in defendant's normal business custom without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

#### C. Affirmative Employment Program

The defendant shall recruit, hire, assign, promote and transfer employees and agents without regard to race, color,

<sup>\*/</sup> The requirements of this provision need not be followed for apartment buildings which presently have or in the future reach a black occupancy rate of 10%. For these apartment buildings, apartments shall continue to be rented without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The three-day period shall begin when notification has been completed and the Open Housing Center has received, either in person, by telephone, or by mail, the listings. For purposes of this Decree, rental on the open market shall mean rental to any person not referred by the Open Housing Center.

religion, sex or national origin and will endeavor to place
blacks and other nonwhite persons in supervisory and professional positions as vacancies for which they are qualified
arise.\*/

Pursuant to this program, the defendant shall take the following steps:

- 1. For every third available employment opportunity, place advertisements on a regular basis in newspapers that primarily serve the black and Spanish community\*\*/ describing the available work opportunities.\*\*\*/
- 2. Prominently include in all advertising of available jobs the slogan "Equal Opportunity Employer."
- 3. Display an equal employment opportunity poster\*\*\*\*/
  in a prominent place clearly visible to prospective agents,
  employees, and applicants for employment in each office of
  the defendant where applications for employment are taken.

<sup>\*/</sup> References to employees and agents in Part IV C of this Decree shall include only those persons who are presently employed as or seek to be superintendents, rental agents, leasing agents, or central office personnel who receive, review or approve applications for tenancy or otherwise participate in the rental process.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> The parties agree that the placement of such advertisements in the Amsterdam News and El Diario will satisfy this requirement.

<sup>\*\*\*/</sup> If defendants shall choose to restrict employment to persons living within a reasonable distance from the employment location, they shall so specify in these advertisements. Such designated areas shall be designed to include areas of potential black and Spanish residents

<sup>\*\*\*\*/</sup> This poster shall be in the form, size and prominence approved by the United States Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

4. Notify in writing, each labor union representing any part of defendant's work force of the terms of Part IV(C) of this Decree and that prospective employees are to be referred without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

In recruiting and hiring nonwhite employees, the defendant shall not require that nonwhite persons recruited or hired possess qualifications for any job or position more exacting than those which were in effect with respect to white employees before the institution of this action.

v

### IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVE RENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

In order to assure nondiscriminatory selection and assignment of tenants and to assure equal opportunity in housing at each building owned or managed by Trump Management, Inc., defendant shall adopt and implement the following standards and procedures which shall be applied in determining whether or not to rent to an applicant.

#### A. Standards

#### 1. Income

One week's gross income from all sources\*/ must be at least equal to one month's rent, except in the following circumstances:

(a) The applicant(s) have outstanding automobile payments, or other fixed debt in excess of \$50.00 a month, with a remaining debt period in excess of four (4) months, or

<sup>\*/</sup> This shall include alimony, child support, public assistance payments, or guarantor's assurances on behalf of public assistance recipients, wife's income, part-time employment, pensions, etc.

(b) The family composition is in excess of three (3) persons.

In either circumstance (a) or (b) above, one week's net income must be at least equal to one month's rent.

If an applicant does not meet the foregoing income standards, he or she may still qualify for rental if:

- verify funds sufficient to meet the financial obligations of the guarantors fixed monthly payments for his or her residence, as well as the applicant's rental, based on the defendant's income standards.
- (b) If the applicant is willing to post three (3) months security deposit or will supply six (6) months rent in advance.
- (c) If a tenant switches from one Trump building to another Trump building and if that tenant has met his obligations to Trump Management, Inc., in the past.

#### 2. Occupancy

Not more than two (2) persons in a one-bedroom apartment. Not more than four (4) persons, two (2) adults and two (2) children of the same  $\text{sex}, \frac{*}{}$  in a two-bedroom apartment.

#### B. Procedures \*\*/

#### 1. Application Procedure

<sup>\*/</sup> Except that children under ten years of age may be of different sexes.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> These procedures are substantially based on defendant's past practices, as described during discovery.

- a. Applications for tenancy will be received at the apartment building or complex where the tenant is applying for an apartment. Applications shall be received by Superintendents or rental agents authorized by the defendant to accept applications, and instructed in the requirements of this Order and of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.

  3601 et seq. Applications shall be accepted from all persons wishing to apply and the superintendent or agent shall make no subjective judgment on the acceptability of a prospective tenant, unless said prospective tenant is:
  - (i) visibly and objectively drunkand disorderly;
  - (ii) visibly and objectively under
    the influence of drugs;
  - (iii)abusive towards the superintendent
    or rental agent;

or there is,

(iv) a visible and objective indication that the applicant will not maintain his or her apartment with sufficient care and cleanliness so as not to intrude on the rights of other tenants. In order to satisfy this criteria, defendant or its agents shall contact the applicant's former landlord to ascertain the manner in which he or she had maintained the rented premises. In no event shall the subjective impression by a superintendent of the manner of dress or style of grooming disqualify an applicant. This subsection shall apply solely to cleanliness criteria.

- b. The superintendent or rental agent shall review the application for completeness and shall require a security deposit of one month's rent and a W2 form (or reasonable substitute therefor) from all applicants. The agents shall then submit the deposit, W2 form and application, for review and determination to one of the defendant's two main offices. No superintendent or rental agent shall have the authority to make a determination on the acceptability for tenancy of an applicant except as outlined in B(1)(a) (i-iv) above.
- c. Applications shall be reviewed and a determination of acceptability shall be made by the Section Managers employed in the defendant's main offices.
- d. If conducted, a uniform credit check and/or employment check shall be conducted with respect to each applicant. The standards of acceptability based on credit and employment shall be uniformly applied without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- e. Each applicant shall be informed wherever possible within ten (10) business days whether or not he or she has been accepted for tenancy. If an application can not be processed within ten (10) days, defendant shall notify the applicant of the reason therefor, but in no event shall an applicant not be informed of the disposition of his application beyond twenty (20) days from the time he or she applied. If rejected, the applicant shall be informed of the reason for rejection, and of the specific objective standard he or she has failed to meet.

### 2. Providing Rental Information to Apartment Seekers

- Defendant shall maintain at its central offices at 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, a Central Listing, to be compiled on a weekly basis, of each currently vacant or available apartment in the New York area, and of each apartment expected to be vacant or available in the New York area within the next thirty days. This list shall include the type of apartment, the number of rooms, the monthly rent, and the date of availability and shall be shown to all persons inquiring about available apartments. Defendant shall also maintain at each of its buildings a similar list of the apartments vacant at that building by type of apartment available and a notification that complete lists of all available apartments in the New York area are available for inspection at defendant's main offices located at 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York and 2064 Cropsey Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.
- b. Apartments which are available for rental and listed on the apartment availability list (2(a) above) shall be shown to all interested inquirers by an authorized agent of the defendant.
- c. Inquirers shall be uniformly informed of the qualifications for rental, including the income, security deposit and W2 form requirements.

d. No waiting list\*/ will be maintained at any of the defendant's offices or apartment buildings nor shall there be any preference for persons referred by present tenants.

Rental will be on a first-come, first-served basis when apartments are available for rental.

VI

#### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is further ORDERED that three (3) months after the entry of this Decree, and thereafter three (3) times per year for two years the defendant shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the plaintiff a report containing the following information for the following apartment buildings owned and/or managed by the defendant:

- 1. Argyle Hall
- 2. Westminster Hall
- 3. Fontainebleau Apartments
- 4. Lawrence Gardens and Lawrence Towers
- 5. Sea Isle Apartments
- 6. Bachaven Apartments
- 7. Shorehaven Apartments
- 8. Belcrest Apartments
- 9. Highlander Hall
- 10. Saxony Hall
- 11. Clyde Hall
- 12. Edgerton Apartments
- 13. Winston Hall
- 14. Sussex Hall

<sup>\*/</sup> Since this is defendant's present practice and it is non-discriminatory, plaintiff interposes no objection thereto.

- a. The number of persons, by race\*/ (as visually observable) making inquiry in person about the availability of terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding reporting period and the number by race, that:
  - 1. made inquiry;
  - were offered an application;
  - 3. filled out an application;
  - 4. submitted an applicant with deposit;
  - 5. were accepted for occupancy;
  - were rejected;
  - 7. withdrew applications;
  - had applications pending at the end of the reporting period.

This report may be forwarded to plaintiff on a form similar to the sample form attached hereto as Appendix C.

- b. A report reflecting the applications for tenancy submitted during the preceding reporting period, including the following information for each person submitting an application:
  - name, address, business and home telephone number, and race;
  - 2. date of application;
  - 3. whether a deposit was received;
  - 4. date notified of acceptance or rejection;
  - 5. weekly income of applicant and monthly rent of apartment sought;

<sup>\*/</sup> For purposes of this Decree, all notations of race shall be as visually observable.

- 6. if accepted, apartment chosen;
- 7. if rejected, reason therefor;
- 8. name of person or persons who decided to accept or reject the application;
- if neither accepted nor rejected, status
   or disposition of application.

This report may be forwarded to plaintiff on a form similar to the sample form attached hereto as Appendix D. For each rejected nonwhite applicant, the report shall include a detailed statement of the reason(s) for rejection and supporting information.

- c. A list of vacancies during the preceding quarter, including the date the apartment was placed on the market \*/ and the date each apartment was rented or otherwise committed for rental.
- d. Reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include the current statistics with respect to the race of tenants in each apartment building owned or managed by the defendant, and an account of the steps taken during the preceding reporting period to implement the program outlined in Sections I and II above, including:
  - 1. Copies of all letters sent to apartment locators and credit checking companies, Fair Housing groups, and labor unions pursuant to Parts III and IV of this Decree.

<sup>\*/</sup> Including where appropriate, the date the Open Housing Center was contacted concerning the apartment's availability in accordance with Part III above.

- 2. Representative copies of all newspaper advertisements placed in the Amsterdam News and El Diario pursuant to this Order and the date of each advertisement.
- 3. The name, race, position and office assignment of each rental agent, superintendent and main office employee employed as of the date of the entry of this Order, an assurance that the educational program required by Part II has been conducted, and copies of all signed statements obtained in accordance with Part II of this Decree. If any rental agent refuses to sign such a statement the defendants shall include a full statement of all pertinent circumstances and of any action taken by them in relation thereto.

#### VII

#### RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall, for two years following the entry of this Decree, make and preserve the following records for all apartment buildings owned or managed by them:

- 1. The name, address, telephone number and date and time of contact of each person inquiring in person about the availability or terms of rental of an apartment therein,\*/
  the size of apartment sought, if known, and whether:
  - A. he was offered an application;
  - B. he filled out an application;
  - C. he submitted an application with deposit.

<sup>\*/</sup> This may be accomplished by maintaining a guest register at each apartment building owned by the defendants.

- 2. A detailed record of all action taken on each inquiry and application and the reasons for such action.
- 3. A detailed record of all steps taken by the defendant in ascertaining the acceptability for tenancy of the applicant and the name of the employee who took such steps or who approved or rejected the application.
- 4. All records which are the source of, or contain any of the information pertinent to defendant's obligations under this Order. Representatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the defendant at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendant from the inspection of such records.

#### VIII

It is further ORDERED that for a period extending two years from the entry of this Decree, the defendant shall, at least twenty (20) days prior to the event, report to counsel for the plaintiff:

- 1. Any new ownership or management interests in residential property, acquired by the defendant.
- 2. The divestment through transfer or sale, of any ownership or management interests in residential property.

#### ΙX

It is further ORDERED that for a period of two years after the entry of this Decree the defendant shall advise counsel for plaintiff, in writing, of all complaints,\*/ from

<sup>\*/</sup> For purposes of this Decree, "complaints" shall mean any information which comes to the attention of the defendant or its officers from whatever source received, which indicates a possible denial of equal housing opportunities under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or a potential violation of this Decree.

whatever source, received by the defendant regarding equal opportunity in housing at properties owned and/or managed by Trump Management, Inc. In addition, plaintiff shall, for a period of two years after the entry of this Decree, notify the defendant of all complaints received by the plaintiff.

Except where the plaintiff determines that there exists a need for emergency relief threatening the effectiveness of this Decree, the plaintiff shall afford the defendant fifteen (15) days from the date notice of such a complaint is received to investigate the complaint and provide plaintiff with an explanation of the information contained in the complaint. If the complaint is determined to be valid by either party, plaintiff shall recommend what steps it believes to be necessary to correct the conditions leading to the complaint, and shall afford the defendants an additional seven (7) days to effectuate appropriate steps to remedy the conditions leading to the complaint and to overcome any continuing effects of the alleged discriminatory actions before applying to the court for a motion to compel compliance with this Decree, or any other additional judicial relief.

X

Each party shall bear its own costs.

The Court shall retain jursidiction of this action for all purposes.

ORDERED this

day of

, 1975.

EDWARD NEAHER
United States District Judge

The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this Order:

For the Defendants:

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New York, New York

FRED C. TRUMP

DONALD TRUMP

For the Plaintiff:

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HENRY BRACHTL Assistant U.S. Attorney Eastern District of New York 37 F.R. 3429 Feb. 16, 1972

### Rules and Regulations

## Title 24—HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Chapter I-Office of Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Department of Housing and Urban Development

SUBCHAPTER A-FAIR HOUSING

[Docket No. R-72-165]

#### PART 110-FAIR HOUSING POSTER

The purpose of this regulation is to require the display of a fair housing poster by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and to prescribe the content of this poster.

prescribe the content of this poster.

Notice of a proposed amendment to Title 24 to include a new Part 72 was published in the Federal Register on August 4, 1971 (36 F.R. 14336). (Under the reorganization of Title 24 published in the Federal Register on December 22, 1971 (36 F.R. 24402), the fair housing poster will become new Part 110.) Comments were received from approximately 20 interested persons and organizations and consideration has been given to each comment.

Some comments with respect to proposed § 72.10 criticized the coverage of the proposed regulation as too broad, while other comments objected that the coverage is too narrow, and various suggestions were made for changes in coverage. Comments were directed not only to what dwellings should be included but also to the stage at which the requirement should take effect and the persons to whom it should apply. In response to the comments, § 72.10(a) (now § 110.10 (a) and (b)) has been revised to clarify the extent of coverage, to broaden coverage to the extent appropriate and to climinate unnecessary burdens where the requirement can appropriately be narrowed or climinated. Under § 110.10 (a) and (b), display of the prescribed poster at a single-family dwelling is not required unless the dwelling is being effered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings; however if a real estate

broker or agent is handling the sale or broker or agent is handling the sale or rental, he must display the poster at any place of business where the dwelling is being offered for sale or rental. With respect to all other dwellings covered by the Act, the poster must be displayed at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for sale or rental; in addition, the poster must be displayed at the dwelling except that in the case of a singlethe poster must be displayed at the dwelling, except that in the case of a single-family dwelling being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, e.g., a subdivision, the poster may be displayed at model homes instead of at each of the individual dwellings. Finally, in the case of dwellings other than a single-family dwelling not being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, the poster must be displayed from the beginning of con-struction through the end of the sale or rental process.

Several comments suggested revisions in the language of the poster described in proposed § 72.25. Such suggestions included rewriting the poster in terms of the individual's rights rather than the Act's prohibitions, adding additional prohibitions contained in the Act, emphasizing the nature of penalties for failure to post, and listing the HUD area office instead of the regional office as a office instead of the regional office as a location to which to send complaints. The new § 110.25 adopts the suggestion with regard to the area offices in that the poster will provide for insertion of the address of the regional or area office as appropriate. It has been decided that instead of lengthening the content of the poster by adding additional prohibitions. poster by adding additional prohibitions, the poster should be made shorter and easier to understand by briefly higheasier to understand by briefly highlighting the major prohibitions. In addition, the Equal Housing Opportunity
logotype and slogan have been inserted
at the top of the poster.

A comment by the Federal Home Lean
Bank Board (FHLBB) recommended
exempting from this regulation of the FHLBB
on subject to a regulation of the FHLBB

son subject to a regulation of the FHLBB requiring that person to post a poster substantially similar in content to the poster described in HUD's regulation. A similar comment was made by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to entities subject to supervision by any of the four Federal financial regulatory agencies. The Department will authorize a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Federal financial regulatory agency to utilize a pectar preregulatory agency to utilize a poster pre-scribed in a regulation by such agency, and approved by the Department, in-stead of the poster prescribed by HUD. However, all of the other requirements of Part 110 will remain fully applicable re-Part 110 will remain fully applicable regardless of whatever sanctions the regulatory agency prescribes for failure to comply with its regulation. This provision is set forth in § 110.25(b). The requirement, set forth in § 110.10(c), that financial institutions post and maintain a fair housing poster will not be effective until May 1, 1972, in order to allow time for the Federal financial regulatory agencies to issue appropriate regulations. agencies to issue appropriate regulations.

Proposed § 72.30 stated that a failure

to display the poster as required would be

deemed a discriminatory housing pracdeemed a discriminatory notising practice, i.e., an act unlawful under sections 804, 805, and 806 of title VIII, and prima facie evidence of a violation of these sections, as applicable. There were comments favoring this provision and a comments favoring this provision and a comments favoring the section of the section ment stating that such a provision was beyond the Department's authority on the ground that title VIII prescribes the specific acts of discrimination which are unlawful. There was also a comment recommending that failure to comply should subject a person to suspension from eligibility for FHA insurance.

The Department believes that it has the authority to require a fair housing poster, and that proposed § 72.30 does not prescribe a new violation not provided for in title VIII. Rather, the section provides an appropriate evidentiary mechanism for 'assisting in the determination of whether a violation of title VIII has occurred. For purposes of clarity, the provision has been combined with prosion has been combined with proposed § 72.35—complaints—into a new § 110.30—Effect of failure to display poster—and the combined text shortened. Under § 110.30, when a person claiming to have been injured by a displayment to the combined text shortened. criminatory housing practice files a com-plaint pursuant to Part 105—Fair Hous-ing, a failure to display the required poster shall be deemed prima facie evidence of such practice.

The comment with respect to application of additional sanctions is rejected. tion of additional sanctions is rejected, since such sanctions as well as others are provided in the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations published January 5, 1972 (37 F.R. 75), for failure to make the posting required at FHA project sites by \$ 200.620(f) of that regulation. Although Part 110 is applicable to some persons who are not covered by some persons who are not covered by the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing regulations, the Department considers that the insertion in Part 110 of the sanctions proposed in the comment is not appropriate.

Accordingly, a new Part 110 is added to Title 24 to read as follows:

#### Subport A-Purpose and Definitions

110.1 Purpose.

110.5 Definitions.

#### Subpart B-Requirements for Display of Posters

110.10 Persons subject. 110.15 Location of posters. 110.20 Availability of posters. 110.25 Description of posters.

#### Subpart C-Enforcement

110.30 Effect of failure to display poster.

AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 110 are issued under section 7(d) of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3535(d)).

#### Subpart A-Purpose and Definitions § 110.1 Purposc.

The regulations set forth in this part contain the procedures established by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development with respect to the display of a fair housing poster by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604-3606.

#### § 110.5 Definitions.

(a) "Department" means the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-

(b) "Discriminatory housing practice" neans an act that is unlawful under sec-

tion 804, 805, or 806 of title VIII.

(c) "Dwelling" means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.
(d) "Family" includes a single individ-

(e) "Person" includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor'organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, jointstock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and fiduciaries.
(f) "Secretary" means the Secretary

of Housing and Urban Development.
(g) "Fair housing poster" means the poster prescribed by the Secretary for display by persons subject to sections 804-806 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
(h) "The Act" means title VIII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601

et seq.
(i) "Person in the business of selling or renting dwellings" means a person as defined in section 803(c) of the Act.

#### Subpart P.—Requirements for Display of Posters

#### § 110.10 Persons subject.

(a) Except to the extent that paragraph (b) of this section applies, all persons subject to section 804 of the Act. Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster as follows:

(1) With respect to a single-family dwelling (not being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings) offered for sale or rental through a real estate broker, agent, salesman, or person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, such person shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for sale or rental.

(2) With respect to all other dwellings

covered by the Act:

(i) A fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained at any place of business where the dwelling is offered for sale or rental, and

(ii) A fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained at the dwelling, except that with respect to a singlefamily dwelling being offered for sale or rental in conjunction with the sale or rental of other dwellings, the fair housing poster may be posted and maintained at the model dwellings instead of at each of the individual dwellings.

(3) With respect to those dwellings to which subparagraph (2) of this paragraph applies, the fair housing poster must be posted at the beginning of construction and maintained throughout the period of construction and sale or

(b) This part shall not require posting and maintaining a fair housing poster:
(i) On vacant land, or

(ii) At any single-family dwelling, unless such dwelling

(a) Is being offered for sale or rental conjunction with the sale or rental other dwellings in which circumposted and maintained as specified in paragraph (a) (2) (ii) of this section, or (b) Is being offered for sale or rental

through a real estate broker, agent, salesman, or person in the business of selling or renting dwellings in which circumstances a fair housing poster shall be posted and maintained as specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section,

(c) All persons subject to section 805 of the Act, Discrimination in the Financing of Housing, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at all their places of business which participate in the financing of housing.

(d) All persons subject to section 806 of the Act, Discrimination in the Provision of Brokerage Services, shall post and maintain a fair housing poster at all their places of business.

#### § 110.15 Location of posters.

All fair housing posters shall be prominently displayed so as to be readily ap-parent to all persons seeking housing accommodations or financial assistance or brokerage services in connection therewith as contemplated by sections 804-806 of the Act.

#### § 110.20 Availability of posters.

All persons subject to this part may obtain fair housing posters from the De-partment's regional and area offices. A facsimile may be used if the poster and the lettering are equivalent in size and legibility to the poster available from the Department.

#### § 110.25 Description of posters.

(a) The fair housing poster shall be 11 inches by 14 inches and shall bear the following legend:



OPPORTUNITY We Do Business in Accordance With the Federal Fair Housing Law

(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) IT IS ILLEGAL

TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST

ANY PERSON BECAUSE OF RACE,

#### COLOR, RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN

- In the sale or rental of housing or residential lots.
- In advertising the sale or rental of hous-

- In the financing of housing.
  In the provision of real estate brokerage services.
- Blockbusting is also illegal.

Anyone who feels he has been discriminated against should send a complaint to:

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Washington, D.C. 20410

**HUD** Region or

#### [Area Office stamp]

(b) The Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity may grant a waiver permitting the substitution of a poster prescribed by a Federal financial regulatory agency for the fair housing poster described in paragraph (a) of this section. While such waiver remains in effect, compliance with the posting require-ments of such regulatory agency shall be deemed compliance with the posting requirements of this part. Such waiver shall not affect the applicability of all other provisions of this part.

#### Subpart C-Enforcement

#### § 110.30 Effect of failure to display poster.

Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice may file a complaint with the Secretary pursuant to Part 105 of this chapter. A failure to display the fair housing poster as required by this part shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a discriminatory housing practice.

Effective date. This part shall be effective February 25, 1972, except for § 110.10(c) which shall be effective May 1, 1972.

> SAMUEL J. SIMMONS, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity.

IFR Doc.72 2262 Filed 2-15-72:8:45 am i

#### DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND - URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Office of Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity

[Docket No. R-72-108]

#### ADVERTISING GUIDELINES FOR FAIR HOUSING

#### Notice of Statement of Policy

In order to facilitate and promote In order to facilitate and promote compliance with the requirements of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and particularly section 804(c) thereof (42 U.S.C. 3601, 3604(c)) regarding notices, statements or advertisements, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has prepared guidelines to produce graphic and written references. indicate graphic and written references that are appropriate for the preparation, publication, and general use of advertis-ing matter with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling as defined by the Act.

Notice of a proposed statement of policy was published in the Federal Register on May 21, 1971 (26 F.R. 9266). Comments were received from 26 interested

persons and organizations and consideration has been given to each comment.

Several comments observed that the proposed policy statement was at times unnecessarily limited to the field of newspaper advertising. In response to the comments, the policy statement has been revised in several places to clarify that the guidelines apply to advertise-ments in all media, including, e.g., television and radio, as well as to advertising agencies and other persons who use

advertising.
Several organizations suggested additional catchwords connoting a discriminatory effect for inclusion in section A-3. That section has been expanded to include several additional terms which may have a discriminatory effect when used in a discriminatory context.

In response to other comments, sec-

tion A-6 has been revised to clarify how directional references could be employed in a discriminatory context with an ethnically, as well as a radially, discriminatory effect. Also, section A-7 has been added relating specifically to designation of religious, ethnic or racial facilities to identify an area or neighborhood.

A number of comments indicated that human models or Equal Opportunity advertisements can and have been used selectively to promote the development of racially exclusive communities. A new section C-4 has been added in order to meet this specific problem. The previous human models section has been clarified by revision and reorganization in the new section C, in light of comments which indicated confusion or uncer-tainty surrounding the use of human models.

In response to publishers' comments, Table I has been simplified and references to minimum type sizes limited to a recommendation that the type should be bold display face and no smaller than eight points.

A number of organizations suggested the inclusion of a publisher's notice to appear with real estate advertising. A suggested notice has been included as Table III, in lieu of the provision in the proposed guidelines for direct notifica-tion to all firms or persons using the advertising services of a publisher. This provision was removed in light of objections that such notification would be unworkable or would impose great hardship since a large volume of real estate advertising is placed by a great number of persons on a nonrecurring basis.

Finally, a number of minor editorial or organizational changes have been made in order to clarify or simplify the advertising guidelines.

Several organizations suggested that the guidelines make specific reference to the roles of other enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice and local agencies. These comments suggested that the guidelines specify that they do not alter or affect conciliation agreements or court orders obtained by these agencies, as well as by the Depart-ment. Such a disclaimer appears to be unnecessary, since there is nothing in the guidelines to indicate an intent to

alter or affect agreements or orders obtained by the Department and other agencies.

This document is issued pursuant to

section 7(d), Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 3535(d)

The statement of Policy reads as follows:

PUBLICATION GUIDELINES FOR WITH TITLE VIII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968

#### POLICY STATEMENT

Section 804(c) of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604(c), makes it unlawfui to make, print, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling (any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereof of any such building, structure, or portion thereof) that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.

These advertising guidelines are being issued for the purpose of assisting all advertising media, advertising agencies, and all other persons who use advertising to make, print, or published any classified or display advertisement with respect to the cale or rental of a dwelling by the owner or his agent, in compliance with the requirements of title VIII.

Conformance with these guidelines will be

Conformance with these guidelines will be considered in evaluating compliance with title VIII in connection with investigations by the Assistant Secretary of advertising practices and policies under the title.

A. The use of words, phrases, sentences and visual aids which have a discriminatory effect. The following words, phrases, symbols, and forms typify those most often used in residential real estate advertising to convey either overt or tacit discriminatory intent. Their use should therefore be avoided to convey either overt or tacit discriminatory intent. Their use should therefore be avoided in order to eliminate their discriminatory effect. In considering a complaint under title VIII, the Assistant Secretary will normally consider the use of these and comparable words, phrases, symbols, and forms to indicate possible violation of the title and to establish a need for seeking resolution of the complaint, if it is apparent from the context of the usage that discrimination within the meaning of the Title is likely to result.

result.

1. Words descriptive of dwelling, landlord, and tenant. White private home, Colored home, Jewish home.

2. Words indicative of race, color, religion, or national origin. Negro, Hispano, Mexican, Indian, Oriental, Black, White, WASP, Hebrew, Irish, Italian, European, etc.

3. Catch words. Restricted, ghetto, disadvantaged. Also, words such as private, Integrated, traditional, "board approval" or "membership approved" if used in a discriminatory context.

4. Symbols or legotypes. Symbols or logotypes which imply or suggest race, color, re-

4. Symbols or logotypes. Symbols or logotypes which imply or suggest race, color, religion, or national origin.

5. Colloquialisms. Locally accepted words or phrases which imply or suggest race, color, religion, or national origin.

6. Directions to the real estate for sale or rent (use of maps or written instructions). References to real estate location made in terms of racially or ethnically significant landmarks such as an existing Black de-

velopment (signal to Blacks) or an existing development known for its exclusion of midevelopment known for its exclusion of mi-norities (signal to Whites). Specific direc-tions given from a racially or ethnically

tions given from a racially or ethnically significant area.

7. Area (location) description. Use of religious, ethnic, or racial facilities to describe an area, neighborhood, or location.

B. Selective use of advertising media or content with discriminatory effect. The selective use of advertising in various media and with respect to various housing developments or sites can lead to discriminatory results and may indicate a violation of title sults and may indicate a violation of title

1. Selective geographic impact. Such selective use may involve the strategic placement of billboards, brochure advertisements distributed within a limited geographic area by hand or in the mail, or advertising in parby hand or in the mail, or advertising in particular geographic coverage editions of major metropolitan newspapers, or in local newspapers which are mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular segment of the community, or in displays or announcements only in selected sales offices.

2. Selective use of equal opportunity slogan or logo. Such selective use may involve using the equal opportunity slogan or logo in advertising reaci. g some geographic areas, but not others, or with respect to some properties b not others.

3. Selective use o numan models. Such selective advertising may also involve the use of human models primarily in media that cater to one ractal or ethnic segment of the population that is not balanced by a com-

population that is not balanced by a com-

- plementary advertising campaign that is directed at other groups, or the use by a developer of racially mixed models to advertise one of the developments and not others.

  C. Policy and practices guidelines. The following guidelines are offered as suggested methods of assuring equal opportunity in real estate advertising:

  1. Guidelines for use of logotype, statement, or slogan. All advertising of residential real estate for sale or rent can contain an Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement or slogan as a means of educating the homeseeking public that the property is available to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin. Table 1 (see appendix) indicates surgested sizes for the use of the logotype. In all space advertising which is less than 4 column inches of a page in size, the Equal Housing Opportunity slogan should be used. The advertisement may be grouped with other advertisements under a caption which states that the housing is available to all without regard to race, color, religion or hatlonal origin, Alternatively, 3-5 percent of the advertisement copy may be devoted to a statement of the equal housing opportunity policy of the owner or agent. Table 2 (see appendix) contains copies of the suggested Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement and slogan.

  2. Guidelines for use of human models. Human models in photographs, drawings, or other graphic techniques may be used to indicate racial inclusiveness. If models are used in display advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as reasonably representing both majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area. Models if used, should indicate to the general public that the housing is open to all without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one such group.

  3. Guidelines for notification of Fair Housing Policy. (a) Employees. All publishers of advertisements, advertising agencies, and firms engaged in the sale or rental of real
- 3. Guidelines for notification of Fair Housing Policy. (a) Employees. All publishers of advertisements, advertising agencies, and firms engaged in the sale or rental of real estate should provide a printed copy of their nondiscriminatory policy to each employee and officer.
- (b) Clients. All publishers of advertisements and advertising agencies should post a copy of their nondiscrimination policy in a conspicuous place wherever persons come to place advertising and should have copies available for all firms and persons using their advertising services. their advertising services.
- (c) Publisher's notice. All publishers are encouraged to publish at the beginning of the real estate advertising section a notice such as that appearing in Table 3 (see appendix).

Effective date. This statement of policy shall be effective May 1, 1972.

Samuel J. Simmons,
Assistant Secretary
for Equal Opportunity.

The following three tables may serve as a guide for the use of the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement, slogan, and publisher's notice for display advertising:

#### TABLE I

A simple formula can guide the real estate advertiser in using the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan. If other logotypes are used in the advertisement, then the Equal Housing Opportunity logotype should be of a size equal to the largest of the other logotypes; if no other logotypes are used, then the following guidelines can be used. In all instances, the type should be bold display face and no smaller than 8 points.

	Size of
Approximate size of	Logotype
advertisement	in inches
½ page or larger  ½ page up to ½ page  4 column inches to ½ page  Less than 4 column inches.	2 z 2. 1 x 1. 1/2 x ½. (1).
Do not use.	

TABLE II.-ILLUSTRATIONS OF LOGOTYPE, STATEMENT, AND SLOGAN

Equal Housing Opportunity logotype.



#### **EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY**

Equal Housing Opportunity statement:
We are pledged to the letter and spirit of U.S. policy for the achievement of equal housing opportunity throughout the Nation. We encourage and support an affirmative advertising and marketing program in which there are no barriers to obtaining housing because of race, color, religion or national origin.

Equal Housing Opportunity

Equal Housing Opportunity slogan: "Equal Housing Opportunity."

TABLE III-ILLUSTRATION OF PUBLISHER'S NOTICE

Publisher's notice:

All real estate advertised in this newspaper is subject to the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 which makes it lilegal to advertise "any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national

origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination."

This newspaper will not knowingly accept any advertising for real estate which is in violation of the law. Our readers are hereby informed that all dwellings advertised in this newspaper are available on an equal opportunity basis.

[FR Doc.72-4983 Filed 3-31-72;8:45 g. .1]

#### APPENDIX C

### TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.

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APPENDIX D

### APPLICATIONS FOR TENANCY AT APARTMENTS

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two or more single persons are applying for one apartment, please so indicate.

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# 730 1529 U.S.A. VS. FRED C. TRUMP, INC, ET AL

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10/15/73 Complaint filed. Summons	issued.	1	JS:
10-20-73 Summons returned & filed/e	xecuted.	2	
11/0/73 Notice of Appearance for d		3	
By NEAHER, J Order dated			
the defts to answer to 11/		4	
11-15-73Pltff's first_interrogatori		5	
11-26-73 By NEAHER, J Order dtd 13			
complaint to 12-3-73 filed.	,	6	
12/8/73 By NEAHER, J Order dated	11/30/73 filed extending time		
for the defts to answer to	12/10/73	7	
12-12-73 Notice of motion ret 1-11-	74 for an order dismissing the		
complaint & memorandum of	law in support of motion filed.	8/9	
12-12-73 Counterclaim filed.		10	
1-0-74 Notice of motion and memora	andum of law to dismiss defts!		
counterclaim, ret 1-11-74 a	at 10 A.M. filed.	11/12	
	memo of U.S. in opposition to		
motion to dismiss filed.		13	
1-8-74 Memorandum of U.S. in respon	nse to affidavits of Donald Trump &		
Roy Cohn filed.		14	
111/7A Defore HEAMER, J. Case cal	led Adjd to 1/25/74		
1/16/74 By NEAHER, J Order dated		n	
to dismiss is adjd to 1/25	5/74	15	-
1-22-74 Defts' reply memorandum of I	law in support of motion to dismiss		
counterclaim filed.		16	
1-24-74 Notice of motion to compel	defts to answer nltff's interrogat-		
	A.M. and memorandum of law filed.		
1-25-74 Before NEAHER, J - Case call			
miss complaint & countercla	im. Motions argued Defts' motion		
	ted. Deft has 2 weeks to prepare		
	e submitted. Pltff's motion to dis-		
miss defts' counterclaim gra	anted. Order to be submitted.		
2/6/74 By NEAHER, J Order dated	2/5/74 filed that the deft's motion		
	ne complaint is denied, etc.(see		
order)		19	
2-8-74 Deft's answer to complaint	for injunction filed.	20	
C-S-74 Defts! first demand for int		21	
2-23-74 Stenographer's transcript dt		22	
	(cont'd)		

73 C 1529
CIVIL DOCKET U.S.A. VS.

U.S.A. VS. FRED C. TRUMP, et al

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Mrs. Dorothy Chojecki Manager Eastern Transcription Service Lower Concourse Roosevelt Field Shopping Center Garden City, New York 11530

Re: Transcription of tapes in the case of United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Mrs. Chojecki:

Enclosed Perein please find tapes recorded on May 3, 1974, together with letter dated June 17, 1974, from Henry A. Brachtl, Esq., Assistant U. S. Attorney, which letter is self-explanatory.

Kindly send the original and one copy of the transcript of the recording to this office together with the enclosed tapes.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation in this matter.

Very truly yours,

VINCENT A. CATOGGIO United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York

Encls.

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June 17, 1974

Mrs. Dorothy Chojecki Manager Eastern Transcription Service Lower Concourse Roosevelt Field Shopping Center Garden City, New York 11530

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y., Civil Action
No. 73 C 1529
Date of Hearing - May 3, 1974
Before - Magistrate Vincent Catoggio

Dear Mrs. Chojecki:

We would appreciate your causing the electronic recording of the testimony in the above-mentioned proceeding to be stenographically transcribed. This Office, of course, will assume the expense of the transcript for one copy at the prevailing rate plus the original which must be filed with the office of the United States Magistrates.

Our need for the transcript is pressing, and we would appreciate your efforts to expedite completion and delivery.

Very truly yours,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney

By:

HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant U. S. Attorney

Copy:

Hon. Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 OCTOBER 24, 1974

Before:

NEAHER, J.

AT 10:00 A.M.

CIVIL MOTION

73 C 1529 U.S.A.

-vs-

FRED C. TRUMP, ET AL

APPLICATION OF THE U.S. THAT DEFTS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS BE HEARD, DENIED WITH PREJUDICE & STRICKEN AFTER HEARING.

### APPEARANCES:

DAVID G. TRAGER, U.S. ATTY. BY: H.A. BRACHTL, AUSA.

FOR DEFTS

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)
Plaintiff,	) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 73 C 1529 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,  Defendants.	) } }
WASHINGTON )  DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )	IDAVIT

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am an attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and one of the counsel for the United States in the above-styled action. I am a member of the bar of the State of Pennsylvania. I make this affidavit in response to defendants' motion and supporting papers which accuse me of threatening prospective witnesses and of other improper conduct in the discharge of my responsibilities in this case.
- 2. I have read the affidavits of Carol R. Falcone and Thomas Miranda and the signed statements of Paul and Paula Ziselman. While I interviewed each of these individuals to determine if they had information pertinent to this case, I did not do any of the unlawful or improper things alleged

in their statements, and, on the contrary, interviewed each in a fair and objective way to ascertain the facts. While a complete response to the statements of these individuals must await the hearing on the pending motion I think it important to immediately respond at least briefly, to the principal allegations, and I do so as follows:

- (a) I never harassed Ms. Falcone, nor did I threaten her with perjury, jail, or with anything else. I did not accuse her of any misconduct with regard to her business or money, or of dating Donald Trump, and have no information about these matters. In fact, I made no accusations at all. I did not tell Ms. Falcone that any phones were tapped, or that she was guilty, and in fact, I have no knowledge of any tapped phones and I am sure that the Civil Rights Division does not tap phones or cause them to be tapped. I did not act in a hostile manner towards her. In fact, the interview appeared to me friendly on both sides at all times.
- (b) I never harassed Mr. Miranda, and I never called upon him "to go against Trump Management" by lying. On the contrary, I asked him to tell the truth. I did not tell him that unless he cooperated he would be thrown in jail, nor did I discuss my "ambitions" or winning my case. I did not persecute him, nor did I make "unyielding" threats or any other kind. While Mr. Miranda was reluctant to relate the facts because he expressed fear that Mr. Fred Trump would destroy him, or words to that effect, he described to me some racially discriminatory housing

- 2 -

practices in which defendants have engaged. Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories filed in the case of <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.</u>, and sworn to by Elyse Goldweber, previous counsel for plaintiff in this suit, discloses that Mr. Miranda had also provided information about discriminatory practices before I was assigned to the case. My interview with Mr. Miranda seemed to me to be friendly on both sides.

(c) I did not threaten or intimidate Mr. Ziselman, and the contents of his affidavit suggest that there must have been a misunderstanding. Prior to my interview with Mr. Ziselman, the Department of Justice had, in accordance with our normal practice, requested the FBI to interview a number of former Trump employees. Mr. Ziselman was one of them. When I was interviewing Mr. Ziselman, I mentioned that a request had been made for the FBI to contact him, but I told him that I would try and contact the FBI in time to have the agents cancel their interview with him, since it was now unnecessary. After I had completed my interview with Mr. Ziselman, I interviewed a prospective witness for plaintiff who provided details as to a rental transaction with Mr. Ziselman which differed from Mr. Ziselman's account. Accordingly, I telephoned Mr. Ziselman and asked him if he would permit me to see him again for a short time since there were now a few more matters I wished to discuss with him. He refused my request and stated that he considered it to be harassment. I responded that

- 3 -

I was sorry he felt that way, since it was not intended to be harassment.

- (d) Mr. Manley's letter of June 13, 1974, and Mr. Cohn's affidavit completely distort the facts leading up to the records inspection in June 1974. Mr. Cohn was not present at the Trump office and has no direct information as to these events, a fact omitted from his affidavit. The facts with respect to this incident are described in detail in Appendix C to plaintiff's Report on Discovery, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
- In conclusion, I wish to state that the attacks in defendants' papers on my conduct and integrity as an attorney are entirely without foundation. I hope that the matter can be disposed of at the earliest practicable date.

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Sworn to before me this 2nd day of August, 1974.

My commission expires: January 31, 1917

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
v.	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	)	
Defendants.	) )	

### AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEW YORK )

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

- I, ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER, being duly sworn do depose and say that:
- 1. I am presently employed as an examining attorney with the New York City Department of Investigation located at 111 John Street, New York, New York.
- 2. I was formerly employed as an attorney with the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. from September 19, 1972 until May 24, 1974.
- 3. While employed by the Department of Justice, I participated in the preparation and the pre-trial stage of <u>United</u>

  States v. Fred Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 (EN).
- 4. Prior to the institution of the above-mentioned lawsuit, I interviewed Mr. Thomas Miranda who was formerly

employed by Trump Management, Inc. as a superintendent at Kendall Hall Apartments, 41-10 Bowne Street, Flushing, New York. The purpose of this interview was to determine what, if anything, Mr. Miranda knew about discriminatory practices on the part of Trump Management, Inc. 5. Mr. Miranda related to me that Mr. Hyman, Mrs. Williams & a woman called Sophie whose name he did not recall, all of Trump Management, Inc. had instructed him to attach a separate sheet of paper to all applications received from prospective black apartment seekers and that he was to write a big "C" on such attachment so as to indicate to Trump Management, Inc. that the application being considered was from a "colored" person. Furthermore, Mr. Miranda stated to me that he did this every time a black person applied for an apartment. 6. Mr. Miranda also stated to me during this interview that he was afraid that the Trumps would have him "knocked off", or words to that effect, because he told me about their allegedly discriminatory practices. He was reluctant to have his name disclosed. After this interview, which was in all respects friendly, I had no further personal contact with Mr. Miranda. When it became necessary to disclose his identity, I sent a letter in the form attached hereto to him and to the other - 2 -

persons who had provided information about Trump Management,
Inc. The letter was run off on an MTST machine, and while
in accordance with Justice Department practice, only one
sample copy was retained (the one addressed to Phyllis
Kirschenbaum), Justice Department records disclose that an
identical letter was sent to Mr. Miranda and fourteen others.

Elyse S. Holdwelier ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this feet day of August, 1974.

NOTARY PURITC

My commission expires:

EVELYN SOMMER
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24.4502158
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 19

00P:PUS:USS:00k:cr UJ 175-52-28

> Rs. Phyllis Rindmenbaum 1833 Riean Barnuny Brooklyn, New York 11223

> > Ro: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Honogoment, Inc.

Dear Ms. Kirschenbaum:

I am sure that you recember that, during the last few roaths, I spoke with you about your experiences with Trume danagement, Inc. dased on the information you and many other people cave us, the Department of Justice recently filed a lawseit in the federal court in Brooklyn alleging that Fred C. Trump, Denald Trump and Trump danagement, Inc., have violated the Fair Housing Act by engaging in recial discrimination. You may have heard about the court suit already.

In a court suit like this, the persons and the company which are charged with having broken the law have a right to find out the names of the people whom they are charged with discriminating against. Accordingly, if the defendants so request, your name will have to be furnished to them in accordance with court rules.

It may be that the lawyers representing the Trumps will want to interview you. The main thing is that you have nothing to worry about. If you wish to talk to them, you have a right to do so. If you do not wish to talk to them, you have a right not to.

cc: Records
Chrono
Goldweber
Trial File
Kosack-Hold
Reichard-Hold

you be testify at a charaction, I where you would be under eath or a court remember would be not eath or a court remember would be prosent at such a deposition, and what you say caused by risunderstood since it is seen down by the court reporter word for word. If you would prefer to be interviewed in this way (at a described to interview of the angledy who cours to interview gou at your home or place of work.

It may be that a larger or a person representing the Trumps will want you to sign a statement. You have a right to sign one or not to sign one, as you wish. It is often advisable, however, to obtain a lawyer's help before agreeing to sign a statement, because if, you do sign it, then the Trumps can use it in the court case in the event you testify later. You might be well advised to hold any statement that anyone asks you to sign in your possession for a few days so that you can think about it sell recall all the events that took place. Then, if you decide to sign it, you can at least be sure that you have had a chance to remember everything. Also, if you over do sign a statement, make sure you get to keep a copy for yourself.

If someone representing the Truess does contact you. I would very such appreciate your letting me know right away. Please call to (sollect) at (202) 739-4152. If I am unavailable when you call, I will return your phone call as soon as possible. It is very important that you keep me informed about this.

Pinally, let me repeat that you have nothing to worry about. You do not have to talk to anyone or sign

any statement. If you do talk to openess or sign a statement, I be one you will just tell the truth.

Sincerely,

J. BYAGGEY POSTINGER
Assistant Obtorney General
Civil Figure Division

1

By:

Attorney
Housing Section

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
V.	)	/3 C 1329 (EN)
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	)	
Defendants.	)	

### AFFIDAVIT

WASHINGTON			)	
			)	SS
DISTRICT	OF	COLUMBIA	)	

FRANK E. SCHWELB, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil
  Rights Division, Department of Justice and in supervisory charge
  of the above-styled litigation on behalf of the United States.

  I make this affidavit in support of our request that an Order be
  entered herein directing expedited discovery and designating
  an officer of this Court to supervise depositions with respect
  to defendants' motion to hold one of plaintiff's attorneys in
  contempt and for a cease and desist order against the United
  States.
- 2. On or about July 26, 1974, defendants filed with this Court a Notice of Motion praying that Donna Goldstein, one of plaintiff's counsel in this action, be adjudged in contempt of this Court for alleged coercion and threats against

prospective witnesses, and that the United States be ordered to cease and desist from such alleged unlawful conduct. Notice of Motion is purportedly supported by the affidavits of Carol R. Falcone and Thomas Miranda, former employees of defendants, and by the signed but unsworn statements of two former employees, Paul and Paula Ziselman. Also attached to the motion is an affidavit by Roy Cohn, one of defendants' counsel, which purports to describe a number of events at which he was not present and which did not occur in the manner described by him. The papers filed on behalf of defendant call into question the professional conduct and reputation of Donna F. Goldstein, an attorney on the staff of this Section, with whom I am well acquainted and whom I know to have an excellent reputation, both with respect to her legal ethics and in relation to her professional competence. I am satisfied that the allegations of improper conduct against her are without foundation and therefore constitute an abuse of the processes of this Court.

- 3. In view of the nature of the allegations against Ms. Goldstein, the United States requests that the matter be expeditiously handled in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614 so that the factual issues may be resolved and Ms. Goldstein's reputation cleared. We further ask that the evidentiary hearing be held on August 16, 1974 as scheduled.
- 4. In order to assure that no "surprise" witnesses be called by defendant to further attack Ms. Goldstein's reputation,

- 2 -

plaintiff has propounded brief interrogatories to defendants inquiring into the identity and prospective testimony of all witnesses to alleged misconduct by agents of the United States. Adequate preparation for the hearing will not be possible unless this information is disclosed to the United States in time to take the depositions of possible witnesses in advance of the hearing. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Roy Cohn states that defendants have attached the statements of only "some" former employees as to whom Ms. Goldstein is alleged to have acted improperly, which suggests that there are supposed to be others. Accordingly, we ask that the defendants be required to answer these interrogatories within five days, unless defendants voluntarily disclose this information to plaintiff earlier.

5. The essential thrust of defendants' allegations on this motion is that Ms. Goldstein used threats and other unfair tactics in an attempt to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses. The position of the United States is that the allegations of misconduct on Ms. Goldstein's part are false and scurrilous. In order to resolve this issue, it is essential that the testimony of all witnesses, both on deposition and at the hearing, be free of threats, undue influence, or other interference from the parties or from their counsel, and that each party's right to examine and cross-examine witnesses without interruption or disruption be fully protected.

- 3 -

6. The most effective means to assure the orderly conduct of these depositions is to have them supervised by an officer of the Court. At least one of the witnesses to be deposed -- Mr. Miranda -- has expressed fear of reprisal from defendants on two separate occasions, to attorneys for plaintiff -- once to Elyse Goldweber and once to Donna Goldstein, as reflected in their respective affidavits. At a hearing on May 3, 1974, Honorable Vincent Catoggio, United States Magistrate, reprimanded counsel for defendants for failing to carry out their responsibilities relating to discovery and to expedite the action. Accordingly, the most effective means to assure the orderly conduct of these depositions is to have them supervised by an officer of this Court.

WHEREFORE I respectfully request on behalf of the United States that an Order to Show Cause be entered herein as prayed for. No previous application has been made for the relief here requested.

FRANK E. SCHWELB

Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

Frank E. Schwell

Washington, D. C. 2053

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  $\mathcal{A}$  day of August, 1974.

Valerie Prether NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires: January 31, 1977

ce aile

JDP:HAB:sm F.#730959

### BY HAND

June 14, 1974

Saxe Bacon Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Attention: Scott Manley, Esq.

United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Sirs:

We have your letter of June 14, 1974.

Your description and characterization of the conduct of Government counsel at defendants' office on June 12, 1974, is false.

Your statement that Attorney Goldstein agreed to production of defendants' documents at your offices instead of defendants' office is also false.

We are considering an appropriate response.

Very truly yours,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney

By:

HENRY A BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney

J. STANLEY POTTINGER Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division Department of Justice

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN, Attorney Housing Section

Saxe Bacon Bolan & Manley, Esqs.

June 14, 1974

Copy to:

The Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 (BY HAND)

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 13 C 1529 JOHN GODFREY SAXE (909-1953) (212) 472 - 1400 THOMAS A. BOLAN ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) COUNSEL ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN June 13, 1974 BY HAND Henry A. Bracthl, Assistant U.S. Attorney Donna F. Goldstein, Attorney-Civil Rights Division United States Department of Justice Federal Building Brooklyn, New York Dear Mr. Bracthl: I am in receipt of your letter dated today which was waiting for me at my office upon my return from the Cohen v. Cohen trial this afternoon at 5:00 p.m. We stand ready to let you begin inspecting and copying records in U.S.A. v. Trump tomorrow morning, June 14, as per my agreement with Miss Goldstein reached over the telephone on Wednes-While I regret the misunderstanding that led to your descending upon the Trump offices with five stormtroopers Wednesday morning banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all of the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine, I do not feel that there is any point is carrying the argument any fur-I would assume that your objective is the same as ours in this matter, namely, proceeding orderly with pre-trial discovery so as to enable both sides to continue preparing for a fair trial in this matter. Toward that end, we look forward to cooperating with you Friday morning at our offices. Miss Goldstein and I agreed that the inspection would take place at my offices instead of Trump so as to not have to unnecessarily totally disrupt the Trump necessary business rou-I would assume that by your demand in your letter to inspect the materials at Trump offices that Miss Goldstein neglected to inform you of our oral agreement to the contrary. We are ready to provide you with over 1,000 files Friday on both old and current tenants of Trump. Because Trump cannot

function at all with all of its current leases and files out of its offices, we will have to work out a schedule whereby as soon as you have completed inspecting and copying this very substantial amount of material that this material will be returned to the Trump office and additional material will be sent to our offices for your inspection.

With regard to the depositions of further Trump personnel tenatively scheduled to begin on June 18, I already have advised the Government that this date is impossible as both Mr. Cohn and myself will still be on trial before Justice Gomez in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Cohen v. Cohen and Judge Gomez absolutely refuses to hear any application for even a half-day adjournment in that case. I will supply you with alternate dates as quickly as possible and I am sure we can come to an agreeable solution which will neither delay the matter unnecessarily for you nor prejudice the rights of the defendants by denying them the right to counsel in these proceedings. I would respectfully suggest that is completely unfair on your part to set forth ultimatums in the way of 3:00 deadlines to respond or else in view of the fact that you are completely aware of both Mr. Cohn and myself being on trial before Judge Gomez from 9:00 to 4:30 daily. are completely ready to cooperate in discovery; all we require is a little time in which to assemble matter in view of our extremely heavy present litigation schedule.

Finally, I sincerely wish that at least from this point forward, that we could attempt to cooperate better in all of these matters. If your goal is to expedite discovery and to prepare for a fair trial for both sides as is ours, I think that this end would be better served by cooperation and observation of the basic courtesies normally extended between private counsel in litigation instead of continual threats by the Government and its treating the rules of civil procedure as some kind of undeviating Bible which cannot bend its timetables for even a few hours to promote the ends of justice.

Very truly yours,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY By: Scott E. Manley

SEM/ap cc: Hon. Edward R. Neaher Unted States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> Honorable Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate United States Courthouse Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201

Saxe, Bacon & Bolan 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 THOMAS A. BOLAN JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) (212) 472-1400 ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) COUNSEL ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) DANIEL J. DRISCOLL September 11, 1975 MELVYN RUBIN MICHAEL ROSEN HAROLD L.SCHWARTZ Honorable Edward Neaher United States District Judge Federal Building Cadman Plaza Brooklyn, New York 11201 Re: Trump Decree Dear Judge Neaher: I am writing to Your Honor in response to a letter of Donna F. Goldstein, Esq., United States Department of Justice, the August 5, 1975 letter of Donna Goldstein in which Ms. Goldstein alleges that Trump Management is in violation of Real Property Law §236, which prohibits the failure to rent based on the fact that an applicant has children. Ms. Goldstein's presentation omits the crucial statutory word "solely." We submit that this section is in no way applicable to the instant proceeding, as the Consent Order entered into between the parties provides that rentals shall be pursuant to the policy which Trump Management had employed in the past, i.e., if there were children under the vacating occupancy, there could be children under the new lease. It is thus evident that no one is denied rental solely on the basis that they have children. In fact, this is what the statute provides - that it is a violation only if the sole reason that a prospective tenant is denied rental is that he has children. As a practical matter it is my understanding from discussions between Trump Management and this office that the only apartments in which this situation even arises are a few buildings located in the Jamaica Estates area of Queens. These buildings are not designed to accommodate the needs of young children, but rather older people who need peace and quiet and a greater amount of security than is usually found in buildings which are designed for the young.

· Saze, Bacon & Bolan

Honorable Edward Neaher September 11, 1975 Page Two

In this one area, children cannot be as happy with the facilities as in the over thousands of other units, and what Ms. Goldstein suggests would be unfair to them. With these few exceptions, the buildings under the control of Trump Management not only welcome rental to families with younger children, but, in fact, have specifically designed a majority of their complexes to meet the needs of minors.

Respectfully,

SAXE, BACON & BOLAN, P.C.

Roy M. Cohn J

sb

cc: Donna Goldstein, Esq.

Saxe, Bacon & Bolan NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 ROY M. COHN (212) 472-1400 COUNSEL CABLE: SAXUM August 11, 1975 Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge Cadman Plaza Brooklyn, New York Re: Trump Decree Dear Judge Neaher: The Trump organization has observed the terms of the decree, but the Civil Rights section has violated it in significant respect. We declined to execute the decree unless language in the Civil Rights Section proposal - Article IV, Section A (bottom of p. 77), which gave the Open Housing Center the unbridled right to redistribute vacancy lists all over the place - was deleted. We pointed up the administrative difficulties this would present, and after discussion before Your Honor, the language was deleted, and the vacancy list to go to Open Housing Center - period. Despite this, the Center has been mailing out the vacancy lists we have sent to them to other organizations, causing total confusion and extra work, as by the time the inquiry catches up with us, the list is usually obsolete. And what they are doing defeats the very purpose of the deletion. I am advised by Mr. Eskenazi of the Trump office that he has specifically asked Miss Parrish of the Center, and then Miss Goldstein to desist - and both have said they will not unless specifically directed to by Your Honor. Secondly, Miss Goldstein advises that Article V, No. 2 - p. 13 - which provides that Trump shall adhere to its past and existing practices with respect to two-bedroom apartments and number of occupants - is in her opinion "discriminating" and should not be observed.

• Caxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

Honorable Edward R. Neaher August 11, 1975 Page Two

This is to respectfully request Your Honor to set a hearing on these ex parte decisions by the Civil Rights Section for sometime in early September (I shall be abroad on business until Labor Day.).

Hoping Your Honor has a pleasant summer, I am

Respectfully,

Roy M. Cohy

sb

Laxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 THOMAS A. BOLAN (212) 472 - 1400 JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) COUNSEL ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN August 5, 1974 LORIN DUCKMAN Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 United States V. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 Dear Judge Neaher: I telephoned Mr. Brown of Your Honor's chambers following receipt of a call from Mr. Goldberg, one of the hoard of eager-beavers in the Civil Rights Division, who is working on the above entitled matter. Apparently, what Mr. Goldberg was trying to tell me was that he wished to take depositions in connection with the contempt motion concerning prosecution tactics which Your Honor made returnable for next week (August 16th). Having spent the first week of August suffering through government depositions of approximately 10 more Trump employees, I hardly look forward to another set of depositions relating to a motion which has not even been heard by Your Honor as yet. I would respectfully request that the entire matter, including what, if any, "pre-trial" should be had in connection with this motion be considered by Your Honor at one time on the already scheduled date of August 16th, at which time I shall, of course, be personally before the court.

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

We wish also to apply to Your Honor for an order setting some boundaries on the Civil Rights Division's discovery, which is proceeding at a pace that would suggest the facts are being explored now rather than prior to the following of the compliant. The purpose of concluding discovery at an early date would be the fixing of an early trial date by Your Honor so that the preference granted by Congress under this act may be fullfilled. The defendants who have protested and continue to protest their complete innocence, are most desirous of a prompt trial.

Respectfully yours,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY

By:

RMC:ap
BY HAND

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley

Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Page Two

We assume that the matter is now academic, and we have asked Judge Neaher to fix an early trial date in this matter.

Respectfully yours,

Roy M. Cohn

sb

cc: Mr. Donald Trump Donna Goldstein

Attorney, Housing Section

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff, )	CIVIL ACTION MO. 73 C 1529 (EN)
v. )	
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD  TRUMP and TRUMP MANAGEMENT,  INC.,	REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE COURT ON THE STATUS
Defendants. )	OF DISCOVERY

In accordance with the instructions of the Honorable Vincent Catoggio, United States Magistrate, plaintiff, United States of America, submits its report on the status of discovery in this action. On May 3, 1974, Magistrate Catoggio made reference to the obligation of defense counsel as well as the Court to expedite the action in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 3614, and rebuked defense counsel for not having done so.

### T DISCOVERY IN PROCESS : DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES

### A. Depositions

Prior to the hearing of May 3, 1974, plaintiff encountered substantial difficulties in taking any depositions because of defense counsel's continuous cancellations and rescheduling.

This activity resulted in a substantial waste of the time and resources of counsel for plaintiff, as described in detail in plaintiff's memorandum in support of its motion for sanctions, dated April 19, 1974, at pp. 4-6. Several notices of deposition were outstanding at the time of that hearing, but plaintiff agreed to postpone these until defendants had answered the interrogatories propounded to them in November of the previous year. Abbreviated and incomplete answers to these interrogatories were finally provided on May 16, 1974. (See pp. 10-13 infra). Thereafter, plaintiff attempted to reschedule depositions, as follows:

- 1. On May 28, 1974, Ms. Donna Goldstein, a new attorney for the plaintiff; replacing Ms. Elyse Goldweber, telephoned Mr. Scott Manley in order to advise him that the plaintiff was noticing depositions for June 18-20, 1974.\*/ In deference to Mr. Cohn's busy schedule, Mr. Manley was provided with an opportunity to propose alternative dates within the next few days.
- 2. Between May 28 and June 3, Ms. Goldstein telephoned
  Mr. Manley on at least three occasions to discuss the contemplated
  depositions. Mr. Manley proposed no alternative dates on the two

<sup>\*/</sup> These depositions were noticed on May 30, 1974.

occasions he was reached, and failed to call back in response to the message left on the third call.

- 3. On June 5, 1974, Ms. Goldstein sent a special delivery letter to Mr. Manley indicating that the government intended to proceed with the depositions as noticed, since no alternative dates had been offered.
- 4. On June 11, counsel for the plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Manley dated June 6 cancelling these depositions on the grounds that they conflicted with Mr. Cohn's schedule, but promised to suggest alternative dates the following week.\*/
- 5. Counsel for plaintiff periodically visited the offices of defense counsel between June 14 and June 28, 1974, as a part of the records inspection described below. On June 26, after an inquiry by counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Manley stated that firm dates for the taking of depositions would be provided no later than July 2, and that in no event would these dates be later than the third week in July.
- 6. Having heard nothing from defense counsel by July 3, Ms. Goldstein telephoned Mr. Manley and was told that he still could not provide firm dates for the scheduling of depositions.

<sup>\*/</sup> This letter included a list of those employees scheduled to depose who were no longer employed by the defendants. This information, which plaintiff had been attempting to secure for many months, was to be given to the plaintiff no later than May 13, 1974, at the direction of Magistrate Catoggio at the May 3 hearing.

Mr. Manley promised, however, to call back on July 8 with recommended dates.

- 7. Mr. Manley did not call back on July 8, or for that matter, thereafter. On July 9, plaintiff served notice on defense counsel of the scheduling of depositions of eleven agents of Trump Management for July 30 August 2, 1974.

  Subpoenas were served on each of the prospective deponents.
- 8. On July 26, 1974, Mr. Cohn, by telephone, advised Mr. Goldberg that the eleven scheduled depositions would have to be taken on July 30-31 only, since his schedule could not permit him to attend at any other time. Yielding to these time strictures, plaintiff took the depositions of eight agents on July 30 and 31, 1974. The first attempt to take these depositions had been made on March 19, 1974.

### B. Inspection of Defendants' Records

On May 6, 1974, plaintiff served and filed a Rule 34

Request for Production of Documents on defense counsel Roy Cohn.\*/

On May 15, 1974, Mr. Scott Manley, an associate of Mr. Cohn,

relephonically requested that plaintiff's former attorney Ms.

Elyse Goldweber forward to him a copy of the Request, saying that he knew nothing about it. This was done immediately.

<sup>\*/</sup> See Appendix A.

On May 28, 1974, during the course of one of their discussions about the scheduling of depositions, Ms. Goldstein reminded Mr. Manley of the proposed records inspection.

Mr. Manley again stated that he knew nothing about the proposed inspection, and requested that Ms. Goldstein forward him another copy of the Request, which she did on the same day.\*/

On at least two occasions between May 28 and June 3,
Ms. Goldstein telephonically reminded Mr. Manley that representatives of the plaintiff would travel to New York on June 12,
1974, to inspect records as noticed. At no time during these
conversations did Mr. Manley express any objection to the
inspection or indicate that the records would not be made
available at the designated time and place. Defendants also
filed no objection to the records inspection, nor did they
suggest any alternative site or date, or any limitation on what
the United States would be permitted to inspect.

On June 12, three attorneys for the United States and two law clerks arrived at 10:00 a.m. at the offices of Trump Management, 2611 West 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York, in accordance with the notice of records inspection. The Trump agents and employees present expressed surprise at their arrival.

<sup>★/</sup> See Appendix B.

Mr. Stuart Hyman, controller of Trump Management, asked Mr. Henry Brachtl, Assistant United States Attorney, into his office. The other attorneys, Norman Goldberg and Donna Goldstein, and the assistants Frank Phillips and Larry Rogers, law clerks at the United States Attorney's office, remained in the anteroom of the Trump offices. After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Mr. Hyman asked the remaining representatives of the United States into his office and stated that he had not been informed that a records inspection was scheduled. He further stated that be could not produce any records until he contacted defendants' counsel and that he had been unable to reach counsel. Ms. Goldstein placed a call to Mr. Manley from Mr. Hyman's office. Mr. Manley was not in and a message was left to have Mr. Manley contact Ms. Goldstein at the United States Attorney's office. Plaintiff's representatives then left the Trump Offices and returned to the United States Attorney's office. Contrary to the allegations in Mr. Roy Cohn's affidavit, there was no banging on doors, overreaching, or other improper conduct by any of the representatives of the United States. Mr. Cohn was not present at the Trump offices, nor were any calls placed to the United States Attorney's office by defendants or their counsel complaining about the conduct of representatives of the plaintiff.

On June 12, 1974, at approximately 11:30 a.m. Mr. Manley telephoned Ms. Goldstein at the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York and, for the first time, expressed his objections to Plaintiff's Request. He claimed that he had communicated these objections earlier. Ms. Goldstein informed him that no objections had been transmitted, either formally or informally, and that if defendants would not permit a records inspection to begin, as noticed, plaintiff would have no recourse but to apply to the Court once again for appropriate sanctions under Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After some negotiations between counsel, plaintiff was authorized to begin inspecting defendants' records on Friday, June 14, 1974, at the law offices of defense counsel.

When plaintiff's representatives arrived at these offices on the morning of June 14, Mr. Fanelli, a clerk to Mr. Manley, handed them a letter from Mr. Manley which characterized their conduct at the offices of Trump Management on June 12, as "descending upon the Trump offices with five stormtroopers . . . banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine." (See Letter of Mr. Manley dated June 13, 1974, a copy of which was sent to this Court.) Counsel for plaintiff responded by a brief letter of June 14 denying the veracity of these rhetorical flourishes.

From Thursday, June 13, 1974, until the completion of the records inspection, counsel for plaintiff communicated almost exclusively with Mr. Fanelli since neither Mr. Cohn nor Mr. Manley was then available. On Tuesday afternoon, June 18, 1974, after 2-1/2 days of records inspection, Mr. Fanelli informed counsel for the plaintiff that records would not be available for inspection on the following day, June 19. However, Mr. Fanelli did give assurances that records would be available on Thursday and Friday, June 20 and 21, beginning at 10:00 a.m.

On June 20, however, the records were not made available at 10:00 a.m., as agreed. At 11:30 a.m., Mr. Famelli informed plaintiff's counsel that the automobile carrying the records had broken down and that records would not be produced until 2:00 p.m.\*/
Records were inspected on Thursday afternoon, June 20, and Friday, June 21. On June 19 and 20 alone, plaintiff's two counsel from Washington lost a day and a half of their time for no purpose as a result of these cancellations.

<sup>\*/</sup> When the records arrived on Thursday afternoon, the driver of the automobile, Mr. Simon Wiss, recounted to plaintiff's counsel the many errands he had to run for Trump Management by auto that morning, and extolled the virtues and dependability of the automobile carrying the records.

On Friday, June 21, 1974, Mr. Fanelli indicated that additional records could not be available for inspection until Wednesday, June 26, 1974. Counsel for plaintiff returned to Washington, D. C. and travelled back to New York to complete the records inspection on June 26, 27, and 28, 1974. Thus, during a period of thirteen working days, records were made available for a little over seven days. Not only time but travel money could have been saved had these interruptions not occurred.

#### \* \* \* \*

We are reluctant to belabor the Court with the foregoing details. We believe, however, that while each item individually may be relatively minor, the total impact has been to waste a large amount of the time and money of counsel for the United States.

While it is petty harassment, it seems to us harassment none the less, quite out of keeping with Magistrate Catoggio's directions of May 3. Moreover, in view of the repeated efforts to deal with defense seemed about this records inspection, the allegations in defendants' papers that the United States tried to "by-pass" counsel are without foundation in fact.

### II. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF

### A. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories

Plaintiff's First Interrogatories to defendants were propounded on November, 1973, and were not answered or objected to for more than six months. On May 16, 1974, after two Orders of this Court directing defendants to answer the Interrogatories, defendants finally submitted their response. That submission consisted of slightly more than two pages.\*/ In response to at least three interrogatories, defendants indicated that responses would be forthcoming by the following week (letter from Scott Manley of May 16, 1974). Out more than ten weeks since that promise was made, plaintiff is still waiting for defendants to complete their answers. As noted below, the information defendants have failed to provide goes to the heart of the case.

While this memorandum is not intended to be a substitute for a renewed Rule 37 motion dealing with the deficiencies of defendants'

<sup>\*/</sup> The unusual brevity and incompleteness of these responses may be explained, in part, by the fact that on May 15, 1974, one day before the interrogatories were due, defendant Donald Trump called former Departmental attorney Goldweber and indicated that he had only recently heard about his obligation to answer the interrogatories and wanted to know if there were any penalties for filing untimely answers. Ms. Goldweber referred Mr. Trump to his counsel.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> See Appendix C.

responses to Interrogatories, and while we wish to reserve our right to file such a motion in the future, we believe that a brief examination of some of defendants' responses should be brought to the Court's attention.

Interrogatory 5, requests 16 items of basic information for each apartment complex owned or managed by defendants. The information sought includes a racial breakdown of the tenant force of each building. response, defendants referred to two documents which defendants claimed to have previously furnished to plaintiff. One of those documents had in fact been furnished to plaintiff. Plaintiff has no record of ever having received the other, which is purported to be a memorandum to Ms. Goldweber dated March 15, 1973. The document that was furnished to plaintiff merely contains a list of the Trump buildings and their superintendents as of October, 1972, almost two years ago. In eight months, defendants have surely had the time to write to their superintendents and to provide racial occupancy information in at least approximate form, particularly since Donald Trump characterized the racial makeup of Trump buildings

in an affidavit December 11, 1973, but they have made no attempt to do so. Statistical information of this kind is, of course, important in cases of this kind. See <u>United States</u> v. <u>Real Estate Development Corporation</u>, 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Defendants have an obligation to secure such information from their superintendents. <u>City of Philadelphia</u> v. <u>Westinghouse Electric Corp.</u>, 205 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

(b) In response to Interrogatory 7, which requests the name, address, race, job title, job location and dates of employment for each and every employee of Trump, the defendants attached Exhibit 1 to their Answers. That Exhibit, however, contains only the last name and first initial of black and Puerto Rican employees of the defendants - facts insufficient to locate them for interview - and none of the other requested information was provided.\*/

<sup>\*/</sup> Plaintiff has subsequently secured some of this information during the inspection of defendants' records. The identities of former employees, of course, constitute critical information. See <u>United States v. Youritan Construction Corp.</u>, 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Calif. 1973), and cases there cited, holding that proof of discriminatory instructions to employees meets the Attorney General's burden of proof.

The names of black tenants (Interrogatory 11), complaints about racial discrimination (Interrogatory 13) and the identities of tenants who secured apartments after complaining or threatening to complain about racial policies (Interrogatory 14) have never been provided by defendants.

## B. Failure to Produce Rejected Applications

In Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendants served on November 7, 1973, plaintiff first requested that defendants furnish certain information relating to rejected applicants. On March 28, 1974, defendant Donald Trump testified, on deposition, that there was no particular policy with respect to either retaining or destroying these records and that some of these records may still exist. (Dep. p. 33). Mr. Trump also stated that some of these records may also have been destroyed since the Interrogatories were propounded (Id., p. 99), so that defendants' capacity to answer those interrogatories calling for information as to rejected applicants was impaired, if not destroyed, by their own conduct. During the

taking of this deposition, Mr. Cohn did, however, provide a measure of assurance that his clients would preserve all relevant records, including those pertaining to rejected applicants. (Id., pp. 99-100).

During the June 1974 records inspection and after repeated requests for the production of rejected applications, plaintiff was provided with a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Stuart Hyman, comptroller of Trump Management, stating that "effective March 28, 1974" there were no rejected applications.\*/ Whatever the meaning of Hyman's memorandum, it taxes credulity to suggest that between March 28, 1974 - the day that the defendants are supposed to have stopped destroying these applications - and June 28, 1974, the defendants, who have 2500 - 3000 vacancies a year (Hyman Dep. p. 73) and who have repeatedly testified through their agents that applications are closely reviewed, have not rejected a single application.\*\*/

Defendants now go even further than Mr. Hyman's memorandum and claim that there have never been any rejected applications. Minerva Gilbert, office manager for the past seven years, who has the

<sup>\*/</sup> See Appendix D.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> On July 3, 1974, we sent a letter to Mr. Manley reiterating our concern that none of the rejected applications had been produced and requesting that the defendants furnish us with an explanation for the reproduction of these documents prior to this hearing but no explanation has been forthcoming.

responsibility for approving or rejecting applications, testified during the depositions taken on July 30 and 31 that she cannot recall ever having rejected a single application for tenancy.

Each of the six superintendents\*/ whose depositions were taken on July 30 and 31 likewise stated that even though they accepted applications from anyone, they have never had an application rejected by the main office. The six superintendents whose depositions were taken were also served with subpoenas directing them to bring certain documents including "records of the payment of deposits in the possession, custody or control of the deponent."

Only one superintendent produced these records (Raymond Travis), the others stating that no such records existed.

Mr. Travis, superintendent at Wedgewood Hall Apartments for the past five years, also produced a book of receipts which he described as having been supplied by the main office when he was first hired as superintendent. Mr. Travis tesitfied that he was instructed to give a receipt to each applicant when a deposit is submitted with the application. A number of these receipts are marked "refunded." While early in his deposition Mr. Travis stated that he has never had an application rejected, he later explained

<sup>\*/</sup> Mr. Skender Fici, Mr. Guido Lara, Mr. Walter Rohr, Mr. Daniel Borth, Mr. Joseph Zecher and Mr. Raymond Travis.

that "refunded" signifies applications which were rejected by Ms. Gilbert. In Mr. Travis' receipt book alome, which is used for an apartment complex of only approximately 94 units, there were at least six such "refunded" receipts since the date of service of plaintiff's interrogatories in November 1973 requesting such information. Accordingly, it is apparent that rejected applications exist but that information about them has not been made available to plaintiff.

### CONCLUSION

While some progress has been made in discovery following the hearing before Magistrate Catoggio, defendants remain in substantial noncompliance with their responsibilities in relation to discovery. Some of the noncompliance involves material critical to the disposition of this case, while other conduct has been of a harassing and disruptive nature. Even aside from the false and scurrilous charges assembled by defendants against one of plaintiff's counsel,\*/ there has been sufficient resistance to the orderly conduct of discovery to warrant consideration of a new motion

<sup>\*/</sup> On or about July 26, 1974, defendants noticed a motion for a contempt citation against Ms. Goldstein. While we generally avoid the argument by inflammatory rhetoric which has characterized defense counsel's submissions, we can only say that, for reasons set forth in our other papers filed herewith, these charges are utterly fantastic.

for sanctions after present discovery proceedings have been completed.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES PORTER
Assistant United States
Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

FRANK E. SCHWELB
Chief, Housing Section
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Frank E. Schwell

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN

Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 T. 5-6-74.

MAY 6 1974

JSP:FES:ESG:cmk DJ 175-52-28

> Roy M. Cohn, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan and Hanley 39 East 63th Street New York, New York 10021

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Roy:

Please find enclosed two copies of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

ce: Records
Chrono
Goldweber
Trial File
Hold

By:

ELYSE S. COLDWEBER
Attorney
Housing Section

T. 5/28/74 JSP:DG:mlp DJ:175-52-28

MAY 281974

Scott Manley, Esq. Saxe, Eacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

## Dear Mr. Manley:

In response to our telephone conversation of May 28, 1974, please find enclosed a copy of Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, scheduled to commence on June 12, 1974. Also, please note the attached proposed schedule for continuing depositions of the agents and employees of Trump Management, Inc. Formal notice will be forthcoming. These depositions had been previously scheduled for April 18 - April 22, 1974.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon to confirm the attached discovery schedule.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:


Cc: Records
Chrono
Ms. Goldstein
Trial File
Henry Brachtl

DONNA GOLDSTEIN Attorney Housing Section

PPENDIX C Laxe, Bacon, Bòlan & Stanley 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 (ZIZ) 472-1400 ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MAY 22 19/4 MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL May 16, 1974 CIVIL RIGHTS HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN Miss Donna Goldstein United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 Dear Miss Goldstein: Enclosed please find a copy of defendants' answers to plaintiff's interrogatories. It is my understanding from speaking with Miss Goldweber that you are taking her place on this case since she has left to work in New York. As you will note from our answers, most of the information requested by the Government in the interrogation tories already has been supplied in the five examinations before trial which you already have completed. We could not make specific reference to page numbers due to the fact that the transcripts have not been completed. You will note that there are three questions requiring detailed information from records, which Stuart Exman has been compiling and hopes to complete next week. We will supply you with this information as soon as Mr. Eman completes same. Very truly yours, SEM/ew Scott E. Manley cc: Hon. Vincent Catoggio

CC: Hon. Vincent Catoggio
United States Magistrate
Eastern District of New York
United States Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

EN



Tordong Some Line. Miewellelfrian Rejected applications Mad us rejected applications. Kovern the suchred hile Cores applications of purpositive throat whis Concelled out Most.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have on this date mailed copies of the following documents, postage prepaid, to:

Roy Cohn, Esquire 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

- 1. Response of the United States to Defendants' Motion of July 26, 1974
- 2. Supporting affidavits
- 3. Order to Show Cause (proposed)
- 4. Memorandum of the United States
- 5. Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendants
- 6. Report of the United States to the Court on the Status of Discovery

August 5, 1974

Counsel for Plaintiff

Laxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 THOMAS A. BOLAN (212) 472 -1400 JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) LIBERDOS ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL May 9, 1974 HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN Elyse Goldweber, Esq. Attorney, Housing Section U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 Dear Elyse: In connection with advertising by The Trump Organization, and its support of civil rights organizations, you might remember that Fred and Donald did not recall certain specifics at the time of their depositions. I am enclosing a letter from CORE concerning advertising and support from The Trump Organization in the past and would appreciate it if you would add it to the depositions. Sincerely, Roy M. Cohn Enclosure

Frank E. Schwelb

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Hon. Vincent A. Catoggio

# CORE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY

200 West 135th Street, New York, N.Y. 10030, -212 368-8104

April 30, 1974

Mr. Donald Trump
The Trump Organization
600 Avenue Z
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11223

Dear Mr. Trump:

I am writing you concerning our recent telephone conversation and most certainly wish to thank you for the interest of participation with National CORE in our salute to Hank Aaron.

It is only through the support of thoughtful and interested individuals such as you, as well as all segments of the industrial and commercial society of our country, that the Congress of Racial Equality can continue its efforts and pursuits as it has for many years.

Last year, The Trump Organization was represented in our national publication by purchasing 1/8 page advertisement in the amount of \$250.00. This year, we are requesting that The Trump Organization duplicate last year's representation.

Many thanks for your cooperation.

Clayton S. King

National Affairs Advisor

of file" Laxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 THOMAS A. BOLAN JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) (212) 472-1400 ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1982) COUNSEL ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN April 17, 1974 DANIEL J. DRISCOLL HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN Elyse S. Goldweber Attorney, Housing Section United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 JSP:ESG:eym DJ 175-52-28 United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529 Dear Elyse: I never knew you were such a hot-tempered white The reason for the doubt about the ability to go forward with the continuation of depositions which have already commenced, was because I had been directed to proceed to trial in another matter. As I have advised you, the whole thing is a tempest in a teapot, as the others trial is not going ahead for a week, and we can continue depositions on Tuesday, April 23, at 9:30. We will see you with Mr. Trump and the other witnesses next week. Sincerely, Roy M. Cohn cc Hon. Edward Neaher

## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530



Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number

JSP:FES:DFG:saf DJ 175-52-28

AUG 2 2 1975

The Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge Federal Court House 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 10023

Re: United States v. Trump Management, Inc.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

I am writing in reference to the Consent Order in the above-styled lawsuit. We are in receipt of Mr. Roy Cohn's letter to you of August 11, 1975, which states that the United States has violated the terms of the Consent Order, and requesting that a hearing be set. We have no objection to another hearing in this matter. In that regard, I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of a recent letter from this office to Mr. Cohn advising him that certain rental practices authorized by the Consent Order are in violation of State Law.

Thank you for your continued patience and consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

J. Stanley Pottinger Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

Bv:

Donna F. Goldstein

Attorney Housing Section



JSP:VKS:DFG:eaf DJ 175-52-28

AUG 22 1975

The Honorable Edward R. Nesher United States District Judge Federal Court House 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 10023

> Re: United States v. Trump Management, Inc. Civil Action No. 73 G 1529

## Dear Judge Nesher:

I am writing in reference to the Consent Order in the above-styled lawsuit. We are in receipt of Mr. Roy Gohn's letter to you of August 11, 1975, which states that the United States has violated the terms of the Consent Order, and requesting that a hearing be set. We have no objection to another hearing in this matter. In that regard, I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of a recent letter from this office to Mr. Gohn advising him that certain rental practices authorized by the Consent Order are in violation of State Law.

Thank you for your continued patience and consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

J. Stanley Pottinger Assistant Attorney General Givil Rights Division

By:

Denna F. Geldstein Attorney Housing Section

AUG 5 1975

JSP:FES: NO: saf DJ 175-52-28

> Roy M. Coha, Jag. Saxe, Com, Jolan & Miniley 39 E. Göth Street New York, New York

> > Pe: United State o. Trove fraggerent, Inc.

Dear Mr. Colm:

I am writing to a the Trump imagement's cooperation in expeding the lowest a fer in the above-styled levelet. As you may recall, at the histoing on imme 10, 1975, before Judge Mather, Mr. Fred C. druzp represented that part of his rental practices included a policy of only renting to applicants with children then the vacating tenants also had children, thereby not increasing the number of rental units in his buildings occupied by children. Judge Mather asked if such policies violated any state or city law. At that time, we were uncourse of any.

It has recently were to our attention that New York State Law (specifically location all of the Real Property Law) prohibits the failure to rent based on the fact that an applicant has children. Upon learning of this, I notified Feed C. Trusp of of the requirements of state law to seek his cooperation in voluntarily adjusting his rental practices. However, it appears that defendant's

<sup>\*/</sup> At a recent educational program for employees that I agreed to conduct.

rental policies with respect to children has not as yet been changed to conform to state law. We are aware of at least one instance where an applicant with children was informed that the could only qualify for an apartment where the vacating unnants also had children.

Accordingly, on are requesting that Trump Management agree to amending the Consent Order by the esclosed Supplemental Consent Order, so that all practices under the Decree conform to applicable law.

Thank you for your acopert ion in this matter. I look forward to bearing from you at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,

J. Stanley Pottinger Assistant Assocnay Conaral Ulvil Rights Division

By:

Donna F. Goldstein Actorney Housing Section

cc: Irving Askanazi Trump Management, Inc.

> Mr. George Zuglerusa Burcau Chief, 1117 York State Department of Law

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
Plaintiff, )	CIVIL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
v. )	
FRED C. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP ) AND TRUMP MANAGEMENT INC.,	PROPOSED ORDER
Defendants. )	

This matter is before the Court upon defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement. The pleading in question is the Complaint plaintiff filed under the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., alleging discrimination in housing. This matter is also before the Court upon plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim.

After careful consideration of these matters the Court concludes as follows:

1. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are deemed admitted and are to be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff would be unable to prove a set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 301 F. Supp. 538, 541 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The complaint alleges, in the language of the Act itself, that defendant has engaged in discriminatory practices, and is not subject to dismissal under this test.

- 2. With respect to the Motion for More Definite
  Statement, the plaintiff has provided sufficient notice to
  the defendants of the Government's claims to enable them to
  frame a responsive pleading. The Complaint, paraphrasing the
  language of the statute itself, meets the requirements of the
  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not subject to a motion
  for more definite statement. See, e.g. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Bob</u>
  <u>Lawrence Realty, Inc.</u>, 313 F. Supp. 870, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
  The Federal Rules provide ample opportunity for the defendants
  to discover the facts of plaintiff's case following joinder of
  issue.
- 3. Defendants' counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. No suit may be brought against the United States, as sovereign, without specific statutory consent, and the United States has not consented to suits of this nature.

  <u>United States</u> v. <u>Northside Realty Associates</u>, 324 F. Supp. 287

  (N.D. Ga. 1971). 42 U.S.C. 2680 bars suits against the United States for libel, slander, or abuse of process. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that (1) defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement be and they are hereby denied, and (2) defendants' counterclaim be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

\_\_\_\_\_\_, 1974

United States District Judge

Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, P. C.

39 EAST 68TH STREET JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953) (212) 472-1400 THOMAS A. BOLAN ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) COUNSEL CABLE: SAXUM ROY M. COHN STANLEY M. FRIEDMAN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL MICHAEL ROSEN JOHN F. LANG JAMES M. PECK ROY R. KULCSAR April 19, 1978 JEFFREY A. SHUMAN RONALD F. POEPPLEIN EDWARD H. HELLER LOUIS BIANCONE # \*ADMITTED IN NEW JERSEY ONLY Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 U.S. v. Trump Management, Inc. 73-C-1529 Dear Judge Neaher: This is to confirm that the scheduling of the status conference in the above-entitled action for May 9, 1978, at 9:30 a.m. is agreeable to counsel, and confirmed by Brian Heffernan of the U.S. Department of Justice. Respectfully yours, SAXE, BACON & BOLAN, P.C. Stanley M. Friedman sb cc: Brian Heffernan

Bay 508308



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number

DSD:BFH:mop DJ 175-52-28 1 9 APR 1979

Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

Re: United States v. Trump Management, Inc. Civil Action No. 73-C-1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

Homer LaRue of the United States Attorney's office has informed us that the Court proposes to reschedule the status conference in the captioned case for May 9, 1978 at 9:30 A.M. I have consulted with Mr. Friedman of Saxe, Bacon and Bolan, counsel for the defendant, and this is to advise you that May 9 is satisfactory to both parties.

We appreciate the Court's consideration and time in this matter.

Sincerely,

Drew S. Days, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

Brian F. Heffernan

Attorney

Housing and Credit Section

B e fo r e:

HONORABLE VINCENT A. CATOGGIO

AT 10:00 AM

United States Magistrate

## CIVIL MOTION

C 1529

U. S. A.

-vs-

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, ETC.

## PEARANCES:

For Pltff:

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Frank E. Schwell, Esq. Miss Goldweber

For Defts:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq. By: Scott Manley, Esq.

CASE CALLED - DELAYED 2 hrs DUE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY'S LATENESS - GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS PRESENT AS SCHEDULED -RESPECTIVE PARTIES HEARD - PROCEEDINGS RECORDED - TWO TAPES -MR. MANLEY AGREED THAT BY MAY 13, 1974 HE WILL NOTIFY THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS AS TO WHO IS STILL UNDER EMPLOY MENT WITH TRUMP MANAGEMENT CORP., AND BY MAY 16, 1974 HE WILL ANSWER INTERROGATORIES.

B e fo r e:

HONORABLE VINCENT A. CATOGGIO United States Magistrate

AT 10:00 AM

## CIVIL MOTION

3 C 1529

U. S. A.

-vs-

FRED C. TRUMP, et al.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, ETC.

## PPEARANCES:

For Pltff:

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Frank E. Schwell, Esq.

For Defts:

Roy M. Cohn, Esq.

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	<b>)</b>
Plaintiff,	) CIVEL ACTION NO. 73 C 1529
V .	<b>\( \)</b>
TRUMP MANAGEMENT, INC.,	) SUPPLEMENTAL ) CONSENT ORDER
Defendants.	) )

On the application of the Plaintiff, United States of America, and by consent of Defendant, Trump Management, Inc., it is hereby ordered that Part V (A)(2) of the Consent Order in this action filed in this Court on June 10, 1975, is hereby amended as follows:

## (2) Occupancy

Not more than two (2) persons in a one bedroom

apartment, nor more than four (4) persons, two (2)

adults and two (2) children of the same sex \*/

in a two bedroom apartment.

Solely on the yound that

No applicant shall be denied terancy because he or she has children so long as the number of persons to occupy

<sup>\*/</sup> Except that children under seven years of age may be of different sexes.

the rental unit, and the sexes	of the children conform
to the above occupancy standar	ds
ORDERED this d	ay of, 1975.
	Edward R. Neaher
The undersigned apply for and consent to the entry of this Order.	
For the Defendants	For the Plaintiff
ROY M. COHN Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 E. 68th Street New York, New York  FRED C. TRUMP	FRANK E. SCHWELB Chief, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530  DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN Attorney, Housing Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530
DONALD TRUMP	DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney by HENRY A. BRACHTL Assistant U.S. Attorney

JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1909-1953)
ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

ROY M. COUNT.

ROLAN & Macon (1919-1962)

ROLAN & GOLD (1919-1962)

ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962)

ROY M. COHN

SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA)
MICHAEL ROSEN

DANIEL J. DRISCOLL

HAROLD SCHWARTZ MELVYN RUBIN JEFFREY A. SHUMAN LORIN DUCKMAN THOMAS A. BOLAN

June 13, 1974

## BY HAND

Henry A. Bracthl, Assistant U.S. Attorney Donna F. Goldstein, Attorney-Civil Rights Division United States Department of Justice Federal Building Brooklyn, New York

Dear Mr. Bracthl:

I am in receipt of your letter dated today which was waiting for me at my office upon my return from the Cohen v. Cohen trial this afternoon at 5:00 p.m.

We stand ready to let you begin inspecting and copying records in U.S.A. v. Trump tomorrow morning, June 14, as per my agreement with Miss Goldstein reached over the telephone on Wednesday. While I regret the misunderstanding that led to your descending upon the Trump offices with five stormtroopers Wednesday morning banging on the doors and demanding to be allowed to swarm haphazardly through all of the Trump files and to totally disrupt their daily business routine, I do not feel that there is any point is carrying the argument any further. I would assume that your objective is the same as ours in this matter, namely, proceeding orderly with pre-trial discovery so as to enable both sides to continue preparing for a fair trial in this matter. Toward that end, we look forward to cooperating with you Friday morning at our offices.

Miss Goldstein and I agreed that the inspection would take place at my offices instead of Trump so as to not have to unnecessarily totally disrupt the Trump necessary business routine. I would assume that by your demand in your letter to inspect the materials at Trump offices that Miss Goldstein neglected to inform you of our oral agreement to the contrary.

We are ready to provide you with over 1,000 files Friday on both old and current tenants of Trump. Because Trump cannot

function at all with all of its current leases and files out of its offices, we will have to work out a schedule whereby as soon as you have completed inspecting and copying this very substantial amount of material that this material will be returned to the Trump office and additional material will be sent to our offices for your inspection.

With regard to the depositions of further Trump personnel tenatively scheduled to begin on June 18, I already have advised the Government that this date is impossible as both Mr. Cohn and myself will still be on trial before Justice Gomez in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Cohen v. Cohen and Judge Gomez absolutely refuses to hear any application for even a half-day adjournment in that case. I will supply you with alternate dates as quickly as possible and I am sure we can come to an agreeable solution which will neither delay the matter unnecessarily for you nor prejudice the rights of the defendants by denying them the right to counsel in these proceedings. I would respectfully suggest that is completely unfair on your part to set forth ultimatums in the way of 3:00 deadlines to respond or else in view of the fact that you are completely aware of both Mr. Cohn and myself being on trial before Judge Gomez from 9:00 to 4:30 daily. We are completely ready to cooperate in discovery; all we require is a little time in which to assemble matter in view of our extremely heavy present litigation schedule.

Finally, I sincerely wish that at least from this point forward, that we could attempt to cooperate better in all of these matters. If your goal is to expedite discovery and to prepare for a fair trial for both sides as is ours, I think that this end would be better served by cooperation and observation of the basic courtesies normally extended between private counsel in litigation instead of continual threats by the Government and its treating the rules of civil procedure as some kind of undeviating Bible which cannot bend its timetables for even a few hours to promote the ends of justice.

Very truly yours,

SAXE, BACON, BOLAN & MANLEY

By: Scott E. Manley

SEM/ap cc: Hon. Edward R. Neaher Unted States District Judge United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> Honorable Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate United States Courthouse Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201

United States Department of Justice

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JDP:CIS:es File No. 730959

#### UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FEDERAL BUILDING BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11201 23C1577

BY HAND

August 6, 1974

Roy M. Cohn, Esq.
Messrs. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan
and Manley
39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Re: U. S. v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Mr. Cohn:

Enclosed herewith are the following documents:

- 1. Order to Show Cause, entered August 5, 1974,
- 2. Memorandum of the United States in Support of the Entry of an Order to Show Cause,
- 3. Response of United States to Defendant's Motion of July 26, 1974,
- 4. Affidavit of Frank E. Schwelb, dated August 2, 1974,
- Affidavit of Donna F. Goldstein, dated August 2, 1974,
- Affidavit of Elyse S. Goldweber with accompanying letter of November 5, 1973,
- 7. Plaintiff's Interrogatories to the Defendants, and
- 8. Report of the United States to the Court on the Status of Discovery.

Please note that the Order to Show Cause is returnable August 8, 1974, at 2:00 P.M.

Very truly yours,

DAVID G. TRAGER United States Attorney

By:

CARL I. STEWART
Assistant U. S. Attorney

Encls. a/s

cc:
The Honorable Edward R. Neaher
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
United States Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

Laxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley
39 EAST 68TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 THOMAS A. BOLAN JOHN GODFREY SAXE (909-1953) (212) 472 - 1400 COUNSEL ROGERS H. BACON (1919-1962) ROY M. COHN SCOTT E. MANLEY (ADMITTED ILLINOIS AND INDIANA) MICHAEL ROSEN DANIEL J. DRISCOLL May 15th, 1975 Hon. Edward R. Neaher United States District Court Eastern District U. S. Court House 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 Re: Trump Dear Judge Neaher:-Your Honor can surmise from the sixpage single space letter written to you by the Housing Section under date May 8, 1975, just how much bureaucratic knit-picking and time-wasting has characterized the process of agreeing on final language in the decree. I think what they're trying to say is that a meeting with Your Honor would be constructive, which is precisely what I had suggested to Miss Goldstein last week. Respectfully, RMC:at cc: Frank Schwelb, Chief Housing Section

JSP:FES:DFG:car DJ 175-52-28

> Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Magistrate, United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Catoggio:

We have just received a copy of Mr. Roy Cohn's September 5, 1974, letter to you in which he contends that our response to defendants' objections to plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents in the above-captioned case was so untimely as to render the issue "academic." While we hesitate to burden you with additional correspondence on this matter, we believe the letter raises issues requiring a short response.

On August 20, after being informed by the United States Attorney's office that Mr. Cohn had objected by letter to our request to inspect records in Norfolk, Virginia, we delivered a letter to you which advised that we intended to respond fully to these objections. You may recall that on September 3, I advised your Honor by telephone that I was on that date mailing, by special delivery, plaintiff's response. During that conversation, it was my impression that the matter remained open for determination.

Despite Mr. Cohn's assertion that the issue is now "academic," we believe that Plaintiff's outstanding Request for Production of Documents, noticed on August 13, 1974, remains active and survives the September first discovery

deadline. Indeed, if plaintiff's September third response is deemed to be untimely because it comes after the discovery deadline, defendants would succeed in defeating what would otherwise be permissible discovery by making informal objections at the eleventh hour.

Mr. Cohn also indicates that he has asked Judge Neaher to fix an early trial date. We have, as yet, received no notice from the defendants, either formal or informal, that they have requested that this case be put on the trial calendar. However, we will be contacting Judge Neaher to advise him that we believe there are certain matters remaining outstanding in this lawsuit which need to be settled before this action is set for trial. These include our request to inspect records in Norfolk, Virginia, and a forthcoming motion which we intend to file to have defendants' July 26 notice of Motion and supporting Affidavits, which seek to have plaintiff's counsel held in contempt of court, stricken from the record.

Respectfully yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

DONNA F. GOLDSTEIN
Attorney
Housing Section

cc: Honorable Edward R. Neaher
Roy M. Cohn, Esquire

JSP:FES:NG:car DJ 175-52-28

> Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Court Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> > Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Judge Neaher:

On September 11, 1974, we received a copy of a letter sent by Mr. Roy Cohn to Magistrate Catoggio in which he states that he has requested that the above-captioned suit be placed on the trial calendar. As our responding letter to Magistrate Catoggio (a copy of which is enclosed) indicates, we believe there are important matters remaining outstanding which need to be settled before this case is set for trial.

For example, defendants have made objections to plaintiff's August 13th Request for Production of Documents. The parties are now awaiting a determination by Magistrate Catoggio as to the permissibility of this requested discovery. Moreover, we intend, in the very near future, to file a motion to Strike defendants' July 26th Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavits which seek disciplinary action against plaintiff's counsel for alleged misconduct. As you may recall, on August 8, 1974, after the hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, the parties met with Judge Catoggio. At that time the defendants decided to withdraw their contempt motion from the calendar, but refused to agree to a full withdrawal with prejudice.

Plaintiff believes that allowing this motion to remain in its present state of limbo only serves to further cloud the issues in this lawsuit. It additionally unduly prejudices the reputation of one of plaintiff's counsel with charges which we are prepared to prove are totally without foundation.

The United States wants an early and expeditious trial in this case in keeping with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 3613. In fact, this lawsuit could have already been tried had it not been for the continued delays and dilatory tactics occasioned by the defendants and their counsel. However, we do not believe that with these outstanding issues still unresolved, this case is now ready to be set for trial. Therefore, we respectfully urge that this case not be placed on the trial calendar until the resolution of these open matters.

Respectfully yours,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

NORMAN P. GOLDBERG Attorney Housing Section

cc: The Honorable Vincent A. Catoggio Roy M. Cohn, Esquire

ct ple

JDP:HAB:ec F. #730959

BY HAND

April 16, 1974

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Attn: Roy M. Cohn, Esq.

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al.

U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y.

Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Sirs:

We are sorry to learn from your associate Jeffrey Schuman, Esq. that you will not honor your commitment to produce previously designated officers, agents and employees of defendants in the above action for depositions on April 17, 18, 19 and 22, 1974, notwithstanding your written stipulation, by Mr. Schuman, so ordered by the Court on April 1, 1974, and the oral representation of Mr. Cohn of your firm to Government counsel on March 29, 1974. To avoid obviously futile expenditure, we have cancelled our request for a stenographer to record the depositions on those dates.

We regret, too, that defendant has chosen to violate the Court's order of February 5, 1974 which ordered defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories on or before April 1, 1974.

We will, of course, apply for appropriate sanctions against defendants.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD JOHN BOYD V United States Attorney

By:

HENRY A. BRACHTL

Assistant U. S. Attorney

CC: The Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 JSP:FES:ESG:saf DJ 175-52-28

MAY 9 1974

Scott Manley, Esq. Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

> Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

Dear Mr. Manley:

I am writing to confirm our telephone conversations of May 9, 1974. During our conversations, you requested that the United States stipulate to granting the defendants a ten day extension of time to respond to our interrogatories of November 7, 1973.

Ordinarily we would consent to such a request, however, in light of the fact that there have been so many delays in the above-styled lawsuit; that we have previously made a Motion for Sanctions; and that on May 3, 1974, Judge Catoggio ordered the defendants to respond to our interrogatories on or before May 16, 1974, we decline to consent to an extension of time.

If you decide to move for leave of court for an extension of time, we would naturally want to be served with a copy of all the pertinent papers.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

ELYSE S. GOLDWEBER
Attorney
Housing Section

cc: Hon. Edward R. Neaher
United States District Court Judge
Eastern District of New York
United States Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

Hon. Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

ct file

JSP:FES:ESG:oaf DJ 175-52-28 MAY 9 1974

Scott Manley, Req. Same, Bacon, Bolen & Manley 39 Rest 68th Street How York, New York 10021

> No: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., Civil Africa No. 73 C 1529

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Ordinarily we would consent to such a request, however, in light of the fact that there have been so many delays in the above-styled lawsuit; that we have previously made a Motion for Sanctions; and that on May 3, 1974, Judge Catoggio ordered the defendants to respond to our interrogatories on or before May 16, 1974, we decline to consent to an extension of time.

If you decide to move for leave of court for an extension of time, we would naturally want to be served with a copy of all the pertinent papers.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

By:

Attorney
Housing Section

United States District Court Judge Eastern District of New York United States Courthouse 225 Gedman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

> Hon. Vincent Catoggio United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plana Kast Brooklyn, New York 11201

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Assistant U. S. Attorney Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

J. Stanley Pottinger, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Washington, D. C.

Att: Donna F. Goldetein, Esq. Attorney, Housing Section

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 East 68th Street New York, New York 10021

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

### Gentlemen:

In connection with the application to adjourn the pre-trial hearing on June 27, 1974, the reason the hearing was scheduled was because of the apparent inability of the attorneys to conduct pre-trials processes in the usual and normal way. This appraisal was to be justified by the tenor of letters exchanged including those of June 13 and June 14, 1974.

Sometime ago I read to counsel the statutory provision which requires that a suit such as this be given preferred attention. Before that time, at that time and since that time it seems that Mr. Trump's attorneys have had one case after another which took preference over the instant one.

### **UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11201

June 18, 1974

Henry A. Brachtl, Esq. Assistant U. S. Attorney Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201

Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, Esqs. 39 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Re: United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al. Civil Action No. 73 C 1529

#### Gentlemen:

A further conference in this case will be held before the undersigned on June 27, 1974 at 4:30 P. M. This meeting is made necessary by the tenor of your letter of June 13, 1974 and June 14, 1974. No excuse for non-attendance will be accepted and failure to appear will invite consideration of the imposition of sanctions.

Very truly yours,

VINCENT A. CATOGGIO

United States Magistrate Eastern District of New York

cc: Honorable Edward R. Neaher United States District Judge Eastern District of New York

100 Jedwood Place Valley Stream, L.I., N.Y. July 19th, 1974

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Paul & Ziselman hereby make the following true and correct statements of my own free will:

I was formerly employed by Trump Management on a parttime basis as a rental agent at Beach Haven Apartments, 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York. During my period of employment I personally never discriminated against any prospective tenants regardless of race, color or creed.

Additionally, I have never been instructed by any superior of the Trump Office, nor was it ever suggested or stated to me in any way, manner or form to follow a racially discriminatory rental policy while I was employed by this company. In fact, during such employment I rented many apartments to minorities, including blacks.

Despite the above mentioned, I was visited by a representative of the Justice Department who stated that an "FBI Agent" would be back to continue the interrogation. These statements were made in a threatening manner and I strongly resent and object to it. I was especially harassed and intimidated by a Donna Goldstein and in my opinion, her unethical conduct in itself should be a matter of investigation.

WITNESSED:

PAUL ZISELMAN IN



100 Jedwood Place Valley Stream, L.I., N.Y. July 19th, 1974

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Reside Ziselman hereby make the following statements of my own free will, which are true and correct.

I was formerly employed by Trump Management on a part-time basis as a rental agent at Beach Haven Apartments, 2611 W. 2nd Street, Brooklyn, New York. During my employment under no circumstances did I ever discriminate, nor was I ever told to discriminate by any superior of Trump Management against any person any superior of Trump Management against any person regardless of race, color or creed desiring the rental of an apartment.

PAULA ZIZELMIAN



Before Judge: BEI	4 27		/	Number:	529	•
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